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

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BROWNSON'S

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BROWNSON'S

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1850.

ART. I.—*Remarks on the Science of History; followed by an a priori Autobiography.* Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1849. 12mo. pp. 164.

THIS work appears without the author's name; but we presume we betray no confidence in saying that it is by a Unitarian minister, in whom, while he was pursuing his preparatory studies, we took a deep personal interest, and who was one of our most intimate and highly esteemed young friends. If we submit, in the course of the following remarks, some of its reasonings and speculations to a severe, this fact may assure the author that it is to no unfriendly, criticism.

The author inscribes his work to "Citoyen Pierre Leroux, Republican and Philosopher," and tells us that the materials requisite for its construction are to be found in the works of Jacob Boehme, Fabre d'Olivet, and P. J. B. Buchez; but this, though creditable to his independence and frankness, can hardly be regarded as a recommendation of his work itself. We have, it is true, never studied the writings of Jacob Boehme, but we have looked into them far enough to see that their author was a wild enthusiast, who mistook his own heated fancies for the illuminations of the Holy Ghost. Fabre d'Olivet we know only as cited by Leroux in his *L'Humanité*; but we hazard nothing in classing him with those profound scholars who draw their erudition from their theories, and then support their theories by it. Buchez, best known to our public as the first President of the French National Assembly, appears to be a man of moderate abilities and respectable attainments, a half disciple of Lamennais, and a visionary, who would conform

NEW SERIES. — VOL. IV. NO. I.

1

the Church to the spirit of the age, and make her on earth the Church Triumphant, by effecting an impossible amalgamation between Catholicity and modern pantheistic Socialism. All three are men with whom we have little sympathy, and the last from whose works we should expect materials suitable for a work to be composed and published by a professedly Christian minister.

Leroux is, unquestionably, a man of ability, endowed with no small portion of the philosophical spirit, and possessed of various and extensive, though ill-digested, erudition. He has been well characterized by M. Lerminier, in one of the French periodicals, — we cannot now recollect which, — as an author with “numerous notions on a variety of subjects, but acquired in a manner somewhat confused,” as having “more fervor of spirit than strength of mind, more impetuosity in the pursuit of ideas than power to master and translate them, and more boldness of imagination than solidity of judgment.” The present writer, as editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review*, had, we believe, the very questionable honor of being the first to introduce him to the American public; and we cannot deny that there was a brief period when he exerted a very great influence over our own philosophical speculations. Indeed, the study of his writings formed an epoch in our mental history, and we drew largely upon him in constructing our *Synthetic Philosophy*, some chapters of which were published in *The Democratic Review* for 1842 and 1843; and we are indebted to him for much that is sound, and nearly all that is unsound, chimerical, extravagant, and pantheistic, in the various philosophical essays which we published during the period beginning with January, 1842, and ending with July, 1844, and which we hope no one will regard as indicative of the philosophical doctrines we have since held or now hold.

We learned, it is true, much from Leroux which we have seen no reason to reject, but still more which we now regard as false and absurd. We learned from him to substitute, intentionally at least, the ontological method of philosophizing for the psychological, which we had hitherto professed, and this was much; but, unhappily, we learned from him, at the same time, a vicious ontology, conducting, though we saw it not then, necessarily to pantheism or nihilism. We learned from him, though for false and insufficient reasons, to respect scientific tradition, the continuity of science through the ages, and that every system which breaks it is to be rejected, — a

great and important truth ; but we learned from him to confound scientific and theological tradition, and to subject both to a psychological instead of an ontological test. We learned from him to assert the direct intuition of ideas, or the intelligible, as Reid had taught us to assert the direct perception of bodies, — a fact, the neglect or denial of which has ruined modern philosophy ; but we were, at the same time, led by him to disregard all distinction between intuition and reflection, and therefore to contend that reflection, as well as intuition, reproduces the order of being ; which involves the absurdity of supposing that, in the order of being, the abstract precedes the concrete, the possible the real, and that the creator is fulfilled or completed in the creature. In fine, we learned from him to assert an ontological basis for Christianity, and to regard the Christian mysteries as great ontological truths or facts ; but were led by him to assert natural ontology, or the ontological truths and facts of the natural order, in the place of those of the supernatural order, the peculiarly Christian ontology. These errors vitiated the truths we borrowed from Leroux, and which we might better have learned from far purer sources, if we had had any thing like that acquaintance with philosophical literature which every one should have who assumes the attitude of a teacher of philosophy.

The author of the small, but ambitious and not insignificant volume before us, appears to have adopted from Leroux, substantially, these same truths, coupled with these same errors, however widely he may differ from his master in his development of them. He is not a plagiarist, he is not a mere compiler, but he fails to give his own fine metaphysical genius fair play. He thinks and writes too much under the influence of masters, and relies with too generous a confidence on the acuteness, depth, and erudition of the school to which he finds himself accidentally attached. In consequence of this, though possessing the capacity for original thought, and no ordinary aptitude for free and independent philosophical speculation, he does not work freely, and gives us, after all, little else than what we may find in the authors he has studied. He will, we trust, emancipate himself, one of these days, and justify the expectation we long ago indulged, that he would prove a valuable contributor to American philosophical science.

The author has bestowed much thought and labor on his work, and yet it bears the marks of haste. It is not equally elaborated throughout, and it wants artistic conception and

finish. Its several parts do not seem to us to cohere, or to have originated in the same design. We feel, in reading it, that it lacks unity and regular scientific development. It is not easy to discover the connection between the author's Remarks on the Science of History, and his *A priori* Autobiography, which follows, avowedly for the purpose of illustrating and verifying them. The Autobiography is said to be constructed according to the *a priori* methods; that is, as we understand it, deduced, geometrically, from necessary and eternal principles. No such principles appear to be enunciated, and there is nothing in the Autobiography itself to lead one to regard it as any thing else than an autobiographical sketch of the religious experience of a serious young man, of a speculative turn, exhibiting with spirit and fidelity the various doubts he encountered, and the methods and reasonings by which he solved or attempted to solve them. But as the author really has a philosophical genius, we must presume that he connects the several parts of his work in his own mind, and has, underlying them, a philosophy which he regards as moulding them all into a uniform and systematic whole. This philosophy, which he presupposes rather than states, we must seize in the best way we can, and appreciate, as the condition of understanding and appreciating what he has written.

It is evident from the Remarks on the Science of History, with which the author prefaces his *A priori* Autobiography, that he holds, — 1st, that the human race is progressive, and that the history of its progress is universal history; 2d, that universal history may be written in the form of the biography of any given individual; and 3d, that biography, and therefore universal history, may be constructed *a priori*. The following extract will clearly prove this much.

“Desire, according to Buchez, the first President of the present French National Assembly, is a movement of the will, an outbreak, and energetic operation, of the active principle, toward something we have not as yet.

“When we do not understand our desire, we are conscious of uneasiness, doubt, and trouble: as soon, however, as the intelligence begins to comprehend the blind appetency, a formula for it rises to the mind, and it becomes transformed at once into acceptance, hope, determinate volition, aspiration in view of an ideal, a conviction, a form of faith, a belief, &c.; — *it becomes, moreover, a thesis proposed for reasoning.* Thus the movement for the comprehension of a desire may be considered as containing the progress and

completion of a distinct event, viz. the acquisition of a clearly defined sentiment ; and, for this reason, that movement may be subdivided as follows : (1.) The appetency, or longing tendency, toward something we do not possess, and of whose nature we have no clear apprehension ; (2.) The reasoning we institute within ourselves to discover the origin of our uneasiness, — to discover also the object which is necessary for the satisfaction of our desires ; (3.) The full and conscious act of desire, which is the operation of instinctive tendencies, with an open knowledge of the object desired.

“The progress of any event, in which men are actors, takes place always in three stages : the first is the great epoch of *DESIRE*, which is subdivided, as we have seen, into three sub-epochs ; the second is the great epoch of *REASONING*, wherein are discovered the ways and means by which the object necessary in order to the gratification of desire may be obtained ; and the last is the great epoch of *EXECUTION* or *REALIZATION*. The epochs of Reasoning and Execution are, like that of Desire, each of them subdivided into three sub-epochs, — as shall be fully exemplified in the sequel.

“These three Grand Epochs, each of which is composed of three sub-epochs, form, when taken together, the great Logical Series by Nines, the series of Buchez.*

“No example, in illustration of the movement of this series, would carry so much conviction to the mind of the reader, as one that could be verified by each individual from his own private experience : such an example is possible for us, for the ordinary process of a religious experience lends itself very readily for the purposes of scientific investigation, and, moreover, fulfils the requisite conditions. To test, therefore, the correctness of the serial order and movement, we will proceed to construct, by the *a priori* methods, a sort of imaginary spiritual Autobiography. And we shall take the liberty, for the sake of securing facility of composition, and avoiding circumlocution, to commence at once by speaking in the first person.

“The method of writing universal history under the form of a biography, and of writing biography under the forms of universal history, is philosophically correct.

“As it was necessary for the race to go through the Mosaic dispensation, in order to become prepared for the reception of Christianity, so it was necessary for it to go through the Patriarchal dispensation, in order to become prepared for the religion revealed through Moses. In like manner, in the experience of the private Christian, the understanding of the Old Testament must pave the way for the understanding of the New. Every thing moves forward

* *Introduction to the Science of History*, by P. J. B. Buchez. Paris. 1842. 2 vols. 8vo.

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in regular progressions. He who *thoroughly* understands the present epoch must have reproduced, and lived through, in his private experience, all the religions, dispensations, and civilizations that preceded it." — pp. v. viii.

1. That mankind are progressive, though not in the sense the modern progressists, or humanists, pretend, we do not dispute, and could not, without denying the propriety of all efforts for their moral, physical, intellectual, and religious improvement, and of all exhortations, admonitions, instructions, schools, colleges, seminaries, and churches. But it is no less certain that they are also retrogressive, and that, if in one time or place they advance, they in another decline and suffer deterioration. Their history, or what the author terms universal history, must take note of this fact, and record the decline and fall of individuals, of nations, states, and empires, as well as their rise and progress. The author's conception of history, then, omits a very real and a very important class of facts, and is therefore inadequate.

2. The history of mankind can be written in the form of biography only on condition that there is no difference between individual and individual, and none between the individual and the species, which, since the species is identical in all individuals, is to deny all individual existence, and therefore all existences, — for existence is, and must be, individual. *Genera* and *species* are, no doubt, very real; but, considered apart from individuals, in which they are concreted, their reality is God, and distinct or distinguishable from him they *are* not. As God, they are the possibility of actual existences, but are themselves only possible, not actual, existences. But history is always of the actual, and existence resolved into its possibility has no history. If, then, the author admits no difference between individual and *species*, he cannot write history at all; for there is then no history conceivable. If he admits a difference between individual and species, he cannot write universal history in the form of biography, or biography in the form of universal history; for biography must note what is peculiar to one individual, and history must record, not only what is common to all individuals, but also that wherein different ages and nations differ from one another. The biography of Theodore Parker will not be the biography of Plato; nor the biography of Aristotle, or even that of our author, the history of all men. It is true, the author cites Ralph Waldo Emerson in proof of his doctrine, but the passage he cites is not precisely to his purpose; besides, Mr. Emerson is not conclusive philosophical authority.

3. But passing over this, neither history nor biography can be written *a priori*, because the supposition denies free creation, that is to say all creation, and then all contingent existence, and therefore all existences, as distinguishable from necessary Being, or God. To write or construct *a priori* is to deduce from necessary principles their eternal and necessary consequences. *A priori* reasoning is simply analysis, and gives only what is already contained in the matter analyzed ; for nothing can be in the conclusion not contained in the premises. If the premises are necessary and eternal, the consequences must be necessary and eternal ; and if the premises are not necessary and eternal, the reasoning is not, strictly speaking, *a priori*. To assert that history can be constructed *a priori* is, then, either to assert that history takes note only of the essences or forms of things, or that all men, nay, all existences, are necessary and eternal. The author can assert neither ; not the latter, because if he makes all existences necessary and eternal, he identifies them with God, and denies them as existences, and of course what is not can have no history ; not the former, because the essences or forms of things are necessary and eternal, as he himself strenuously maintains ; and the necessary and eternal has no history, for it is immutable and immovable, neither progressive nor retrogressive. History is predicable only of the contingent, subjected to the accidents of space and time ; and if the author denies space and time, he cannot assert his theory of the progress of the race by the " great logical series by nines," which, though logical, he evidently holds to be also chronological. Evidently, then, the author is mistaken in saying that history or biography can be constructed *a priori* ; for the only condition on which he can suppose it would deny its possibility, by asserting that existences are necessary and eternal, therefore only necessary and eternal modes or affections of the Divine Being, who, as not subjected to the accidents of space and time, has and can have no history.

But waiving this, the author's theory of history is inconsistent with itself. He is, like Buchez and Leroux, a devout believer in progress. He holds, as may be seen from the passage cited, that mankind commence their career in space and time at the lowest conceivable point, in the epoch of Desire, and in the lowest sub-epoch of this grand epoch, namely, in that of mere " blind appetency," and that they gradually work their way up through the several epochs and sub-epochs to the grand epoch of Execution or of Realization, both logically and chrono-

logically. But from the connection he asserts between history and biography, it is evident that he holds that every individual of every successive generation must commence at the same point, and traverse the same number of epochs, and in the same order. Where, then, is the progress of mankind? Their progress would seem to be in a circle, that is, a progress in which there is no advance. The ages accumulate nothing; every newborn individual has to begin where the first began, and no one can derive any advantage from his predecessors.

Assuming that the starting-point for the race and for the individual is in mere blind appetency, the author takes, as the point of departure for his Autobiography, the mere blind *religious* appetency, and conducts himself, step by step, through his several epochs and sub-epochs, to the grand epoch of Realization, that is, the realization of the appetency in full scientific belief in God and the Christian revelation, — at least such is his pretension. But in reading his work, we cannot help feeling that he very effectually refutes himself; for his reasoning powers appear to have been as fully developed in the first epoch as in the last, and the reasons by which he sustains his doubts to be every whit as conclusive as those by which he sustains his belief. He, moreover, does not adhere rigidly to his plan of proceeding, by geometrical reasoning, from blind appetency to its final realization. His chain of deduction, here and there, lacks a link, and he is obliged to *toggle* it with frequent sudden revelations. These sudden revelations are of great assistance to him, and appear as accommodating as were the gods to Homer, when the blind old bard wished to excuse or cover the retreat of a favorite hero, or enable him to elude a blow which might send him prematurely to the land of shadows. We trust this is the only likeness between them and the Homeric gods, and far be it from us to intimate that they proceed from the author's imagination.

We cannot follow the author, step by step, through his Autobiography, of which we are to presume that he is himself no more the subject than is every other man. All we can do is to seize upon a few prominent points, which will serve best to bring out his philosophy, and enable us to set forth what we regard as his more fundamental errors. It is clear to the philosophical reader, that his theory is based, on the one hand, on the Cartesian enthymem, *cogito, ergo sum*, and on a false Platonism, on the other. The pretension of Cartesianism is to demonstrate, after the manner of the geometers, from the

simple sentiment or conception of our personal existence, or rather entity, the being of God and the existence of the universe, — an absurd pretension, which vitiates all modern philosophy, and leads, as Gioberti has unanswerably proved, necessarily to the sensism of Locke and Condillac, and the skepticism and atheism of the French school, on the one side, and on the other, to the pantheism of Spinoza and of the recent German philosophers. Nothing can be deduced from the conception of our personal existence, regarded as entity, but that existence itself; for deduction is analysis, and analysis adds nothing to the intuition, as Kant has for ever settled in his masterly *Critik der reinen Vernunft*. Hence it is that the syllogism, which is nothing but the instrument of analysis, as Mill in his *Logic* has sufficiently proved, never advances knowledge beyond direct intuition. It serves to clear up and render distinct the reality already intuitively revealed, but not to extend the perception of that reality. If the great men among the Scholastics have sometimes the air of teaching the contrary, it is because they are accustomed to speak of knowledge only as reduced to the form of science, that is, of knowledge in the order of reflection, not in the order of intuition. In the order of reflection, the syllogism may be said, inasmuch as it is its province to clear up and distinguish, to advance science, for knowledge is termed science only by reason of its being clear and distinct; but in the order of intuition it does not, as is evident from the fact universally conceded, that nothing can be in the conclusion which is not affirmed in the premises. There is no logic by which we can go from the known to the strictly unknown.

The conception of ourselves, as obtained by Descartes, must be considered either as psychological or as ontological, — in modern language, either as subjective or as objective. As the former, that is, reflection taking as its direct object, not the reality intuitively revealed, but the intuition itself, as a psychological fact, it is a mere sensitive affection, external or internal, and necessarily leads, if regarded as external, to the sensism of Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, Volney, Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, and Broussais; if as internal, to the sentimentalism of Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Bernardin Saint-Pierre, Madame de Staël, the Schlegels, Benjamin Constant, Jacobi and a host of Germans, men and women, too numerous to be mentioned. As the latter, which is reflection taking as its object, not the mere intuition, but the substance or being re-

vealed in it, it must take substance or being either as concrete or as abstract. If as concrete, it leads necessarily to the autotheism of Fichte, Waldo Emerson, Bronson Alcott, and our author. The substance or being asserted is *I* or *Ego*; as analysis adds nothing to the intuitive assertion, from this it can obtain only *I* or *Ego*. Then *I* or *Ego* is all that is or exists, which is autotheism. If as abstract, as the *ens in genere* of the Abbate Rosmini, it leads necessarily to the pantheism of Spinoza, who pretends to construct all, geometrically, from the single conception of substance or being. But substance or being *in genere* is a pure abstraction, an empty word, therefore a mere nullity. From nothing, nothing can be obtained. Hence the nullism or nihilism of Hegel and his followers, and also of our author, — the last result of Cartesianism, as was already implied in its making universal doubt its point of departure.

That our author virtually reaches this sad result is evident enough from the following paragraphs :—

“I had, indeed, become really ill. But in the midst of the excitement of my physical system, this great formula seemed to be continually repeating itself:—*Life is the activity of an Efficient Cause, LIFE IS THE ACTIVITY OF AN EFFICIENT CAUSE.* I saw that I had unconsciously built up all my speculations upon the premise that I myself was *dead*: and now when the evidence to my mind was irresistible that I was *ALIVE*, an *efficient cause*, that is, A *FREE AGENT*, no one can tell how I loathed the practical conclusions of all my preceding theories.

“I expected a great deal from this formula, which thus revealed itself to me in the midst of a tumult of thought; and, verily, I was not disappointed: for, first of all, it utterly annihilated my Pantheism. I reasoned as follows:—

“I am revealed to myself, *by observation in consciousness*, as *TRANSCENDING TIME*: for I perceive the facts of my memory, and say of them, They are facts of memory, and I contradistinguish myself from them in consciousness,—therefore they are *not me*. I am not a fact of memory, but a living, perceiving subject. I see also the relation between these facts of memory, and call it *time*; but say, it is a relation between things which are *not me*, and, therefore, it also is *not me*. I perceive *it*,—*it is time*. Time is the relation in which the facts of memory stand to each other, and not the relation in which they stand to me. The events and their relation stand before me in the relation of *objects perceived*; but to each other they stand in the relation of *time*. To me, a transaction of ten years' date is as present as an affair of yesterday; for

if it were not thus present, I should not be able to see its relation to the affair of yesterday, affirming that it took place exactly ten years ago, all but one day. I contradistinguish myself from time, and am independent of it: nevertheless, all my acts fall in time. When I perceive, think, will, the perception, thought, volition, is an act which is an event, following some events, and preceding others; but *I*, who originate these events, remain still transcending time; for only the acts, and not the *I*, find a place in time. The *I*, therefore, is in *ETERNITY*, but *exists* in *time*.

"If we abstract from the soul its active existence, there will remain its essential *Being*, which is rooted in eternity, — not an eternity which is time indefinitely extended, but an eternity altogether independent of time, having nothing in common with time, for it *altogether transcends* it. It is a matter of no importance to me, if some men see fit not to understand all this; for they are unable to understand it, because they are incapable of that observation in consciousness wherein the soul perceives itself as subject, — wherein the soul perceives itself, not as thought, feeling, volition, but as the *I* which thinks, feels, and wills. I perceive myself in consciousness, not as an activity, but as the *efficient cause* which exerts an activity. I know that I shall not be annihilated when my activity ceases, but that I shall merely hold my activity *in potentia*, ready to deploy it again when the moment comes. This *I*, this *efficient cause*, this essential being of the soul, could not have been created at any former time, neither can it be annihilated at any future time, because it *is* in *eternity*, in an eternal now; and, if it is once, that once is eternity: there is no before or after for it.

"I perceive myself in consciousness as an efficient cause. By *efficient cause* I mean a cause which operates by virtue of efficiency *inhering in itself*, — I mean a cause which is itself the ground, origin, and reason of its own activity. Without doubt, I have a notion of *efficiency*, which notion I could have obtained from no source whatever other than the observation of the activity of my own soul. In the outward world I perceive only effects; — will any man pretend that he ever perceived an *efficient cause* in the external world? He may indeed have perceived the *operation* of such a cause, but he surely never perceived the cause itself. If I perceive the Divine activity, I perceive only the activity, and never the Efficient Cause, which is the Divine Substance. Will any one pretend that he has seen God directly? Does not the very fact of our possessing a *notion* of efficiency prove the existence of the efficiency which inheres in our own souls? But what is all this reasoning to me? After prolonged meditation, I have attained to be able to carry on investigations in my own consciousness: I am able, on rare occasions, to perceive myself directly, as an efficient cause, — as subject: and, by more extended observation, I find that nowhere else can I *directly* observe any *efficiency*." — pp. 76–80.

The author defines pantheism to be the assertion of God as the only efficient cause, and contends that he refutes it by asserting another efficient cause, namely, himself. If he does really assert another efficient cause, he certainly does refute it ; but this he does not do. It is true, he asserts himself as efficient cause, but as uncreated, independent, and eternal efficient cause ; therefore, if words have meaning, he asserts that he is himself God, which, if he recognizes other efficient causes, is polytheism ; if no other, is autotheism. But he recognizes no other efficient cause, for he says expressly, "I find that nowhere else can I directly observe any efficiency" ; that is, he has direct intuition of no efficiency but his own. Then he can obtain no other by reflection or analysis. From the fact that I am an efficient cause, I cannot conclude something else, which is not myself and of which I have no intuition, is an efficient cause. Then he must take himself as the only efficient cause. Then, since he asserts himself as uncreated, eternal, independent, and indestructible efficient cause, he asserts himself as God, and the only God, — all that is or exists. He may call this pantheism or autotheism as he will ; it makes no difference, for at bottom both are one and the same thing.

But the uncreated, eternal, and indestructible *I* or *Ego* he asserts as efficient cause is, after all, a mere abstraction, and must be so ; for, as actual, we are, in fact, subject to the accidents of space and time, — too evidently contingent for any man to assert seriously the contrary. Hence says the author, "If we abstract from the soul its active existence, there remains its essential being, which is rooted in eternity." "*This I*, this efficient cause, this *essential* being of the soul, could not have been created, neither can it be annihilated." Undeniably, then, the soul he asserts as efficient cause is not the soul as concrete existence, but the soul as abstract being. But abstract being is a nullity, and therefore the author's philosophy, which rests on it as its foundation, is, in the last analysis, nullism or nihilism.

This is where the author finds, or rather loses, himself in following Descartes, as must every man of tolerable reasoning powers who follows that psychologist, whether he takes one or the other of the two routes we have indicated ; for that sensism leads to nullism has long since been amply established. Our author, consciously or unconsciously, seeks to save himself by means of a bastard Platonism. Descartes makes ideas mere abstractions, formed by reflection operating on intuition as a

psychological fact ; according to Plato, ideas are real objects of intuition, necessary and eternal, anterior to all actual existences, the necessary and eternal forms or essences of things. The author attempts to combine both doctrines, and therefore asserts ideas as abstractions, and abstractions as real, necessary, and eternal, — the very absurdity, justly or unjustly, charged to the account of the old realists. It is neither more nor less than setting forth abstractions as real entities, and clothing the possible with the attributes of the real. This will appear if we examine the author's note H, in his Appendix.

“The affirmation that GOD CREATED THE WORLDS OUT OF NOTHING annihilates itself :

“For, if God created them out of nothing, their creation was evidently *possible* to him. This possibility existed as a necessary condition of the creation, *before the worlds were created* ; for, had the creation not been possible, it is evident that it would never have taken place. The possibility existed, therefore, in the logical order (for we have nothing to do here with chronology) prior to the creation. — This possibility was not created, but existed prior to the very first act of creation ; for, if it was created, its creation was possible, and this new possibility preceded the creation of the created possibility, else that creation could not have taken place. This possibility of a possibility, if it was created, must have been preceded by still another possibility, and thus, by continuing the hypothesis, we fall upon an infinite series, — an evident sign of the absurdity of the supposition.

“Therefore the creation of the worlds was preceded by the POSSIBILITY of that creation, and this possibility was itself uncreated.

“The very first act of the Divine Will must have been preceded by the possibility of that act, else it could not have taken place. This possibility is independent of the Divine Will, for it is anterior to the very first act of that Will, and is, indeed, that upon which the operation of the Divine Will depends.

“It is evident, therefore, that two Powers concurred in the creation of the Worlds, (1.) The Divine Will, and (2.) That which made the creation of the Worlds, and the operation of the Divine Will, *possible*.

“God, therefore, is not only the voluntary cause of the existence of the universe, he is also the eminent cause ; and he knows the things which are made, partly by perceiving them in the operations of his Will, and partly by perceiving them in Himself as eminent cause.

“The soul of man has its root of being, not in the Divine Will, but in God as eminent cause ; for the Soul, as is made evident in

the text, transcends all time so far as its essence is concerned, and therefore never began to be, and never can cease to be, — that is, it is uncreated. The *possibility* of the soul's existence is indeed that root of substance, hid in God as eminent cause, which is the essential being of the soul.

"The Divine Will depends, for its ability to operate, upon its possibility inhering in the very Being of God, and the Will of Man depends also, for *its* ability to operate, upon *its* possibility, inhering in the same Being of God: the Will of Man, therefore, having its ground and root in the soul's substance, is dependent upon the Being, but not upon the Will, of God. God sees all our actions in himself; he sees our subjective movements in himself as eminent cause, and he sees the operation of the circumstances which act upon us in his Will: and thus he sees us as free agents, beings capable of acting in opposition to his Will, — beings whose actions he cannot control by his Will, because those actions have their origin in regions of Divine Essence as ancient and as remote as is the source of the Divine Will itself: beings whose actions he cannot control by his Will, because the Will of God is subsequent in the order of nature to the sublime ground which is the spring of the activity of the human soul.

"Thus the doctrine of a creation out of nothing defeats itself; for it is equivalent to the doctrine, that all creation is effected by the leading forth of visible things, through the energy of the Divine Will, from *POTENTIALITY* into *ACTUALITY*. God brings forth, according to his Will, from potentiality into actuality, just what he pleases; but when any human soul *is* brought into actual relations, it acts from itself, independently of God's Will, for it acts from an origin transcending God's Will. — God may drive any human soul back into potentiality, that is, may destroy its life, but while he suffers it to live, he cannot alter its will by any direct exertion of power. If he wishes to alter its will, he must change the circumstances which surround it, or change its bodily conditions. In short, he cannot change the subjective action of the soul, and, if he wish to change its life, he must do it by changing the objective element with which it concurs, or by changing the instrument by which the concurrence is effected.

"Is this Pantheism? Nay, is it not the doctrine which truly and especially avoids all Pantheism? Atheism sinks the Will of God and the Will of Man in the movement of Destiny: Pantheism sinks Man and Nature in the Will of God: and New England Transcendentalism sinks God and Nature in Man. The true doctrine must be sought in a Synthesis of the operation of the three great Powers." — pp. 148 – 152.

Here the author with admirable gravity assures us, that "the

affirmation that God created the worlds out of nothing annihilates itself." The creation of the worlds out of nothing, he reasons, if we understand him, either was possible to God or it was not. If it was not, he could not have so created them, and the affirmation is false. If it was possible, the affirmation is still false, for their creation was then preceded by its possibility, and could have been only the bringing forth of that possibility into actuality. But, conceding the latter supposition, the conclusion does not follow. If the creation of the worlds out of nothing was not possible to God, the affirmation is false, we concede, for God cannot do what he cannot. If it was possible, — then it was not possible? Not at all. Then, by the very terms of the supposition, it was possible; therefore the affirmation may be true, and does not annihilate itself.

The author asserts the contrary, because he conceives the possibility of creation is *something*, is *res* or reality, which, since it does and must precede creation, cannot but be something uncreated, necessary, and eternal. Therefore, since creation is nothing but the reduction of possibility to actuality, creation could not have been out of nothing, but, if at all, must have been out of this very something called possibility. We grant that creation must have been possible, or it could not have been created. We grant that the possibility of creation was itself uncreated, necessary, and eternal, and yet not therefore does it follow that God could not have created the worlds out of nothing; *because this very possibility is an abstraction, and therefore in itself nothing*. Grant, then, that God creates only by reducing potentiality to actuality, nothing is granted against the affirmation; for since abstract possibility is nothing, to "bring forth from it into actuality" is precisely to create out of nothing; as the author himself not only concedes, but even asserts, when he says, as he does, that the doctrine of a creation out of nothing "is equivalent to the doctrine, that all creation is effected by the leading forth of visible things, [why not of *invisible* things also?] through the energy of the Divine Will, from potentiality into actuality." Then the leading forth from potentiality into actuality must be equivalent to creation out of nothing.

The assertion of creation out of nothing does not mean that nothing creates, or that the Creator creates his own ability to create; that is, creates himself. It is intended, on the one hand, to deny that God creates out of preëxisting matter, or that creation is merely impressing matter with form, as the Pla-

tonists maintained, and, on the other, to assert that God creates by himself alone, from his own omnipotent energy or inherent ability to create. Creation certainly implies, or rather connotes, the uncreated possibility of creation, and we readily concede that the possibility of the creation of the worlds was not created, but eternal. Thus far we have no quarrel with the author. But *the possibility of creation is the ABILITY of the Creator, and the possibility of the creation of the worlds is the eternal, underived, inherent ability of the Creator to create them*, as the author himself, apparently without being fully aware of the import of his language, asserts, when he tells us it "inheres in the very being of God." The possibility of creation inhering in the Divine Essence itself is precisely what all theologians and philosophers generally understand by the Divine ability to create. Understood in this sense, the author's reasoning amounts simply to this: The worlds could not have been created if God could not have created them, and God could not have created them if he had not been able to create them; but God was able to create them; therefore their creation was possible, and he may have created them. No Christian philosopher will find any difficulty in acceding to all this.

But, assuming the reality of abstractions, the author thinks he finds in the assertion, that the possibility of creation is itself uncreated, the assertion of a solid and indestructible basis of free agency, or the freedom and independence of the human will. The human will has the root of its activity in the soul's substance, and the soul's substance, since eternally possible, is itself eternal, uncreated, and therefore independent of the Divine Will, and therefore the human will must be independent of the Divine Will, and not controllable by it. God can neither will nor create a human soul, unless it be possible to him. The possibility, whether of an act of the Divine Will or of the creation of the human soul, is therefore anterior to either, and therefore uncreated. But this uncreated possibility inheres in the very being of God. Therefore "the Divine Will depends, for its ability to operate, upon its possibility inhering in the very being of God, and the human will depends, for *its* ability to operate, upon *its* possibility, inhering in the same being of God." Therefore the human will depends on the being, but not on the will, of God. Therefore we are free agents, and God cannot control our actions by his will, because they "have their origin in regions of Divine Essence as ancient and as remote as is the source of the Divine Will itself," "and because the

Will of God is subsequent in the order of nature to the sublime ground which is the spring of the activity of the human soul."

This discovery, like most new discoveries in the fundamental principles of philosophy, is more specious than solid. The author has evidently thought long and hard to obtain his conclusion, but that conclusion rests on the supposition, that the soul which acts is identically the uncreated, eternal soul,—that is to say, the uncreated and eternal ability of God to create the soul,—which is not true in itself, and is, moreover, contrary to the author's own doctrine. The soul that acts is the soul as "active existence"; but the soul, which the author asserts as eternal, which "could not have been created, and cannot be annihilated," is the essential soul, the soul "abstracted from its active existence," as we have already seen; that is to say, no soul at all, for abstractions are nothing. There are no abstractions in nature, or the ontological order; that is, in the order of being, of reality. But the soul, as actual or active existence, the author concedes, depends on the will of God; and since, then, it is only in the sense in which we depend on the will of God that we do or can act, it does not follow that our actions are independent of that will, and uncontrollable by it. Nay, on the author's own principles, it follows that they are controllable by it.

The author seems not to have considered, that to assert that the possibility of an existence inheres in the being of God is to assert, in regard to the existence itself, that it cannot exist without the intervention of the Divine creative act. To say that a being depends upon its possibility so inhering, is only saying that it cannot exist without God, and can be only what he has the inherent ability to make it; which is to assert its limitation, not its ability, and God's ability, not his limitation. Grant that the human soul depends upon its possibility inhering in the very being of God, what follows? Therefore the soul is eternal? Not at all; but therefore the soul is not eternal, is created, or else does not exist; because the possible does not exist till rendered actual, and to render the possible actual, the author himself tells us, is equivalent to creation out of nothing. The author has fallen into a slight mistake; he has made the soul's possibility God's inability, and the soul's want of existence its eternal and independent existence. The soul is possible in God, therefore God is unable to create it; therefore the soul is, and is eternal, capable of acting freely and independently of the Divine will. As much as to say, if the

creation of the soul is possible, it is impossible. We can hardly believe that this logic has been borrowed from Aristotle.

The author protests against pantheism, and, we doubt not, with sincerity. He wishes, we presume, to distinguish, and fully believes that he does distinguish, between the human will and the Divine. Yet his doctrine, if he excludes the Divine creative act, makes the human will, physically as well as morally, the Divine will. "The Will of Man," he says expressly, "depends, for its ability to operate, upon its possibility inhering in the very being of God." The possibility of a will inhering in the Divine Being must mean, either the ability of God to will, or his ability to create a will. If the author understands it in the latter sense, he loses his argument for the freedom of the will founded on the supposition that it is not created; if in the former sense, he makes it identically the Divine will itself, for the inherent ability to will is the will, and all that is ever meant by the will, ontologically considered. But to make the human will identically the Divine will, and on that ground to assert its freedom, is to assert its freedom by making it physically the will of God, and annihilating it as human, — pure pantheism. Divest us of the substantive force that wills, and restore it to God, and what remains to be called *we*? It is not a little surprising that the author did not see this, for he is very careful to tell us that the Divine will and the human will are alike dependent, and in the same sense dependent, upon their respective possibilities inhering in the very being of God; and it is on the ground that they are so dependent, and that the activity of each is the inherent activity of the same Divine Essence, that he asserts one is independent of the other. But if so dependent, either both are the will of God, and then identical, or neither is. The author's mathematics should have taught him, that two things respectively equal to a third are equal to one another.

It is not difficult to seize the truth the author has in his mind, and which, interpreted by his doctrine that abstractions are real, may well seem to support his conclusion. "God," he says, "brings forth, according to his Will, from potentiality into actuality, just what he pleases; but when any human soul *is* brought into actual relations, it acts from itself, independently of God's Will, for it acts from an origin transcending God's Will. — God may drive any human soul back into potentiality, that is, may destroy its life, but while he suffers it to live,

he cannot alter its will by any direct [how any more by *indirect* ?] exertion of power." It is easy to see what the author is driving at, though he does not appear to have very distinctly apprehended it, and he is far from expressing it correctly. What he wishes to say appears to us very briefly and very accurately expressed by Vasquez :* — *Essentiæ rerum ordine rationis sunt ante omnem Dei scientiam et voluntatem : quare licet possit cuilibet rei tribuere, aut non tribuere existentiam, non potest illius naturam intrinsicis immutare.* "The essences of things, in the order of reason, are before all science and will of God ; and hence, though God may or may not give existence to any thing he pleases, he cannot intrinsically change its nature." Here is evidently what the author has in view. The essences of things are what are also called the possibilities, forms, or ideas of things, and being prior, in the order of reason, — not, by the way, in the order of nature, — to the science and the will of God, are uncreated, therefore necessary and eternal. God may or may not endow them with existence, bring them forth into actuality, actualize them, as he pleases, but if he wills to actualize or render actually existent any one of them, he must conform to its intrinsic nature. Thus, if he choose to actualize the *man-idea*, to clothe it with actual existence, he must do so without altering, or in any respect impairing, the intrinsic nature of that idea, — what our author calls the possibility of a human soul. Hence, by virtue of this necessary and eternal *man-idea*, — our possibility inhering in the very being of God, — we are rendered, as actual existences, free agents, and our actions are independent of the will of God. This is really the process, we suppose, by which the author obtains his startling conclusion. But his conclusion is invalid, because it is obtained only by reasoning *a posse ad esse*, which the logicians tell us is not allowable. We act not as possible, but as actual existences, and we cannot conclude what we actually are from what it was possible for God to make us. Before we can assert *what* we are, we must know, not only that God has actualized *an* idea, but *what* idea he has actualized in creating us. If the idea is that of free agents, or existences capable of free will, then we may say, God must, *necessitate a suppositione*, as it is called, treat us as such, because he cannot both do and not do the same thing at the same time ; but not otherwise. The

* Apud Perrone, *De Deo*, Part II. Cap. 1, note.

error of the author is not in asserting that we are free agents, and that God cannot, while he suffers us to live, make us any thing else, for that is a fact ; but in concluding our free agency, not from *the* idea of the existence which we are, but from the fact that our existence is the actualization of *an* idea. This cannot be done, for, since every existence is the actualization of *some* idea, it would imply that all existences have free will, and that minerals, plants, and animals have free will as well as men ; which would destroy the author's notion of Destiny, compel him to abate one of the three great powers he supposes to concur in the movement and government of things, thus razing the ontological basis of his three grand epochs, and oblige him to a very essential modification of the mysterious figure poised on three forces coalescing in their action, which adorns his title-page, and is, we presume, emblematical of his theory of God, man, and nature. Besides, it would limit the Divine omnipotence, deny to God the power to create different orders of existence, resolve all genera and species into one, and bring us back by another route — the ordinary route of American Transcendentalists — once more to pantheism.

The author obtains his conclusion from the assumption, that ideas, genera, and species, regarded in themselves, abstracted from the existences in which they are concentered, are active, causative, not merely *causæ essentielles*, but *causæ efficientes*. This is a most grave error, and yet it is not peculiar to the author. It is the common error of all who assert the reality of abstractions. We ourselves fell into it in the essays we have referred to, and which we wish to be considered as retracting. Leroux avowedly asserts it, and it is fundamental in nearly all the humanistic theories of the day, — theories which glorify humanity at the expense of individuals, and absorb the individual in the race. Even Cousin, who should have escaped it, expressly teaches it, and makes it the principle of the solution of the problem proposed by Porphyry, and so furiously debated by the Scholastics.* But the idea is the mere possibility of existence, and it is a contradiction in terms to assert that the possible is active. Only the actual is active. All reality is, no doubt, in a certain manner, active ; and this fact, since ideas are real, is what misled us, and, we presume, is that which has misled others. Ideas are certainly real, and in some sense active ; but their activity is not the activity of the

* *Fragments Philosophiques : Philosophie Scholastique*, edit. 2e. Paris. 1840.

things of which they are the ideas or the necessary and eternal forms, but of the Divine Intelligence or Reason, in which they are real. If the ideas are considered as concentered in existences, the activity is the activity of the existences themselves; if they are considered as not so concentered, yet as real, the activity is the activity of the Divine mind which contains them, and is the power to concenter or actualize them.

The author's errors seem to us to result solely from his attempt, consciously or unconsciously made, to combine Cartesianism and Platonism in a single doctrine, and will vanish of themselves, if he will just bear in mind that ideas, the forms, essences, or possibilities of things, are before the science and will of God only in the order of reflection, not in the order of being, and that they are God himself, infinite in number, indeed, if regarded in relation to the effects which God is able to produce, but regarded in relation to his ability one only, and identically his own real, necessary, and eternal being. It is in regard to these two points that modern philosophy is principally at fault. Let it once be set right as to these, and its other errors, so far as of grave magnitude, will fall of themselves.

The author confounds the order of reflection with the order of being. If he had not been betrayed by the prevailing psychologism of the age, he would hardly have done this, for his own genius is philosophical rather than psychological. His mistake arises from not distinguishing between reflection and intuition. The Scholastics are aware of the distinction, and presuppose it, but we rarely find them treating it *ex professo*. Cousin and the modern Germans have, indeed, distinguished between reflection and spontaneity, which would virtually be the true distinction, if they did not contrive to identify the intellect and its object, the *vis intellectiva*, with the *intelligibile*, sometimes making both human, sometimes both Divine. Cousin comes nearer than most others to the truth, but misses it, in consequence of supposing that method must take precedence of principles; that it is by method we obtain the principles of philosophy, and not that it is the principles that precede and determine the method. He has been misled by Descartes, who makes the consideration of method precede that of principles, whereas method is nothing but the application of principles, and necessarily presupposes them. It does not obtain or discover principles, it merely applies them to the solution of special problems. The principles must precede, and be given

a priori, or no practical application of method is possible. Cousin has virtually acknowledged this, but he has still supposed that it is our reason, not, indeed, in its reflective, but in its spontaneous movement, that supplies or discovers and affirms them; which is to suppose that reason can operate without them, that the intellect can act without the intelligible! Every act of intellect is an intellection; and so there can be intellection in which nothing is understood, or known, — a sheer contradiction in terms. Here is his mistake. The principles are necessary to constitute the intellect, intellect *in actu*, and the understanding cannot operate at all without the intelligible object. Consequently, as destitute of the intelligible, it cannot go forth, either spontaneously or at the command of the will, to seek the intelligible, the principles, which method is subsequently to apply. The principles are not and cannot be sought, for the mind without them is incapable of action, and therefore incapable of seeking. Hence it is never *we* who seek or who find them, but *they* who find us, reveal and self-affirm themselves in direct intuition. It is *they* that affirm themselves, not *we* who affirm them; and they affirm themselves in affirming their own intelligibility, for what *is* not is not intelligible, and therefore no object of intuition. Here is what Reid has attempted to state, in his doctrine of the constituent principles of human belief, but which he has failed to state in its true philosophical light, with scientific precision.

The philosopher and the psychologist, or rather psychologue, both depend alike on intuitions for the intelligible, and both do and must work with and on materials supplied by them, and have and can have no materials not so supplied. Thus far, both agree. But the philosopher proceeds to construct his philosophy ontologically, as we say, that is, by *contemplation* of the being, reality, or objects revealed and self-affirmed in the intuitions; while the psychologue proceeds to construct philosophy psychologically, that is, by *reflection* on the intuitions themselves, taken as mere psychological facts or phenomena. As the idea is that which is primarily and immediately intelligible, and that by whose intelligibility all else is intelligible, and as the idea which is obtained by reflection operating upon mere psychological phenomena is and can be only an abstract idea, the psychologue is compelled to place the abstract before the concrete, the possible before the real, which, transferred to theology, asserts the Divine essence before the Divine *esse*, and the Divine *esse* before the Divine

attributes. But this, as we have seen, leads necessarily to skepticism and nihilism, because there are no abstractions in the order of reality, — because an abstract idea is a mere nullity. To place the abstract before the concrete, the possible before the real, is to place nullity for the starting-point; and he who starts from nothing will have to travel a long way before he arrives at something. *Ex nihilo, nihil fit.* Either, then, for result, nihilism, or we must start with reality. If we start with reality, God must be conceived primarily as real being, and then we cannot conceive his essence as prior to his *esse*, or his *esse* as prior to his attributes.

If the author had paused a moment to compel modern psychologism to give an account of itself, he could hardly have failed to perceive, that to suppose the possible precedes the real, the abstract the concrete, is as false psychologically as it is ontologically. The conception of essence as prior to being, or being as prior to its attributes, is a mere abstraction, and like all abstractions is the product of reflection operating on conceptions. But if the product of reflection, it cannot be psychologically primary. Certainly, men do not begin with reflection, that is, *re-think* before they think. In the order of knowledge, the abstract must be subsequent to the concrete, precisely because reflection must always be subsequent to intuition; for it is formed by reflection operating on intuition, and only the concrete is revealed in the intuition, since what is not is no object of intuition. Neither ontologically nor psychologically, neither in the order of being nor in the order of knowledge, therefore, is the abstract prior to the concrete, the possible to the real, the essence to the subsisting being, or the being to the attributes of God. Then no potentiality in God; then God is pure act, *actus purissimus*, and then in his nature simple, *simplicissimus*, — a fact our author denies, but which he cannot deny without assuming a principle of reasoning false in itself, and involving absolute and universal negation.*

* Certainly, in asserting that the order of knowledge follows and reproduces the order of being, we do not intend to deny the *distinctio rationis* asserted by our theologians, and which we could not deny without falling into the error or heresy of the old Aëtians and Eunomians. But this distinction — the *distinctio rationis ratiocinata*, for the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* presents no difficulty — does not of itself imply any difference between the order of knowing and the order of being; it merely implies the inadequacy of our knowledge, — not that we know reality in an order not real, but that we do not know all reality, and are not able to embrace even what we do know in a single conception. Owing to the

The author, not fully comprehending this, fails to perceive, though he virtually asserts it, that ideas, the essences, forms, or possibilities of things, are God. He asserts, and very properly, that the possible, that is, the *idea*, in the sense of Plato, — the only sense in which we use the word in this article, — inheres in the very being of God, and therefore, if God is pure act, as we have just proved, both ontologically and psychologically, must be God himself. This is the doctrine of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, and, indeed, of all great philosophers in all ages. Ideas, the necessary and eternal forms of things, genera and species, universals, or *essentia rerum metaphysica*, as they are sometimes denominated, — possibilities of things, in the terminology of our author, — are not mere words, as Roscelin and the nominalists pretend ; are not pure conceptions, as Abelard and Descartes would persuade us ; are not mere subjective forms of the understanding, as Kant teaches ; are not entities, as the old realists are said to have maintained ; are not innate ideas originally inserted in the soul, as Henry Moore, Cudworth, Descartes (!), Leibnitz, and some Catholic theologians, allege ; nor are they concep-

infinity of God and our finiteness, we are obliged to conceive what is revealed to us of God, whether naturally or supernaturally revealed, in separate and successive conceptions ; and hence, when we wish to reduce it to the forms of reflective science, we are obliged to treat the essence of God as if it preceded his *esse*, his *esse* as if it preceded his attributes, and his attributes as if distinguished from and following one another. That some of the Schoolmen, especially the Scotists, have introduced distinctions uncalled for, and which have given rise to much unsound theology, and still more unsound philosophy, is very possible, and, in our judgment, very true ; but that the distinction in question is allowable and necessary cannot be denied. That our theologians do not understand it as implying any difference between the order of knowledge and the order of being is evident from their efforts to show that it is founded in reality, — that it is *eminently* or virtually contained in God, in the respect that there is in him what is equivalent and more than equivalent to all that we embrace in our separate and successive conceptions. In conceiving God distinctly as Being, Truth, Intelligence, Wisdom, Goodness, &c., we ascribe to him nothing that he is not ; and though he is all these at once in their indissoluble unity and indistinguishable simplicity, the distinctions admitted do not falsify our knowledge, for they are privative, not positive, and suppose, not that we add what is not, but that we fail to embrace in our conceptions all that is, in the Divine Being. The distinction asserts a defect in our knowledge, — not that it is not true, as far as it goes, but that it is inadequate ; and a similar defect in our knowledge is universal, for always above what is intelligible to us rises that which is superintelligible to us, indicating that reality is infinite, and proving that finite intellects do not and cannot comprehend it.

tions *cum fundamento in re*, as we ourselves at one time tried to hold ; but they are in the Divine mind, and are the real, necessary, eternal, and indestructible God himself. *Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia*, says St. Thomas.* Therefore it is God, for no distinction *secundum rem* is admissible between God and his essence. “*Sunt ideæ*,” says St. Augustine, “*principales formæ quædam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quæ ipsæ formatæ non sunt, ac per hoc æternæ ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quæ in divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsæ neque oriantur neque intereant ; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit.*”† If contained in the Divine mind, if eternal and immutable, neither beginning nor passing away, but the forms of all things which may be or are originated, that may or do perish, they are unquestionably the necessary, eternal, immutable, and immovable God himself, in the infinite plenitude of his being ; for certainly God is all that is uncreated, necessary, immutable, and eternal, as all theology and all philosophy never cease to assert. The necessary, immutable, and eternal, abstracted from reality, from real being, who is it, is necessary, immutable, and eternal nothing, and therefore absolutely unintelligible ; for we never cease to repeat, that what is not is not intelligible. What is not is a pure negation, and negation is intelligible only in the intelligibleness of the affirmative, and hence God is said to know evil only by knowing its opposite, good. Necessary and eternal possibility is intelligible only as the necessary and eternal ability of God, that is, as his Divine omnipotence. We may consider the idea under the distinct aspect of possibility in the order of production, and then it is simply the power or ability of God ; under that of exemplar or archetype, after which the Creator operates or may operate, and then it is the intelligence of God ; under that of the end, the *finis propter quem*, of the Divine operations, and then it is the goodness, *bonitas*, of God ; or, in fine, under that of the essence of things, the *causa essentialis*, the basis, so to speak, or foundation of existence, and then it is the being of God. But as power, intelligence, goodness, being, &c., are identical and indistinguishable in God, the idea, under whatever aspect it is revealed to us, or is contem-

* *Summa*, 1. Q. 15, a. 1 ad 3.

† *Lib. de Diversis Quæstionibus* LXXXIII. Quæst. 46.

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But if so, is not God all things, the universe itself? *Mediante* the creative act, yes, otherwise no; because, conceived simply as real, necessary, and eternal Being, *Ens reale, et necessarium*, he is not conceived as productive, and no universe is or can be asserted. The difference between philosophy and pantheism lies precisely in this creative act of God. Pantheism asserts, Real being is, *Ens reale est*, and there stops, and in doing so asserts God as real and necessary being, and nothing else. Philosophy goes a step farther, and asserts, *Ens reale creator est*, Real being is creator, and in doing so asserts the universe; for existences are nothing but the creative act of God in its terminus, as is asserted in asserting creation out of nothing. The difference between the two formulas, however slight at first view, is all the difference between act and no act, between existences and no existences, universe and no universe. To say that God *non mediante* the creative act is the universe, is not true, for then there is no universe; to say that God *mediante* the creative act is all things, is the universe, is true; for then the universe is not only asserted, but asserted in its true relation to God, as being only from him, by him, and in him, through the creative act bringing it, as our author would say, forth from potentiality into actuality. There is no possible bridge from God as real and necessary being to existences, or from existences to him, but his creative act, and therefore we must either rest in pantheism, or assert creation out of nothing.

But it follows from what we have said, that the formula, Real and necessary being is, *Ens reale est*, which is ontologically and psychologically primary, is not an *adequate* philosophical formula. We cannot attain to the conception of existences from the conception of being, or being is, any more than we can attain to the conception of God and the universe from the single conception of ourselves as simple entity. The simple formula, *Ens reale est*, Real entity is, is and must be unproductive, because from Real entity is, we can conclude only Real entity is. Being is intelligible of itself, and demands nothing in addition to itself to its intelligibility, as Hegel and others prove clearly enough. It does not depend on another to be, for if it did it would not be simple *being*, but an *existence*; it does not need to produce in order to be, for it already *is*. It is being free from the category of relation of every sort, and it

is only the category of relation of some sort that demands or connotes something beyond itself. It is what is called *substance*, and needs nothing beyond itself for its complete intelligibility, or, as Spinoza says, to be conceived. Unless, then, we can add to it the further conception of cause, of creator, it can be no more productive in the order of knowledge than in the order of being itself. Cousin has felt the difficulty, and has sought to escape it by resolving the category of being into that of cause, and the category of cause into that of being, and asserting that God is being only in that he is cause, thus making creation an intrinsic necessity, which, as it denies the free creative act, is pantheism. The Germans, falsely holding, that Being is, is an adequate philosophical formula, fail utterly, as all who are familiar with their theories well know, to attain to the real conception of existences, and revolve unceasingly in dead pantheism or nihilism. The error common to all is that of supposing that all conceptions are generable and generated from a single original conception. This is the grand error of modern philosophy itself, and that which has led it to attempt, first, with Descartes, that prince of psychologism and absurdity, to deduce geometrically all our conceptions from the single conception of our personal entity, and second, with Spinoza, Schelling, and Hegel, to do the same from the conception of what they call the Absolute, — Absolute Being, that is, simple *ens reale*. Some few, like Cousin and our friend Channing, following the neoplatonists, and misapprehending the sacred mystery of the Trinity, introduce plurality and variety into their original conception of God, the first cause; but they obtain no relief, for they lose unity, dissolve the absolute, and assert the generative principle either of polytheism or of atheism.

The remedy is in supplying the defect in our formula, and rendering it productive. The productive formula must embrace the two conceptions entity and existence, connected by the creative act, the copula or medium between the two extremes. That is, the only adequate or productive formula is the synthesis or synthetic judgment, *Ens reale creator est*, or Being creates existences, because it is only *mediante* the creative act that real being is itself productive, and a formula cannot be productive in the order of knowledge unless it includes all the terms necessary to productiveness in the order of being, or ontological order. The error of modern philosophers does not lie in the denial of the necessity of having this

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synthetic formula, so much as in attempting to obtain it by reflection, as if reflection could add something to intuition, or operate productively before having obtained a productive formula,—in principle nothing less than supposing that the Creator creates his own creativeness, that is, creates himself. The synthesis must precede all our judgments *a posteriori*, because without it no judgment is possible, except the simple judgment Being is, which is not *a posteriori*, but *a priori*, for he who says *Being* says all he says who says *Being is*. It is possible, then, to obtain this synthesis, the adequate philosophical formula, only as it reveals and affirms itself *a priori* in direct and immediate intuition, in which we ourselves are but simple spectators; and that it does so reveal and affirm itself is certain; for after the labors of Reid and the Scottish school, especially as that school has been developed by Sir William Hamilton, we are well permitted to assert, that we have direct intuition, not only of phenomena, but of existences themselves; and existences, as we have seen, are and can be nothing but the Divine creative act, which, as what is called conservation of existences is nothing but the very act, unsuspended, that originally created them out of nothing, is constantly before our eyes in the simple fact of existence itself. As this synthesis reveals and affirms itself *a priori* in immediate intuition, it is and cannot but be certain, both ontologically and psychologically, *secundum rem* and *secundum nos*. Here is the principle of the solution, which, for the want of space, we must leave to our readers to develop for themselves.*

* Consult on the philosophical formula, or "Ideal Formula," Gioberti, *Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia*, Cap. IV. It is with some hesitation that we refer our readers to this work, because its author is in bad odor, and also because, though we have commenced the examination of it, we have as yet proceeded but a little way, and are far from having mastered it. We certainly do not refer to him as in himself authority, although his ability is unquestionable, nor as to a writer whose works can be safely consulted without great caution; but on the point on which we refer to him, he is more full and satisfactory than any other writer, ancient or modern, of our acquaintance. We cannot say that we have been absolutely indebted to him for any of the views set forth in the text, for we had obtained them, substantially, before we had the least knowledge of his writings or of his doctrines; but it would be folly on our part, and injustice to him and the public, to attempt to dissemble that he has greatly aided us to clear up our previous views, and on several not unimportant points to extend them. In his hostility to the Jesuits, we have no occasion to inform the readers of this journal that we neither do nor are likely to share, and we rejoice to hear that his *Gesuita Moderno* has

Keeping in mind what we have established, that the idea, the ideal, in modern language, whether under the aspect of intelligibility, of wisdom, goodness, power, immutability, being, is God himself, the apparent limitation of the Divine freedom the author fancies he detects can present no difficulty. Grant that the idea is uncreated, necessary, eternal, — grant that God in producing existences operates, and can operate, so to speak, only after the idea, and must conform to its intrinsic nature, — nothing is granted but that God, in creating, must create according to his *own* intrinsic nature, and can neither in creating nor in dealing with existences do violence to himself. That is, God is what he is, and cannot be any thing else, — is God and cannot cease to be God, — *is*, and cannot annihilate himself. As the only necessity supposed or supposable is his own most perfect nature, he is necessarily free to do whatever is not repugnant to that nature, that is, which would not imply his non-being; for since he is pure act, and most simple, any thing repugnant to his wisdom, intelligence, goodness, or any other attribute, would be repugnant to his very being, and imply his annihilation. But this is no restriction of his freedom, for freedom is in being, not in not being, and is restricted only by some defect in the being of whom it is predicated, never by that being's own perfection or plenitude. To say that God is free to do whatever he pleases, except annihilate himself, since the exception results from the perfection, not from the defect, of his nature, is to assert his absolute freedom; for freedom to do whatever does not imply the non-being of its possessor, *and therefore the annihilation of itself*, is the highest and most perfect freedom conceivable. The *Arbitrium Liberum*, as possessed by us, in the sense that it demands deliberation, is, of course, not predicable of God, for in that sense it implies defect; but in the sense in which it is a positive perfection, it is implied in

been placed on the *Index*. In the work to which we refer, we find many things, not immediately connected with philosophy, things affecting him as a man, a statesman, and an Italian patriot, which commend themselves neither to our judgment nor to our taste. We by no means participate in his political passions or his national prejudices; we do not expect with him to see the Church Triumphant on earth, and we wholly dissent from his doctrine that the state, instead of the Church, is the proper school-master. In a word, in those of his writings we have read, we find not a little extraneous matter that we do not like, and much, if not unsound, that is easily misapprehended, and not inapt to lead to dangerous errors; but we have, in what pertains exclusively to philosophy, found much that we most heartily approve, and which, in our age especially, needs to be profoundly meditated.

the freedom we have just asserted, and must be predicable of God as most perfect being. Then since God is pure act, and no distinction *secundum rem* is admissible in the Divine nature, God must be intrinsically *Arbitrium Liberum*, and therefore whatever he does must, from the very perfection of his nature, be done by free-will. Consequently, the Divine operations are and can be subjected to no necessity but the necessity *ex suppositione*, that is, the necessity which compels you, if you suppose a thing is, to suppose it is, or that compels us to say, What is is, and cannot *not* be without ceasing to be.

But we have dwelt longer than we intended on the author's note. We return to his text. We regret that our limits compel us to leave many things unnoticed which we should be glad to consider. The author goes into a long argument, in which he attempts to deduce from his primary conception of himself as efficient cause another conception of himself as *relative* efficient cause, and then from himself as *relative* efficient cause to conclude God as *absolute* efficient cause. We can only cite his summing up of his argument :—

“ I have reproduced this argument as well as I could, for it passed through my mind so rapidly that I was not conscious of the steps. But all this reasoning is to no purpose. The following proposition and conclusion, if rightly considered, are self-evident :—

“ If there were no ABSOLUTE EFFICIENT CAUSE, there could be no RELATIVE EFFICIENT CAUSES : but there are RELATIVE EFFICIENT CAUSES, therefore, the ABSOLUTE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS.

“ The necessary corollary followed at once :—

“ But every efficient cause is ALIVE, therefore the ABSOLUTE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS ALIVE. I believe, therefore, in the LIVING GOD.”— pp. 99, 100.

The argument here is, substantially, the ordinary argument *a posteriori* of philosophers and natural theologians. As an explicative or interpretative argument addressed to believers, or even to those who through mental confusion occasioned by false science fancy themselves atheists, it certainly has its value, and a very high value ; but as an argument addressed to those supposed *really* to doubt that God is, it does not appear to us to be properly an argument at all, for it contains no genuine illation. “ If there were no absolute efficient cause, there could be no relative efficient causes.” Nothing in the world more true. So if there were no relative efficient causes, there could be no absolute efficient cause. The argument rests on the supposi-

tion, allowable or not, that absolute and relative are correlatives, and that one cannot be without the other. But if the absolute and relative are correlatives, and cannot be, one without the other, how can you know one without knowing the other? Correlatives do not *imply*, they *connote*, one the other. The assertion of one is then the assertion of both, and the doubt of one is the doubt of both. If, then, you place, as you necessarily do in the argument, the absolute in question, you place the relative equally in question, and how then can you obtain your conclusion without begging the question?

“But there are relative efficient causes.” We do not doubt it; but how do you know it? You either do know it, or you do not. If you do not, you are not entitled to your conclusion, “the absolute efficient cause is.” If you do, you know it either immediately, by intuition, or mediately, by discursion. If the former, you have intuition of *relation*, then of the absolute, for relation without the *related*, the two terms of the comparison, is an abstraction, a nullity, and therefore no object of intuition. If you have intuition of the absolute, you know it immediately, and therefore do not conclude it. If you say the latter, that you know the relative mediately, by discursion, you must then have some *datum* intuitively revealed from which you can conclude it. Whatever is intuitively revealed must be revealed either as simple entity or being, or as entity or being under the category of relation of some sort. The supposition itself excludes the latter; therefore nothing remains but the former, that is to say, pure, unrelated being, simple, naked entity. But pure being, simple entity, is already absolute, and if you assume that you can derive the relative from it, your argument is a *vicious* circle, for you take the absolute to prove the relative, and then the relative to prove the absolute.

But the grand difficulty is, that you cannot conclude the relative from simple entity or being. This is what we have all along insisted upon. Have we not already shown that the simple formula, Entity is, is unproductive, and that, torture it as you will, you can get from it only Entity is? The conception of relation is neither generated nor generable from simple entity. We grant you have the intuition of being, of entity, and that this intuition contains a judgment *a priori*, namely, Entity or being is. But, if this is the whole of the intuition, how without a further intuition are you to get beyond it, or to add to it? Conceptions without intuition, remember, Kant

has for ever settled, are empty, and of no value.* As entity you know it, but, by the very supposition, you do not know it under any relation, positive or negative, of time, place, or position, of quantity or quality, of cause or effect, of habit, action, or passion. All you can say of it is, *It is*. Term it in conception God, and you are a pantheist; term it yourself, and you are an autotheist; term it nature, and you are an atheist.

Here is seen the folly of Descartes, who pretends to deduce God and the universe from *sum, I am*; but from the simple intuition *I am*, only *I am* is attainable. The author very properly adds, I am *efficient cause*, but from *I am efficient cause*, nothing follows but I and my effects. From I and my effects, I can conclude only my relation to my effects and theirs to me; not that I am myself an effect, a creature, related to an efficient cause which I am not. Nor can I infer that I am a relative, dependent cause from the external causes which, in point of fact, limit and not unfrequently thwart my causality; for with only the intuition, *I am efficient cause*, these really external causes, as the Idealists amply prove, are to me only sensitive affections, only myself, and therefore warrant no conclusion beyond myself. That I am a relative efficient cause cannot then be concluded from sensible impressions, nor from the intuition of myself as efficient cause. Then either I cannot conceive myself as *relative* efficient cause, or I have direct intuition of myself as *relative* efficient cause. But the relative connotes the absolute. Therefore, to have intuition of myself as relative, as an effect, as a creature, is also to have intuition of the other term of the comparison, that is, of the absolute, the creator, God.

The patrons of the argument *a posteriori* do not deny, they in reality assume, what we maintain, — that we have direct intuition of ourselves and external objects, as relative, as effects, as creatures, or existences; but they assume that, while we know them immediately, we know God only mediately, as implied in them, and logically concluded from them, and therefore that they are more evident to us than he. They are, probably, led to make this assumption from mistaking sensible for intelligible intuition, or, at least, from regarding the sensible object as more evident than the intelligible. Certainly, we have no sensible intuition of God, and if we have sensible in-

* Thus far Kant was right; his error was in denying intelligible, and admitting only sensible intuition.

tuition of existences, it must be conceded that they are in the sensible order more evident than the Creator; and this, we suppose, is what St. Thomas means, when he says the effect is more evident *quoad nos* than the cause. But it must be borne in mind, that, without the intelligible, the sensible is not, or at least only a sensitive affection, from which nothing is concludable, as we have already shown : and, moreover, the effect in its character of *effect*, the character in which it must be asserted, if any thing is to be concluded from it, is no more a sensible intuition than the cause. The effect as external object strikes the senses, but as effect it does not. The relation of effect belongs as much to the intelligible order as does the relation of cause ; for it is only the same relation viewed from its terminus *ad quem*, instead of its terminus *a quo*. The greater or less degree of evidence predicated or predicable of either must be in the same order, and, as the cause is confessedly in the intelligible order, the only evidence of the effect that can be any thing to the purpose must be also in the intelligible order. We therefore deny the assumption, for we deny that we can have immediate intuition of existences as existences without immediate intuition of God. What is not is not intelligible, and what is not intelligible cannot be known. Existences, therefore, cannot be immediately revealed to us in intuition without God, for without him they are unintelligible, and unintelligible because without him they are not existences, that is, do not exist. To suppose a thing intelligible without that by which it exists, is only supposing that it can be intelligible without being. Knowledge, from the very fact that what is not is not intelligible, must follow the order of being. Then, as existences in the order of being are not and cannot be without God, it follows that they cannot be without him in the order of knowledge. Then they cannot be more evident to us than God ; for certainly a thing can never be more evident to us than that by which it is evident, and without which it would be totally inevident.

The *a priori* argument, sometimes resorted to, is even less of an argument, if possible, than the argument *a posteriori*, because its pretension is to demonstrate God from necessary and eternal principles, and necessary and eternal principles are God already, as we have shown in showing that the idea is God. Indeed, we are unable to conceive the possibility of constructing an argument to prove that God is, which does not assume that he is, both as its necessary conditions and principle. From sensibles alone we can conclude nothing, because they have in

themselves no *nexus*, as Hume has clearly demonstrated, that binds them to the necessary. The intelligible must supply the *nexus*, before we can begin to frame our argument, and the intelligible is the idea, and the idea is God. In every argument, the major term must be more general in its order than the conclusion, or nothing is concluded. But in no order, not even in that of knowledge, as we have just proved, is there any thing conceivable more general than God. *Ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia*, says the inspired Apostle, and it must be so, if God is at all. How, then, frame an argument to conclude him, that does not assume him as its condition and principle? A God that could be concluded by an argument would, it strikes us, by that fact alone, be proved to be not the true God; for if he could be concluded, it would at least follow that something can be known without knowing him, and then that something can be without him, and if something can be without him, his very being is denied.

But this inability, in the ordinary sense of the words, to demonstrate that God is, should rather rejoice than alarm us, for it proceeds from the perfection of our evidence that he is, not from its defect. We cannot prove that God is, for we have nothing more evident, *secundum rem* or *secundum nos*, than he with which to prove that he is. He is QUI EST, He who is, and from whom, and by whom, and in whom are all things, and therefore by and in whose intelligibility all things are intelligible. He is the Being of beings, himself intelligible, and the principle of all intelligibleness; himself evident, and the principle of all evidence; himself certain, and the principle of all certitude and of all certainty. What more can be asked? He is light, the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world. Is the light less evident than that which it enlighteneth? Is it the object enlightened that affirms the light, or is it the light that affirms the object, and in affirming it affirms itself? No, we have erred. It is not we who make God, but God who has made us. It is not we nor creation that affirm God, but it is God who affirms himself, in direct intuition, and the heavens and the earth, the sea and the land, all creatures great and small, catch the Divine affirmation, and echo and reëcho it to every intelligence.

It is a great mistake to suppose that God may be placed in question. It is this mistake that has created the embarrassments from which we find it so difficult to extricate ourselves. It is agreed on all hands, that God, if at all, is real and necessary

Being, — *Ens reale et necessarium*, — and the characteristic of the necessary is that the contrary cannot be thought. But to place God in question is to concede that the contrary can be thought. To proceed in the face of this concession to prove that God is, can be only proceeding to prove impossible what we concede to be possible. *Ex Deo, et per Deo, et in Deo sunt omnia*. Therefore, to place God in question is to place all things in question, and then nothing that is not conceded to be doubtful remains from which to construct an argument. From doubtful premises we can obtain only a doubtful conclusion. The moment you concede that God is doubtful, you concede universal doubt, and that certainty is unattainable. Here, again, is the condemnation of Descartes, who makes the assumption, that all things are doubtful, or that nothing is certain, or to be accepted as certain, till demonstrated, the necessary point of departure of philosophy. But if we start with the assumption, that nothing is certain, how are we ever to arrive at certainty? If all things can be thought as uncertain, what is there that can be thought as certain? If all things cannot be thought as uncertain, the Cartesian doubt is impracticable, and Cartesianism proposes to arrive at truth by starting with a stupendous falsehood. Yet Descartes had some reputation in his day, and his method is still that of the majority of modern philosophers. For ourselves, we reject the Cartesian method as unphilosophical, absurd, impossible, and impious. The fool, no doubt, has said in his heart, God is not, — *Dixit insipiens in corde suo : Non est Deus*, — but has only evinced his folly; for it is only by intuition of God that he is able to give a meaning to his words, since negation is intelligible only by virtue of the positive. The words “God is not” are universal negation, but universal negation is absolutely unintelligible, and consequently, if nothing is, nothing can be denied; that is, unless something is, it is impossible to make a denial, and if something is, God is. Well, then, does the Holy Ghost say it is the fool who says in his heart, “God is not.”

We deny not that there have been persons — may God in his great mercy pardon us, for we were ourselves during a brief period of the number — who persuade themselves that they doubt the Divine Being. And we certainly have encountered theories, ancient and modern, sometimes under the name of philosophy, and sometimes under the name of religion, which are explicitly atheism, or which necessarily, if pushed to their logical consequences, lead to atheism; nevertheless, we maintain that no man ever did, ever will, or ever can really doubt that God is. Athe-

ism, or what passes for atheism, is rarely the vice of the unlettered and simple, but nearly always of the refined, the voluptuous, and the speculative, and is cherished, not because there is no conviction that God is, but because that conviction condemns both the practice and the speculations which atheism favors. It is not that the light does not shine, but those people resolutely refuse to let it illuminate them because their deeds are evil, or, at least, deeds that will not bear the light. Mere practical atheists, that is, those who conduct themselves as if there were no God, present no difficulty; for it is evident that their conduct necessarily implies nothing more than the inactivity, not the total absence, of belief. The so-called intellectual atheists are persons of a speculative turn of mind, and invariably take as the object of reflection, not the reality revealed in their intuitions, but their intuitions themselves, as mere psychological facts. They thus lose sight, *in the reflective order*, of the reality intuitively revealed, and build up a theory which excludes God. God not being included in their theories, they cannot believe in him theoretically, and therefore conclude they ought not to believe, do not, and cannot believe, in him at all. They are thus in will and in reflection really atheists. Nevertheless, the light, though they comprehend it not in their theories, continues to shine in their darkness; their intuitions remain, but they treat them with contempt, will not hear to them, because they see clearly, that, were they to do so, their theories would fade away as the shades of night before the rising sun. It is not that they lack conviction, but that, puffed up with the pride of intellect, and confused by false science, they stifle it, — pretending that it is the creation of fear, of habit, or of early education. Their cure is not to be effected by syllogisms, or mere reasoning. Their disease lies in the fact, that they close, instead of opening, their hearts to the truth. Take a man brought up in their school, who has all his life been poring over dry psychological conceptions, and resolutely refusing to admit as true every thing he is unable to comprehend in his contracted and dead formula, and bring him one day to leave his empty conceptions, to turn his mind to the contemplation of the objects revealed to him in his intuitions, and he is surprised to see how rapidly the mists disperse, the darkness rolls back, his doubts melt away, and the glorious reality appears before him, informing with its light his intellect, and enrapturing his heart with its beauty. He stands amazed at his former blindness, astonished at his doubts of yesterday, so clear is the light to his unclosed eye, so easy is it to

his open heart to believe. No doubt the grace of God is operating within him, but, so far as the change depends on human effort, it consists in the fact, that he has turned round with his face towards God in his intuitions, and beholds reality in the light, no longer in the shadow cast by himself. What, humanly speaking, will best serve those who esteem themselves atheists, are such considerations as tend to draw them off from mere reflection on their own psychological phenomena, and set them with free mind and open heart to contemplating the objects revealed to them and to all men in direct and immediate intuition. These are, no doubt, such as are usually presented by the patrons of the argument *a posteriori*, and, if presented in the light of a sound philosophy, for what they really are, and not for what they are not, they are all, the grace of God supposed, that can be required.

If the entire drift of our reasoning be not misapprehended, the question whether God is living God or not will present no difficulty. It has been our endeavour to enter our solemn protest against the dead abstractions of modern psychologism, to prove that there are no abstractions in nature, that abstractions are nullities, and yield only nullity, that ideas are not mere words, are not mental conceptions, are not intellections, are not subjective forms of the understanding, are not *ours*, but are real *intelligibilia*, intelligible objects, objects of our intellect, not our intellect nor the products of our intellect itself, and that they are in the Divine Mind or Eternal Reason, infinite in number considered in relation to the effects God is able to produce, considered in relation to his ability, one, and identical with himself. We have also endeavoured to establish that God reveals himself immediately to us in direct intuition as creator, actually creating, according to his own will, out of nothing, therefore as free, voluntary creator, therefore as living, personal, and therefore as proper object of worship, prayer, praise, love, and reverence.

One word more we must add, to prevent misapprehension. From the fact that we assert direct and immediate intuition of God, it must not be inferred that we assert, or intend to assert, either that we see God intuitively by himself alone, or as he is in himself, — the former of which it would be at least temerity, and the latter undeniably heresy, to assert. We assert, indeed, intuition of intelligibles, but we do not assert pure intellections, as does exaggerated spiritualism. Of pure intellections we are not naturally capable ; for we are not pure intelligences, but in-

telligence wedded to body, and therefore can naturally apprehend the intelligible only in union with the sensible. What we have denied and attempted to disprove is, that God is known only as contained implicitly in his works and discursively obtained from them ; but we have not asserted, or intended to assert, that he is known as God without his works. *Invisibilia ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quæ factæ sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur*, (Rom. i. 20,) says St. Paul, and he seems to us to express precisely our meaning. If we see God only discursively, as implicitly contained in his works, we do not see him clearly, for such implicit seeing is not clear seeing. It is not thus we see God ; but we clearly see him or the things of God, otherwise unknown or invisible to us, in understanding, or by understanding, his works, as we see the light in seeing the visible body which it renders visible. We actually see the light ; it is the primary and immediate object of our vision, and the medium by which we see all else that we do see ; but we do not see it in itself, nor by itself alone, for our eyes are too weak for that, and it would strike us blind were we to attempt to look directly into it, as any one may satisfy himself by attempting at mid-day to look directly into the sun. So in the intelligible world, we really and truly see God ; he is the primary and immediate object of the intellect, and the medium by which we intellectually see all else that we do intellectually see, understand, or know, but not as he is in himself ; for if we cannot look into the sun, which is but the shadow of his light, without being struck blind, how much less can we look into him who is light itself ; nor do we know him by himself alone, that is, apart from his works, but we know him in knowing objects, which are made intelligible objects only in and by his intelligibility, as they are made existence only by and in his creative act, or omnipotent power.

There are several things in the author's book of considerable importance, which we have passed over ; but if he seizes the real import of what we have advanced, he will have no difficulty in understanding how we view them. We have aimed, not so much to refute his particular views, as to point out what we consider to be the fundamental mistakes into which he, misled by prevailing psychologism, has fallen, and to explain their origin and establish the principles on which they can be and are to be corrected. We take our leave of the book with kind feelings towards its author, and with the confident hope of meeting him hereafter in a work which we can cordially accept.

ART. II. — *Dissertatio Historico-Dogmatica de Sacrarum Imaginum Cultu Religioso Quatuor Epochis complectens Dogma et Disciplinam Ecclesiæ super Sanctus Imagines.*
Auctore ABB. JOSEPHO GUEVERA, Hispano. Fulginæ. 1789.

IT is our object, not so much to review the able and learned treatise, the title of which we have prefixed to this article, as to arrange in an independent essay some facts, authorities, and arguments in support of the Catholic doctrine respecting the veneration of images. We shall, however, have occasion to borrow largely from the rich stores of the Abbate Guevara, and we therefore, in the outset, acknowledge our obligations to him for the chief portion of our materials.

Our design leads us to present our subject, first in an historical light, leaving the consideration of the difficulties usually brought up from the Old Testament for after consideration. In the treatise of the Abbate Guevara, the history of Christian sacred images is divided into four epochs :— 1. From the death of our Lord to the conversion of Constantine ; 2. From the reign of Constantine to that of Leo the Isaurian ; 3. From the time of the Emperor Leo to that of the Second Nicene, or Seventh Œcumenical Council ; and 4. From the Second Council of Nice to the Council of Trent. During the first period, says our learned author,—

“ Aliquæ sanctæ imagines fuere in usu, eosque *religioso cultu*, clam, ut ita loquor, timore et tyrannorum persecutione cogentibus, Christifideles prosequabantur.” “ Some sacred images were made use of, and the faithful of Christ honored them with religious veneration, privately so to speak, through the compulsion of fear and of the persecution of tyrants.”

“ In secunda, serenitatis aurora Ecclesiæ oborta, sine ullo timore, in templis haberi cœptum ; ipseque pius Constantinus multas coloribus effigiatus, auro argentoque cœlatas fusilesque, qua late ejus imperium porrigebatur, collocari jussit, maxima Christiani orbis lætitia.” “ In the second, the dawn of peace having arisen upon the Church, they began to be placed, without the least fear, in the temples ; and the pious Constantine himself commanded many, both images painted with various colors, and such as were formed from silver and gold, and also sculptures, to be erected, throughout the whole wide extent of his dominions, to the extreme joy of the Christian world.”

“ In tertia, Leo Isauricus,” etc. “ In the third, Leo the Isaurian,” and other persecutors.

"In quarta, cultus restitutus." "In the fourth, the religious honor of images restored."

Again, our author says of the first epoch : —

"Prima epocha, frequenter adorationi publicæ non expositas, ob causam persecutionum. Religio enim sancta, qua nititur prudenti discretionem, quibusdam non obligatoriis, ne sibi ipsi officiat, laudabiliter desciscit, tempus expectans opportunus." "During the first epoch, holy images were not frequently exposed for public veneration,* on account of the persecutions. For our holy religion, with that prudent discretion which she practises, laudably, at times, abstains from some things not of obligation, in order to avoid incurring an injury, awaiting, meanwhile, a more favorable opportunity."

It appears from this, that the period between the First and Second Nicene Councils, that is, between the fourth and eighth centuries, was the one in which the use of sacred images, and the doctrine concerning the veneration due to them, were universally confirmed and recognized; and that the Church based her practice and teaching upon a tradition received from the preceding ages, and handed down from the very days of the Apostles, — which will become clear as we proceed. In the words of our author : —

"Dogma Catholicum in quacumque materiæ, ab initio fuit semper idem, semper invariabiliter est idem, et semper immutabile ubique terrarum permanebit. 'Verbum enim Domini permanet in æternum. Cælum et terra pertransibunt; verba enim Domini non præteribunt.' Tamen, dogma non semper æque manifestum, neque omnibus pari claritatis splendore proditum. Ecclesia, quæ laudabili pollet discretionis dono, prudenter judicavit, non omnia ab initio cum proventu declaranda, sed, dato tempore, et circumstantiis convenientibus, quæ occulta manebant, et quasi in abscondito latebant, educere in lucem ad populorum instructionem." "The Catholic dogma, in regard to every subject whatsoever, has been always the same, from the beginning, remains always unchangeably the same, and will always continue, in every part of the world, immutable. For, 'The word of the Lord remains for ever. Heaven and earth shall pass away, but the word of the Lord shall not pass away.' Nevertheless, a dogma is not always equally manifest, or brought before the minds of all with an equally brilliant light. The Church, who possesses

* We use the term "veneration," instead of literally translating the Latin word by "adoration," because experience has taught us that some of our antagonists will persist in giving to our words a meaning which they are never intended to have.

an admirable gift of discretion, has prudently judged that she would not *declare* all things, explicitly, from the beginning, but, at a given time, and in suitable circumstances, would bring into the light some things which were hitherto in concealment, and covered with a certain obscurity.”*

Let us first examine the few remaining monuments of the primitive tradition, from which the Church of the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries derived her doctrine. These are the image of Edessa, the Veronica, the image of Paneas, the images found in the cemeteries, and a number of passages from the Fathers.

1. The image of Edessa. The story of the letter of King Abgarus to our Saviour, and our Saviour's reply, accompanied by a miraculous image of himself, is well known. The letters attributed to Christ and Abgarus are universally regarded as apocryphal; this, however, does not prove that the story itself is false. It can be traced to a very early period, and, although we cannot tell exactly what was the true history on which it is founded, yet it seems clear that there was one, and the whole matter, obscure as it is, illustrates the belief and temper of the Ante-Nicene period. The Greek Menology contains a festival called “*Commemoratio Imaginis non manufactæ D. D. N. S. J. C. ex urbe Edessæ egressæ, et in hanc urbem regiam et a Deo servatam, deportatæ.*” “The Commemoration of the Image not made by hands of the Lord our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, brought from the city Edessa, and transported to this royal city, by God protected.” The history was, moreover, examined and approved by the Second Nicene Council. St. John Damascen says:—

“Cum Abgarus Edessæ rex, eo nomine pictorem misisset, ut Domini imaginem exprimeret, neque id pictor, ob splendorem ex ipsius vultu manantem consequi potuisset. Dominum ipsum divinæ suæ ac vivificæ faciei pallium admovisse, imaginemque suam ei impressisse, se que illud ad Abgarum, ut ipsius cupiditati satisfaceret, misisse, ferunt.” “They say, that when Abgarus, king of Edessa, had sent a painter for the purpose of taking the likeness of our Lord, and the painter was unable to do it, on account of the splendor which was emanating from his countenance, the Lord himself

* The reader can hardly need to be admonished, that here is nothing resembling Mr. Newman's doctrine of development. The doctrine is from the beginning, but is not always and everywhere declared with equal distinctness.

applied a cloth to his divine and life-giving face, impressed his likeness upon it, and sent it to Abgarus, in order to satisfy his desire."

Pope Adrian says the same in his letter to the Council, and Gregory II. in his letter to the Greek emperor, Leo the Isaurian. It is to be particularly noted, also, that this story was not questioned by the Iconoclasts.

Ascending higher, we have the testimony of Eusebius, who had seen and examined the historical records of Edessa. This shows that the credit of the tradition was established at Edessa, before the fourth century, and throws it back indefinitely into primitive antiquity. Spondanus, moreover, asserts, from Eusebius, — who cites as his authority Procopius's History of the Persian Wars, where the passage cannot now be found, but from which it may have been lost, — that the statue of Christ was placed over the gate of the city, having the inscription, "O God Christ, he who hopes in thee shall never fall from his hope." He also says, that "the Saviour's protection rendered the attempts of the enemy useless," and that when "this report was spread far and wide," Chosroes, king of the Persians, having heard of it, attacked and besieged the city, but was driven off with signal loss. An image which had been kept at Edessa from time immemorial was translated to Constantinople in the tenth century, as being this miraculous image; and Constantine Porphyrogenitus, emperor of Constantinople, in a public oration, declared that the translation had been attended with numerous miracles, such as the blind regaining sight, the lame leaping up, the diseased, palsied, and infirm being restored to health and soundness.

Whatever doubt may hang over this story of the miraculous image of Edessa, this much is clear, — that an image to which this miraculous history traditionally belonged was preserved at Edessa from a time indefinitely earlier than the era of Eusebius (320); and that such was the temper of the Church at the time of his writing, that the narrative which he took from the Edessan annals found instant and universal credit.

2. The Veronica. This is the Vera Icon, or true likeness, impressed by our Lord upon the handkerchief of a pious woman, who assisted him on the way to the place of crucifixion, and who is thence called St. Veronica.

The Bollandists, who were the most learned and judicious critics that could be selected from the Society of Jesus, say that the tradition respecting the Veronica is undoubted among the orthodox, "*indubitata apud orthodoxos*" (Feb. 4). The testimony of St. Methodius is claimed by some as proving

that this Veronica was sent to Rome in the days of Tiberius, who, being afflicted with leprosy, had sent to Jerusalem to pray our Saviour to come and heal him ; he having heard of our Lord's miracles, but not of his death. The passage cited as from St. Methodius reads thus : —

“ Quæ dum nuncios convenisset, et ita esse, atque se habere per omnia evidentissime asseruit, Romam ab ipsis delata est, atque in præsentiam principis adducta, speciem divinæ testificationis ostendit, et virtutem perfecti medicaminis gratia Christi mirabiliter effecit.”
 “ Who, when she had come before the ambassadors, and had most clearly, by all means, proved that the thing was so, and that what was reported was really true, was brought by them to Rome, and being led into the presence of the prince, exhibited the appearance of the divine testimony, and wonderfully exerted the virtue of a perfect cure, by the grace of Christ.”

The only reason for doubting the genuineness of this extract is, that Marianus Schotus, a writer of the eleventh century, from whom it is taken, is in some things unworthy of credit. Tillemont and others are of opinion that it is a genuine quotation from St. Methodius, Bishop of Tyre and martyr ; and if so, it proves the translation of the Veronica to Rome in the reign of Tiberius. F. Honoratus a Sancta Maria, whom Burnet has so highly lauded for his learning and philosophical judgment, considers it doubtful whether this translation took place at this period or later ; but this learned father and Bxovius consider it as certain, from unquestionable documents, that the public religious ceremonies in honor of the sacred Veronica date, at latest, from the fourth century. The office of the Veronica has been attributed to St. Ambrose, in support of which the fact is adduced that the church of Milan alone has retained it, all other churches of Italy having conformed to the Roman rite. In the year 705, Pope John VII. erected a shrine for this image, the walls of which were decorated with magnificent pictures in tessellated work, representing scenes in the life of Christ, and the pavement of which was also of tessellated marble. There is extant an ancient Gradual, which was used, according to the testimony of Grimaldus, one of the officers of Pope John VII., on Christmas eve, when it was customary to offer special prayers and chant the *Te Deum* before this shrine. The linen cloth which was wrapped around our Saviour's body is also preserved, having on it the impression of his sacred form.

3. The image of Paneas. This was a statue erected at Paneas, or Cæsarea-Philippi, by the woman who was healed of

an issue of blood by our Saviour. The history of this image comes to us on the authority of Eusebius and Sozomen, corroborated by Theophylact, the Second Council of Nice, and universal tradition. The following is the narrative of Eusebius (*Hist.*, Lib. VII. c. 14) : —

“ Sed quoniam in mentionem hujus civitatis incidi, operæ pretium arbitror, historiam hoc loco citare, quæ digna plane videtur, quam memoriæ ad posteritatem commendemus. Mulierem illam sanguinis profluvio afflictatam, quam sanctorum evangeliorum testimonio, a Salvatore nostro morbi remedium invenisse cognovimus, ex ea civitate oriundam, illiusque domum ibi ostendi, et admirabilia quædam Salvatoris, in eam beneficii monumenta, et quasi trophæa ad hoc tempus durare memorant. Pro foribus enim domus illius æneam mulieris effigiem genibus flexis et manibus instar supplicantis in anteriorem partem intensis, super editum lapidem collocatam. Huic e regione erectam imaginem ex eadem materia confectam, vestitu ad talos demisso decenter ornatam et manum mulieri porrigentem: ad cujus pedes in ipsa basi, peregrinam quamdam et inusitatam herbam enasci, quam quidem ut ad ænei vestitus fimbriam excreverit, morbi cujusque generis medicandan vim et facultatem. Hanc statuam effigiem Jesu exprimere dicunt, quam ad nostram usque ætatem manentem ipsi ad eam civitatem profecti, oculis cernebamus.” “ But since I have fallen upon mentioning this city, I think it worth my while to relate here an historical fact, which seems evidently worthy that we should make provision for keeping up the memory of it for posterity. They relate, that the woman afflicted by a bloody flux, whom we know from the testimony of the holy Gospels to have found a remedy of her disease from our Saviour, was a native of that city, and that her house is now shown there, and that some memorable monuments of our Saviour's benefit to her, and, as it were, trophies, remain even to the present time. For there is, before the doors of that house, a kneeling statue of the woman, made of brass, with the hands stretched out in front, in the manner of a suppliant, and placed on a high pedestal of stone. Near to this, an image made of the same material is erected, covered with drapery reaching to the feet, in a comely manner, and extending its hand to the woman: at the feet of which, and from out of the pedestal itself, an exotic and unusual herb springs up, which, moreover, when it has grown up as high as the edge of the brazen garment, has the virtue and power of healing every kind of disease. They say that this statue represents the figure of Jesus, and this same statue, which remains even to our age, we ourselves saw, with our own eyes, when we went to that city.”

Sozomen testifies that the Emperor Julian removed this statue and put his own in its place, which was struck by light-

ning, the head and neck being thrown violently on the ground, and only the blackened body remaining when he wrote. The fragments of the image of Christ, which was broken in pieces by the heathen, were carefully gathered up by the Christians and preserved in the churches. One remark of Eusebius, which follows his narrative, is particularly worthy of notice : —

“Nec plane mirum eos, qui ex Gentilibus prognati, a Salvatore, dum inter homines vivebat, beneficiis affecti fuissent, ita fecisse : cum et nos, Petri et Pauli Apostolorum, et Christi etiam ipsius, imagines in picturis colorum varietate expressas conservatasque aspexerimus.” “Nor, indeed, is it strange that those persons of Gentile origin, who had received blessings from the Saviour while he was living among men, should have done this ; since even we have seen likenesses of the Apostles Peter and Paul, and also of Christ himself, painted in pictures with various colors, and carefully preserved.”

This passage alone sustains the proposition of our author in its full extent. Observe, Eusebius adduces these images and pictures which had been preserved from a period long anterior to the Nicene era, to prove that images of our Saviour were made, “dum inter viventes agebat,” “while he was acting among the living” ; and thus traces back the history of sacred images to the “cunabula Ecclesiæ,” “the cradle of the Church.”

A canon of the Council of Antioch, so called, — that is, one of the Apostolical canons, which was produced at the Second Council of Nice, — is available in proof of the prevailing belief of the early period when those spurious canons were compiled, concerning the doctrine of the Apostles. It reads thus : —

“Ne decipiantur Salvati ob idola ; sed pingant ex opposito divinam, humanamque manufactam, impermixtamque effigiem Dei veri et Salvatoris D. N. J. C. : ipsiusque servorum, contra idola et Judæos ; neque errent in idolis, nec similes sint Judæis.” “Let not the faithful be deceived in respect to idols ; but, in opposition to them, let them paint the image of the divine person, also made human without any mixture, of the true God and Saviour, our Lord Jesus Christ ; and also of his servants, against idols and the Jews ; and let them neither err in idols, or become similar to the Jews.”

Baronius and Benedict XIV. are of the opinion, that the cross was placed over altars from the time of the Apostles.

4. As to ancient images and pictures found in the cemeteries, and preserved at Rome, although we intended to touch upon

this part of our subject when we began, we must content ourselves with referring our readers to Dr. Wiseman's Letters to Mr. Poynder, and other works which contain the requisite information.

5. We come now to cite some passages from the Fathers, as evidences of the Catholic tradition respecting holy images. St. Paulinus of Nola (353 – 431) and Prudentius speak of an ancient image of Abraham which they had seen. St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Chrysostom also say, that for a long time Christians had worn rings having images of Christ and the saints upon them. Tertullian (*De Pudicit.*, c. vii.) testifies, that in his time, (end of the second and beginning of the third century,) Christ was engraved on the chalices, as the Good Shepherd carrying the lost sheep on his shoulders. “*Ubi est ovis perdita, a Domino requisita, et humeris ipsius revecta? Procedant ipsæ picturæ calicum vestrorum,*” etc. “Where is the lost sheep, sought by the Lord, and brought back on his shoulders? Let the very pictures on your chalices come forward,” &c. And, c. 10: — “*Patrocina-bitur Pastor, quem in calice depingitis.*” “The Shepherd, whom you represent on the chalice, will patronize us.” Eusebius and Sozomen, cited above, also properly come in under this head.

The greater number of testimonies belong to the second epoch, between the First and Second Councils of Nice. Some already cited belong also to that epoch, but all bear witness to the doctrine and usage of the first. Before the time of Constantine, we can find but a few faint traces remaining, to tell us what was the doctrine and practice of Christians concerning sacred images; but, though few and faint, they are satisfactory, illustrated as they are by the clear light of the subsequent epoch. “This epoch,” says Guevara, “is properly to be commenced from the year 312, in which Heaven, by the miraculous appearance of the cross, gave a brilliant precedent (*præluxit*) to the public use of sacred images in the Church. From that time, sacred images were publicly set up, Constantine himself, by the pious instinct of the Deity, laudably directing, and admonishing others by letters which he despatched, to imitate the same holy example. . . . You might say, indeed, that God wished to teach the Christian people, by the miraculous exhibition of the cross, how consistent is the use of sacred forms.” This last sentence conveys an excellent thought; and evidently, as the general and public use of images, and their solemn veneration, are to be traced to the time of Constantine, as their chief

promoter, and as he was moved in what he did by the miraculous vision of the cross, that vision is a divine sanction of the whole doctrine and practice, in this respect, of the epoch we are considering.

The following is a description of some of the images erected by this religious prince:—

“ In the reservoir of the baptistery which is called the Constantinian, he placed a lamb of the purest gold, of 170 pounds’ weight. On the left of the lamb, a John the Baptist, of silver, holding the following written label:— ‘ Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi.’ In the Constantinian Basilica he made a silver shrine, having in front of it our Saviour sitting on a seat or throne, the whole weighing 120 pounds, and the twelve Apostles, each five feet high and weighing 90 pounds, with crowns of the purest silver, which weighed 140 pounds; and four silver angels, each five feet high, and weighing 115 pounds, with gems of Alabanda.” “ Since the pious Constantine was persuaded that all the happiness of himself and of his empire was to be attributed to the holy and venerable cross, and to the Saviour Jesus Christ, he constructed images of Christ and the cross in as great numbers as possible. In Constantinople, in the Mediterranean Forum, there was a very large fountain, constructed with wonderful art, whose summit an image of the Good Shepherd beautifully decorated. And there also you might see the memorable history of Daniel unharmed among the lions, represented in brass. In the greater palace, a cross was placed, wrought in with precious stones of extraordinary size.”

The author of an Ode on the Passion, ascribed to Lactantius, thus alludes to the crucifixes which were placed, from this period, in the churches:—

“ Quisquis ades, mediique subis ad limina Templi
Siste parum. Insonsemque tuo procrimine passum
Respice me, me corde, animo, me in pectore serva.
Ille ego, qui casus hominum miseratus acerbos,
Huc veni,” etc.

“ You, who the threshold of my Temple’s nave approach,
Stop for a time, and me behold, the guiltless One,
For your crimes suffering: let your heart and mind and soul
Retain me; I am He, who, pitying man’s deep woes,
Have hither come,” &c.

St. Paulinus thus describes the images with which the apsis of the church was adorned in the fourth and fifth centuries:—

“ Pleno coruscat Trinitas mysterio,
Stat Christus, Agno vox Patris intonat;
Et per Columbam Spiritus Sanctus fluit.
Crucem, corona lucido cingit globo,
Cui coronæ sunt corona Apostoli.”

"The Trinity in full, mysterious splendor shines :
Christ stands, and o'er the Lamb thunders the Father's voice,
While in a dove-like shape the Holy Ghost rides down.
A crown with lucid circle binds a cross,
The Twelve Apostles crown the crown itself."

"Cerne coronatam Domini super atria Christi
Stare crucem, duro spondentem celsa labore
Præmia. Tolle crucem qui vis auferre coronam."

"See crowned, above the courts of Christ our Lord, a cross
Erected; pledge of high reward for labor hard;
Take up the cross, brave soul, that would the crown possess."

Prudentius also gives a description of the image of the martyr Cassian, in his Hymn on Saints Cassian and Hippolytus : —

"Erexī ad cælum faciem, stetit obvia contra,
Fucis colorum picta imago martyris,
Plagos mire gerens, totos lacerata per artus,
Ruptam minutis præferens punctis cutem.
Innumeri circum pueri, (miserabile dictu,)
Confossa parvis — membra figebant — stylis."

"Lifting my eyes, I saw before me stand,
With various colors drawn, a martyr's form,
Wounded in wondrous sort, the limbs all torn,
And skin with smallest punctures thickly pierced;
While numerous throngs of children, (sad to tell,)
Through his stabbed members thrust their little styles."

St. Basil exclaims, in his Oration on St. Barlaam : —

"Surgite nunc athleticorum gestorum præstantissimi pictores : mutilatæ, hujus ducis, imagini, artis vestræ ornamenta conferte, et obscurius a me designatum victorem, laureatum industriæ vestræ coloribus illustrate. Discedam victus a vobis præclarorum martyris facinorum pictura. Tali hodie parta vobis per vestram dexteritatem victoria, superatus gaudeam. Manum videam, cum igne pugnantem, accuratius a vobis delineatam : in vestra tabella pugilem aspiciam, elegantius descriptum. . . . Qui nimmo, in eadem tabula, præsens Christus appingatur."

"Arise, now, you most skilful painters of athletic exploits; cover the mutilated figure of this leader with the ornaments of your art, and decorate with the colors of your industry him, who has been more dimly drawn by me, as a laurelled victor. I will depart, vanquished by you in depicting the brilliant deeds of the martyr. Your skill having this day obtained for you so great a victory, I will rejoice in my own defeat. I can see the hand battling with the fire, more correctly delineated by you : in your picture, I can behold the combatant more elegantly represented. . . . Yes, even let Christ be painted with him in the same picture."

Theodoret has a most explicit and satisfactory passage in his History of St. Simeon Stylites : —

"Aiunt Romæ, fuisse cum ab omnium ore celebratum, ut in omnibus officinarum vestibulis, et porticibus, ei parvas posuerint imagines, *hinc sibi præsidium et tutelam parantes.*"

"They say at Rome, that he was famous by the common speech of all, so that in all the vestibules of their offices, and in their porticos, they erected little images to him, *thus securing to themselves protection and patronage.*"

The following passage, quoted by Cardinal Gotti and others from a supposed fragment of an Epistle of St. Basil to Julian the Apostate, is given up by Tillemont. It was read at the Second Nicene Council, and is, at least, good testimony of the belief of the age preceding that Council. According to the Latin version it reads : —

"Characteres imaginum illorum (*sc. sanctorum*), honoro et palam adoro. Hoc enim nobis traditum a sanctis Apostolis non est prohibendum; sed in omnibus ecclesiis nostris eorum historias erigimus." "The forms of the images of these persons (*i. e.* the saints), honor and openly adore. For this, which was handed down to us by the holy Apostles, is not to be forbidden; but in all our churches we erect the memorials of these men."

We come now to the epoch of the Second Nicene Council. A perusal of any minute and accurate account of the Iconoclastic heresy, and of this Council which condemned it, such, for instance, as that of Henrion in his admirable Ecclesiastical History, is sufficient to decide the question we are treating of for any one who respects Catholic antiquity.

The Iconoclastic doctrine was a new opinion, in opposition to the universal practice of the Church, based on a tradition reaching back into Catholic antiquity, and having no source short of the Apostles.

"If *this ancient custom*," writes St. Germanus, Patriarch of Constantinople, "leads us to idolatry, why has it not been abolished in several œcumenical councils which have been held since the persecutions? This kind of religious observance is not concentrated in a small number of cities, or in those which are the least considerable; it is the custom of almost all countries, and, certainly, of the first and most illustrious churches." To the Emperor Leo he said, — "Remember, my lord, I conjure you, what you have promised at your coronation, and that you have called God to witness, *that you would change nothing in the tradition of the Church.*" Again : — "It is impossible for me to change any thing without an œcumenical council which may explain the tradition."

Pope Gregory II. thus expostulates with Leo : —

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“ You have gone on so well for ten years, who has stopped you at this point, and caused you to make such a deadly fall ? Who has drawn you aside from the path marked out by the Fathers and the six general councils ? ”

St. John Damascene writes : —

“ Either honor no material thing, or refrain from introducing absurd innovations in the usages established by our fathers. Many councils have been held ; whence comes it that none of them has condemned *the worship which we practise from all antiquity* ? ” *

The authors and advocates of the heresy were the basest of men. Xenajas, a Persian refugee slave, who was surreptitiously made bishop without having been baptized, called by Nicephorus “ peridoneus Satanæ minister ” (“ a most fit minister of Satan ”) ; Leo the Isaurian ; Constantine Copronymus ; Anastasius, the intruded Patriarch of Constantinople, “ venalis religionis, quandoque orthodoxus, quandoque heterodoxus, pro temporis opportunitate, vecors, et duplici corde et aspectu ” (one whose religion was for sale, sometimes orthodox, sometimes heterodox, according to the convenience of the time, slothful, and hypocritical both in his heart and in his looks) ; his successor, Constantine, “ vir impius et impurus, dignus talis prædecessoris successor ” (an impious and impure man, worthy to succeed such a predecessor) ; — these, and similar men, were the founders and promoters of Iconoclasm. On the other hand, as soon as the heresy was avowed, all the saints, doctors, and illustrious prelates, — the Popes Gregory and Adrian, Saints Germanus and Ignatius, Patriarchs of Constantinople, the Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, St. John Damascene, St. Theodore the Studite, St. Stephen the Younger, a martyr honored by miracles, and others, — pronounced with one voice that it was contrary to the ancient faith and tradition of the Church. After several turbulent assemblies of the Iconoclasts, a lawful council was assembled by the Pope’s letters missive, at which the whole Eastern Church, including the three ancient patriarchates, was represented ; as also the West, in the persons of the Roman legates. The patrons of Iconoclasm were deposed and anathematized, and many of them, among whom the most distinguished were the Bishops of Ancyra, Myra, and Amoria, were reconciled, on their solemn recantation. After careful deliberation, and an examination of Scripture, tradition, and the Fathers, a decree

* Henrion, Vol. III. Lib. XXIII.

was made, defining the doctrine of the Catholic Church, that a relative worship is due to holy images ; and this decree, after a temporary opposition in France and Germany, based only upon an error of fact and a misapprehension, was universally received, after a time triumphed completely, even in the East, and has remained firm and immovable to this day. The Second Council of Nice did not experience one fourth part of the opposition which the First Council of Nice and the Council of Chalcedon encountered. Whatever obscurity or scantiness of written tradition during the first centuries, in relation to images, there may be, it is undeniable that the judgment of this Council proves, that the living tradition which the Church enunciated by its mouth had existed in her bosom from the beginning. The Fathers of the Council, apart from their divine infallibility, were competent judges in this matter ; we are not.

The very language of the Council may perhaps be more convincing and persuasive than any thing we can say in its defence.

“ His ita se habentibus, regia quasi euntes semita, sequentes divinitus inspiratum sanctorum Patrum nostrorum magisterium et Catholicæ traditiones Ecclesiæ, (nam Spiritus Sancti hanc esse novimus, qui nimirum in ipsa habetur,) definimus in omni certitudine et diligentia ; sicut figuram pretiosæ, et vivificæ crucis, ita venerabiles ac sanctus imagines proponendas, tam de coloribus et tuxillis, quam ex alia materia, congruenter in sanctis Dei ecclesiis, et sacris vasis ac vestibus, et in parietibus, ac in tabellis, domibus ac viis ; tam videlicet Imaginem Dei et Salvatoris Nostri J. C. quam Intemeratæ Dominæ Nostræ, Sanctæ Dei Genitricis, honorabiliumque Angelorum, et omnium sanctorum simul et aliorum virorum. Quanto enim frequentius per imaginalem formationem videntur, tanto qui has contemplantur, alacrius eriguntur ad primitivorum eorum memoriam et desiderium, et ad osculum, et ad honorariam his adorationem tribuendam : non tamen veram Latriam, quæ secundum Fidem est, quæque solum Divinam naturam decet, impertiendam. Ita, et istis, sicut figuræ vivificæ crucis, et sanctis evangelis, et reliquis sacratis monumentis, incensorum et luminum oblatio ad harum honorem efficiendum exhibeatur, quemadmodum et antiquis piæ consuetudinis erat. Imaginis enim honor ad primitivum transit : et qui adorat imaginem adorat in ea depicti subsistentiam (i. e. personam).

“ Sic enim robur obtinet sanctorum Patrum nostrorum doctrina, id est traditio Sanctæ Catholicæ Ecclesiæ, quæ a finibus usque ad fines terræ suscipit evangelium. Sic Paulum, qui in Christo locutus est, et omnem divinum, apostolicum cœtum, et pristinam sanctitatem sequemur, tenentes traditiones quæ accepimus. Hinc triumphales

Ecclesiæ prophetice oanimus hymnos : *Gaude satis, Filia Sion*, etc. Eos ergo qui audent aliter et docere secundum scelestas hæreticos, et ecclesiasticas traditiones spernere, vel novitate qualibet excogitare, vel projicere aliquid ex his, quæ sunt Ecclesiæ deputata, sive evangelium, sive figuram crucis, sive imaginalem picturam, sive sanctas reliquias martyrum, aut excogitare prave, et astute subvertere quamcumque ex legitimis traditionibus, sive Ecclesiæ Catholicæ, vel etiam quasi communibus uti sacris vasis, aut venerabilibus monasteriis.

“*Postea sancta synodus exclamant* : — Omnes ita credimus : omnes id ipsum sapimus : omnes consentientes subscripsimus. Hæc est fides Orthodoxorum. Hæc est fides quæ orbem terrarum stabilivit : credentes in unum Deum in Trinitate, honorabiles imagines adoramus. Qui sic non habent, anathema sint. Qui sic non sentiant, procul ab Ecclesia pellantur,” etc.

“These things being so, as those who walk in the royal paths, and following the authority of our divinely inspired, holy Fathers, and the traditions of the Catholic Church, (for we know her to be of the Holy Ghost, who truly dwells within her,) we define with entire certainty and exactness, that both the figure of the precious and life-giving cross, and also the venerable and holy images, whether painted or made of mosaic work, or of any other material, are to be put in the holy churches of God, as is fitting, and in sacred vessels, on vestments, on walls, in pictures, in private houses, and by the public ways : to wit, both the image of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and that of our undefiled Lady, the Mother of God, and also those of the venerable Angels, and of all saintly and excellent men, without exception. For, the more frequently they are looked upon by the medium of the representative images, the more readily they who contemplate these will be incited to the remembrance and love of their originals, and to kiss them, and to pay them reverential adoration : not, however, to give them the true worship of Latria, which is according to faith, and which belongs only to the Divine nature. Let the offering of incense and lights be made to these also, as well as to the figure of the life-giving cross, the holy Gospels, and the other sacred memorials, in order to pay them due honor, as was also the pious custom of the ancients. For the honor paid to the image passes to its original ; and he who adores an image adores the person of him whom it represents.

“For in this way the doctrine of our holy Fathers receives strength, that is, the tradition of the Holy Catholic Church, which, from one end of the earth to the other, receives the Gospel. Thus we follow Paul, who spoke in Christ, and the whole divine apostolical college, and the pristine sanctity, holding the traditions which we have received. Hence we sing triumphal hymns of the Church, in prophetic language : — *Rejoice abundantly, O Daughter of Sion*,

&c. Those, therefore, who dare to think otherwise, and to teach according to the detestable heretics, and to despise the ecclesiastical traditions, or by any new invention to make an opinion, or to cast off any one of those things which have been committed to the Church, either the Gospel, or the figure of the cross, or the painted representation of forms, or the holy relics of martyrs, or to think erroneously, or to subvert cunningly any one of the legitimate traditions or those of the Catholic Church, or even to treat the sacred vessels and venerable monasteries as common," &c.

"*Afterwards the holy synod exclaimed* : — We all believe thus : we all think the same thing : we have all subscribed, consenting. This is the faith of the Orthodox. This is the faith which has given stability to the world : believing upon one God in Trinity, we adore the venerable images. Let those who do not hold thus be anathema. Let those who do not think thus be driven from the Church," &c.

In order to give a complete view of our subject, it would be necessary to consider the internal character of the dogma, its analogy with natural religion, and its relation to the Jewish law, as well as to the other doctrines of the Catholic faith. This part of the subject is capable of being placed in the clearest light, but it is not our intention to undertake the task of doing it at present. The best means of attaining to a satisfactory apprehension of the whole matter is the study of the Fathers of the eighth century, and the original documents of the Seventh Council.

We have only a few observations to make upon a particular form in which the ordinary Protestant objection is sometimes put, by certain persons who profess to be guided by a Catholic spirit. It is said, with a peculiar indistinctness and evasiveness of expression quite characteristic of the mystic and rationalizing school to which we refer, that the Nicene doctrine concerning the veneration of images is contrary to the spirit of the Old Testament, in a way in which no other part of the Roman Catholic system is so. Those who make this objection ought to make a clearer and less ambiguous charge against the Catholic doctrine, or retract it entirely. Either they should say distinctly that the Roman Church has sanctioned and practises idolatry, or abstain from an argument which derives its force and value only from the supposition that she has done so. But they perceive that, by doing either, they would leave the obscurity and vagueness which forms their only refuge, and fall into fatal dilemmas. The sin of idolatry condemned in the Old Testament consisted either in worshipping idols as hypostatically united with demons

or imaginary deities, or in worshipping these demons and false gods by the medium of their images and representations.* Unless the whole Catholic Church, then, is charged with having committed this sin of idolatry, every thing relating to it in the Old Testament is entirely irrelevant to the doctrine and practice which has prevailed in her communion. So far as the discipline of the Jewish Church is concerned, it was either similar to ours, or differed from it only by reason of the difference between the two dispensations of the old and new law. The use of sacred images, to a certain extent, was not only not forbidden, but expressly enjoined. The representation of the Lord God was indeed forbidden, because, if the Son of God was in any way, as yet, clearly revealed as a distinct person, he was known only by the great body of the faithful, in his spiritual and Divine essence. Whatever may have been the illumination of certain favored persons, it is not probable that the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, and that Economy of Redemption which is represented in the whole visible array of rites, symbols, and images used by the Church, were distinctly and universally known among the Jewish faithful. It appears that the private manufacture and use of sacred images were regarded by the Jews as forbidden; and this also was only a special precept of discipline. There is certainly a great difference apparent on the surface, as regards the use of images, between the Jewish and the Catholic Churches. But the peculiar discipline of the Jewish Church was based on reasons of expediency, or on the nature of the earlier dispensation; and therefore this difference is no argument against the Catholic Church, for it is accidental, not essential; it implies no contradiction of principles, but a mere variation in their external application. A remarkable instance of a similar contrariety between Judaism and Christianity has been adduced by Mr. Newman. Under the Jewish law, the bodies of the pious dead were treated as vile, and imparted pollution; under the Christian law, they are honored, and impart health and grace. In the one case, Christ had not yet died and risen from the grave; but now he has done so, and this is the reason of the change. The offering of Divine worship to the body of our Lord appears also to be contrary to the Jewish

* Bishop England has treated this question in his "Letters to the Gospel Messenger," and "Controversy with the Mt. Zion Missionary," and has proved that the heathen paid the absolute worship of Latria to the idols themselves. See his Works, Vol. II. Part I.

law. In fact, the mystery of the Incarnation itself is the most opposed, in its external appearance, to the manifestation of God in the Old Testament, as a Pure, Spiritual, Infinite Essence, that we can conceive one part of a Divine revelation to be to another. Reason cannot reconcile them. We have, in the mystery of the Incarnation, the very source and principle of all the external changes which have been made in the Divine Economy, including that which relates to images; and this consideration dissipates all the difficulties which overshadow the subject. The great thing to be desired by one who acknowledges the Divinity of our Lord is, to discover the reason for the change of the Jewish discipline in regard to images in the grand fact of the Incarnation, and a necessary connection between the veneration paid to them and this central doctrine of the faith, by which the former shall appear to have grown out of the latter. In order to obtain clear and accurate knowledge of that mode of representing "the invisible things of God" which is agreeable to his will, and also of the nature of that perversion of his law which he condemns as idolatry, it is necessary to reason up to some first principle grounded upon the very nature and being of God, and upon the primary doctrines of the Christian faith. The question will reduce itself at last to this: "Is it possible, and in accordance with God's will, that he should be represented by a material image?" The question is decided by the simple fact that God has created such an image of himself, the body of his Son. If God had made no such manifestation of himself as this, we might, in our ignorance, imagine, that the visible representation of God or of any spiritual substance is essentially impossible, and inconsistent with the true idea of divine and spiritual essence; and that the attempt to do so would be a sin, not merely of presumption, but of *atheism*. But when the Incarnation is admitted, we are obliged to regard all forbidden and sinful methods of representation, in short, every thing which is included under the name of idolatry, as perversions of the Divine Economy, but not as intrinsically contrary to the Divine Essence. The sin of idolatry consists rather in the substitution of counterfeits for realities, than in the attempt at representation. Accordingly, there is a plain reason why the use of images should be restrained before the coming of Christ, and encouraged afterwards. Arnold saw this truth, and has stated it clearly and forcibly. The Fathers and Saints of the age of Iconoclasm, and the whole Council of Nice, made it one of their first principles, when, with such

depth of wisdom, they elucidated and defended the Catholic doctrine.

They reason invariably from the Incarnation to the veneration of images, and illustrate their doctrine by analogies drawn from every part of the creation and revelation of God, in order to show that a common principle pervades all. It is a proof that the fixed and precise doctrine of the Church declared at Nice is a necessary consequence of the doctrine of the Incarnation, because the arguments by which the former was defended were actually derived from the deepest views of the latter. It may be remarked also, in passing, that they invariably place images in the same class with other sacred things, as temples and altars, and trace the usage of the Church in regard to all to one principle, their *sacredness*, and consequent claim to veneration, which is differently exhibited according to the different nature and signification of the objects to which it is applied. They disregard, also, the distinction between images and symbols.

In conclusion, we simply remark, that the great difficulty and repugnance which many persons experience in regard to the Catholic custom of venerating images is purely imaginary, and is much more effectually dissipated by making the stations of the cross, kissing the feet of a crucifix, and praying before an image of Our Lady, than by all the arguments of St. Thomas, or any other profound theologian. To such persons we say, as the Greek bishops did to the nonjurors, "Behold, you have stood in great fear, where no fear was."

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- ART. III. — 1. *Evangeline, a Tale of Acadie*. By HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW. Sixth Edition. Boston: William D. Ticknor & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 163.
 2. *Kavanagh, a Tale*. By HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1849. 12mo. pp. 188.

THERE are some authors who take the world by storm, and, happening to produce at the first effort precisely what popular taste demands, escape the long probation of unrequited drudgery and unmerited neglect, and secure with one bold, brilliant leap the honor and emolument of literary success.

There are others of equal power, who steal slowly and si-

lently into public favor, after weathering years of ridicule and indifference, in which the consciousness of strength, the conviction of ultimate triumph, and, perhaps, a fixed resolve to work out an interiorly recognized mission of good to mankind, have sustained and inspired them. Those, the few, who can discover and admit merit, in the course of some years, amount, with their proselytes, to a considerable body, often large enough to influence the world of letters, and to constitute their approval a passport to the consideration of that very exclusive, but passive and obedient creature, the reading community. To this class Mr. Longfellow, in some respects, belongs. His poetry was never destined to rapid and universal popularity, for it lacks the Satanic glare of Byron, the epicurean glitter of Moore, and the strong, natural, genuine, deep, unaffected pathos, humor, and home-interest of Burns ; while it certainly cannot boast that indefinable magic of a higher and the highest genius, which it is not in man to resist. Had Mr. Longfellow been born fifty years earlier than he was, he never could have lived to enjoy his reputation. But Wordsworth, and the whole tribe of Lakers in England, Goethe in Germany, and kindred, though lesser, spirits in Belgium and Sweden, have smoothed a path for him, and created the taste to which he appeals. During the last half-century England has contained two mutually hostile schools of poets, — one of passion, the other of reason, — and neither perfectly natural ; for the one went out of its way to avoid simplicity, whilst the other went out of its way to get it.

Of late years the *passion party* have almost ceased to write, except in prose, leaving to France the completion of Don Juan in the deliberate orgies of Eugene Sue, and the hypocritical, seductive sentimentality of Lamartine. The reason party — the moralists, the *Levites* — remain in undisputed possession of the field. We rejoice at their victory only as a choice of evils, for we fear the use they will make of it. It is true that their verses are undefiled by impurity and open profanity ; but they extol natural piety until they forget revealed religion, and celebrate the dignity of the creature until they lose sight of the majesty of God.

But let us give them their due. It is not easy for a poet, unsustained by the sacraments of the Church of God, to reject the delicate impurities that rise before him like Venus from the flashing foam of the Ægean, — to dispense with the sensual rouge which the morbid taste of the majority has made essential to beauty. Nor is this virtue simply a want of ability to sin ; for

the hand that sketched so finely the fate of poor Lucy might easily have made it a temptation instead of a warning, and the father of the Tryad might have created their opposites. It is not easy for one actuated chiefly by earthly ambition and worldly motives to write for the calm approval of the virtuous and discriminating few, instead of the adulation and fervent applause of the many, — to be content with the attention of the old and the wise, the enthusiasm of certain metaphysical young men and transcendental young women, — with here and there the tributary but momentary tear of a belle, whose heart may have retained a spark of feeling in spite of fashion, or a beau, whose occasional glimmerings of intellect show that he has missed his vocation. It is a noble and difficult thing to labor for the good of mankind at the expense of their applause.

Nor is it easy, while suffering from public scorn and private affliction, — while encountering the stern trials, the petty annoyances, the disappointment, shame, mortification, and regret of life, — after seeing the weaknesses of those we most admired, and exposing our own to those we best loved, — after juvenile heartbreaks and adult headaches, — independent friends and thoroughly democratic children, — to refrain from an indignant burst of universal contempt and defiance, and to compose every line to meekness, forgiveness, charity, and instruction.

What, then, has inspired the poet to attempt this difficult career? The ambition to be a *priest*! The mighty mind of Goethe “set that ball in motion.” Protestantism was beginning to decline, as the fanaticism of reform expired; her churches were without an altar; she had no hold on the skies; she had cut away all those consoling ties with which Jesus of Nazareth united heaven and earth; her aspect was forbidding and cadaverous; there was no principle of life and beauty in her. Too proud to admit or to accept the guidance of an infallible Church, the great German declared, “*The poet is the priest of God*”; and as such is Goethe regarded by his disciples. But there has been a change since his day. Goethe wished no union with Protestantism; it was reserved for England and America to effect the combination. Can any thing well be plainer, than that the British bard is now the adjunct of the British parson, — that poetry is invoked to keep Protestantism alive, and supply a deficiency in her system which is every day becoming more and more evident? “Hearken to us!” exclaim these priests of Parnassus; “our numbers shall serve you instead of Gothic cathedral, chant and vest-

ment, picture and statue, and our intelligence shall instruct where your mission fails."

This sounds ludicrous enough when brought down into plain prose : such is the case, nevertheless. Deduct the unwitting followers of Carlyle, Wordsworth, Emerson, and Co., and you diminish English-language-Protestantism more than one half : so much more attractive is a song than a sermon.

Mr. Longfellow has something of this ambition, and his verse and prose are intended to be *religious*. So far as he appears in these two volumes, he is not wholly undeserving of our respect. He has a perception, if not of the truth of the Catholic Church, at least of her beauty, and writes like an upright, earnest, pure, benevolent man. He has won a large circle of admirers, and enjoys a fair reputation throughout the country ; and perhaps, in the fulness of his pride, he may turn away in self-complacency from any praise or censure of ours. But if poets do not entirely escape humanity, they cannot be indifferent to the honest opinion of any unprejudiced, capable reader, — and such an opinion he may expect from us. Our business as a critic, where morality is not invaded, is rather to instruct those who write books, than serve up to those who read them a hash, in which a thousand far-fetched spices disguise the original flavor.

Evangeline is the daughter of Benedict Bellefontaine, the wealthiest farmer of Grand-Pré, a little village in the Acadian land, on the shores of the Basin of Minas. She is thus described : —

" Fair was she to behold, that maiden of seventeen summers.

Black were her eyes as the berry that grows on the thorn by the way-side,

Black, yet how softly they gleamed beneath the brown shade of her tresses !

Sweet was her breath as the breath of kine that feed in the meadows.

When in the harvest heat she bore to the reapers at noontide
Flagons of home-brewed ale, ah ! fair in sooth was the maiden.

Fairer was she when, on Sunday morn, while the bell from its turret

Sprinkled with holy sounds the air, as the priest with his hyssop
Sprinkles the congregation, and scatters blessings upon them,

Down the long street she passed, with her chaplet of beads and her missal,

Wearing her Norman cap, and her kirtle of blue, and the ear-rings,

Brought in the olden time from France, and since, as an heir-loom,
 Handed down from mother to child, through long generations.
 But a celestial brightness — a more ethereal beauty —
 Shone on her face and encircled her form, when, after confession,
 Homeward serenely she walked with God's benediction upon her.
 When she had passed, it seemed like the ceasing of exquisite music."

This passage, copied with Chinese fidelity, is a fair specimen of the author's beauties and blemishes. "*Black were her eyes as the berry*," is still deliciously pastoral; but "*Sweet was her breath as —*," like "*ox-eyed*," is classical no longer. Whatever may be the taste of the South of Europe, an American has little love for garlic. The next two lines are unexceptionable. The figure of the bell sprinkling the air with holy sounds, as the priest sprinkles the congregation with hyssop, seems a little fantastic at first; but in spite of cavil, the similitude exists, and is visible to the poet's eye: if it cannot exactly be expressed, it is owing to the inferiority of language to thought. Thus a very difficult question arises, — whether these subtle perceptions of a fine fancy shall be suppressed, because when pent up in words they dwindle into airy nothingness, or whether they shall be bodied forth as accurately as may be, to *suggest* to kindred spirits the vision of beauty that was floating clear, but undefinable, in the poet's brain. Let them have a body, however imperfect, say we, in spite of Horace. We feel certain that no amount of human censure could induce Mr. Longfellow to strike out that image, — at least we hope so. "Her chaplet of beads and her missal, her Norman cap, and her kirtle of blue, and the ear-rings," — all this is exquisite, and makes us see and love the maiden of seventeen summers. The three following lines are filled with truth, sweetness, and the best poetry, — they breathe a Catholic purity and elevation; we can pay no higher compliment.

"Homeward serenely she walked, with God's benediction upon her."

The soft flow of this single line is poetry of the highest order. Yet how little valued in ordinary criticism is this *music* by which the imagination, flooded with beauty, imparts the feeling which millions of metaphors are impotent to convey! Mr.

Longfellow was conscious of this, or he would not have added the last period, —

“ When she had passed, it seemed like the ceasing of exquisite music.”

This line, though most admirable, is far from being original in itself. We remember many like it, particularly a passage in one of Maturin's plays. But in the connection in which we presume it to exist, it is eminently original. We shall not pursue our minute investigations farther, lest the criticism of the passage be as Chinese as our copy of it. Take the whole, we doubt whether Wordsworth ever surpassed it in simplicity or spirituality.

The lines, if we are not mistaken, are hexameter : at all events, they can be scanned as such by ear, if not by rule. Our prosody is too variable and irregular to permit this metre, — the genius of our language is averse to it. It never grew up with our literature, — it is too late in the season to engraft it. The words form their fixed, familiar combinations before we reach the end of the long line, and come to us in old melodies that utterly ruin the hexameter. Whatever it may be in Homer and Virgil, when transplanted into English, the hexameter is far inferior to our blank verse, and to our taste intolerable.

Our authors have been striving to vary the monotony of *rhyme* for many years. Before Pope's time it was difficult to write single lines smoothly and sweetly; there was much awful ruggedness even in celebrated poets. Pope's great merit was in moulding the language to such pliancy and softness, that any dabster could pour it into verse. We see every schoolboy fancying that he is a Walley or Raleigh at least, — forgetting the part *they* played in the formation of a poetic language, — forgetting that what is now trite and stale then had the merit of freshness and invention, — forgetting that the numbers which now flow so easily were then not attained without infinite pains.

Latterly, many of our masters of rhyme have disdained the facility of turning out faultless couplets, gliding on in the same everlasting, unchanging cadence. Byron and Moore stuck fast to Pope, — Byron particularly echoes his heroics with slavish fidelity. Coleridge, who excels them all in richness of melody, introduced a golden rule, that the proper musical quantity is far more important than the standard number of syllables. Southey attempted the improvement of rhyme by rapidly changing the length of the line, plumping down from twelve feet to two, and from ten to one. Poor Keats had the glorious ambition

transportation, their lands, dwellings, and cattle declared forfeit to the crown. The offence of the Acadians is not stated.

However, after a long pause of speechless wonder, and a wail of sorrow and anger, Basil the blacksmith, his face distorted with passion, rose, and wildly shouted : —

“Down with the tyrants of England ! we never have sworn them allegiance !

Death to these foreign soldiers, who seize on our homes and our harvests !’

More he fain would have said, but the merciless hand of a soldier

Smote him upon the mouth, and dragged him down to the pavement.

“In the midst of the strife and the tumult of angry contention,

Lo ! the door of the chancel opened, and Father Felician

Entered, with serious mien, and ascended the steps of the altar.

Raising his reverend hand, with a gesture he awed into silence

All that clamorous throng.

Few were his words of rebuke, but deep in the hearts of his people

Sank they, and sobs of contrition succeeded that passionate outbreak ;

And they repeated his prayer, and said, ‘ O Father, forgive them !’

“Then came the evening service. The tapers gleamed from the altar.

Fervent and deep was the voice of the priest, and the people responded,

Not with their lips alone, but their hearts ; and the Ave Maria

Sang they, and fell on their knees, and their souls, with devotion translated,

Rose on the ardor of prayer, like Elijah ascending to heaven.”

Meanwhile the tidings of ill had spread in the village, and women and children wandered, wailing, from house to house. But we must pass over this season of desolation, and Evangeline’s sorrow, charity, meekness, love, and hope, and forgiveness and patience, while still, in spite of the calamity,

“Sweetly over the village the bell of the Angelus sounded.”

On the fourth day, the villagers are forced to the sea-shore ; there, heart-broken, on the beach the wealthiest farmer of Grand-Pré dies, and Evangeline

"Knelt at her father's side, and wailed aloud in her terror.
Then in a swoon she sank, and lay with her head on his bosom."

She and Father Felician are carried to one ship, Gabriel and Basil to another.

"Then recommenced once more the stir and noise of embarking ;
And with the ebb of that tide the ships sailed out of the harbour,
Leaving behind them the dead on the shore, and the village in ruins."

Many a weary year had passed since the burning of Grand-Pré. Far asunder, on separate coasts, the Acadians landed ; scattered were they, like flakes of snow. Friendless, homeless, hopeless, they wandered from city to city, from the cold lakes of the North to sultry Southern savannas, — from the Atlantic to the Mississippi.

"Long among them was seen a maiden who waited and wandered,
Lowly and meek in spirit, and patiently suffering all things.
Fair was she and young ;
Something there was in her life incomplete, imperfect, unfinished ;
As if a morning of June, with all its music and sunshine,
Suddenly paused in the sky, and, fading, slowly descended
Into the east again, from whence it late had arisen."

It was *Evangeline* seeking her lover ; sometimes in churchyards straying, she sat by some nameless grave, thinking that perhaps in its bosom he was already at rest. Sometimes a rumor, a hearsay, an inarticulate whisper, came with its airy hand to point and beckon her forward. Sometimes she spake with those who had seen her beloved and known him, but long ago, in some far-off, forgotten place. Some would say, "He has gone to the prairies" ; others, "He is a *Voyageur* in the lowlands of Louisiana. Why dream and wait for him any longer ? Are there not other youths as fair as Gabriel ? Give thy hand to another !" But *Evangeline* ever answered, serenely but sadly, "I cannot !" A voice whispered, "Despair not !" and, in want and cheerless discomfort, she still pursued Gabriel.

In the month of May we find her and Father Felician, her faithful protector, floating in a cumbrous boat down the golden stream of the broad, swift Mississippi, past the Ohio shore and the mouth of the Wabash. Day after day they glided down the turbulent river ; night after night, by their blazing fires, encamped on its borders, until they entered the Bayou of Plaquemine.

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"Nearer and ever nearer, among the numberless islands,
Darted a light, swift boat, that sped away o'er the water,
Urged on its course by the sinewy arms of hunters and trappers.
Northward its prow was turned, to the land of the bison and
beaver.

At the helm sat a youth, with countenance thoughtful and care-
worn.

Dark and neglected locks overshadowed his brow, and a sad-
ness

Somewhat beyond his years on his face was legibly written.

Gabriel was it, who, weary with waiting, unhappy and restless,
Sought in the Western wilds oblivion of self and of sorrow."

But the lovers met not ; the stars were in the heavens ; they
passed each other on opposite banks of an island, with a screen
of palmettos between them ; and Evangeline dreamed that Ga-
briel had been near her.

Slowly they entered the Têche, where it flows through the
green Opelousas, and saw, near to the bank of the river, secluded
and still, the house of a herdsman.

"A garden

Girded it round about with a belt of luxuriant blossoms,
Filling the air with fragrance."

Here, mounted upon his horse, with Spanish saddle and stir-
rups, the wanderers saw and recognized Basil the blacksmith.
But Gabriel came not ! Far to the Western wilds has he
gone ; but to-day he departed ! Over Evangeline's face a shade
passed ; tears came into her eyes, and, concealing her face on
Basil's shoulder, all her overburdened heart gave way, and she
wept and lamented.

But she followed him, — followed him until she saw the
moon rise slowly over the tops of the Ozark Mountains. Still
far to the North had he gone. Then Basil left her, and Evan-
geline remained at a Jesuit Mission, still hoping that in the
autumn Gabriel would appear.

Slowly, slowly, slowly the days succeeded each other, —
days, and weeks, and months !

"So came the autumn, and passed, and the winter, — yet Gabriel
came not ;

Blossomed the opening spring, and the notes of the robin and
blue-bird

Sounded sweet upon wold and in wood, yet Gabriel came not.

But on the breath of the summer winds a rumor was wafted.

Far to the north and east, it said, in the Michigan forests,

Gabriel had his lodge by the banks of the Saginaw River.
Saying a sad farewell, Evangeline went from the Mission."

After long and perilous marches, she attains the depths of the Michigan forests, and finds the hunter's lodge deserted and fallen to ruin !

"Thus did the long, sad years glide on, and in seasons and places

Divers and distant far was seen the wandering maiden ; —
Now in the tents of grace of the meek Moravian Missions,
Now in the noisy camps and the battle-fields of the army,
Now in secluded hamlets, in towns, and populous cities.
Like a phantom she came, and passed away unremembered.
Fair was she and young, when in hope began the long journey ;
Faded was she and old, when in disappointment it ended.
Each succeeding year stole something away from her beauty,
Leaving behind it, broader and deeper, the gloom and the shadow.

Then there appeared and spread faint streaks of gray o'er her forehead,

Dawn of another life that broke o'er her earthly horizon,
As in the eastern sky the first faint streaks of the morning."

Thus, in the evening of life, we find her in the city washed by the Delaware's waters. Gabriel was not forgotten. Within her heart was his image, clothed in the beauty of love and youth, as last she beheld him, only more beautiful made by his death-like silence and absence. Thus many years she lived as a Sister of Mercy; frequenting lonely and wretched roofs in the crowded lanes of the city, where distress and want concealed themselves from the sunlight, where disease and sorrow in garrets languished neglected.

"Then it came to pass, that a pestilence fell on the city ;

. the poor
Crept away to die in the almshouse, home of the homeless.
Thither, by night and by day, came the Sister of Mercy. The dying

Looked up into her face, and thought, indeed, to behold there
Gleams of celestial light encircle her forehead with splendor,
Such as the artist paints o'er the brows of saints and apostles."

One Sunday morn, wending her quiet way, she entered the almshouse, — entered the chambers of sickness.

"Many a languid head, upraised as Evangeline entered,

Turned on its pillow of pain to gaze while she passed, for her
 presence
 Fell on their hearts like a ray of the sun on the walls of a
 prison.

"Suddenly, as if arrested by fear or a feeling of wonder,
 Still she stood, with her colorless lips apart, while a shudder
 Ran through her frame, and, forgotten, the flowerets dropped
 from her fingers,
 And from her eyes and cheeks the light and bloom of the
 morning.

Then there escaped from her lips a cry of such terrible anguish,
 That the dying heard it, and started up from their pillows.
On the pallet before her was stretched the form of an old man.
 Long, and thin, and gray were the locks that shaded his temples;
 But, as he lay in the morning light, his face for a moment
 Seemed to assume once more the forms of its earlier man-
 hood.

Motionless, senseless, dying, he lay, and his spirit, exhausted,
 Seemed to be sinking.
 Heard he that cry of pain, and through the hush that succeeded
 Whispered a gentle voice, in accents tender and saint-like,
 'Gabriel! O my beloved!' and died away into silence.
 Then he beheld, in a dream, once more the home of his child-
 hood;

Green Acadian meadows, with sylvan rivers among them,
 Village, and mountain, and woodlands; and, walking under their
 shadow,

As in the days of her youth, *Evangeline* rose in his vision.
 Tears came into his eyes; and, as slowly he lifted his eyelids,
 Vanished the vision away, but *Evangeline* knelt by his bedside.
 Vainly he strove to whisper her name, for the accents unuttered
 Died on his lips, and their motion revealed what his tongue would
 have spoken.

Vainly he strove to rise; and *Evangeline*, kneeling beside him,
 Kissed his dying lips, and laid his head on her bosom.

"All was ended now, the hope, and the fear, and the sorrow,
 And as she pressed once more the lifeless head to her bosom,
 Meekly she bowed her own, and murmured, 'Father, I thank
 Thee!'"

Thus ends *Evangeline*. We have been led by the beauty of
 the narrative, by an unwillingness to do it too much injustice,
 and by a desire to present it as a whole to our Catholic read-
 ers, to give a connected epitome, instead of a straggling outline,
 of the story. We have omitted many faults, and more beauties.
 Mr. Longfellow must pardon the jumble we have made of his

language, since, even in our compound of prose and verse, and what is neither prose nor verse, the pathos, simplicity, and fervent purity of the poem are not entirely lost.

Of the tale itself, — the incident, the plot, — we need not speak, — it is subordinate ; the portraiture of the finer feelings of the heart, — the contemplation of the beautiful in man and in nature, — give value and fascination to the book. The fervent way in which the author is seen to feel what he creates gives a charm to his characters which no art can bestow, and they live because he loves them.

Evangeline, as a Sister of Charity, is as pure a conception as Protestantism permits. Indeed, her whole character is vastly more Catholic than that of most of our own theologico-romantic heroines, so innocently invented, now-a-days, for the edification of youths, by too zealous converts, who write before they have well tasted the first sweet waters of Catholic purity.

Before passing to *Kavanagh*, we must briefly notice some glaring faults. Mr. Longfellow himself has said, "In character, in manners, in style, in all things, the supreme excellence is simplicity," — and yet it is against this very excellence that he sins the oftenest. It is lamentable to see a man of fair proportions straining himself out of all symmetry for the sake of being original. In society, eccentricity is originality, but scarcely in literature.

Speaking of Basil, he says : —

"And all his thoughts congealed into lines on his face, as the
vapors

Freeze in fantastic shapes on the window-panes in the winter."

Again : —

"Silently, one by one, in the infinite meadows of heaven,
Blossomed the lovely stars, the *forget-me-nots* of the angels."

This is exquisitely dainty, but overwhelmingly artificial ; we admire, and yet we despise. However, few authors would blot it out. But here is something utterly unjustifiable : —

"She saw serenely the moon pass
Forth from the folds of a cloud, and one star follow her footsteps,
As out of Abraham's tent young Ishmael wandered with Hagar."

Again, a fine passage we have quoted is spoiled by adding to "Rose on the ardor of prayer," "like Elijah ascending to heaven." Again : —

"And from the fields of her soul a fragrance celestial ascended."

Wherever the following came from, — German it seems to be, — let it be anathema : —

“ And in the flickering light beheld the face of the old man,
Haggard, and hollow, and wan, and without either thought or
emotion,
*E'en as the face of a clock from which the hands have been
taken.*”

In Sam Slick, the illustration would be capital. So,

“ Where the Father of Waters
Seizes the hills in his hands, and drags them down to the ocean.”

And that morning in June, with all its music and sunshine, is too fantastic and improbable, though the conception shows genius of no ordinary power.

But what can be said of this ? —

“ The trumpet-flower and the grape-vine
Hung their ladder of ropes aloft, like the ladder of Jacob,
On whose pendulous stairs the angels ascending, descending,
Were the swift *humming-birds*, that flitted from blossom to
blossom.”

It is a vision, but a dream too much like the forget-me-nots of the angels not to be indorsed by the author.

Again : —

“ The manifold flowers of the garden
Poured out their souls in odors, that were their prayers and con-
fessions
Unto the night, as it went its way like a silent Carthusian.”

And again, the last meeting of Gabriel and Evangeline is half ruined, thus : —

“ Hot and red on his lips still burned the flush of the fever,
As if life, like the Hebrew, with blood had besprinkled its portals,
That the Angel of Death might see the sign and pass over.”

We could laugh at all these conceits, if they did not contain glimmerings of a fine fancy run mad, — if they did not spring up unaccountably in the midst of the most delicious simplicity. Sometimes he is much happier, as, —

“ And clamorous labor
Knocked with its hundred hands at the golden gates of the
morning.”

This is equal to Homer. Nor is the following without sublimity : —

"Down sank the great red sun, and in golden, glimmering vapors
Veiled the light of his face, like the Prophet descending from
Sinai."

Again : —

"And the bluest of heavens
Bending above, and resting its domes on the walls of the forest."

And again : —

"And over all is the sky, the clear and crystalline heaven,
Like the protecting hand of God inverted above them."

But even in these instances, the fantastic injures the sublime. These are exceptions. When Mr. Longfellow is in his element, — when he is content with being himself, — he lavishes on us some of the sweetest pastoral in any language. How much pathos and power in this touch, when the villagers are embarking : —

"Then, as the night descended, the herds returned from their pastures ;
Sweet was the moist, still air with the odor of milk from their udders ;
Lowing they waited, and long, at the well-known bars of the farm-yard, —
Waited and looked in vain for the voice and the hand of the milkmaid."

Or, more beautiful still, —

"Now recommenced the reign of rest, and affection, and stillness.
Day with its burden and heat had departed, and twilight descending
Brought back the evening star to the sky, and the herds to the homestead.
Pawing the ground they came, and resting their necks on each other,
And with their nostrils distended inhaling the freshness of evening.
Foremost, bearing the bell, Evangeline's beautiful heifer,
Proud of her snow-white hide, and the ribbon that waved from her collar,
Quietly paced and slow, as if conscious of human affection.
Then came the shepherd," &c.

"O ! si sic omnia." — Too much cannot be said in praise of that passage.

Often, too, there is a touch like this, where the blacksmith

"Takes in his leathern lap the hoof of the horse as a plaything."

And often, too, are sprinkled lines like these : —

“Bright was her face with smiles, and words of welcome and glad-
ness
Fell from her beautiful lips, and blessed the cup as she gave
it.”

But we pass from *Evangeline*, on which we have lingered long, to *Kavanagh*, the other work on our list, and the last that has reached us from its author.

“The flighty purpose never is o’ertook,
Unless the deed go with it.”

The choice of this motto indicates, what the context sufficiently confirms, that Churchill is the real hero of the book, whatever *Kavanagh* may be allegorically. In Churchill, a singular class of beings is most felicitously described. By two fine touches he is brought vividly before us :—He thought himself a great man, — “for we judge ourselves by what we feel capable of doing, whilst others judge us by what we have already done. And, moreover, his wife considered him equal to great things. But to the people in the village, he was the schoolmaster, and nothing more. They saw him daily moiling and delving in the common path, like a beetle, and little thought that under that hard and cold exterior lay folded delicate golden wings, wherewith, when the heat of the day was over, he soared and revelled in the pleasant evening air.”

“Nature had made Mr. Churchill a poet, but destiny made him a schoolmaster. This produced a discord between his outward and his inward existence. Life presented itself to him like the Sphynx, with its perpetual riddle of the real and the ideal. To the solution of this dark problem, he devoted his days and his nights. He was forced to teach grammar, when he would fain have written poems ; and from day to day, and year to year, the trivial things of life postponed the great designs which he felt capable of accomplishing, but never had the resolute courage to begin. Thus he dallied with his thoughts and with all things, and wasted his strength on trifles ; like the lazy sea that plays with the pebbles on its beach, but under the inspiration of the wind might lift great navies on its outstretched palms, and toss them into the air as playthings.”

Here we have a tangible character, familiar to every one from experience of others or himself. The power to accomplish much, and the actual accomplishment of nothing, is seen in some phase or other at every step in life. Thus the foot of a college

class contents himself with the flattering reproach, — “ You might be head with ease, Sir.” Many, again, are seduced by wealth, or fettered by poverty, from a career of usefulness and distinction. This is true, in spite of the fact, that, when a man of ordinary ability throws himself away, the glimmering of talent set off by the darkness that surrounds him is generally hailed as an emanation of the highest genius. Mediocrity in the gutter is apt to be mistaken for fallen greatness.

But Mr. Longfellow aims at a rarer and more delicate combination of strength of mind and weakness of will. The fruits of the brain, like those of the earth, are not produced without labor : the curse pronounced in Eden is on mind as well as matter. Man is originally averse to both mental and physical labor. In some, this antipathy is overbalanced by ambition, corrected by education and the rod, and eradicated by habit, until exertion becomes a pleasure ; in others, it is overcome by necessity, avarice, or duty. But the man of genius who has tidings to impart, and who feels his mission, is different from all these. Place him in the ordinary pursuits of life, he languishes after time and opportunity for the full, free play of his powers, and pines to climb the blue hills so soft and alluring in the distance. But unshackle him, let him roam at large ; — he wanders to the base of the mountain, — he finds all those soft outlines gone, — the ascent rugged, steep, and forbidding ; — there are sweet springs murmuring overhead, — but then the toil, the *labor*, of reaching them ! The few, who have the requisite will, reach the summit ; the rest, with poor Churchill, wander in penniless spirituality along the base.

Poetry and music have their tedious details, as well as science and the counting-house ; and it is over these details that genius sickens, droops, and dies. It is instinctively impelled by the delight of conceiving and creating beauty, but deterred by the pang, the labor, of bringing it forth. In vain did Churchill exclaim, “ I shall write a romance ! ” — he remained for ever barren. When he wandered to the old windmill, and saw below him the lights of the village, and around him the great landscape sinking deeper and deeper into the sea of darkness, — when he passed the orchards where the air, filled with the odor of the fallen fruit, seemed as sweet to him as the fragrance of the blossoms in June, — when a few steps farther brought him to an old, neglected church-yard, and he paused a moment to look at the white, gleaming stone, under which slumbered the old

clergyman who came into the village in the time of the Indian wars, — then, O, then ! he felt that he could write. But when he entered the village street, and encountered the booted centipede, — when the steam of strong tobacco-smoke, exhaled from a laborer's pipe, saluted him *up to his own door*, — then, alas ! the inspiration departed.

Mrs. Churchill, a pretty, motherly, intensely literal personage, was not eminently qualified to recall the fine frenzy, as the following morsel of dialogue will demonstrate : —

“ ‘ Ah ! these children, these children ! ’ said Churchill, as he sat down at the tea-table, ‘ we ought to love them very much now, for we shall not have them long with us ! ’ ”

“ ‘ Good heavens ! ’ exclaimed his wife, ‘ what do you mean ? Does any thing ail them ? Are they going to die ? ’ ”

“ ‘ I hope not. But they are going to grow up and be no longer children. ’ ”

“ ‘ O you foolish man ! You gave me such a fright ! ’ ”

“ ‘ And yet it seems impossible that they should ever grow to be men, and drag the heavy artillery along the dusty roads of life. ’ ”

“ ‘ And I hope they never will. That is the last thing I want either of them to do. ’ ”

There is much contained and suggested in that brief passage, bald and artificial as it seems. Churchill continues to teach school and do every thing else but begin his romance ; — here we find him discoursing on the beautiful arithmetical system contained in the *Lilawati* of Bhascara Acharya, — there answering the young lady who sent him the poetry to look over and criticize, — now diverted by Mr. Hanson's cooking-range, or intercepted by Mr. Wilmerdings, the butcher, with his cart and five pensionary cats, — again, after extinguishing the Vesuvius of the prospective editor of the projected Niagara, deliberately consenting to write him a series of papers on *Obscure Martyrs*. To use the best image in the book, and one of the best on record, — “ Such was the schoolmaster's life ; and a dreary, weary life it would have been, had not poetry from within gushed through every crack and crevice in it. This transformed it, and made it resemble a well, into which stones and rubbish have been thrown ; but underneath is a spring of fresh, pure water, which nothing external can ever check or defile. ” How different this from that outrageous metaphor in which my Lord Coke appears to inflict a death-wound on literature on the threshold of law !

The subordinate characters of the story, like Churchill, are merely sketched. We do not say this in condemnation : far from it. We cannot easily describe our pleasure to find *Kavanagh* but one small volume, — we cannot express our delight to discover that the author meant to tell his tale by a few brief masterly touches, instead of inflating pages with useless expatiation, explanation, and analysis, conformably to the prevailing vicious fashion. As books multiply, they ought to be brief : a well-read community want suggestiveness, not repetition. It is time now that the author should trust something to the reader. If we must have fiction, let it consist of meaning outlines, that in a glance we may enjoy it. Let the author lift us to the eminence he occupies, that we may see at once the prospect he would unfold, instead of compelling us to wade through description and reflection as endless and deep as a Florida everglade, before we catch a glimpse of what he is pointing at. Let genius leave dilution to mediocrity, and bend itself to condensation.

What is the condition of English and French fiction at this moment ? Volume after volume, fine print, rolled off with incredible velocity, — vast masses of love, lust, and battle, heaped up high as a pyramid. Every thing for quantity, nothing for quality, — a given amount must be read before a certain interest can be obtained. If there is one green spot in the book, the author has surrounded it with a desert of dulness to make it an oasis, — to give it a zest, which, standing alone, it could not have ; whilst, camel-like, the patient reader plods along, without even a mirage to relieve him.

Had Mr. Longfellow's book no other merit, his bold, rapid attempts at delineation would entitle him to gratitude and encouragement. His intention is thus handsomely expressed in *Evangeline* : —

“ Let me essay, O Muse ! to follow the wanderer's footsteps ; —

Not through each devious path, each changeful year of existence ;

But as a traveller follows a streamlet's course through the valley :
Far from its margin at times, and seeing the gleam of its water
Here and there, in some open space, and at intervals only.”

We know Mr. Pendexter perfectly well by his sermon ; we can see his old white horse shaking from his feet the dust of the ungrateful village ; there is a dramatic distinctness in his subsequent return to the village, in the same old ark of a chaise, drawn

by the same white horse, with the same disdainful fling to his hind legs. Sally Manchester, Mr. H. Adolphus Hawkins, and his sister, are equally well sketched, and kept in proper subordination to the superior actors on the little stage. With Lucy he has been eminently happy.

"Lucy was a girl of fifteen, who had been taken a few years before from an orphan asylum. Her dark eyes had a Gypsy look, and she wore her brown hair twisted round her head, after the manner of some of Murillo's girls. She had Milesian blood in her veins, and was impetuous and impatient of contradiction."

Lucy lived with Mrs. Churchill, and came one evening to ask permission to go down to the village to buy some ribbon for her bonnet. As she left the room, Churchill thought of the ill-looking creature he had seen. A year passed by. Lucy, the pretty orphan girl, had disappeared with the centipede, — but whither gone and wherefore remained a mystery. Autumn came, and brought an unexpected guest, — the forlorn, forsaken Lucy. She returned alone in destitution and despair; and often, in the grief of a broken heart and a bewildered brain, was heard to say, —

"O how I wish I were a Christian! If I were only a Christian, I would not live any longer; I would kill myself! I am too wretched!"

"A few days afterwards, a gloomy-looking man rode through the town on horseback, stopping at every corner, and crying into every street, with a loud and solemn voice, — 'Prepare! Prepare! Prepare to meet the living God.' Then numerous camp-meetings were held in the woods, to whose white tents and leafy chapels many went for consolation, and found despair."

"Then rose the voice of Elder Evans high above the rest, clear and musical as a clarion, —

'Don't you hear the Lord a-coming
To the old church-yards,
With a band of music,
With a band of music,
With a band of music,
Sounding through the air?' "

A figure stood below, in the shadow of the bridge, —

"on the brink of the stream, watching wistfully the steady flow of the current. It was Lucy! Her bonnet and shawl were lying at her feet; she waded far out into the shallow stream, laid herself gently down in its deeper waves, and floated slowly away into the moon-

light, among the golden leaves that were faded and fallen like herself, — among the water-lilies, whose fragrant white blossoms had been broken off and polluted long ago. Without a struggle, without a sigh, without a sound, she floated downward, downward, and silently sank into the silent river. Far off, faint and indistinct, was heard the startling hymn, with its wild and peculiar melody, —

‘O, there will be mourning, mourning, mourning, mourning,—
O, there will be mourning at the judgment-seat of Christ!’”

To us there is a strange power and pathos in this brief sketch, which, if minutely expanded, would have been a temptation instead of a warning. Here, as in other places, Mr. Longfellow displays the rare faculty of revealing, as if through a magic glass, the incident as it is felt by the mind that first conceived it, — of revealing to the reader the same spirit of beauty and tenderness that animated the writer when words were far unequal to the vision of his mind.

After Churchill and Kavanagh, the principal characters are Alice Archer and Cecilia Vaughan. They are placed in striking contrast. Alice is a fair, delicate girl, whose life has been saddened by a too sensitive organization, and by somewhat untoward circumstances. She had a pale, transparent complexion, and large, gray eyes, that seemed to see visions. Her figure was slight, almost fragile; her hands white, slender, diaphanous. She was thoughtful, silent, susceptible; often sad, often in tears, often lost in reveries. She led a lonely life with her mother, who was old, querulous, and nearly blind. She, herself, had inherited a predisposition to blindness, and in winter the power of vision failed her. The old house they lived in, with its four sickly Lombardy poplars in front, was one of those houses that depress you as you enter, as if many persons had died in it, — sombre, desolate, silent.

Cecilia Vaughan had been Alice Archer's bosom friend at school; and, after they left school, in spite of social disparity, the love between them had rather increased than diminished. Endowed with youth, beauty, talent, fortune, and, moreover, with that indefinable fascination which has no name, Cecilia Vaughan was not without lovers, avowed and unavowed; — young men who made an ostentatious display of their affection; boys, who treasured it in their bosoms, as something indescribably sweet and precious, perfuming all the chambers of the heart with its celestial fragrance. Whenever she returned from a visit to the city, some unknown youth, of elegant manners and varnished leather boots, was sure to hover round the village inn

for a few days, — was known to visit the Vaughans assiduously, and then silently to disappear, and be seen no more.

The old family mansion of the Vaughans stood a little out of town, in the midst of a pleasant farm. The country road was not near enough to annoy; and the rattling wheels and little clouds of dust seemed like friendly salutations from travellers as they passed. In this old-fashioned house had Cecilia Vaughan grown up to maidenhood. The travelling shadows of the clouds on the hill-sides, the sudden summer wind that lifted the languid leaves, and, most of all, the mysterious mountain, whose coolness was a perpetual invitation to her, and whose silence a perpetual fear, fostered her dreamy and poetic temperament. Her mother had been dead for many years, and the memory of that mother had become almost a religion to her. Her father was a kindly old man; a judge in one of the courts; dignified, affable, somewhat bent by his legal erudition, as a shelf is by the weight of the books upon it.

Alice is more distinct, and better drawn than her friend, for this very obvious reason, — that it is infinitely easier to portray the real feeling of a melancholy child of nature, than catch and convey the true character of a woman with a light heart and something of the world in her. It required quite as much genius to delineate Julia Mannering, as Rebecca the Jewess or Minna Troil, and far more care and experience.

We have now prepared the village of Fairmeadow for Kavanagh's reception. Mr. Pendexter, the old-fashioned Evangelical parson, has evacuated, at the request of his parishioners, but not without preaching a pathetic and withering valedictory. Then, as the school-girl's letter has it, — which, by the way, is one of the cleverest and best-contrived performances of its kind we know of, —

"The church has been repaired, and we have a new mahogany pulpit. Mr. Churchill bought the old one, and had it put up in his study. What a strange man he is! A good many candidates have preached for us. The only one we like is Mr. Kavanagh. Arthur Kavanagh! is not that a romantic name? He is tall, very pale, with beautiful black eyes and hair! Sally — Alice Archer's Sally — says 'he is not a man; he is a Thaddeus of Warsaw!' I think he is very handsome. And such sermons! So beautifully written, so different from old Mr. Pendexter's."

So much for public impression; now for the author's conception: —

"Arthur Kavanagh was descended from an ancient Catholic family. His ancestors had purchased from the Baron Victor of St. Castine a portion of his vast estates, lying upon the wild and wonderful sea-coast of Maine. There, in the bosom of the solemn forests, they continued the practice of that faith which had been first planted there by Rasle and St. Castine.

"In these solitudes, in this faith, was Kavanagh born, and grew to childhood, a feeble, delicate boy, watched over by a grave, taciturn father, and a mother who looked upon him with infinite tenderness, as upon a treasure she could not long retain. She walked with him by the sea-side, and spake to him of God. She taught him his letters from the Lives of the Saints; she explained to him the pictures; she read to him the legends; the lives of holy men and women, full of faith and good works; things which ever afterward remained associated together in his mind. Thus, holiness of life, and self-renunciation, and devotion to duty, were early impressed upon his soul. To his quick imagination, the spiritual world became real; the holy company of the saints stood round about the solitary boy; his guardian angels led him by the hand by day, and sat by his pillow at night. At times, even, he wished to die, that he might see them and talk with them, and return no more to his weak and weary body.

"Of all the legends of the mysterious book, that which most delighted and most deeply impressed him was the legend of St. Christopher. Later in life it became more and more evident to him, and remained for ever in his mind as a lovely allegory of *active charity* and a *willingness to serve*.

"But the time at length came, when his father decreed that he must be sent away to school. He must go to the Jesuit College in Canada, leaving behind him all the endearments of home, and a wound in his mother's heart that never ceased to ache; a longing, unsatisfied and insatiable, for her absent Arthur, who had gone from her, perhaps for ever.

"At length his college days were ended. He returned home full of youth, full of joy and hope; but it was only to receive the dying blessings of his mother. Then the house became empty to him. Solitary was the sea-shore, solitary were the woodland walks. But the spiritual world seemed nearer and more real. For affairs he had no aptitude; and he betook himself again to his philosophic and theological studies. He pondered with fond enthusiasm on the rapturous pages of Molinos and Madame Guyon, or, in a spirit akin to that which wrote, he read the writings of St. Theresa.

"In such meditations passed many weeks and months. But mingled with them, continually and ever with more distinctness, arose in his memory the old tradition of St. Christopher, the beautiful allegory of humility and labor. It became more and more

evident to him, that the life of man consists, not in seeing visions and in dreaming dreams, but in *active charity and willing service*.

"Moreover, the study of ecclesiastical history awoke within him many strange and dubious thoughts. It was impossible to hear of Calvin without hearing of Servetus; to read Athanasius without reading also of Arian. The search after Truth and Freedom, both intellectual and spiritual, became a passion in his soul. *By slow degrees, and not by violent spiritual conflicts, he became a Protestant. He had but passed from one chapel to another in the same vast cathedral. He was still beneath the same ample roof,* still heard the same divine service chanted in a different dialect of the same universal language. Out of his old faith he brought with him all he had found in it that was holy, and pure, and of good report. Not its bigotry, and fanaticism, and intolerance; but its zeal, its self-devotion, its heavenly aspirations, its human sympathies, its endless deeds of charity.* Not till after his father's death, however, did he become a clergyman. Then his vocation was manifest to him. He no longer hesitated, but entered upon its many duties and responsibilities, its many trials and discouragements, *with the zeal of Peter and the gentleness of John.*"

We shall briefly conclude the story, and return to this most important chapter. With the spring, and the flowers, and the birds, came Kavanagh to the village. The first thing he remarked, and it cheered and consoled him, was the pale countenance of a young girl, whose dark eyes had been fixed upon him, during the whole discourse, with unflagging interest and

* If the difference was so slight, and the change no more than represented, why did Kavanagh cease to be a Catholic and become a Protestant, or rather Puseyitish Unitarian? Does not the author perceive, that, just in proportion as he diminishes the importance of the change, does he weaken the motives to make it? If Kavanagh remained in the same building, continued to worship under the ample roof of the same spacious temple, he continued to retain substantially his Catholic faith, and then, in professing himself a Protestant, must have believed that he was incurring the damnation of his own soul. Moreover, if he still recognized his former religion as substantially true, he could not have supposed that he at all endangered his salvation by remaining a Catholic, and then he could have been influenced only by worldly motives, or temporal interests, in avowing himself a Protestant. Does Mr. Longfellow mean to teach that there are only worldly reasons for being a Protestant rather than a Catholic, and thus, by implication, avow that he himself would be a Catholic, if he consulted only the salvation of his soul? This is no strained inference from his doctrine, and we have not the shadow of a doubt that it is true with regard to Protestants generally. They would all be Catholics, if they consulted only their own spiritual welfare, and are Protestants only because they wish to enjoy the world, and live without having to practise the rigid self-denial Catholicity enjoins.

attention. She sat alone in a pew near the pulpit. It was Alice Archer.

Alas for Alice ! he soon met Miss Vaughan at the taxidermist's. She had come to purchase a carrier-pigeon to conduct a correspondence between herself and Alice. As she departed, he said, half aloud, — " Of course she would never think of marrying a poor clergyman ! "

A week later Kavanagh was installed in a little room in the church-tower. He had become intimate with Churchill, and completed the first great cycle of parochial visits, besides working assiduously at his sermons. His words were always kindly ; but while he was gentle, he was firm. In short, he completely enchanted the congregation. He did not suggest many changes, but showed that some relics of Catholic good taste and feeling were in him, by desiring the organist to relinquish the old and pernicious habit of preluding with triumphal marches, or playing scraps of regular music very slowly to make them sacred, and substitute, instead of this and his own barbarous conceptions, some of the beautiful symphonies of Pergolesi, Palestrina, and Sebastian Bach.

Meanwhile, the church-bells of Fairmeadow, like those of Varennes, kept sounding, " Marry thee, marry thee, marry, marry ! " and the Roaring Brook responded sympathetically to the peal. We cannot narrate all the incidents of the pleasure-party ; but this one circumstance makes us wish Cecilia a little more gifted or a little less in love : —

" ' How indescribably beautiful this brown water is ! ' exclaimed Kavanagh. ' It is like wine, or the nectar of the gods of Olympus ; as if the falling Hebe had poured it from her goblet. '

" ' More like the mead or metheglin of the Northern gods, ' said Mr. Churchill, ' spilled from the drinking-horns of Valhalla. '

" But all the ladies thought Kavanagh's comparison the better of the two. "

We half suspect the humor of that passage to have been obtained more by accident than design ; the touch is so exquisitely fine, that it suggests the sponge of Protogenes.

Cecilia's hand trembled in Kavanagh's, and his soul was softened within him. The day passed delightfully with all.

But Alice Archer ? The carrier-pigeon was flying from her to Cecilia, when, pursued by a kingfisher, it darted into Kavanagh's room. A billet was beneath its wing addressed " Cecilia. " The bird was then on its way to her. Seizing a pen, he

wrote his love, and fastened the note to the silken band around the messenger's neck.

Disordered by its flight, the dove flew back to Alice, who, mistaking Kavanagh's epistle for Cecilia's answer, opened and read it. It was an impulse, an ejaculation of love, every line quivering with electric fire, signed "Arthur Kavanagh." But in the ecstasy of her joy and wonder that her prayer for Kavanagh's love should have been answered, her eye fell, for the first time, on the superscription; — it was "Cecilia Vaughan." Alice fainted. Her first act on recovering was to reseal the note, and send the bird to its proper destiny.

Cecilia's answer was brief, — "Come to me!" — and the magic syllables brought Kavanagh to her side.

That afternoon Cecilia went to Alice to tell her of what had happened, and accept her *congratulations*. In her happiness Cecilia saw not her poor friend's agony, but mistook her tears of blood for tears of joy. The snow of that winter fell on the happy home of Cecilia Vaughan and the lonely grave of Alice Archer.

The wedding did not take place till spring. And then Kavanagh and his Cecilia departed on their journey to Italy and the East. They intended to be absent one year; they were gone three.

When they returned, they found Churchill still correcting school exercises, — his romance not yet begun, — his *Obscure Martyrs* yet unrecorded, though Alice Archer had perished broken-hearted under his eye. The curtain is then drawn over the actors for the present. Will it rise to unfold a *sequel*?

Mr. Longfellow had the good taste to make Kavanagh's conversion to Protestantism sentimental instead of logical. It was mainly effected by the legend of a giant who wished to serve Christ, but knew not how, until he heard the voice of a child crying out, "Plant thy staff in the ground and it shall blossom and bear fruit." This is emblematic of active charity and willing service, — and active charity and willing service are not to be found in Catholicity; therefore Kavanagh became a Protestant! The application of the legend is akin to that of Hawkesworth's celebrated tale of the dervise, — "No life pleasing to God that is not useful to man." It is assumed that the Catholic Church is a collection of lazy monks, nuns, and hermits, and concluded that a set of creatures politically and socially useless cannot be acceptable to God. Really, it is impossible to argue this point seriously. If rational beings, knowing well

that the Catholic Church saved Europe from barbarism, and reduced it from chaos to peace and order,—to something very different from its present condition,—knowing well that the monasteries were the model farms, the colleges, the inns, the sanctuaries of Christendom,—knowing well that Catholicity converted all Europe, and a great portion of Asia, Africa, and America, to Christianity,—if rational beings, knowing all this, and a great deal more, and having before them the Jesuit missions in North America, and Protestant exterminations in the Sandwich Islands, are still so jaundiced by prejudice as to prate of Catholic supineness and Protestant activity, we care not how soon we are complimented on our insanity.

It is extremely difficult to get Protestants to feel that the kingdom of God is not of this world,—that we are *permitted* to give up all and follow our Redeemer,—that we *may* live, not for time, but for eternity. They never will comprehend that there is still a Church that is commissioned to teach, and a body to be taught. They are incapable of perceiving that it is not every man's vocation to be a missionary ; that many of us have trouble enough to save our own souls, and have to fly all contact with the temptations of society to escape defeat. Serving man is the main thing,—their primal virtue ; pleasing God, secondary. Would to Heaven they would begin by loving and serving *God* with their whole souls ! They would soon discover that whatever is pleasing to God *must* be useful to man, individually and collectively. They refuse to see, that if every individual purifies himself, society must be pure. They shrink from believing the salvation of a single human soul of infinitely more importance than the prosperity and glory of a nation. They never suspect that the prayers offered up on Catholic altars every minute in the year may, like the prayer of the high-priest on the battle-field, avail more than armies, and preserve a people from destruction. They little believe that the fervent aspiration of some pale, feeble daughter of St. Vincent, breathed out at the foot of the cross, for her neighbour and her country, is far more useful to mankind than pyramid, aqueduct, railroad, or telegraph, and all the committees of ways and means who were ever appointed to enlighten or bewilder themselves or their constituents.

We hope we are wrong in suspecting Mr. Longfellow of insinuating that active charity and willing service are not Catholic virtues ; for he recognizes “the zeal, the self-devotion, the heavenly aspirations, the human sympathies, the endless deeds

And often, too, are sprinkled lines like these : —

“Bright was her face with smiles, and words of welcome and gladness
Fell from her beautiful lips, and blessed the cup as she gave it.”

But we pass from *Evangeline*, on which we have lingered long, to *Kavanagh*, the other work on our list, and the last that has reached us from its author.

“The flighty purpose never is o’ertook,
Unless the deed go with it.”

The choice of this motto indicates, what the context sufficiently confirms, that Churchill is the real hero of the book whatever *Kavanagh* may be allegorically. In Churchill, singular class of beings is most felicitously described. By two fine touches he is brought vividly before us :—He thought himself a great man, — “for we judge ourselves by what we feel capable of doing, whilst others judge us by what we have already done. And, moreover, his wife considered him equal to great things. But to the people in the village, he was the schoolmaster, and nothing more. They saw him daily moiling and delving in the common path, like a beetle, and little thought that under that hard and cold exterior lay folded delicate golden wings, wherewith, when the heat of the day was over, he soared and revelled in the pleasant evening air.”

“Nature had made Mr. Churchill a poet, but destiny made him a schoolmaster. This produced a discord between his outward and his inward existence. Life presented itself to him like the Sphinx with its perpetual riddle of the real and the ideal. To the solution of this dark problem, he devoted his days and his nights. He was forced to teach grammar, when he would fain have written poems and from day to day, and year to year, the trivial things of life postponed the great designs which he felt capable of accomplishing but never had the resolute courage to begin. Thus he dallied with his thoughts and with all things, and wasted his strength on trifles like the lazy sea that plays with the pebbles on its beach, but under the inspiration of the wind might lift great navies on its outstretched palms, and toss them into the air as playthings.”

Here we have a tangible character, familiar to every one from experience of others or himself. The power to accomplish much, and the actual accomplishment of nothing, is seen in some phase or other at every step in life. Thus the foot of a collegian

class contents himself with the flattering reproach, — “ You might be head with ease, Sir.” Many, again, are seduced by wealth, or fettered by poverty, from a career of usefulness and distinction. This is true, in spite of the fact, that, when a man of ordinary ability throws himself away, the glimmering of talent set off by the darkness that surrounds him is generally hailed as an emanation of the highest genius. Mediocrity in the gutter is apt to be mistaken for fallen greatness.

But Mr. Longfellow aims at a rarer and more delicate combination of strength of mind and weakness of will. The fruits of the brain, like those of the earth, are not produced without labor : the curse pronounced in Eden is on mind as well as matter. Man is originally averse to both mental and physical labor. In some, this antipathy is overbalanced by ambition, corrected by education and the rod, and eradicated by habit, until exertion becomes a pleasure ; in others, it is overcome by necessity, avarice, or duty. But the man of genius who has tidings to impart, and who feels his mission, is different from all these. Place him in the ordinary pursuits of life, he languishes after time and opportunity for the full, free play of his powers, and pines to climb the blue hills so soft and alluring in the distance. But unshackle him, let him roam at large ; — he wanders to the base of the mountain, — he finds all those soft outlines gone, — the ascent rugged, steep, and forbidding ; — there are sweet springs murmuring overhead, — but then the toil, the *labor*, of reaching them ! The few, who have the requisite will, reach the summit ; the rest, with poor Churchill, wander in penniless spirituality along the base.

Poetry and music have their tedious details, as well as science and the counting-house ; and it is over these details that genius sickens, droops, and dies. It is instinctively impelled by the delight of conceiving and creating beauty, but deterred by the pang, the labor, of bringing it forth. In vain did Churchill exclaim, “ I shall write a romance ! ” — he remained for ever barren. When he wandered to the old windmill, and saw below him the lights of the village, and around him the great landscape sinking deeper and deeper into the sea of darkness, — when he passed the orchards where the air, filled with the odor of the fallen fruit, seemed as sweet to him as the fragrance of the blossoms in June, — when a few steps farther brought him to an old, neglected church-yard, and he paused a moment to look at the white, gleaming stone, under which slumbered the old

clergyman who came into the village in the time of the Indian wars, — then, O, then ! he felt that he could write. But when he entered the village street, and encountered the booted centipede, — when the steam of strong tobacco-smoke, exhaled from a laborer's pipe, saluted him *up to his own door*, — then, alas ! the inspiration departed.

Mrs. Churchill, a pretty, motherly, intensely literal personage, was not eminently qualified to recall the fine frenzy, as the following morsel of dialogue will demonstrate : —

“ ‘ Ah ! these children, these children ! ’ said Churchill, as he sat down at the tea-table, ‘ we ought to love them very much now, for we shall not have them long with us ! ’ ”

“ ‘ Good heavens ! ’ exclaimed his wife, ‘ what do you mean ? Does any thing ail them ? Are they going to die ? ’ ”

“ ‘ I hope not. But they are going to grow up and be no longer children. ’ ”

“ ‘ O you foolish man ! You gave me such a fright ! ’ ”

“ ‘ And yet it seems impossible that they should ever grow to be men, and drag the heavy artillery along the dusty roads of life. ’ ”

“ ‘ And I hope they never will. That is the last thing I want either of them to do. ’ ”

There is much contained and suggested in that brief passage, bald and artificial as it seems. Churchill continues to teach school and do every thing else but begin his romance ; — here we find him discoursing on the beautiful arithmetical system contained in the *Lilawati* of Bhascara Acharya, — there answering the young lady who sent him the poetry to look over and criticize, — now diverted by Mr. Hanson's cooking-range, or intercepted by Mr. Wilmerdings, the butcher, with his cart and five pensionary cats, — again, after extinguishing the Vesuvius of the prospective editor of the projected Niagara, deliberately consenting to write him a series of papers on *Obscure Martyrs*. To use the best image in the book, and one of the best on record, — “ Such was the schoolmaster's life ; and a dreary, weary life it would have been, had not poetry from within gushed through every crack and crevice in it. This transformed it, and made it resemble a well, into which stones and rubbish have been thrown ; but underneath is a spring of fresh, pure water, which nothing external can ever check or defile. ” How different this from that outrageous metaphor in which my Lord Coke appears to inflict a death-wound on literature on the threshold of law !

The subordinate characters of the story, like Churchill, are merely sketched. We do not say this in condemnation : far from it. We cannot easily describe our pleasure to find *Kavanagh* but one small volume, — we cannot express our delight to discover that the author meant to tell his tale by a few brief masterly touches, instead of inflating pages with useless expatiation, explanation, and analysis, conformably to the prevailing vicious fashion. As books multiply, they ought to be brief : a well-read community want suggestiveness, not repetition. It is time now that the author should trust something to the reader. If we must have fiction, let it consist of meaning outlines, that in a glance we may enjoy it. Let the author lift us to the eminence he occupies, that we may see at once the prospect he would unfold, instead of compelling us to wade through description and reflection as endless and deep as a Florida everglade, before we catch a glimpse of what he is pointing at. Let genius leave dilution to mediocrity, and bend itself to condensation.

What is the condition of English and French fiction at this moment ? Volume after volume, fine print, rolled off with incredible velocity, — vast masses of love, lust, and battle, heaped up high as a pyramid. Every thing for quantity, nothing for quality, — a given amount must be read before a certain interest can be obtained. If there is one green spot in the book, the author has surrounded it with a desert of dulness to make it an oasis, — to give it a zest, which, standing alone, it could not have ; whilst, camel-like, the patient reader plods along, without even a mirage to relieve him.

Had Mr. Longfellow's book no other merit, his bold, rapid attempts at delineation would entitle him to gratitude and encouragement. His intention is thus handsomely expressed in *Evangeline* : —

“ Let me essay, O Muse ! to follow the wanderer's footsteps ; —

Not through each devious path, each changeful year of existence ;

But as a traveller follows a streamlet's course through the valley :
Far from its margin at times, and seeing the gleam of its water
Here and there, in some open space, and at intervals only.”

We know Mr. Pendexter perfectly well by his sermon ; we can see his old white horse shaking from his feet the dust of the ungrateful village ; there is a dramatic distinctness in his subsequent return to the village, in the same old ark of a chaise, drawn

by the same white horse, with the same disdainful fling to his hind legs. Sally Manchester, Mr. H. Adolphus Hawkins, and his sister, are equally well sketched, and kept in proper subordination to the superior actors on the little stage. With Lucy he has been eminently happy.

"Lucy was a girl of fifteen, who had been taken a few years before from an orphan asylum. Her dark eyes had a Gypsy look, and she wore her brown hair twisted round her head, after the manner of some of Murillo's girls. She had Milesian blood in her veins, and was impetuous and impatient of contradiction."

Lucy lived with Mrs. Churchill, and came one evening to ask permission to go down to the village to buy some ribbon for her bonnet. As she left the room, Churchill thought of the ill-looking creature he had seen. A year passed by. Lucy, the pretty orphan girl, had disappeared with the centipede, — but whither gone and wherefore remained a mystery. Autumn came, and brought an unexpected guest, — the forlorn, forsaken Lucy. She returned alone in desitution and despair; and often, in the grief of a broken heart and a bewildered brain, was heard to say, —

"O how I wish I were a Christian! If I were only a Christian, I would not live any longer; I would kill myself! I am too wretched!"

"A few days afterwards, a gloomy-looking man rode through the town on horseback, stopping at every corner, and crying into every street, with a loud and solemn voice, — 'Prepare! Prepare! Prepare to meet the living God.' Then numerous camp-meetings were held in the woods, to whose white tents and leafy chapels many went for consolation, and found despair."

"Then rose the voice of Elder Evans high above the rest, clear and musical as a clarion, —

'Don't you hear the Lord a-coming
To the old church-yards,
With a band of music,
With a band of music,
With a band of music,
Sounding through the air?'"

A figure stood below, in the shadow of the bridge, —

"on the brink of the stream, watching wistfully the steady flow of the current. It was Lucy! Her bonnet and shawl were lying at her feet; she waded far out into the shallow stream, laid herself gently down in its deeper waves, and floated slowly away into the moon-

light, among the golden leaves that were faded and fallen like herself,—among the water-lilies, whose fragrant white blossoms had been broken off and polluted long ago. Without a struggle, without a sigh, without a sound, she floated downward, downward, and silently sank into the silent river. Far off, faint and indistinct, was heard the startling hymn, with its wild and peculiar melody,—

‘O, there will be mourning, mourning, mourning, mourning,—
O, there will be mourning at the judgment-seat of Christ!’”

To us there is a strange power and pathos in this brief sketch, which, if minutely expanded, would have been a temptation instead of a warning. Here, as in other places, Mr. Longfellow displays the rare faculty of revealing, as if through a magic glass, the incident as it is felt by the mind that first conceived it,—of revealing to the reader the same spirit of beauty and tenderness that animated the writer when words were far unequal to the vision of his mind.

After Churchill and Kavanagh, the principal characters are Alice Archer and Cecilia Vaughan. They are placed in striking contrast. Alice is a fair, delicate girl, whose life has been saddened by a too sensitive organization, and by somewhat untoward circumstances. She had a pale, transparent complexion, and large, gray eyes, that seemed to see visions. Her figure was slight, almost fragile; her hands white, slender, diaphanous. She was thoughtful, silent, susceptible; often sad, often in tears, often lost in reveries. She led a lonely life with her mother, who was old, querulous, and nearly blind. She, herself, had inherited a predisposition to blindness, and in winter the power of vision failed her. The old house they lived in, with its four sickly Lombardy poplars in front, was one of those houses that depress you as you enter, as if many persons had died in it,—sombre, desolate, silent.

Cecilia Vaughan had been Alice Archer's bosom friend at school; and, after they left school, in spite of social disparity, the love between them had rather increased than diminished. Endowed with youth, beauty, talent, fortune, and, moreover, with that indefinable fascination which has no name, Cecilia Vaughan was not without lovers, avowed and unavowed;—young men who made an ostentatious display of their affection; boys, who treasured it in their bosoms, as something indescribably sweet and precious, perfuming all the chambers of the heart with its celestial fragrance. Whenever she returned from a visit to the city, some unknown youth, of elegant manners and varnished leather boots, was sure to hover round the village inn

for a few days, — was known to visit the Vaughans assiduously, and then silently to disappear, and be seen no more.

The old family mansion of the Vaughans stood a little out of town, in the midst of a pleasant farm. The country road was not near enough to annoy ; and the rattling wheels and little clouds of dust seemed like friendly salutations from travellers as they passed. In this old-fashioned house had Cecilia Vaughan grown up to maidenhood. The travelling shadows of the clouds on the hill-sides, the sudden summer wind that lifted the languid leaves, and, most of all, the mysterious mountain, whose coolness was a perpetual invitation to her, and whose silence a perpetual fear, fostered her dreamy and poetic temperament. Her mother had been dead for many years, and the memory of that mother had become almost a religion to her. Her father was a kindly old man ; a judge in one of the courts ; dignified, affable, somewhat bent by his legal erudition, as a shelf is by the weight of the books upon it.

Alice is more distinct, and better drawn than her friend, for this very obvious reason, — that it is infinitely easier to portray the real feeling of a melancholy child of nature, than catch and convey the true character of a woman with a light heart and something of the world in her. It required quite as much genius to delineate Julia Mannering, as Rebecca the Jewess or Minna Troil, and far more care and experience.

We have now prepared the village of Fairmeadow for Kavanagh's reception. Mr. Pendexter, the old-fashioned Evangelical parson, has evacuated, at the request of his parishioners, but not without preaching a pathetic and withering valedictory. Then, as the school-girl's letter has it, — which, by the way, is one of the cleverest and best-contrived performances of its kind we know of, —

“ The church has been repaired, and we have a new mahogany pulpit. Mr. Churchill bought the old one, and had it put up in his study. What a strange man he is ! A good many candidates have preached for us. The only one we like is Mr. Kavanagh. Arthur Kavanagh ! is not that a romantic name ? He is tall, very pale, with beautiful black eyes and hair ! Sally — Alice Archer's Sally — says ‘ he is not a man ; he is a Thaddeus of Warsaw ! ’ I think he is very handsome. And such sermons ! So beautifully written, so different from old Mr. Pendexter's.”

So much for public impression ; now for the author's conception : —

"Arthur Kavanagh was descended from an ancient Catholic family. His ancestors had purchased from the Baron Victor of St. Castine a portion of his vast estates, lying upon the wild and wonderful sea-coast of Maine. There, in the bosom of the solemn forests, they continued the practice of that faith which had been first planted there by Rasle and St. Castine.

"In these solitudes, in this faith, was Kavanagh born, and grew to childhood, a feeble, delicate boy, watched over by a grave, taciturn father, and a mother who looked upon him with infinite tenderness, as upon a treasure she could not long retain. She walked with him by the sea-side, and spake to him of God. She taught him his letters from the Lives of the Saints; she explained to him the pictures; she read to him the legends; the lives of holy men and women, full of faith and good works; things which ever afterward remained associated together in his mind. Thus, holiness of life, and self-renunciation, and devotion to duty, were early impressed upon his soul. To his quick imagination, the spiritual world became real; the holy company of the saints stood round about the solitary boy; his guardian angels led him by the hand by day, and sat by his pillow at night. At times, even, he wished to die, that he might see them and talk with them, and return no more to his weak and weary body.

"Of all the legends of the mysterious book, that which most delighted and most deeply impressed him was the legend of St. Christopher. Later in life it became more and more evident to him, and remained for ever in his mind as a lovely allegory of *active charity* and a *willingness to serve*.

"But the time at length came, when his father decreed that he must be sent away to school. He must go to the Jesuit College in Canada, leaving behind him all the endearments of home, and a wound in his mother's heart that never ceased to ache; a longing, unsatisfied and insatiable, for her absent Arthur, who had gone from her, perhaps for ever.

"At length his college days were ended. He returned home full of youth, full of joy and hope; but it was only to receive the dying blessings of his mother. Then the house became empty to him. Solitary was the sea-shore, solitary were the woodland walks. But the spiritual world seemed nearer and more real. For affairs he had no aptitude; and he betook himself again to his philosophic and theological studies. He pondered with fond enthusiasm on the rapturous pages of Molinos and Madame Guyon, or, in a spirit akin to that which wrote, he read the writings of St. Theresa.

"In such meditations passed many weeks and months. But mingled with them, continually and ever with more distinctness, arose in his memory the old tradition of St. Christopher, the beautiful allegory of humility and labor. It became more and more

evident to him, that the life of man consists, not in seeing visions and in dreaming dreams, but in *active charity and willing service*.

"Moreover, the study of ecclesiastical history awoke within him many strange and dubious thoughts. It was impossible to hear of Calvin without hearing of Servetus; to read Athanasius without reading also of Arian. The search after Truth and Freedom, both intellectual and spiritual, became a passion in his soul. *By slow degrees, and not by violent spiritual conflicts, he became a Protestant. He had but passed from one chapel to another in the same vast cathedral. He was still beneath the same ample roof,* still heard the same divine service chanted in a different dialect of the same universal language. Out of his old faith he brought with him all he had found in it that was holy, and pure, and of good report. Not its bigotry, and fanaticism, and intolerance; but its zeal, its self-devotion, its heavenly aspirations, its human sympathies, its endless deeds of charity.* Not till after his father's death, however, did he become a clergyman. Then his vocation was manifest to him. He no longer hesitated, but entered upon its many duties and responsibilities, its many trials and discouragements, *with the zeal of Peter and the gentleness of John.*"

We shall briefly conclude the story, and return to this most important chapter. With the spring, and the flowers, and the birds, came Kavanagh to the village. The first thing he remarked, and it cheered and consoled him, was the pale countenance of a young girl, whose dark eyes had been fixed upon him, during the whole discourse, with unflagging interest and

* If the difference was so slight, and the change no more than represented, why did Kavanagh cease to be a Catholic and become a Protestant, or rather Puseyitish Unitarian? Does not the author perceive, that, just in proportion as he diminishes the importance of the change, does he weaken the motives to make it? If Kavanagh remained in the same building, continued to worship under the ample roof of the same spacious temple, he continued to retain substantially his Catholic faith, and then, in professing himself a Protestant, must have believed that he was incurring the damnation of his own soul. Moreover, if he still recognized his former religion as substantially true, he could not have supposed that he at all endangered his salvation by remaining a Catholic, and then he could have been influenced only by worldly motives, or temporal interests, in avowing himself a Protestant. Does Mr. Longfellow mean to teach that there are only worldly reasons for being a Protestant rather than a Catholic, and thus, by implication, avow that he himself would be a Catholic, if he consulted only the salvation of his soul? This is no strained inference from his doctrine, and we have not the shadow of a doubt that it is true with regard to Protestants generally. They would all be Catholics, if they consulted only their own spiritual welfare, and are Protestants only because they wish to enjoy the world, and live without having to practise the rigid self-denial Catholicity enjoins.

attention. She sat alone in a pew near the pulpit. It was Alice Archer.

Alas for Alice ! he soon met Miss Vaughan at the taxidermist's. She had come to purchase a carrier-pigeon to conduct a correspondence between herself and Alice. As she departed, he said, half aloud, — " Of course she would never think of marrying a poor clergyman ! "

A week later Kavanagh was installed in a little room in the church-tower. He had become intimate with Churchill, and completed the first great cycle of parochial visits, besides working assiduously at his sermons. His words were always kindly ; but while he was gentle, he was firm. In short, he completely enchanted the congregation. He did not suggest many changes, but showed that some relics of Catholic good taste and feeling were in him, by desiring the organist to relinquish the old and pernicious habit of preluding with triumphal marches, or playing scraps of regular music very slowly to make them sacred, and substitute, instead of this and his own barbarous conceptions, some of the beautiful symphonies of Pergolesi, Palestrina, and Sebastian Bach.

Meanwhile, the church-bells of Fairmeadow, like those of Varennes, kept sounding, " Marry thee, marry thee, marry, marry ! " and the Roaring Brook responded sympathetically to the peal. We cannot narrate all the incidents of the pleasure-party ; but this one circumstance makes us wish Cecilia a little more gifted or a little less in love : —

" ' How indescribably beautiful this brown water is ! ' exclaimed Kavanagh. ' It is like wine, or the nectar of the gods of Olympus ; as if the falling Hebe had poured it from her goblet. '

" ' More like the mead or metheglin of the Northern gods, ' said Mr. Churchill, ' spilled from the drinking-horns of Valhalla. '

" But all the ladies thought Kavanagh's comparison the better of the two. "

We half suspect the humor of that passage to have been obtained more by accident than design ; the touch is so exquisitely fine, that it suggests the sponge of Protogenes.

Cecilia's hand trembled in Kavanagh's, and his soul was softened within him. The day passed delightfully with all.

But Alice Archer ? The carrier-pigeon was flying from her to Cecilia, when, pursued by a kingfisher, it darted into Kavanagh's room. A billet was beneath its wing addressed " Cecilia. " The bird was then on its way to her. Seizing a pen, he

wrote his love, and fastened the note to the silken band around the messenger's neck.

Disordered by its flight, the dove flew back to Alice, who, mistaking Kavanagh's epistle for Cecilia's answer, opened and read it. It was an impulse, an ejaculation of love, every line quivering with electric fire, signed "Arthur Kavanagh." But in the ecstasy of her joy and wonder that her prayer for Kavanagh's love should have been answered, her eye fell, for the first time, on the superscription; — it was "Cecilia Vaughan." Alice fainted. Her first act on recovering was to reseal the note, and send the bird to its proper destiny.

Cecilia's answer was brief, — "Come to me!" — and the magic syllables brought Kavanagh to her side.

That afternoon Cecilia went to Alice to tell her of what had happened, and accept her *congratulations*. In her happiness Cecilia saw not her poor friend's agony, but mistook her tears of blood for tears of joy. The snow of that winter fell on the happy home of Cecilia Vaughan and the lonely grave of Alice Archer.

The wedding did not take place till spring. And then Kavanagh and his Cecilia departed on their journey to Italy and the East. They intended to be absent one year; they were gone three.

When they returned, they found Churchill still correcting school exercises, — his romance not yet begun, — his *Obscure Martyrs* yet unrecorded, though Alice Archer had perished broken-hearted under his eye. The curtain is then drawn over the actors for the present. Will it rise to unfold a *sequel*?

Mr. Longfellow had the good taste to make Kavanagh's conversion to Protestantism sentimental instead of logical. It was mainly effected by the legend of a giant who wished to serve Christ, but knew not how, until he heard the voice of a child crying out, "Plant thy staff in the ground and it shall blossom and bear fruit." This is emblematic of active charity and willing service, — and active charity and willing service are not to be found in Catholicity; therefore Kavanagh became a Protestant! The application of the legend is akin to that of Hawthorne's celebrated tale of the dervise, — "No life pleasing to God that is not useful to man." It is assumed that the Catholic Church is a collection of lazy monks, nuns, and hermits, and concluded that a set of creatures politically and socially useless cannot be acceptable to God. Really, it is impossible to argue this point seriously. If rational beings, knowing well

that the Catholic Church saved Europe from barbarism, and reduced it from chaos to peace and order,—to something very different from its present condition,—knowing well that the monasteries were the model farms, the colleges, the inns, the sanctuaries of Christendom,—knowing well that Catholicity converted all Europe, and a great portion of Asia, Africa, and America, to Christianity,—if rational beings, knowing all this, and a great deal more, and having before them the Jesuit missions in North America, and Protestant exterminations in the Sandwich Islands, are still so jaundiced by prejudice as to prate of Catholic supineness and Protestant activity, we care not how soon we are complimented on our insanity.

It is extremely difficult to get Protestants to feel that the kingdom of God is not of this world,—that we are *permitted* to give up all and follow our Redeemer,—that we *may* live, not for time, but for eternity. They never will comprehend that there is still a Church that is commissioned to teach, and a body to be taught. They are incapable of perceiving that it is not every man's vocation to be a missionary; that many of us have trouble enough to save our own souls, and have to fly all contact with the temptations of society to escape defeat. Serving man is the main thing,—their primal virtue; pleasing God, secondary. Would to Heaven they would begin by loving and serving *God* with their whole souls! They would soon discover that whatever is pleasing to God *must* be useful to man, individually and collectively. They refuse to see, that if every individual purifies himself, society must be pure. They shrink from believing the salvation of a single human soul of infinitely more importance than the prosperity and glory of a nation. They never suspect that the prayers offered up on Catholic altars every minute in the year may, like the prayer of the high-priest on the battle-field, avail more than armies, and preserve a people from destruction. They little believe that the fervent aspiration of some pale, feeble daughter of St. Vincent, breathed out at the foot of the cross, for her neighbour and her country, is far more useful to mankind than pyramid, aqueduct, railroad, or telegraph, and all the committees of ways and means who were ever appointed to enlighten or bewilder themselves or their constituents.

We hope we are wrong in suspecting Mr. Longfellow of insinuating that active charity and willing service are not Catholic virtues; for he recognizes “the zeal, the self-devotion, the heavenly aspirations, the human sympathies, the endless deeds

of charity," of the Church of Christ. He seems really to have a share of Catholic feeling, — he is free from most vulgar prejudices respecting us, — he loves to speak of the sweetly sounding Angelus, and of the bells that recalled "the ages when in all Christendom there was but one Church; when bells were anointed, baptized, and prayed for, that, wheresoever those holy bells should sound, all danger of whirlwinds, thunders, lightnings, and tempests might be driven away." Perhaps the legend is meant only to excite Kavanagh to action as well as meditation; still we fear not, since, immediately afterward, the author has the heart to accuse us of "bigotry, fanaticism, and intolerance."

Of Mr. Longfellow the writer of this knows nothing, save from these two little volumes. His private and public life, his pursuits, his ordinary conversation and habits, his religion, his social reputation, even the bulk of his writings, are unknown to him. Before reading *Evangeline*, he only knew him by hearsay and these three lines : —

"And our hearts, though bold and brave,
Still like muffled drums are beating
Funeral marches to the grave."

But in *Evangeline* we fancied that we discovered that yearning after Catholicity, so conspicuous in Wordsworth, Young, Coleridge, Shelley, and Walter Scott, — a yearning that every man of genius has often felt and expressed. In Mr. Longfellow it seemed profounder, and blended with a keen relish of the beauty of Catholic life. In *Kavanagh* this yearning is still more conspicuous.

The symbolical meaning of *Evangeline* is not very evident; it seems to be a vain pursuit of earthly happiness, never attained until the soul is consecrated to God, — whilst, reactively, with Gabriel it represents man ever losing the happiness that pursues him, by his own impatience and want of resignation. Mr. Longfellow is German enough to conceive these double allegories.

In *Kavanagh* the allegory is palpable. Kavanagh is a liberal æsthetic church. He brought out of the old faith all that was holy, pure, and of good repute, and left behind all its bigotry, fanaticism, and intolerance; he embraced the duties and responsibilities, the trials and discouragements of the ministry, with the zeal of Peter and the gentleness of John, and found a reasonable amount of temporal felicity in the eyes and arms of Cecilia Vaughan. He is a higher than the Church of England, —

higher even than Puseyism. He pines after the universality of Catholicity, — he longs for the union of all sects into one universal church, — in short, he wishes for all the truth, and grandeur, and beauty, and unity he has abandoned, without the resolution to retrace his steps and become the Catholic that he was. Is this Mr. Longfellow's case? Is *Kavanagh* to have a sequel?

The author wished to represent a fusion of Catholicity with Protestantism : — let him mix the clouds and the sun. The Church of God is not compound ; it can have no union with error ; it is pure, unchangeable, complete ; *the gentleness of John* is hers just as well as *the zeal of Peter*.

We must now conclude. The faults in *Kavanagh* resemble those in *Evangeline*, — both proceeding from a severe strain after originality resulting in deformity. For instance : — “The setting sun stretched his celestial rods of light across the level landscape, and, like the Hebrew in Egypt, smote the rivers and the brooks and the ponds, and they became as blood.” There is sublimity in that, however. But this is inexcusable : — “And on the threshold stood, with his legs apart, *like a miniature colossus*, a lovely, golden boy.” But, not to multiply instances, worse than all is Mrs. Churchill showering kisses, like roses, on her husband's forehead and cheeks, “as he passed beneath the triumphal archway of her arms, trying in vain to articulate, — ‘My dearest Lilawati, what is the whole number of the geese?’”

But there are other faults from which *Evangeline* is free. The description of H. Adolphus Hawkins and Sally Manchester is too evidently Dickens ; and though much of the imitation is successful, there is some of it singularly unhappy. Mr. Churchill's dream smacks too strongly of Hans Christian Andersen, and in many passages there is a vein of Goethe. Still, we read and remember these volumes with pleasure, and as we recall their many beauties, their brevity, and their purity, are proud in feeling that this product of our own country is so much superior to all the imported fabric of Bulwer, James, Sue, Dumas, or even the authoress of *The Neighbours*. It has removed our antipathy to American literature, — an antipathy generated, perhaps, by old-fashioned prejudices, and an early, exclusive, and jealous devotion to the older English writers.

We have done Mr. Longfellow great injustice in abridging his narratives, and laid a severe stress upon the patience of our readers ; but we could not do otherwise. We have had two objects in view. One, to show the Catholic reader how easy

it is for genius to mould the simplest elements of Catholic life into a story full of instruction and beauty, without cramming it full of inconsequent controversy and questionable theology. How easy it would be for a pious Catholic, even of inferior genius, to present a still more charming picture, and introduce *portraits* of more real and solid excellence than either *Evangeline* or Father Felician ! No one is fit to write fiction, unless endowed with imagination ; and it is the province of imagination not to convince the reason, but to attract the heart. If our religious novelists could get Protestants to *feel* the beauty of Catholic customs and Catholic life, they would accomplish much in thus removing a load of prejudice that impairs the proper exercise of reason. This is their legitimate sphere, and more than this they cannot effect. An acquaintance with the interior loveliness of Catholic life may remove the bigotry of Protestants, but reason, prayer, and the grace of God can alone convert them to Catholicity.

Our other object, however imperfectly pursued, has been to caution our author against the originality of extravagance and distortion ; to stimulate him to higher things, yet confine him where he is truly excellent and original, — in the delineation of pastoral simplicity, and in the masterly use of action by which the most delicate shades of thought and feeling become visible ; to protest against introducing characters, as he does over and over again in *Kavanagh*, merely as the media of some of the author's opinions utterly apart from the purpose of his work, — excrescences, digressions, patchwork, — matter made up and laid by long ago, — old cloth fringed with new lace. There is little incident in his books, — we care not for that ; so much the better, though the taste of the age covets it, — but what incident there is should have regularity, proportion, and unity. We saw that all most beautiful, holy, and pure in these volumes emanated from an acquaintance, however imperfect, with Catholic life and feeling, and we had a faint hope, an earnest ambition, of inducing him to study more closely a Church to whose truth and splendor he is not insensible. Then would he discover beauty and majesty, purity and truth, far beyond a poet's conception ; then would he discover that her ornaments, her music, her painting, her statues, her aisles, and her bells, are but the offerings of piety and genius which she alone can inspire, — that she is not dependent on them, but they on her, — that all that is noblest in man must surround her, because she is invested with eternal beauty, — that she cannot avoid what Protestantism

never can attain, for they follow and cling to her like verdure and lilies and date-trees over the Nile, as, scattering blessings, she rolls steadily along in majesty and usefulness, adorning and redeeming the desert of life. Then would he find the true application of the Shawnee's legend, that Protestantism is Mowis ; —

“ Mowis, the bridegroom of snow, who won and wedded a maiden,
But, when the morning came, arose and passed from the wigwam,
Fading and melting away and dissolving into the sunshine,
Till she beheld him no more, though she followed far into the forest.”

And when he has found that, let him apply to himself the farewell warning he gives to Churchill : —

“ Stay, stay the present instant !
Imprint the marks of wisdom on its wings !
O, let it not elude thy grasp, but, like
The good old patriarch upon record,
Hold the fleet angel fast until he bless thee ! ”

ART. IV. — *Conversations of an Old Man and his Young Friends.* — No. I.

F. I HAVE been told that your views on most subjects were not always what they now are. My father says he has known you when you boasted of being a liberalist in politics and in religion, when you professed yourself a firm believer in the progress of the race, and were really a man of the modern world, sympathizing with humanity, and foremost in the various socialist movements of the day.

B. I did not, as a young man, differ much from most young men of ardent temperaments, lively sensibilities, generous impulses, and little practical knowledge ; I said and did a great many foolish things.

C. You will hardly persuade your young friends that it is foolish to sympathize with our kind, to feel that every man is our brother, to plead for the wronged, and to devote ourselves heart and soul to the progress of liberty, and the meliora-

tion of society, especially of the poorer and more numerous classes.

B. We are, till after long and sometimes bitter experience the dupes of words and phrases. It is not difficult to disguise mischievous purposes in fine words; it is also easy, in pursuing even a laudable object, to say and do a great many foolish things. It may be very laudable to fell a tree that cumbered ground, or hides our prospect, but not very wise to attempt to do it by climbing up and beginning at the top. It is as foolish to cut off the branch on which we must stand, as to may fall and break our necks, and not accomplish our purpose after all.

G. By which you would admonish us that our ends are necessarily good because we express them in fine phrases, that even good ends are wisely sought only by appropriate adequate means?

B. Precisely, my young friend. Schiller's *Marquis Posa* bids us remember, when we are old, the dreams of youth. Some follow his direction, and remain ignorant in spite of experience. Others do not. It is not, as you youngsters suppose, that we harden with age, grow cold and self-interested, and cease to interest ourselves in the welfare of others; that we profit by experience, and that a wider survey of men and things, a deeper insight into the springs of human action, individual and social, enable us to see what we proposed in the ardor of youth is seldom desirable, and when desirable, seldom practicable. Youth deals mostly in generals, and rarely descends to particulars. The evils which afflict the individual and society spring chiefly from moral causes, from inordinate desires, and unrestrained passions. The methods of amelioration which our young enthusiasm proposes appeal exclusively to these for their support, and can only strengthen them, aggravate the evils we seek to remove.

O. Pardon me, but I am a little impatient at the outset, which even you do not disdain to echo against human nature. I have never been able to see any truth or justice in this perpetual admonition to restrain our feelings and subdue our passions. The moralist seems to me to make himself accomplice of the despot.

C. All our native instincts, unperverted feelings, and generous sentiments are for liberty. They lead us to resist the tyrant, and where they have free scope, tyranny can never form a permanent establishment. The tyrant would repress the

annihilate them, so that we may have no spirit or disposition to rebel against him. It is the fox preaching to the geese, the wolf to the lamb.

B. All very spiritedly said, my young friends ; but it is nothing very novel. I have in the course of my life said as much, and a great deal more. All authority appears to us in youth very hateful. We see not its reason or necessity, and we fancy that it only creates the crimes that it punishes. I thought my mother was exceedingly tyrannical, when she gave me, then a boy some four or five years old, a severe whipping for telling a lie. I have lived long enough to thank her for that whipping over and over again ; for it impressed indelibly upon my memory this important lesson, — If you speak at all, speak the truth. Indeed, all authority that restrains us, or hinders us from doing whatever we wish, seems to us tyrannical. Tyranny is always odious, and so we conclude that we ought to be freed from all restraint, and at liberty to follow our inclinations. Since our inclinations, instincts, feelings, passions, resist whatever resists them, we conclude that they are intrinsically opposed to tyranny, and that whoever would restrain them is a tyrant, deserving of universal execration. God, indeed, gives us no faculties that it is unlawful to exercise — in a lawful manner, and he requires the physical destruction of no element of that nature which he has created. All the several elements of our nature may be exercised, but they are to be exercised in the order the Creator intended, in due subordination, the lower to the higher ; or, in other words, order and harmony are to be maintained in the bosom of the individual, and between individual and individual, and you will need very little experience of practical life to learn that this is impossible without authority and self-denial. We see not this at first, but gradually it dawns on our minds, and by and by becomes clear to us, and from hot-headed radicals, clamoring for liberty, seeking the elevation of mankind and social progress by removing all restraints, and giving loose reins to appetite and passion, we become sober conservatives, insisting upon submission to authority, obedience to law, as the first lesson to be taught, and the first to be learned.

F. I do not object to all authority ; for one needs not to have lived long to be aware that order is desirable, and that it is not possible, without authority of some sort, to maintain it. But I want order with liberty, not order without liberty.

O. The authority should be reasonable, and govern by

appeals to reason, not by a resort to physical force, as if man were a brute.

B. I am not learned in such matters, but I have heard it stated, that man combines in his animal nature the distinctive traits of every species of animal with which we are acquainted. Certain it is, that he has an animal nature distinct from his rational nature, and that he is often beastly in his habits, and brutish in his conduct. It is not seldom that it is necessary to treat him as a wild colt or an unruly ox. Physical force is frequently the only force that can restrain him, and corporal chastisement the only argument he is able to appreciate. The fine sentimentalisms now so common are very becoming in the young men and maidens who delight in them. One is rarely pleased to see an old head upon young shoulders. I am always afraid of a very wise youth. It is unnatural, almost monstrous. I am never displeased to hear the young and inexperienced protest against the use of the rod, and, in their sprightly way, maintain that parents and magistrates should always govern by moral suasion, — by love. It carries me back to my own spring-time of life, before I had dreamed the support for virtue which the sentiments afford is very precarious, or how hard it is, even when one's reason is fully convinced, to resist passion, or to overcome inveterate habits. Parents and magistrates should, unquestionably, govern by love, but love, if worthy of the name, is far more an affection of the rational than of the sensitive nature. It is often the highest proof of love the parent can give, to chastise his child, and the prince would show little love to his subjects, and have little claim to be called the father of his people, if he should do nothing to protect the innocent, and to repress crime by punishing the guilty.

F. I think authority, whether parental or civil, relies too little on moral power. The parent would succeed better if he would pay more respect to the reason of the child, and the prince would have less occasion to resort to physical force, if he would be more ready to treat his subjects as reasonable beings.

O. I would have authority appeal always to reason and affection. We obey cheerfully and readily, when we obey from conviction and love.

B. Authority is bound to be reasonable, and has no right to exact any thing contrary to reason or justice. Yet whatever *legitimate* authority commands must be presumed to be reasonable, till the contrary is established, and whether we see its

reasonableness or not, it is ours to obey for conscience' sake. As long as it commands nothing contrary to the law of God, its commands are binding upon us, and cannot be lawfully disregarded. Authority is under no obligation to reason with its subjects, and I have seldom seen good come from its attempts to set forth the reasons of its acts. The parent who reasons with his child usually wastes his breath. He who is so unreasonable as to demand what is not reasonable, will seldom prove himself a good reasoner. The reasons can rarely be given, because they for the most part surpass the child's comprehension.

When my eldest son was born, I entertained the doctrine contended for by my young friends. My child was never to be crossed, no restraint was ever to be placed upon his will or inclination; I would use only moral suasion, and induce him to conform to my wishes by simple appeals to his reason and affection. It did not occur to me that moral suasion can have little efficacy with a child not yet capable of moral action. I tried, however, to carry out my theory. I soon found that it was founded in sheer ignorance, and, if practicable at all, could be so only by having two or three grown persons of extraordinary natural endowments, and rare accomplishments, whose sole business it should be to attend upon one child. I learned that, though affection in a child is early developed, and is never to be disregarded, yet it is seldom, if ever, sufficient to enable him to resist the ten thousand temptations he has to do what his own preservation requires him not to do. He must be restrained long before he can in any possible way understand the reason of the restraint. Even when sufficiently advanced to understand it, in some measure, it is not enough to induce him to practise the requisite self-denial. My experience taught me that long moral lectures have as little effect on children as they usually have on grown people. A word, a proper word, in the proper tone, at the proper time, is useful; beyond, the fewer words we use the better. The child must be made to obey, and obey because his father bids. "I your father bid," is the only proper reason to address to a child, — at least till the habit of obedience is well formed. Taking care to be uniformly reasonable, just, and kind, the parent will have, in ordinary cases, rarely occasion to resort to coercion; but sometimes, let him do the best he can, he will find the rod indispensable.

Men are but children of a larger growth, and are always in

need of tutors and governors. We can count on their good behaviour no farther than they are imbued with the principle of obedience ; and that is no obedience at all which is yielded only from private conviction and inclination. If our reason, love, feelings, inclinations, are on the side of authority, and go with its requirements, so much the easier will it be for us to obey ; but if we refuse to obey when what is commanded demands their sacrifice, we lack the principle of obedience. We must obey, whether agreeable to our feelings and convictions or not.

C. That appears to me to be pushing the matter rather too far. It denies to me the right to have any will of my own, and may make it my duty to act contrary to my own convictions.

B. It undoubtedly does not favor what is called the right of private judgment ; but that is no solid objection. Private judgment and authority, in the same matter, are not reconcilable. The subject cannot be both subject and sovereign. The world for three hundred years has been trying to solve the problem, how authority can be authority and yet not be authority, — how men can be governed where all are governors and none are governed ; but it does not appear to have made much progress. Where the sovereign has the right to command, the subject is bound to obey, and has no right to have any will of his own other than his sovereign's will. We have no right *over* our sovereign, or to sit in judgment on our judge. Our will should be to conform to the will of God, expressed by himself through such organs as he has constituted, and we have no right to have any will or any conviction to the contrary.

F. Nothing is more sacred than a man's own convictions, and I know of no more intolerable tyranny than that which compels him to do violence to them.

O. It is because religion, or what claims to be religion, fails to respect our private convictions, because it tramples on the sacred rights of the mind, and prohibits free inquiry, free thought, free speech, and free action, that so many in the modern world are opposed to it. No man wishes to be without religion, and every one would willingly embrace a religion which should not demand the sacrifice of his manhood.

C. The priesthood seem to me to stand greatly in their own light. They do not appear to comprehend the age. The dominant sentiment of our age is the love of freedom, of hu-

manity, and it will not submit to be directed by those who seek to repress its lofty aspirations and its noble energies. If the clergy would respect the age, it would respect them; but it has sworn it will not bow its neck to the yoke of servitude, and surrender its conscience to those who will not respect its rights.

B. It was Lucifer, I believe, that Milton represents as saying, —

“Better to reign in hell, than serve in heaven.”

But Lucifer finds less freedom in reigning than St. Michael in serving. The principle of license, and that of despotism, are one and the same, and the clamor for freedom usually indicates only impatience of law, and the desire for the predominance of mere will, — the essential principle of despotism. Your radical is always an ingrained despot, who, finding he cannot himself rule, resolves that nobody shall rule. Clothe him with authority, and he forthwith institutes the Reign of Terror. You never find your Robespierres as moderate in the exercise of power as even your Mirabeaus, your Ledru-Rollins as your Lamartines, your Thierses as your Guizots. That the dominant spirit of our age is freedom from all restraint may be true enough, but I have never read of an age, claiming to be civilized, in which there was less of the spirit of true liberty, or in which tyranny, under the form either of anarchy or of despotism, more abounded. The age not only has failed to establish liberty in any proper sense of the term, but has labored, not unsuccessfully, to render its establishment for a long time to come extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible. The revolutionary efforts throughout Europe, in our day, to introduce democracy, have loosened the bands of society, to a great extent destroyed respect for law, and left authority no possible means of preserving itself and maintaining social order but the resort to physical force. I can prudently give a child who I know will not abuse it far more liberty than I can one who I know will use whatever liberty I give him only for his and my ruin. Government threatened in its very existence by a numerous band of restless spirits, who are constantly plotting against it, is obliged to resort to the most stringent measures of repression, — measures which would be as unjustifiable as unnecessary, if the whole population were submissive and loyal.

The great mass of the people are easily imposed upon.

Let a number of men set up and continue for a certain length of time the cry, that religion is hostile to freedom, and they begin to think that there must be something in it. Where there is so much smoke there must be some fire. Religion certainly is opposed to license, it certainly does require us to practise self-denial, but this simply proves that it is the necessary basis of all true liberty. There is no liberty without justice, and justice is inconceivable without religion. What you call freedom of mind is its slavery, did you but know it. The mind was created for truth, and finds its freedom, as its food, only in the possession of truth. Without truth it has no free movement, no active force, no life, but necessarily droops, withers, and dies. A worse calamity is not conceivable, than to be doomed to be ever seeking the truth and never to find it. He who is so doomed has no resting-place, no repose. He has no solid footing ; at every step, he feels the ground give way beneath him. Darkness is before him, darkness is behind him. He cannot see his hand before his face, and yet he must move on, for to stand still is to sink into the abyss ; but whither, he sees not. He knows not where he is, or in what direction he is moving, or ought to move. It is idle to pretend that such a man has freedom of mind, for he has no mind at all, — cannot make up his mind on any thing.

My young friends do not at this moment appreciate what I am saying, for they have not yet felt the pressure of life. They are just entering what appears to them a career of free inquiry, — buoyant and hopeful, sustained in part by their animal spirits, and in part by the truths they have learned from their tutors and governors, and which they have not as yet wholly effaced from their minds. They are charmed, too, by the novelty of their situation and the freshness of their emotions, and borne onward by the excitement of the exercise. But the excitement will soon subside, the freshness will fade, the novelty will wear off, and the heart and soul will cry out for their appropriate food. It is dangerous tampering with the eternal laws of God ; a day of vengeance is sure to come. If you are not among those, as I trust you are not, who cannot learn even in the school of experience, you will one day cease to find delight in the pursuit of what continues constantly to elude your grasp, and will fall back upon yourselves weary and disheartened ; a universal lassitude will succeed to your present buoyancy, your hopes will be withered, and nothing will remain for you but to seek forgetfulness in sensual gratification, or in the vice of avarice or ambition.

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Strike out religion and morality, and nothing remains but our animal nature and its objects. The sensualist did not begin in gross sensualism. He began in soft and sweet sentiments, which, as he was conscious of no impure intention, he imagined to be pure, and such as he could safely indulge. Nay, he imagined it almost a sin to forego them. Day by day they grew upon him by indulgence, till they became too strong for ordinary virtue to repress, and then he found them to have been only the germs of beastly vices and grievous sins. The beginnings of all vice and crime are pleasant and sweet to our animal nature ; but all emotions or sentiments originating in that nature are vice and crime, when fully developed. " Every man is tempted, being drawn away by his own concupiscence, [or lusts,] and allured. Then when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin ; but sin when it is completed begetteth death." The modern world followeth concupiscence, the inferior or irrational nature. It began in what is most pleasing and seductive in that nature, which it dignifies with the names of liberty and philanthropy. But these when taken as affections of the animal, not of the rational soul, can be followed only on condition that we gradually discard both revealed religion and natural. Hence you find that your modern reformers, notwithstanding their fine words and lofty phrases, tend with all their energy to establish the supremacy of the flesh over the spirit. Hence their breach with the past. The past has labored, not indeed always with complete success, to institute and maintain a social and political order in which the rational nature should be supreme, and the animal be subordinate, and held, as far as possible, in subjection. This our reformers condemn ; they seek to organize society and the state on an entirely different set of principles, so that intellect and reason shall be the mere instruments of appetite and passion. It could not be otherwise ; for the flesh knoweth not God, and, if followed, excludes God and the whole rational nature.

Freedom of inquiry, thought, speech, and action, rightly understood, are no doubt good things ; but your friends who claim their exclusive possession have very little right to them. All they understand by them is freedom to think, speak, and act against religion, without losing their reputation, or suffering any social or civil inconvenience. The pick-pocket, the thief, the robber, the adulterer, the murderer, the traitor, wish, no doubt, as much, and with as much justice. I have never found unbelievers actuated by a love of truth ; I

have never found one of their number going forth in pursuit of it with a free mind, and an open heart, ready to receive it. They are all disciples of some master, and if they inquire at all, it is only to confirm their prejudices. I have no reason to think that I was, when among them, less candid, open, and truthful than the rest ; yet I never knew what it was to seek for the truth, till I became a believer. I sought to refute that doctrine, or to establish this, never distinctly to ascertain what is true doctrine ; and I embraced the truth only as it forced itself upon me. I had no intention, no thought, of becoming a Catholic ; I did not even ask myself whether Catholicity was true or false. Its truth burst of itself upon me, while I was busily engaged with something else ; and I accepted it only because I could not help it. It interfered with all my plans of life, with all my old habits, with all my associations, and was any thing but pleasant to flesh and blood. But it broke upon my mind with such clearness, distinctness, and force, that I had no power to resist it. I did not seek it,—it came of itself ; I did not find it,—it found me, and took me captive, and carried me away in spite of myself.

I have looked over no small portion of the literature of the modern Liberal world ; I have looked in vain for some trace of free, strong, and manly thought. Your most admired authors are cramped in their movements, narrow and superficial in their views, and generally weak and flippant in their expressions. They are strong only in their appeals to passion, and invariably fall far below the better sort of enlightened heathen. Out of the departments of physical science and mathematics, which do not require a very high order of intellect, the greatest names you can boast are Bayle and Voltaire, and these have been able to make no real advance on Celsus and Julian. Jean Jacques Rousseau was a sophist, a puny sentimentalist, and a disgusting sensualist, who set forth nothing novel that was not false. Your English deists, Lord Herbert, Tindall, Toland, Woolston, &c., are the dullest of mortals. I never could fairly read through one of their stupid productions. Your liberals have succeeded in shaking the faith of many, in sowing doubt and despair ; but I do not call to mind a single subject on which their lucubrations have thrown new light. They only repeat one another, and are tediously monotonous in error. What are the greatest of them by the side of such men as St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. John Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome,

St. Austin, St. Gregory the Great, St. Bernard, St. Thomas of Aquin, Suarez, Bossuet, the great Fathers and Doctors of the Church, the really great men of the human race, — great as men, as scholars, thinkers, philosophers, as well as great in sanctity, the highest order of greatness, — what beside these men are your Bayles, your Voltaires, your Rousseaus, your Tom Paines, your Saint-Simons, your Owens, your Fouriers? These men were at the summit of their respective epochs, and every one of them has contributed to the sum of human knowledge and virtue.

There is no doubt the age would respect religion, if religion would respect it; but religion gives the law, it does not receive it. Unbelievers, no doubt, would accept religion, if she would make herself infidel; but has it never occurred to our wise young men, that religion become infidel is no longer religion? You remind me of my old friends, the Unitarians, who are in the habit of maintaining that their religion is the best in the world for checking the spread of infidelity, — because it presents nothing that an unbeliever can find any difficulty in accepting. It brings Christianity down to the level of the unbeliever's capacity, that is, strips it of every thing, except its name, that distinguishes it from infidelity. I know no solid reason why an unbeliever should hesitate to accept of a Christianity which requires him to change only his name. The clergy very possibly stand in their own light by not conforming to the dominant spirit of the age, — if religion be, as our sage liberals pretend, mere priestcraft, and if they seek only temporary popular applause. But the clergy are the *ministers* of religion, and have no authority over it. If they were at liberty to mould it to the various and ever-varying caprices of the multitude, to make it one thing in one age or country, and another thing in another, no sensible man could respect either it or them. It is singular that our liberals take it upon them to advise the clergy, in order to secure respect for religion, to adopt a policy which would show on its very face that they hold religion to be mere craft and imposition, and still more singular that they should suppose any friend to religion should not see that their advice is that of an enemy.

O. Yet the clergy, as a body, have always shown themselves hostile to liberty, and have never sufficiently urged the importance of improving society, and elevating the lower classes.

C. Their chief study relates to another world, and they

appear to have proceeded on the principle, that it matters little what is our condition in this world, if we but secure the salvation of our souls in the world to come.

F. They proceed as if the chief business of religion were not to teach us how to live, but how to die,—as if we had nothing to do in this world but to get out of it the best way we can !

B. That the clergy have as a body been opposed to what is sometimes called liberty is no doubt true,—but this is to their honor. There can be no question that they have taken the words of their Master literally, “Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice” ; but this does not prove that they have at all neglected man’s social well-being, for the only certain way of making sure of earth is first to make sure of heaven. He who lives solely for heaven lives the best life even for this world. The clergy, as a body, have always been the friends of liberty, but they very frequently deny that what some men call liberty is liberty, and I know no reason for asserting that they have less authority than their opponents to define what is, or is not, true liberty. They certainly teach that this world is not our abiding-place, that we are here only pilgrims and sojourners, that we are here to prepare for another world, for the return to our native country. If in this they are right,—and which of my young friends dares say they are wrong?—this world is, in itself considered, a matter of no importance, and social well-being, save in its bearing on our eternal welfare, deserves no attention. That state of society which is the most favorable to preparation for heaven, is the best. Supposing, then, the clergy do as you allege, it is only a proof that they are faithful to their God and to the human soul ; and if my young friends were to inquire into the matter, they would find that the evils they complain of result solely from attachment to the world, from giving it an undue place in our affections, and from not following the teaching of the clergy, and trampling the world beneath our feet. If all men would live for heaven, and not for earth, there would be no tyranny, no oppression, no political or social evils. “Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be superadded to you.” This world feeds only our animal nature, and you should be prepared to maintain that man ought to live as a mere animal, before you venture to urge your objection to the Christian doctrine of detachment and self-denial.

O. Supposing Christianity to be true, the clergy are, no doubt, justifiable; but the very fact that it enjoins this detachment and self-denial is to me the best of all reasons for believing it false.

B. That is, Christianity is false because it asserts in man something superior to the human animal, and for man a higher destiny than that of the beasts that perish! Whatever asserts the superiority of the soul over the body, and teaches us to live for the soul instead of the body, is false! My young friend, I grant, is consistent with himself.

F. But is it not an objection to the Church, that she uniformly frowns upon all efforts to ameliorate the political and social condition of mankind?

B. I am not aware that she ever does so. She may frown upon the efforts of hot-headed radicals and savage revolutionists, for she does not recognize the so-called "sacred right of insurrection" as one of her dogmas. She enjoins obedience to legitimate authority, so long as it commands nothing contrary to the law of God, and therefore regards sedition, insurrection, rebellion, as sins against God, no less than as crimes against the state. But she is always on the side of honest freedom, and never fails to exert all her influence to lessen political and social evils, and to augment the sum of political and social well-being.

C. Before you became a Catholic, you were the friend of the people, ready to do battle to the best of your ability in their cause; now we find you siding with the people's masters, sympathizing with the despotic governments that, in the recent revolutions in Europe, have repressed the popular movements for liberty. Is it not because your religion requires you to do so?

B. There are several ways of telling a story. In my youth I was a wild radical, and sympathized with rebels wherever I found them, — unless rebels against the authority of the mob. I took it for granted, that all old institutions are bad, and tend only to restrain the free spirit of man, and I looked upon every established government as necessarily tyrannical, and hostile to liberty. Whoever seeks to demolish old institutions, and to overthrow all fixed government, belongs, I said, to the party of progress, and is on the side of humanity. I sympathized with Lucifer in his rebellion against the Almighty, and with admiration heard him say, in Milton, after his defeat, —

"All is not lost; the unconquerable will,
And study of revenge, immortal hate

And courage never to submit or yield,
 And what is else not to be overcome;
 That glory never shall his wrath or might
 Extort from me : to bow and sue for grace,
 With suppliant knee, and deify his power,
 Who from the terror of this arm so late
 Doubted his empire, — that were low indeed,
 That were an ignominy and shame beneath
 This downfall ; since by fate the strength of gods
 And this empyreal substance cannot fail ;
 Since through experience of this great event,
 In arms not worse, in foresight much advanced,
 We may with more successful hope resolve
 To wage by force or guile eternal war,
 Irreconcilable to our grand foe,
 Who now triumphs, and in the excess of joy
 Sole reigning holds the tyranny of heaven."

But in those mad days when I was animated by the spirit of the age, I was any thing but a friend to the people.

I have not sympathized with the recent European revolutions, not, indeed, because I am hostile to the people; but because I love them and wish their good. Kings and nobles are nothing to me. What have I to gain by opposing popular frenzy, and telling the people they are fools and mad? Am I not one of the people? Is not my earthly lot, and that of my children, bound up with theirs? Why should I desert my old friends, and expose myself to the reproach and obloquy of popular leaders? I do not concede that nobody understands or seeks the good of the people but radicals, Red Republicans, communists, and socialists. I oppose these because they are the enemies of the people, as well as of God. Men who consult the lessons of past experience, who respect the wisdom of past ages, and uniformly act under an abiding sense of their accountability, are fully as likely to understand and seek the real good of the people, as your atheistical and immoral revolutionists, who despise all knowledge, wisdom, or authority but their own.

I can hardly restrain my indignation when I find our liberal press representing these recent revolutions as attempted in favor of the people. A more God-forgetting and God-forsaken set of mortals it would be difficult to find, than the leaders of the European liberals, who excited these revolutions and sought through them to introduce popular government in the European states. There may be here and there an honest man in the ranks of the party, but among the chiefs I have not found a single one worthy of the least respect for his moral principles or his practical virtue. Some of them have received

a passable education, — are not deficient either in scientific culture or refinement of manners, — but as yet not a great man, a man of a high order of character, has appeared among them. Mazzini has low cunning and some rhetorical ability ; Lamartine is a mere phrase-monger, and Kossuth is a whimpering sentimentalist. Bem and Dembinski, their ablest generals, have proved what they were by turning Turks, — if reports are to be credited. Ledru Rollin is a cross between Marat and Robespierre. Nothing in the world is easier than to gain a reputation by opposing authority, declaiming for liberty, and professing unlimited devotion to the cause of the people. One needs but rattle off a few commonplaces for liberty, or against despotism, to gain the admiration of the multitude, and the name of patriot and people's friend. Chime in with popular passions, and those passions will swell your voice, and sustain you — for a time.

I was trained to sympathize with European liberals, and to receive as so much law and gospel whatever received the sanction of French infidels, Polish and Italian refugees, and English Whigs. In later years I have asked myself what European liberals, or the liberals in any country, from the Gracchi down to our own time, have ever effected for the liberty or the happiness of the people. In modern times they have frequently been in power. They were in power in England in the seventeenth century ; they beheaded their king, brushed away the lords temporal and the lords spiritual, and had every thing their own way. The nation gladly, to get rid of their misrule, submitted, under Cromwell, to a military despotism, — to a slavery hitherto unknown in England. They were in power in Holland under the De Witts, and brought their country to the verge of ruin. They were in power in France in 1789, 1830, and in 1848, and in each instance, as long as they held the power, terror reigned, and there was no security for person or property. Never do they rise to power but they prove themselves real despots, savages, and butchers. No nation has yet been found that could for any considerable length endure their sway, or that has not on the very first opportunity thrown them off. Religion and philosophy teach us that it must be so, and history proves that it is so. The reason is, that every liberal is by nature a despot, and it is his spirit of lawlessness and insubordination that places him in opposition to authority. However he may disguise the matter from himself or others, he wishes to be governed only by his

own will, that is, to make his own will the government, which is the essential principle of despotism. When I hear a man declaiming lustily for liberty, I suspect it is for liberty to debauch my wife, to pick my pocket, or cut my throat.

If you are wise, you will place no confidence in European liberals. You cannot rely on one of their statements. They fear not God, and regard not man. The truth is the last thing in the world they see or choose to tell, and whoever has in these days relied on their published statements has found himself deceived. Witness the case of the Hungarians. Up to the very last moment, the liberal press in Europe and this country teemed with glowing accounts of the successes of the Hungarians, and the defeats of the Russo-Austrian forces, while every man not blinded by his sympathy with the rebels knew that these successes and defeats were pure inventions, — as well as every body knows now that the Russo-Austrian army met with no serious check even once during the whole campaign.

In none of the European states was a revolution called for. Abuses of administration there may have been, but it is well known that the governments were doing their best to correct them ; evils, no doubt, there were, but chiefly of that nature which no government can reach, and which will generally be greater under a democratic government than any other. As a Catholic I complain of nearly all the European governments, for their denial of the freedom of religion, and their taking into their own hands the business of education, which of right belongs to the Church ; but besides this I am aware of no well-grounded complaint that could be brought against any of the European governments, and this was no ground of complaint with the liberals. None of them were tyrannical, or showed any disposition to tyrannize over their subjects, and whatever severity they practised was practised against those only who were continually conspiring to overthrow them. The complaints of the liberals were ridiculous. “The government won’t keep still and suffer us to destroy it. It is detestably tyrannical. It has no respect for the rights of the people ; it puts down free discussion ; it insults the majesty of reason, and tramples intellect in the dust. It puts out the light of the soul, and involves man in darkness. It will not let us quietly cut its throat, and insists that we shall demean ourselves as good citizens and loyal subjects !” This is the sum and substance of their complaint, as you may gather, if you will, even from the *Mie Prigione* of Silvio Pellico.

F. But do you not overlook the fact, that all the European governments were antipopular in their constitution? The liberals were struggling to introduce popular forms of government as the condition and guaranty of popular liberty. In this I sympathize with them, and regret that the combined forces of the crowned despots have been able to triumph over them.

O. Their triumph is only for a time. The friends of the people, European democrats, are defeated, but not subdued, nor even disheartened. They have not struggled in vain; their cause lives; the sacred fire of popular liberty is still cherished, and they will conquer at last.

" Yet, Freedom ! yet, thy banner torn, but flying,
Screams like the thunder-storm *against* the wind ;
Thy trumpet-voice, though broken now and dying,
The loudest still the tempest leaves behind ;
Thy tree hath lost its blossoms, and its rind,
Chopped by the axe, looks rough and little worth,
But the sap lasts, — and still the seed we find
Sown deep, even in the bosom of the North ;
So shall a better spring less bitter fruit bring forth."

The people have been awakened, and tyrants will never charm them to sleep again. Henceforth no throne is firm, no crown sits secure. The struggle will never cease till the people obtain their rights.

B. My young friends, I see, do not lack the power to declaim. But lofty words and high-sounding periods cost little expenditure of thought. I am no prophet, and therefore shall not undertake to say what will or will not occur hereafter. I do not, however, think the struggle between society and its enemies is by any means ended. There is no doubt great truth in what you say about the people having been awakened. So large a portion of the European population have been rendered dissatisfied with their condition, — have been made to believe that their sufferings are due to bad government, or to a falsely organized society, and induced to hope amelioration only from popular institutions, — that I do not believe the democratic movement will suddenly subside; and the youngest of you probably will not live long enough to see social peace restored, and legitimate government at liberty to devote all its energies to the welfare and prosperity of its subjects.

If I, like my young friends, believed that popular liberty and democracy were inseparable, and that it is impossible to have one without the other, I should undoubtedly think and feel very differently, in respect of European liberals, from what I do at present. But you liberals are too illiberal for me.

You are political bigots, and would compel us all to think as you do. You will allow of no political salvation out of democracy. I cannot stand that. I nowhere read that Almighty God declares all forms of government, except the democratic, are illegitimate. When he himself framed immediately a civil polity for his chosen people, it was not the democratic. The Jewish polity was, as near as it can be described by comparison with secular governments generally, a federative aristocracy, under the hierarchy, which was monarchical. The Church has never made democracy a dogma of faith, and I have never been able to find in the Holy Scriptures a single passage that gives the preference to the democratic over other forms of government. If I find myself the citizen of a democratic state, I hold myself bound to sustain democracy. I am a republican by habit, association, and by preference for my own country ; but, excepting my own country and Switzerland, I know of no country in which the introduction of democratic republicanism would not sacrifice liberty, and prove a curse to the people. I therefore do not regard European liberals as worthy of our sympathy because they are struggling for democracy. That is rather a ground of accusation against them.

It is very easy to call the emperors of Russia and Austria despots and tyrants, to rail at Metternich, and pronounce Haynau a butcher, to call the victims of their just punishment the martyrs of liberty, and to brand as enemies of the people all who will not say as much. Nay, it is not difficult to make the dear people themselves believe so. But it will take much to convince me that Nicholas of Russia is not a better man than Joseph Mazzini, Haynau a better friend of the people than the weak and whimpering Kossuth, or that Prince Metternich has not done more for real liberty and the welfare of the people of Europe, during the last thirty years, than has been done by all your liberals from Hampden to M. Proudhon. I do not expect you to believe me to-day. You are young, and filled with the spirit of liberalism. You have not yet learned that the first lesson in freedom is submission to authority, and the practice of self-denial. There is and can be no freedom for irreligious men, or a godless nation. Never is it the free government that makes a free people ; always is it the free people that makes the free government. You may turn the matter over as you will, to this you must come at last. " If the Son make you free, you shall be free indeed." If he does not, you are slaves in democratic America no less than in despotic Turkey.

ART. V. — *Solution de Grands Problèmes, mise à la portée de tous les Esprits.* Par l'Auteur de Platon-Polichinelle. Lyon. 1847. 4 tomes. 18mo.

AT a period like the one in which we live, when the civil commotions which agitate the nations of the Old World, and the uneasiness which exists amongst the instructed of all classes and creeds in the New, offer to the mind of the Christian philosopher strong indications of a conflict far more important than that of nation against nation, sect against sect, and subjects against their rulers, — when men are so apt to stand firmly in the position they assume, and to pronounce emphatically and to act energetically for the cause into whose scale they throw their influence, — it is extremely necessary for each one to understand clearly the programme, so to speak, by which he is to abide, or whose provisions he is to oppose. The irresolute, the wavering, the inconstant, of both sides, are those who render most difficult a mutually satisfactory understanding. While others find it a difficult task to define what principles such doubtful champions embody, they themselves feel the effects of drowsy carelessness incidental to one who knows not whence he came, or whither he is going.

The author of the celebrated work before us seems to have written especially for these victims of uncertainty, and while, by the brilliancy of his imagination, the rapidity of his argument, the lucidness of his reasoning, and the earnestness of his conclusions, he interests them in the discussion, he gives proof of so much honesty, so much warmth, so much anxiety for their welfare, that they cannot but admire his sincerity and reciprocate his affection. Less profound than Moehler, less searching than Gioberti, less eloquent than Balmes, he partakes of the genius and solidity of each of these great writers, and is more popular than any of them. He does not exactly engage you in a profound study of the principles he defends, but gives you the quintessence of his own reflections upon them, with such power of illustration, such clearness of views, such brilliancy of wit, such varied and pleasing erudition, as to force you almost to consider as absurd and ridiculous what you thought it hard for him to prove simply false. He does not merely tell you the direction in which you are going, but points out to you the end at which you will arrive, using in the mean time rather your own intellect than his, and adroitly

enlisting your good sense and your good nature against yourself. We shall be highly pleased to see an English translation of this admirable work, and we are sure that a first edition of it will be speedily exhausted. In the mean time we recommend it earnestly to all who would possess a strong Catholic statement of principle in regard to matters not strictly connected with the solemn worship of the Church, and to those who wish to place in the hands of their Protestant friends a brief and conclusive answer to the many objections and doubts which a want of any fixed principle is apt to beget.

Our object in this article is, not to review it, but to offer some reflections upon a subject incidentally connected with it, and which daily becomes more and more important, — the relative position of religion and society. Our remarks are intended chiefly for our Catholic brethren, before whom we would place such doctrines of the Church and such passages of her history as may suffice clearly to explain the influence she rightfully claims to exercise on our social relations, and the only conditions on which society can reap the fruits of her heavenly guidance and protection. It is always a more pleasing task for us to illustrate and apply our own principles, than to attack the erroneous systems of those who have not the privilege of the infallible guidance of the Church. In this spirit we enter upon the subject of *Religion in Society*, the development of which is every day becoming a more important department of our Review.

When the Son of God came down from heaven and was made man, he did not simply assume human flesh as a garment which might screen the effulgent majesty of a Divine visitor, but, intimately uniting himself with humanity, he stood before the world a real and true man in soul, in body, in all save that which alone man received not from God, the guilt of ingratitude and rebellion. The fulness of his Divine nature dwelt in human nature, by means of whose outward form he lived and moved among men, condescending to fulfil various offices which mere human persons fulfil according to their various callings. These offices and callings which we so feebly and imperfectly perform, he in a perfect manner discharged for our encouragement and instruction. Hence it is that his example presents the perfect ideal of a holy priest, a faithful friend, a dutiful son, a kind master, an upright subject, an honest neighbour, a virtuous and useful citizen.

The Church, established by him to continue throughout all

ages the mission which he discharged during his life upon earth, directs towards him the eyes of her children, and teaches even the most feeble and helpless of them to copy according to the best of their ability the perfections of his sinless character. Wherever their lot may be cast, whatever office or calling may have been apportioned to them by the hand of Providence, she teaches them to fulfil the duties of their station for the one great ultimate end of the glory of God and the salvation of their souls, — to fulfil them as nearly as possible in the manner Christ did when similarly engaged upon earth. These remarks present three ideas to the mind, viz. the Candidate, the Guide, and the Exemplar, that is to say, the Christian, the Church, and the Redeemer. The Christian is to accomplish the end for which he was created, the Church leads him onward towards its accomplishment, and Christ shows how it is to be accomplished.

Having thus stated the end to be gained, who is to gain it, and how and by what guidance he is to gain it, the question most likely to arise is, How far does the vigilance of the Church, as by Christ commissioned, extend in eliciting this sublime spirit of imitation? It extends to all time and place where God may be honored or offended, — to every soul that may be lost or saved, — to all men not sentenced already as belonging to heaven or to hell. These remarks contain the sum and substance of all the elucidations that may be required to place the formulary adopted as our subject — *Religion in Society* — in its true aspect. Many readers, however, will be apt to approach its solution from a more remote quarter, and to recall sayings quite common in our day, the truth or error of which lies back, so to speak, of the region in which we have practically opened our case. The sayings to which we allude as maxims which pass current in our day, would most likely suggest the following questions : — Has Religion any thing to do with Society? Is Society bound to take its principles from Religion? Has Religion any right to interfere with Society, except in matters connected with the solemn worship of the Creator? Does Religion, for instance, occupy herself with our business pursuits, our secular avocations, our temporal possessions, our politics, our bargains, our manners, our amusements? We can almost imagine some of our young friends who talk so loudly about the rights of the people, the temporal power of the Pope, the necessity of keeping the spiritual order and the political order distinct, the glories of liberty, the base-

ness of kings, &c., propounding these questions, and demanding no obscure or uncertain answer. And while we are in this mood, we cannot help imagining how different an answer the Spirit of the Age, if interrogated in the above manner, would return to those youthful inquirers from what Catholic doctrine points out as the true one. A wonderful genius is this Spirit of the Age! No matter how true or how much needed a maxim may be, one is reminded of the danger he incurs in uttering it, by the awful warning that it is not in accordance with the Spirit of the Age. The Spirit of the Age knows all things, and has an opinion to express on all subjects, past, present, or future. It is a thousand pities that so learned a spirit can never be tangibly taken hold of and made to speak for himself. But, like certain other spirits, though always busy at work, he is never seen, and though quoted by everybody, never speaks himself. Still, as we do not bear him unlimited veneration, we take the liberty sometimes to bring him fairly before us, in the form we imagine his vague and unsettled nature would choose, were he to become visible. In these instances the great Genius presents himself adorned with a face very much like that of an ape, for his speech imitates wisdom and truth precisely as a monkey imitates a man. The body, half human and half Satanic, winds off in a serpentine manner, emblematic of the crookedness of his philosophy. On his head, in lieu of the Socratic bays, we discern a little Red Republican cap dashed slightly on one side, to make him look interesting; under his arm he carries a wonderful dictionary, compiled from the leading socialist, progressive, ultra-democratic, and Young-Ireland periodicals of the day. From this book of wisdom, the obliging Genius answers, without stopping to take breath, all the possible difficulties of every art, science, and creed, in a manner which would put all the gray-bearded philosophy of olden times to the blush. Nothing is too high or too profound for him. Yet, to tell the truth, whenever he affirms a thing, we have a shrewd suspicion that he knows he ought to deny it, and whenever we hear him cry loudly for a measure as good, we feel pretty sure that secretly he understands it to be evil. What he says may often seem plausible enough, but we prefer to look at his professions more searchingly, and discover what he means. Thus, for example, when he opens his dictionary at the word Liberty, and reads a brilliant passage descriptive of its greatness and glory, we marvel at his keeping a serious face, and suspect that, were he to state

honestly what he means, it would sound very much in this fashion : — “ Gentlemen, Liberty means leave for me to pick your pocket, and for you — not to complain.” He turns over a leaf of his book, and tells us of the philosophy of his enlightened school. We translate his definition of philosophy, and it avers that philosophy is the art of proving that two and two, not unfrequently, make five ; that black in many cases looks exceedingly like white, and that persons who wish to preserve their countenances from being burnt by the sun ought to wear a thick veil, especially at twelve o’clock at night. Does the Genius speak of the upwardness of modern progress ? Then, to our understanding, he means that progress is a faithful imitation of the motion of a crab going down hill. He descants upon the comforts of equality. Understood as he means it, no matter what he may say, equality consists in the very pleasant process of cutting off the heads of the tall men, and in pulling out the small men, as one might do a spy-glass, so that both become of a size. And when he searches his dictionary to give us the true meaning of his favorite word, Fraternity, his warm description of the peace which it produces puts us in mind of the famous Kilkenny cats, who fought until they had eaten each other up, all except the tips of their respective tails, which they wagged in token of defiance.

Guided by this key to the true meaning of the learned Genius of the Age, we look to him for an answer to the questions proposed higher up, and we have no doubt that his true view of the case would embody itself in solutions equivalent to the following. “ Religion and society,” he would say, “ are two orders, one opposed to the other. Religion was made, of course, by the Almighty, — it begins at the altar, ends at the holy-water font at the door, and is bounded by the four walls of the church. The period of its duration is from Sunday morning until Sunday evening. Society was invented by the Devil, and it rules the week from Monday morning until Saturday night. Business, politics, and amusements are things that lie beyond the verge of morality, and the control of religion. He who pretends to be religious anywhere but inside of the church is a bigot, a hypocrite, a man of the Dark Ages ; and he who outside of the church suits his convenience by cunningly cheating, smoothly lying, — playing, in short, the *confidence man*, — is a smart man, — in fact, something of an honorable man, — and, in fact, (if he take care not to be found out,) may be one of the most remarkable men of his age and country.”

After this statement of the morality which passes current with this age of high-pressure progress, let us examine what the teaching of the Church is regarding Religion in Society. This section of our article is, properly speaking, the pivot upon which the whole discussion turns. Hence we must endeavour to render it clear and plain to the mind of every Catholic reader.

Man is a being fashioned in all his parts, and placed upon earth, by the hand of God. God created by a direct act of his power the soul of man, indirectly, according to the order of his wise Providence, the body of man. The part of man which makes him like unto his Creator is his soul. Now in his soul he has that power which is called will, or free-will. This free-will is the link which connects man with the moral order established by God.

This will is like a point upon which the law of God rests, as an ivory ball upon a smoothly polished marble table, which it touches only in one point. But as in this instance the whole weight of the ball rests upon the whole of the table, though touching it only at one point, so the whole weight of God's moral law rests upon the whole man, in every place and at every time, upon all his actions and relations. The reason of this is because man as an intelligent being, a free agent, a responsible person, is governed only by this will, which is sometimes called the monarch of the soul. But this monarch of the soul is governed by the moral law of God made known to the intellect. To be brief, God rules the will, the will rules the whole human being. All the rules laid down for man's will by his God, and made known to him through reason, or conscience, or revelation, are united and organized under the term Religion. Whenever an act is produced by the will of man, it is either according to the order required by religion, or it is not. If it is, that act is a virtuous act; if it is not, that act is not a virtuous act, but a vicious one. Virtue means the good use of free-will, vice the bad use of free-will. So that, in conclusion, you may search from Adam's first breath until the day of judgment, and you will find no act of human will indifferent in the face of religion, no act upon which it does not pass judgment, and register as a loss or a gain. Were an illustration desired to explain this universal influence of religion upon man and society, the world might be compared to a vast garden filled with every variety of flowers and plants, and religion to the light which illumines and vivifies them. Were the compari-

son to be carried out more fully, we might remember how God first created the light, and then organized it in the resplendent orb of day, which he placed as its centre and source, and to which he attached all its rays. In like manner he has centred and organized in a common focus and source, — in his Holy Church, — all the precepts of religion, its duties, its teachings, its moral and intellectual bearings upon man and society. From this glorious centre emanate the streams and floods of rich noonday light, which convey heat, color, and life to the gorgeous rose of the garden, the unspotted chalice of the virgin lily, and even cheer with a ray of comfort the modest violet in the bosom of the distant valley. This Church, appointed to be the inseparable companion and the faithful guardian of man, is a mother to him in his childhood, a teacher to him in youth, in manhood a friend, a guide in old age, until, when his tottering footsteps grow feebler and heavier as he approaches the end of his career, his eyes are closed, and he is wrapped in the mortuary shroud by the same fond parental hand which had rocked the cradle of his infancy. These principles, which are to be found in the catechism learned by every Catholic child, furnish a satisfactory answer to the questions proposed in the beginning of our article. They follow naturally from the maxim that God is the master of all. They merely assert that he is our master everywhere, that the Ten Commandments were made for the rich as well as for the poor, for the sage as well as for the ploughman, for the homestead as well as for the church, for the night as well as for the day, for the public as well as for the private individual, for old age as well as for youth.

Still, even such plain truths as these sound rather jarringly upon the ear of one reared under the tuition of this “enlightened nineteenth century.” Many there are, who, without denying their truth, would laugh at one who were to utter them in a place of every-day resort. He would even be told, most probably, that he has no right to mix up religion and politics; that spiritual matters are one thing, and temporal matters another; that these things may do well enough for the pulpit, but that it is not good manners to speak of them among gentlemen and ladies. That the Church, or religion, which is the same thing, wants us to be good, of course, and to say our prayers once in a while, but that she does not want us to be bigoted, superstitious, unenlightened. Are not expressions similar to these used every day by people who pretend to be devoted to the faith, — ready even to die for it?

But what in common honesty is the meaning of the assertion, that we must not mix up politics and religion, spirituals and temporals, civil matters and Church matters? It either means that the sacred practices of religious worship must not be confused with secular pursuits, or that such pursuits are not subject to the control of the religious principle. If the first, let it go for what it is worth. For it amounts merely to saying that it is not the most appropriate time for a man to say his beads when he is taking his dinner, or that he ought not to read the newspaper in church, or that his children cannot say their prayers and study their catechism while they are playing at leap-frog, or singing Ethiopian melodies. If it mean the second, then it amounts to the exclusion of the Church and of God from every thing except religious worship, and is the fundamental principle of practical infidelity.

There is no act in life over which the principles of religion do not exercise their sway. In matters connected with God's worship, they exercise a direct and immediate sway. In matters appertaining to politics, education, business, and amusements, they exercise a sway which is indirect or mediate. In other words, they rule these avocations by maxims which are deductions from them, applications of them to matters somewhat remote from the centre and source from which they part. As there can be no effect without a cause, no series without a beginning, no conclusion without premises, so there can be no principle of honor, of justice, of common sense, or of common decency, if religion be taken away. All virtue depends upon religion as fully as religion itself depends upon the existence of God. Even the conscience of the savage and of the unbeliever, when in some particular instance it prompts him to abstain from all acts of revenge or injustice, gives to the existence of religion the testimony of a soul naturally Christian, as far as it is naturally candid and honest. All truth is one, and religion is God's truth, the order of truth and goodness, upon which all other orders of individual and social action, and in so far as they are not criminal even unconsciously, depend. The manner in which the order of religion governs us in matters not strictly religious is not, however, by interfering with us in their merely material elements. The Church does not, in civil and secular matters, exercise over us an importunate or tyrannical sway. She allows us, where we see no wrong, to go on freely and cheerfully, and according to the state of life in which Providence has placed us. But she requires of us

that our will in these things shall be guided by an honest intention. She teaches us that our whole life, and every most minute action of our life must ultimately be referred to the end for which we were created, the service of Him who created us. It is a property of the will of man, that it never acts without a motive, an intention, an end in view. The particular aim we have in each action refers to some other end to which it is subservient. Now the ultimate end of all our actions, and of all the motives from which we act in detail, must be the service of God, to whom we are indebted for the power of acting at all.

Religion, by keeping this ultimate end steadily before our eyes, sanctifies and exalts our merely secular pursuits. By this plea she holds us accountable even for an act in itself so insignificant as an idle word. This intention, either by immediately preceding our actions, or by a happy frame of soul possessing habits of faith and virtue, and dedicating them to God in a general way, renders our slightest exertions deserving of being registered and rewarded in heaven. Who has not heard of the widow's mite, and of the glass of water given for God's sake to a thirsty brother? These simple deeds gained the notice and commendation of Him who gives wisdom to little ones, and confounded the self-sufficient knowledge of the proud sages of the world. The standard by which the Christian is to measure the actions of men is thus established. He is not to look, as the admirers of merely human heroism, at the greater or less degree of energy such actions call forth, or at the intrepidity with which they are performed, or at the success with which they are crowned, but at the greater or less relation they bear to the service of God and to life eternal.

By these remarks, likewise, it is sufficiently explained how Religion does not interfere with us in a way to embarrass us, confuse our actions, or deaden our efficiency, but only to exalt and to sanctify our pursuits. She is no tyrant, but a fond mother, no disorganizer, but the most angelic of harmonizers. An ingenious mind has illustrated this varied influence of religion by comparing the mere material actions we perform to the air breathed into a flute, and the influence of the principles of religion to the fingers of the artist, whose delicate touch harmonizes and modulates into notes of exquisite music the current of breath which of itself would only produce a monotonous or a disagreeable sound.

This simile illustrates at once the power which the religious

principle possesses, and the absence of suddenness and violence in its diffusion through the veins and arteries of society. The steady and healthy life which Religion imparts is thus distinguished from the workings of the various schemes and systems proposed in our day for the improvement of mankind, by men who, while refusing to submit to the guidance of her principles, would fain produce an equivalent to their admirable results. They begin their reforms at the pinnacle of the social pyramid, instead of toiling at its foundation. The object of their culture is not man, but the metaphysical person of society, in its complex and abstract acception. The "harmony," the "progress," the "reform," of which they speak as means, are in fact only the ends to be obtained. What man is to do to become possessed of these advantages, they themselves are unable to say. Socialism, associationism, Fourierism, even taken in a mild and modified sense, practically suppose man and society to be already what they would make them. We find this singular inconsistency confessed by the advocates of those systems which seem to be the most inoffensive. The state to which they would bring mankind must be the state he exists in before they can work upon him at all.

It is not our object to follow out the reflections suggested by these remarks, which we introduce only as an illustration of truth taken from the systems most opposed to truth. For let us be understood as giving no credit or countenance to these theories, however great may be our personal affection for many unfortunate individuals who devote talent and energy worthy of a better cause to dreams, not only unsubstantial and idle, but deeply and fatally pernicious. The Church does not appeal to mankind with vague cries of progress and reform, the only effect of which is to destroy without rebuilding, but her light and life, spreading through the whole social body, produce in reality the golden results which the most amiable of our visionary innovators can only see faintly traced in the mists of an unattainable distance. If there be such a thing as a follower of contemporary social philanthropy outside of the Church who is sincere, what an object of compassion he affords to the contemplation of a Catholic philosopher! He rises in the midst of his fellow-blind-men to talk about what neither he nor they know the meaning of. He exerts the utmost of his ingenuity to prevent them, by his individual influence, from seeing the only light which can lead them safely on to better things. Even though he may not

wilfully employ means which he knows to be impious in bringing them to embrace his views, he is under the influence of an intellectual dishonesty, which urges him on to render his hearers morally and physically wretched, at the very moment when he would wish to make them happy. Such orators will admire the order, the beauty, the power, of the Church, but see defects in her organization which in sober truth are only defects of their own diseased imagination. They speak as if it were their business to put the Church right, forgetting that it is her business to put them right. The authority which to the Catholic is a source of sweet consolation as well as of ever new and youthful vigor, they, under the vitiating influence of a crooked self-training, can only look upon as a burden and a hardship. All the blessings which they invoke for the human family are offered to them by the Church, with a fulness which far transcends their most sublime aspirations; but they are unable to see it, and labor even with might and main to prevent the very results which they seem most anxious to obtain. But enough of theories outside of the Church, and which she condemns as heresies.

Our remarks thus far may seem to deal more with principles than facts, more with the elements of religious society than the grand results which it exhibits. Yet the observations we have made go very far towards suggesting the idea of what society would be, were it such as the Church desires it to be. The Church is able, through the religious training she holds out to each man, to make the union of all as perfect as human society is capable of becoming. Where she stops short, it is only on account of the insufficiency of the materials upon which she is working. Let each one faithfully copy the prototype she points to, aided by the helps she communicates, and the earthly kingdom of Christ will resemble his heavenly kingdom. Such resemblance, however, is not to be obtained by the removal of physical evil. The removal of a portion of such evil will undoubtedly be the result of a temperate, contented, virtuous Christian life. But the Church works with man as she finds him, and only wants to make him what he can really be. Where she can remove the afflictions which cross his path, she does so, and where this result is not to be obtained, she makes such afflictions work as part of her economy. She divests them of all moral guilt where they are stained by it, and then, as the natural philosopher produces light from inert and noisome

matter, she extracts heavenly consolation from the clogs and inconveniences of life. Were there nothing to be borne with in this life, how many virtues would be unknown, how many brilliant examples lost, how much generous and ennobling exertion unheard of! God permits the existence of physical evils, while he teaches the manner of turning them into gold. The modern philosopher, unacquainted with this heavenly alchemy, loses his time, and renders himself ridiculous, by attempting the vain task of their total exclusion. The philosopher would fain empty out the font which he knows to be swollen by many a tear, but the poor man's ingenious systems prove to be like the vessels with which the Danaides were condemned to work by paganism, — pails without bottoms to them. Hence his results are in an inverse ratio to his labor, the latter almost infinite, the former equal — to zero.

These remarks show that any objection derived from the existence of physical evil does not destroy what we are anxious to have placed before the reader's mind, *the ideal of Christian society*. Once we class the fundamental principles involved in this subject in their legitimate order, the conception of such an ideal is not difficult. By the proper formation of individuals, and the understanding that their aim is to be the fulfilment, in a perfect manner, of the duties of their respective positions, we see no insuperable obstacle in the formation of the family and the state. The system of religious society thus proposed requires no violent and sudden revulsion to correct what anomalies may now exist in the social framework, — unless, indeed, we treat of extreme and exceptional cases, which are to be met by extreme and exceptional remedies, rarely, if ever, to be applied by private individuals. In proposing this system, we offer nothing new. The remarks we have made are contained in the principle which, in some measure, has been the leading motto of our journal, — “Seek first the kingdom of God, and his justice, and all other things shall be added unto you.” Those who will admit no theory for the amelioration of society, from which God and his justice are not excluded, may smile at our simplicity. But we are very much mistaken if their mirth will be of long duration. The world, gentlemen of the modern schools, is beginning to grow weary of your high-sounding words, from which no decent result is obtained. Even your favorite pupil, “the people,” must finally see that you do nothing but lead them by the nose. Perhaps it was as well that you should have your

day, and try your hand for a while, to show how utterly incompetent you are to effect what you so boldly and brilliantly promised. Even the people, stupid as you consider them, and reckless as they have shown themselves, must finally wish for something better than perpetual restlessness and excitement, attended only by failure and disappointment. The substitution of the Red Republican cap for the monarch's crown, and of the liberty-pole for his sceptre, may be a very pretty piece of melodramatic display. But when it is attended by the other substitution of a stone for bread, and a scorpion for fish, the people must come to realize this much, at least, that your logic passes not through the stomach to the brain, — a fatal truth for the popularity of the new guides. The kings and old leaders may have been too eager to devour their subjects, but the change insisted upon will not end merely in getting a new set of wolves in place of the old ones. No, no ! We repeat it, what is to be corrected are the abuses existing in society, not the form of society itself ; what is to be purified is the life-blood which courses through its veins. If the remedy resorted to be only to lop off the head and the arms, or to draw the blood forth from its channel, the difficulty will only be made greater, and in no wise remedied, — for inanition is even worse than feverish strength.

Under the guidance of the Church, we should see ambition give way to generous and healthy emulation. Political intrigue would find a corrective in the Christian virtue of prudence, exercised for the common weal. Restless and grasping avarice would be superseded by worthier motives, disinterested yet intense activity. Just and enlightened authority would protect the rights, and nicely balance the relations, of the higher and the lower classes, and thus remove the suspicion and distrust which must ever render a community restless and unhappy. Each individual, and each union of individuals, would learn to be elevated, not by aspiring intemperately to a higher sphere, but by becoming each hour, and each day, less and less faulty, more and more perfect in its own. The difference of interests and pursuits would introduce variety, without destroying harmony. For the wills of the various individuals would be sufficiently coördinate where each one cheerfully submits to the will of God. Thus would humanity, not, indeed, according to the vain dream of socialist theorizers, make a heaven of this earth, but it would make such use of the means placed within its reach as to become fit for heaven.

This, briefly, is what is needed, and all this the Church is able to effect for the people who confide their welfare to her protection, provided they be really and practically Catholics, — in fact and not merely in name. Has she not succeeded in this admirable work of elevating the individual in his sphere, without raising him out of his sphere? Has she not succeeded in sanctifying every condition of life, every grade of society? Has she not made the pursuits of each of her children a Christian vocation, and prescribed for the aim of all Christian vocations the highest possible degree of perfection, even that of the Father who is in heaven? Let us hear no more of the cant about the corruption or the weakness of nations called Catholic. Those nations, even in their decrepitude, exhibit signs of power and of life which their bitterest enemies cannot but envy and admire. These and all instances like unto these testify to the dignity of society as modelled and preserved by the Church. Where they have failed to be truly great, it is precisely because they failed to follow her leadership, and, like the Jews of old, sought to imitate the fashions of the heathen. Thus even the downward tendencies of Catholic nations do honor indirectly to the Church, just as the upward efforts of uncatholics, by their unfinished and partial attempts in the absence of her assistance, testify in her favor. Where uncatholic nations accomplish aught of good, it is in virtue of their Catholic traditions not totally lost, and where Catholic nations exhibit aught of evil, it is because of their adulterating their Catholic traditions with the uncatholic training of their neighbours.

The Church, however, is *not* unable to exhibit a great people, by whom her teachings have been fully understood and perfectly carried out in every possible state and condition of society. Her history presents us with a vast army of saints, whose lives were passed, not in any hidden or secret place, but in broad daylight, under the eyes of her enemies as well as her friends and followers. This array of individuals made perfect by her tutorship does not consist in a few, uncertain names. It is composed of persons belonging to every rank, from the pope and the emperor to the hewer of wood and the drawer of water. It is not confined to any particular shore, but numbers people of all ages and sexes from every tribe and tongue of the earth. The only professions excluded from this exalted company are those which, being decidedly bad in themselves, cannot contribute to the honor or the advantage of human-

ity. But members once belonging to such professions are enrolled by the Church among her saints ; for it was necessary she should explain the transition by which, from being her opponents, men could become princes of her court. In numbers this cloud of witnesses to the power of the Church is immense, for it does not merely include the saints properly so called on account of their solemn canonization, but all who were like them, whether canonized or not. Of the latter there are millions whose names are known only in heaven. Every saintly personage raised to the honor of the altar speaks not only for himself, but represents the countless numbers who, by his example, his zeal, and his prayers, were brought to lead a truly Christian life. And where can an assembly be found more noble, more diversified, more harmonious, which confers more honor upon the whole human family ? Whoever has been led to look with admiration upon any peculiar character will find it here exhibited in its fullest bloom. Whoever loves to read of the traits of high-minded generosity evinced by any one age or nation will find them here exalted, and unalloyed by the faults which elsewhere accompany them. Whoever is more pleased in observing the delicate and gentle workings of a well-tempered disposition will find them here represented in their sweetest and loveliest aspect, unaccompanied by frailty, and illumined by the reflex of light from heaven. No history exists of higher interest to all mankind, with the exception of the history of Him who was not simply true man, but true God. Do you admire the excellence of the military character ? There you can contemplate military heroism elevated to the rank of Christian virtue in the Roman officers St. Sebastian and St. Mauritius. Does your taste lead you to admire the splendor of a noble lineage when accompanied by honorable deeds ? Observe them both united in the Spanish prince, St. Hermenegild, the Hungarian duke, St. Wenceslaus, the Italian baron, St. Andrew Corsini. Or observe them still more august on account of the outward dignity of their persons in the Saints Chad, Canute, Edmund, Stephen, and Louis, who were kings, or in St. Henry, who was an emperor. Not only are popes and priests offered to the imitation of the Christian, as fitting models of perfection, but saints from every class of society are recorded in the glorious annals of the Church. The Saints Margaret, and Elizabeth of Portugal, were queens ; Monica, and Frances of Rome, were the widows of two private citizens. St. Ambrose was a magistrate, St. Ivo of Brittany a

lawyer, St. Homobonus a merchant, Saints Cosmos and Damian physicians. Even the most humble walks of life have had their Christian heroes. For example, St. Isidore was a farmer, St. Paschal Baylon a shepherd, St. Alexius a servant, St. Crispin a shoemaker, St. Blandina and St. Vita were servant-maids. Even pursuits in themselves indifferent were made the means of giving honor to God in a perfect manner. Hence we have our blessed Bartholomew, and Angelo da Fiesole, who were artists, and St. Paulinus of Nola, who was a poet. The majesty-loving Roman and the ingenious Athenian were admitted as candidates for the highest honor of Christendom, as well as the Israelite and the Egyptian. The high-born matron of Madrid and Naples is seen with the soft Saracen girl become a convert to Christianity. The sturdy English yeoman and the silk-clad Japanese, the Spanish knight and the Irish student, the German count and the French man-at-arms, all, all have in the history of the saints the example of some one of their own country, age, and calling, who has walked in the road of perfection even to the threshold of the kingdom of God. Some of these holy personages lived in solitary retirement, while others moved amid scenes of business and excitement. Some were pioneers of civilization and religion amid the thick forests of the North and the frozen seas of the South ; others were furrowed with honorable scars while facing the enemy of God and country upon the battle-field. When we are asked to point out some proof of what the Church can do for civilization, all these instances of her sublime and heroic influence crowd before our mind. And when the name of some one is requested, who has devoted himself to the extension of civilization under the guidance of the Church, and thereby really done honor to humanity, all her saints present themselves to our view as a vast army engaged in building up the empire of Christian society. When did this great army begin its march ? Where was its forwardmost rank first descried as it advanced ? It took its move from the supper hall at Jerusalem, on the memorable day of Pentecost. Preceded by the standard of the Cross, it pushed its legions into the fastnesses of heathenism. It was met by stalwart arms, and proud hearts resolved to stop its advance, — but in the encounter it was victorious. It halted before the heathen temple. The tongue of the heathen priest was paralyzed, and his lips were struck dumb, while his idol quaked upon its basis, and fell crumbling to the ground. Amid the smoke of

the silver censer, the aspersion of pure water made holy by prayer, and the joyful peal of the choral anthem, the Christian conquerors consecrated the temple to the honor of the true Author of life and death. The era of religious civilization was inaugurated and its great mission begun.

What was the offspring of man's genius, religion preserved, as belonging to her already, but condemned and rejected what came from his errors or his passions.

New recruits were added to the great army as it advanced, and its splendid organization unfolded itself more and more to cover its outstretching and expanding ranks. A conspicuous place was needed for the seat of its chief leader, and a tent was pitched for Peter upon the grave of the Cæsars. Schools were needed where its youthful warriors might be trained, in virtue and wisdom, to wear their accoutrements with more pleasing grace, and, driving away the babbling sophists of the Porch and the Academy, it opened the text-book of Christian doctrine in Antioch, Athens, and Byzantium. Did a fertile and promising country unfold itself to the view? Then, as the inhabitants gradually fell in with the higher discipline of Christian life, their every-day avocations were cared for, and brought to work harmoniously under the control of the new wisdom that diffused itself abroad. The towers of the convent rose on the gentle slope of some smiling hill-side, the corridors of the monastery stretched along on either side of the village church, and the tiller of the soil was taught to mingle with the song that beguiled his hours of repose the praises of the Most High, in the words of the Prophet and Psalmist. All worked for good. What was found already of proper material was consecrated to high and holy purposes. But as the bands of the elect spread far and wide, enkindling in the breasts of men of every tribe and tongue the new fire brought from heaven, new sources of power and confidence were discovered by its light. Unknown vistas of glory opened to the right and left, and forms of beauty and joy moved in their brilliant aisles, unseen hitherto by the eye of man. Regenerate nature, and the dignity which it acquired, not only accompanied the Christian to the foot of the altar, but went abroad with him and inspired him with sublime recollections and sweetest hopes, even amid the scenes of merely mortal life. The mind had learned to ascend higher and higher, and the heart to beat and dilate more fervently and more freely, until to be a hero became habitual to the Christian. The painter and the sculptor had become Catholic, not

only in their act of faith, but in the whole man, and the world that surrounded him was elevated to the consortship of Divine nature. They resumed again the brush and the chisel, but cared no longer for the subjects those plastic implements once discoursed. The canvas, as it unrolled, no longer exhibited dreamy incentives to degrading lust, but was made holy by the love-speaking features of the Virgin of Virgins, that look from their radiant field now bent in adoration at the birth of the Promised One, now veiled by the shadow of grief at the loss of the Beloved, now joyful again at his triumphant return from hell and the tomb. The spotless marble refused to be moulded into the zoneless figure of Grecian voluptuousness, and sprang into the majestic outline of the prophet, or bent to the attitude and assumed the heaven-turned look of the dying martyr. Inspired by the subject glowing into life under his hand, the artist rose to a holy enthusiasm, and gave back again to his subject the rapturous eloquence which uttered its delight from the depths of his own heart. The poet and the musician still sang, but the angels in whose company religion had taught him to think melted heavenly notes into the stream of melody which gushed from his lips, or steeped the chords of his consecrated lyre. The architect still built, but no longer with the vulgar purpose of inducing the soulless multitude to flatter and praise his selfish pride. He conceived the mighty design of calling into existence a structure whose mystic grandeur could bring the thoughtless Christian to feel spontaneously that he was in the house and before the presence of the Almighty, and which might force the unbeliever to kneel and pray in self-defiance at his shrine. Frequently would he lay down his pencil upon the unfinished plan, and pray, — and prayer would turn into fire, and the fire expanding his throbbing heart, lifting his mind above itself, and quickening his imagination with the acuteness and rapidity of lightning, he would grasp his pencil and dare to sketch in a moment of prophet-like fervor the noble vision of his soul, — the vast conception of a pile whose every stone had a tongue to speak of heaven, whose majestic outline would command the breathless admiration of a thousand years. Say you thus of the traveller who no longer limited his desires to the gold and gems of Araby and Golconda, but traded in immortal souls which he purchased for heaven. And if, for a moment, as he stemmed the surge which rose upon his path across the wintry ocean, its deafening roar made his heart begin to fail, buoyed up by his heroic devotion, he smote his

breast and blushed at hesitating to do for God at least as much as the adventurous merchant could accomplish for the love of earthly treasure.

These are a few of the flowers which the army of the saints scattered along the path which led them toward their home in heaven. These are some of the fruits which the saints and those who are like unto them bring forth, because they realize the fact that the true dignity and true happiness of man are centred in religion. This, in other words, is a leaf taken at random from the history of the Church as a civilizer. Brief and desultory though they be, they sufficiently show how religion, though destined ultimately only to invigilate the eternal welfare of man, consults indirectly his temporal advantages, and, while raising his soul towards heaven, elevates his whole being to the highest perfection it is capable of attaining upon earth.

But let us not lose sight of the brilliant panorama wherein we viewed the great army of the saints passing along, in the fulfilment of their noble mission. We saw them start from the Apostolic supper-hall at Jerusalem, upon the eventful day of the coming of the Paraclete, — the day on which was inaugurated the Christian era. We spoke of their trials and their success as they spread abroad over the whole face of the earth. Let us now contemplate the vision of unequalled splendor and grandeur which will embody the fulness of time, and the closing scene of their mortal career.

When the last day of the world shall dawn, and the last saint shall have imprinted the latest footstep of his march upon earth, the glorious army of all the representatives of the true dignity of regenerate humanity will meet together in triumph in the Valley of Judgment. He who was first beheld in the form of a little child in the manger of Bethlehem, and latest on the hard bed of the Cross upon Calvary, will be seen by all men in the valley of Jehosaphat at the right hand of his Divine Father. He will fill the throne of judgment, and preside over the triumph of his elect. Behold them as they spread out in brilliant array, clothed in robes of gladness, and adorned by light from above ! Let those who accuse the Church as being the enemy of true greatness of soul, — those who ask what nation has been made perfect by religious civilization, — those who long for a society free from blemish, — behold this evidence of the power of the Church in elevating humanity of every tribe and tongue, of every age and condition, of every century and country. Where could an assembly of nobler heroes, a cloud of

stronger witnesses, be found, to complete the ideal of perfect society ?

See first the choir of Apostles, preceded by Peter and Paul. What was the work they accomplished ? They changed the legislation and civil usages of the world, — hurled paganism from the altar and the throne, — first made men understand they were brethren, and cast the broad foundations of the moral order. Near to them is the choir of martyrs, with crowns on their brows, and palms in their hands, first of whom Stephen fell, in the morning of life, under the persecutor's sword. They taught by example that man has but one Master, — that there is something more precious than life, — that he who will enter the field of battle for conscience' sake may be silenced, scourged, mutilated, crushed, and still be victorious ! Then follow the venerable confessors of the faith, whose life the proud world smiled at as an infatuation. They took their stand at various posts, and toiled incessantly, it were difficult to say, whether more to save their own souls, or those of their brethren. Some of them were holy pontiffs and doctors, on whose lips was opened a fountain of wisdom, to elevate the mind of the faithful, and confound the audacity of the heretic and blasphemer. Some, again, were venerable monks and hermits, who made vocal the mountain height and the woody glade with the praises of the Most High, and caused the barren wilderness to bloom as a garden of plenty. Or did they select for the field of their labors the hospital and the galley, — the study-hall of youth, — the distant home of the rude barbarian ? Everywhere following the path of the apostle and the martyr, they cultivated the good seed previously sown, and watered it with their blood ; they penetrated the masses, and while humbling the proud, the rich, and the powerful, they elevated the soul of the serf and the plebeian, and equally to each distributed the word of life and the sacramental food, the sources of Christian fortitude and perseverance. Nor is the more gentle and less constant portion of humanity forgotten in this triumphal pageant. Woman will on that great day bear testimony to the dignity of society sanctified by religion, for her representative will be the noblest specimen of humanity not personally united with the Godhead. If, in the consideration of the influence of religion on society, we have omitted to signalize what it has done for woman, ample justice is done and the fulness of so pleasing a theme summed up in one magic name, — that of our loveliest of exemplars, our sweetest of

mothers, our noblest of queens, — MARY! Paganism, by making of woman an idol or a slave, destroyed both her usefulness and her dignity. Christianity made her all in usefulness, but not a slave; all in dignity, but not a goddess. How little inferior to the angels are those myriads of sainted females who, on the great day of triumph, form the crown of the Virgin Mother! The lilies they bear in their hands are emblems of the spotless purity of their souls, the roses with which they are crowned were purpled by the blood of their innocent hearts, freely poured out as the price of constancy in the faith. Let him who delights in examining the tests of highly cultivated civilization try to understand how great must be the depth and healthiness of that society where the influence of woman is characterized by such angelic perfection. Israel foreshadowed the Church, and the Church foreshadows heaven. And as the Synagogue in her palmy days, while making her children as fully as possible Christians, or preparing them to be so, transcended all human schemes of improvement, thus the Church, while rendering the children committed to her care as fit subjects as possible for heaven, renders their society as much like that of the heavenly kingdom as it can possibly become. Here closes our ideal of Catholic society, were it pure and unalloyed, as it ought to be.

O, why will many who are gifted with loving hearts and aspiring souls, and who still speak of happiness for man, refuse to study the secret of that happiness which the Church locks not up in her bosom, but dispenses with the rest of her royal treasures? Why will they waste their time and wear out their spirit in chasing flitting phantoms, which, like the evening mist, glitter for a moment in the rays of the setting sun, but, turning from one fantastic shape to another, pass away and are seen no more? Unhappy, thrice unhappy men! who, in the abundance of their learning, know less than the lisping child who only half understands the prayer he is taught to con. But the loss is theirs, and not the loss of the Church. He who opposes her may succeed for a time in preventing his fellow-sufferers from receiving her soothing care; but let him look to history, and learn the fate of those systems of nationality from which she and the God who speaks through her alone were excluded. Let him see how she was then, and how still she remains, while they are only remembered in the dream of the poet, or the schoolboy's tale.

When, on the eve of the banquet of death, she spoke words

of serious warning to the citizen of Solyma, he laughed at her sanctity as folly, and her wisdom as a maniac's dream. But when the angel of Judah took his departure from the desecrated temple, and the national life of the Jewish people was buried beneath its ruins, the Church moved in the vigor of youth at the foot of Mount Olivet and Thabor Hill. The proud Roman, in the days of his greatness, heard her voice, which flattered not the powerful and the wealthy, with disdain, and drove her to breathe her prayer beneath his feet, down amid the sepulchral gloom of the crypt and the catacomb. But where the Tarpeian Rock, once crowned with gilded palaces and glittering fanes, reared its rugged summit again in silence and desolation to the sky, she sat upon the ruins spread around its base, and mourned over the blindness of those who had fallen to rise no more. She spoke in the Areopagus to the Athenian sage of the God unknown to him, and the only one known to her, and he rejected her doctrine as strange. But she still published that doctrine upon the shores of the Ægean, when nothing remained in the temple of Minerva but the ill-omened owl, and the bat flitted in day-time through the desert halls of the Athenian's pride. Byzantium acknowledged her power, and kissed the hem of her royal garment, and rose to be as queen among the cities of the East. It rejected her sway, and scorned to bow to her sceptre, and sunk to be the slave of the barbarian invader. But the steam of her censer continued still to spread in sweetness around, when the son of a robber of the desert sat upon the throne of the Constantines, and the voice of the turbaned muezzin resounded through the air which once thrilled at the peal of festive music that greeted the advance of the Greek emperor's triumphal car. He who made republican France his footstool, and changed the sceptres of European monarchs as playthings from hand to hand, would not receive from an aged pontiff the crown of Charlemagne and St. Louis, and placed it himself proudly upon his brow; but the Church whom he sought to make his handmaid, and whose High Priest he confined in a prisoner's cell, in the person of that aged pontiff, amid the joyful hosanna of all nations, sat again upon the throne of the world, when the self-crowned universal monarch was entombed upon the beach of a desert island, by the hand of a foreign jailer.

Of the triumphs of Mother Church, and of Religion in Society, no more. May we that have known her love her with still increasing devotion. May those who love her not begin to

understand the wonders that exist in their very midst. Let those who are not for her, however, bear in mind, that, whether they oppose her, or pretend to extend to her their patronage, as she cheered the hearts of the great and good centuries before they and their vain systems were born, so will she lead new generations heavenward ages on ages after they and their vain systems are remembered no more.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their Effects on the Civilization of Europe.* By the Rev. J. BALMEZ. From the French, by C. J. HANFORD and R. KERSHAW. London: James Brown. 1849. 8vo. pp. 452.

OUR readers are already well aware of the high estimation in which we hold this admirable work by the late Abbé Balmez, — a work which will stand the test of the most rigid criticism for lofty eloquence, sound philosophy, solid and various erudition. It does for Protestantism, under a political and social point of view, what the illustrious Moebler has done for it under the point of view of theology. The *Symbolik* of the German professor may here and there contain statements and views that need some modifications, but it utterly demolishes Protestant dogmatism, and shows unanswerably that it is baseless, incoherent, self-contradictory, and unable to stand a moment before enlightened theological criticism. The no less illustrious Spaniard has done the same with political and social Protestantism. For some time Protestants have very generally ceased to claim any superiority for Protestantism over Catholicity as a religion, as a system of dogmatic truth, or as the means of effecting the salvation of the soul, and have placed its defence on the ground of its having disenthralled the human mind, broken up civil despotism, established civil freedom, and advanced the general civilization and social well-being of the European nations. The Abbé Balmez meets Protestants on this their chosen ground of defence, and proves that it is utterly untenable, and that Protestantism has only retarded, instead of advancing, the cause of liberty and general civilization. In him human reason, the common sense of mankind, sits in judgment on Protestantism in its social and political character, and pronounces a sentence of condemnation which the future will not reverse.

The translation of this work into our language we regard as a

happy event. It is precisely the work which in the present crisis we need, and its influence will be wide and lasting. Mr. Hanford and his assistant, Mr. Kershaw, have done their work well. The work hardly reads as a translation, but has the freedom, freshness, ease, and vigor of an original work, and yet, as far as we have compared it with the French, it is faithful, and even literal. These gentlemen prove themselves very fair translators, and we hope their labors will be appreciated by our countrymen, and that the work, which is published in a cheap but neat style, will find as ready a sale in this country as we learn it is finding in England.

We have no room to give any extended review or analysis of the Abbé's work, and, indeed, no analysis can give a correct and adequate notion of it. The work to be known must be read entire. All we have space to do is to give a single extract, which may serve to give as good an idea of the whole as a single brick from its walls of ancient Babylon. We select the first chapter, entitled the "Nature and Name of Protestantism."

"There is a fact in existence among civilized nations, very important on account of the nature of the things which it affects, — a fact of transcendent importance, on account of the number, variety, and consequence of its influences, — a fact extremely interesting, because it is connected with the principal events of modern history.

"Like a clap of thunder, it attracted at once the attention of all Europe; on one side it spread alarm, and on the other excited the most lively sympathy: it grew so rapidly, that its adversaries had not time to strangle it in its cradle. Scarcely had it begun to exist, and already all hope of stopping, or even restraining it, was gone; when, emboldened by being treated with respect and consideration, it became every day more daring; if exasperated by rigor, it openly resisted measures of coercion, or redoubled and concentrated its forces, to make more vigorous attacks. Discussions, the profound investigations and scientific methods which were used in combating it, contributed to develop the spirit of inquiry, and served as vehicles to propagate its ideas.

"By creating new and prevailing interests, it made itself powerful protectors; by throwing all the passions into a state of fury, it aroused them in its favor. It availed itself by turns of stratagem, force, seduction, or violence, according to the exigencies of times and circumstances. It attempted to make its way in all directions; either destroying impediments, or taking advantage of them, if they were capable of being turned to account.

"When introduced into a country, it never rested until it had obtained guaranties for its continued existence; and it succeeded in doing so everywhere. After having obtained vast establishments in Europe, — which it still retains, — it was transported into other parts of the world, and infused into the veins of simple and unsuspecting nations.

"In order to appreciate a fact at its just value, to embrace it in all its relations, and to distinguish properly between them, it is necessary to examine whether the constituting principle of the fact can be ascertained, or at least whether we can observe in its appearance any characteristic trait capable of revealing its inward nature. This examination is very

difficult when we have to do with a fact of the kind and importance of that which now occupies our attention. In matters of this sort, numbers of opinions accumulate in the course of time, in favor of all which arguments have been sought. The inquirer, in the midst of so many and such various objects, is perplexed, disconcerted, and confounded; and if he wish to place himself in a more advantageous point of view, he finds the ground so covered with fragments, that he cannot make his way without risk of losing himself at every step.

"The first glance which we give to Protestantism, whether we consider its actual condition, or whether we regard the various phases of its history, shows us that it is very difficult to find any thing constant in it, any thing which can be assigned as its constituent character. Uncertain in its opinions, it modifies them continually, and changes them in a thousand ways. Vague in its tendencies, and fluctuating in its desires, it attempts every form, and essays every road. It can never attain to a well-defined existence; and we see it every moment enter new paths, to lose itself in new labyrinths.

"Catholic controversialists have pursued and assailed it in every way; ask them what has been the result. They will tell you that they had to contend with a new Proteus, which always escaped the fatal blow by changing its form. If you wish to assail the doctrines of Protestantism, you do not know where to direct your attacks, for they are unknown to you, and even to itself. On this side it is invulnerable, because it has no tangible body. Thus, no more powerful argument has ever been urged, than that of the immortal Bishop of Meaux, — viz. 'You change; and that which changes is not the truth.' An argument much feared by Protestantism, and with justice; because all the various forms which are assumed to evade its force only serve to strengthen it. How just is the expression of this great man! At the very title of his book, Protestantism must tremble: *The History of the Variations!* A history of variations must be a history of error.

"These unceasing changes, which we ought not to be surprised at finding in Protestantism, because they essentially belong to it, show us that it is not in possession of the truth; they show us also, that its moving principle is not a principle of life, but an element of dissolution. It has been called upon, and up to this time in vain, to fix itself, and to present a compact and uniform body. How can that be fixed, which is, by its nature, kept floating about in the air? How can a solid body be formed of an element, whereof the essential tendency is towards an incessant division of particles, by diminishing their reciprocal affinity, and increasing their repellant force?

"It will easily be seen that I speak of the right of private judgment in matters of faith, whether it be looked upon as a matter of human reason alone, or as an individual inspiration from heaven.

"If there be any thing constant in Protestantism, it is undoubtedly the substitution of private judgment for public and lawful authority. This is always found in union with it; and is, properly speaking, its fundamental principle: it is the only point of contact among the various Protestant sects, — the basis of their mutual resemblance. It is very remarkable that this exists, for the most part, unintentionally, and sometimes against their express wishes.

"However lamentable and disastrous this principle may be, if the coryphæi of Protestantism had made it their rallying-point, and had con-

stantly acted up to it in theory and practice, they would have been consistent in error. When men saw them cast into one abyss after another, they would have recognized a system, — false undoubtedly ; but, at any rate, a system. As it is, it has not been even that : if you examine the words and the acts of the first Reformers, you will find that they made use of this principle as a means of resisting the authority which controlled them, but that they never dreamed of establishing it permanently ; that, if they labored to upset lawful authority, it was for the purpose of usurping the command themselves ; that is to say, that they followed, in this respect, the example of revolutionists of all kinds, of all ages, and of all countries. Every body knows how far Luther carried his fanatical intolerance ; he who could not bear the slightest contradiction, either from his own disciples or any body else, without giving way to the most senseless fits of passion, and the most unworthy outrages. Henry VIII. of England, who founded there what is called the liberty of thinking, sent to the scaffold those who did not think as he did ; and it was at the instigation of Calvin that Servetus was burnt alive at Geneva.

“ I insist upon this point, because it seems to me to be of great importance. Men are but too much inclined to pride ; and if they heard it constantly repeated, without contradiction, that the innovators of the sixteenth century proclaimed the freedom of thought, a secret interest might be excited in their favor ; their violent declamations might be regarded as the expressions of a generous movement, and their efforts as a noble attempt to assert the rights of intellectual freedom. Let it be known, never to be forgotten, that if these men proclaimed the principle of free examination, it was for the purpose of making use of it against legitimate authority ; but that they attempted, as soon as they could, to impose upon others the yoke of their own opinions. Their constant endeavour was, to destroy the authority which came from God, in order to establish their own upon its ruins. It is a painful necessity to be obliged to give proofs of this assertion ; not because they are difficult to find, but because one cannot adduce the most incontestable of them without calling to mind words and deeds which not only cover with disgrace the founders of Protestantism, but are of such a nature, that they cannot be mentioned without a blush on the cheek, or written without a stain upon the paper.

“ Protestantism, when viewed in a mass, appears only a shapeless collection of innumerable sects, all opposed to each other, and agreeing only in one point ; viz. in protesting against the authority of the Church. We only find among them particular and exclusive names, commonly taken from the names of their founders ; in vain have they made a thousand efforts to give themselves a general name expressive of a positive idea ; they are still called after the manner of philosophical sects. Lutherans, Calvinists, Zuinglians, Anglicans, Socinians, Arminians, Anabaptists, — all these names, of which I could furnish an endless host, only serve to show the narrowness of the circle in which these sects are inclosed ; and it is only necessary to pronounce them, to show that they contain nothing universal, nothing great.

“ Every body who knows any thing of the Christian religion must be convinced by this fact alone, that these sects are not truly Christian. But what occurred when Protestantism attempted to take a general name is singularly remarkable. If you examine its history, you will see that all the names which it attempted to give itself failed, if they contained any positive idea, or any mark of Christianity ; but that it adopted a name

taken by chance at the Diet of Spires; a name which carries with it its own condemnation, because it is repugnant to the origin, to the spirit, to the maxims, to the entire history of the Christian religion; a name which does not express that unity, — that union which is inseparably connected with the Christian name; a name which is peculiarly becoming to it, which all the world gives to it by acclamation, which is truly its own, — viz. *Protestantism*.

“Within the vast limits marked out by this name, there is room for every error and for every sect. You may deny with the Lutherans the liberty of man, or renew with the Arminians the errors of Pelagius. You may admit with some that real presence, which you are free to reject with the Calvinists and Zuinglians; you may join with the Socinians in denying the divinity of Jesus Christ; you may attach yourself to Episcopalians, to Puritans, or, if you please, to the extravagances of the Quakers; it is of no consequence, for you always remain a Protestant, for you protest against the authority of the Church; your field is so extensive, that you can hardly escape from it, however great may be your wanderings; it contains all the vast extent that we behold on coming forth from the gates of the Holy City.” — pp. 1–3.

The work may be had of Messrs. Dunigan & Brother, 151 Fulton Street, New York; and of Joseph A. Copes, 51 Salem Street, Boston; and we recommend all who would possess one of the great books which has appeared in our day, to lose no time in procuring it.

2. — *The Orphan of Moscow, or the Young Governess. A Tale.*
From the French of MADAME WOILLEZ, by MRS. M. A. SADLIER.
New York: D. & J. Sadlier. 1849. 18mo. pp. 400.

THIS is a very interesting story, admirably translated, breathing a truly Catholic tone, and teaching an unexceptionable moral lesson. It is a valuable present to our young folks, although far better adapted to the wants of Catholic youth in France than in this country. We wish some one would write a tale entitled *The Orphan of New York*, or *The Orphan of Boston*, — *The Irish Orphan*, or *The Catholic Orphan*, — which should be adapted to the condition of the poor orphan boys among ourselves. Let its hero be an orphan boy, and taken from the poorer class, not from the wealthier. Our modern writers take much more pleasure in depicting the piety of girls than of boys. This comes, we suppose, from the fact, that piety in females is prettier and more sentimental than in the other sex, and therefore more within the comprehension of an effeminate and sentimental, not to say sensual, age. Yet boys have souls as well as girls, and were equally redeemed by the Man-God. We are not among those who think lightly of female intellect, female piety and worth, and we willingly accord to woman in her own sphere equality with man. We are not Mahometans, nor savages.

Nor are we of those who see an angel in every woman and a devil in every man. We do not believe the modern idolatry of woman is any more acceptable to God than any other species of idolatry. So long as men believe and practise Christianity, there is no danger of the women being unbelievers ; and we confess that the religious training of boys seems to us to require more attention than even the religious training of girls. One of the things we like Canon von Schmid's stories for is, that they show us good boys as well as good girls.

Boys almost always have a model character before their eyes, some one they seek to be like. Take, then, a boy from the class of poor orphans in one of our large cities, and conduct him step by step from early childhood through the actual difficulties, dangers, and temptations which beset boys of his class, up to virtuous manhood. Let there be nothing strange or marvellous ; be simple and natural, keep within the sphere of every-day life, and show how such a boy may preserve, in a country like ours, his faith, his innocence, and gain a livelihood, respect, and a solid manly character. The poor boys who read it will not be carried out of their sphere of life, they will see that the hero of the story was one of themselves, and they will, in seeing how and what he did, understand how and what they are to do. They will take him for their model, their pattern, and seek to imitate him. We only throw out a brief hint. One is appalled at the number of real or virtual orphans we have in our midst, and perplexed to know what we are to do with them. If we place them in Protestant families, they may get bread for the body, but none for the soul ; they will be trained up in the way they should *not* go, and lose their faith, their piety, and their souls. The question what we are to do to protect them presses more and more heavily upon us, and in some way must be met. It is frightful to think how many of our children and youth are every day lost to the Church and heaven.

3. — *Poems and Prose Writings.* By RICHARD HENRY DANA. New York : Baker & Scribner. 1850. 2 vols. 12mo.

WE welcome this republication of Mr. Dana's *Poems and Prose Writings*. Mr. Dana stands, deservedly, at the head of our American poets, and is surpassed by none of our prose-writers for the clearness, precision, naturalness, purity, and classic grace and finish of his style and diction. But his volumes are too important a contribution to American literature to be despatched in a brief and hurried notice. They deserve an elaborate review, and we shall take the earliest opportunity to recur to them, and to speak at

length of their artistic merits. We confine ourselves now to simply announcing the appearance of this new edition, which is sent forth in a style of typographical neatness and elegance quite creditable to the publishers.

4. — *The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola, translated from the authorized Latin ; with Extracts from the Literal Version and Notes of the Rev. Father Roothan, Father-General of the Company of Jesus.* By CHARLES SEAGER, M. A. To which is prefixed a Preface by the Right Rev. NICHOLAS WISEMAN, D.D. First American, from the last London Edition. Published with the approbation of the Most Reverend Archbishop Eccleston. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1850. 18mo. pp. 256.

THE all but inspired *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius, the founder of the Society of Jesus, are too well known and appreciated to require any notice at our hands. We should as soon think it necessary to commend the *De Imitatione Christi*, as them. The Preface prefixed to the translation, by Dr. Wiseman, is highly valuable, as is every thing that reaches us from that learned and illustrious prelate. Of the translation itself we have nothing to say. The translator is, we presume, a pious and learned scholar ; we only wish he had better taste, and a better knowledge of the English tongue.

5. — *Christianity and the Church.* By the Rev. C. C. PISE, D. D. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1850. 16mo. pp. 304.

THIS is a neatly printed and agreeably written volume, by one for whom we have a high personal affection and esteem, on a great and interesting subject, and with the best intentions in the world. But the author must pardon us if we tell him frankly that we do not like it. To us the title hints and the whole book implies, that the Church and Christianity are separable, and that we arrive at the Church through Christianity, instead of arriving at Christianity through the Church. As an argument for our holy religion, it seems to us not less adapted to raise than to allay doubts. The learned author cites, along with holy doctors of the Church, and with hardly a mark to distinguish them, the most notorious infidel chiefs of modern times. Indeed, his chief authorities are Bayle, Voltaire, Rousseau, D'Alembert, Diderot, and Pierre Leroux. No doubt these are cited as concessions of the enemy ; but the fact that

they are so cited is not brought forward so prominently as it should be, to protect those who do not happen to know from other sources than the book itself, that they are not good Roman Catholics. We cannot help feeling that the citations from these infidel writers, which fill a very considerable portion of the volume, will excite in many readers a curiosity to examine the works from which they are taken. For ourselves, we do not believe that we gain much to the cause of Catholic truth by citing the concessions of its enemies, especially when we cite as concessions what they say ironically, to save themselves from the police, or for the sake of giving more point and force to what they wish to allege against the Church, as is the case with nearly all that is cited from Voltaire and his associates. We cannot, therefore, speak of this volume in the terms we should wish, and we hope that, before it passes to a second edition, the author will give it a thorough revision.

6. — *The Bucolics, Georgics, and Æneid of Virgil, with English Notes, a Life of Virgil, and Remarks upon Scanning.* By EDWARD MOORE, M. A. Boston: Mussey & Co. 1849. 12mo. pp. 550.

THIS is a very neatly, and, as far as we have examined, a very accurately printed edition of Virgil. The notes are, in general, judicious, and such as the pupil needs. The editor departs frequently from the ordinary reading and rendering, in some cases not wisely in our judgment, but in others, perhaps, he is justified. Upon the whole, it is, as far as we can judge, a very creditable edition, and will, no doubt, be so regarded by teachers and learners.

7. — *A History of England, from the Invasion by the Romans, to the Commencement of the Reign of William the Third.* By JOHN LINGARD, D. D. A New Edition. Corrected and considerably enlarged. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1848-49. 13 vols. 16mo.

MESSRS. DUNIGAN have now completed their edition of Dr. Lingard's History of England. The edition is London print, very neatly got up, and is furnished at an exceedingly low price. Now, when so much interest is excited in English history, and new editions of Hume's and Macaulay's romances, which the poor people are fain to look upon as authentic history, are multiplied, no pains

should be spared to circulate Dr. Lingard's work, the only passable history of England ever written. The Catholic may complain justly of Dr. Lingard of yielding too much to Gallicanism, but his work has done an immense service to the cause of truth in England. Its general merits and accuracy are too well known and too generally admitted to need to be pointed out by us. We hope our Catholic public will continue to patronize it liberally.

8. — WE have before us, issued within the last few months, *Angelica*, *The Melon*, *The Little Lamb*, *The Cakes*, *The Cherries*, *Best Inheritance*, and *The Carrier Pigeon*, by Canon von Schmid, extending to No. XIV. of Dunigan's *Library of Popular Instruction and Amusement*. We have so often commended these exquisite tales, and the tasteful manner in which they are sent out, that we need say nothing more.

9. — *Reviews and Essays*. By E. G. HOLLAND. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. 1849. 12mo. pp. 397.

A VERY respectable volume, so far as paper and typography are concerned, and exceedingly important, original, and profound as to its contents, — in the estimation of its author, a young minister of the Christ-ian sect. The author is not one of those who have any occasion to put up the old Scotch prayer, — “O Laird, gie us a gude conceit o’ oursel’s.” He is a marvel to us. He knows all things, and some others, and has a command of words we have never seen approached, save in John Neale and Alexander Campbell, and a simplicity of thought not by any means approached in either of those distinguished gentlemen. He is a wonderful man. Yet let us not be misunderstood. Mr. Holland really has good natural gifts, gifts of a high order, and only lacks modesty and proper discipline. He has grown up amongst men of little learning and less knowledge, and has never learned to measure himself properly. He overrates his acquirements, and undertakes to discuss matters of which he knows only enough to render his discussions ridiculous. His pompous manner, his swelling periods, and his verbose and bombastic style are really intolerable to persons of genuine cultivation and good taste. If he will go to school and put himself under rigid professors for eight or ten years, and attain to some proportion between his acquirements and his ambition, he will be able to write *Reviews and Essays* creditable to himself, and acceptable to scholars and men of solid attainments.

10. — *The Incarnation*. By ROLLIN H. NEALE, Pastor of the First Baptist Church, Boston. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. 1849. 32mo. pp. 94.

Messrs. Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln have sent this little work out in a very tasteful, and even beautiful dress, and Mr. Neale has evidently bestowed great pains in its composition. We cannot treat otherwise than with respect any honest attempt made to vindicate any one of the sacred mysteries of our religion, let it be made by whom it may, especially in these days of Rationalism and Transcendentalism. Mr. Neale is a Calvinistic Baptist minister in this city, and deservedly ranks high among the ministers of his own sect. We remember him as a frank, social, good-hearted man, with less of the peculiar characteristics of Baptist ministers than we commonly meet with. As for the Baptist sect, we have less patience with them than with most others, in consequence of their denial of infant baptism. In denying that, and on the ground on which they deny it, they really place themselves out of the pale of Christendom. Even our New England Unitarians are to be preferred to them, for, as a general thing, the children of Unitarians are, or at least have been heretofore, baptized. We quarrel not with Baptists about the mode of baptism, but we must tell them that they do not recognize Christian baptism at all, and therefore are in no sense joined to the Church of Christ.

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APRIL, 1850.

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BROWNSON'S
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APRIL, 1850.

ART. I. — *The Works of the RIGHT REV. JOHN ENGLAND, First Bishop of Charleston, collected and arranged under the immediate Advice and Direction of his immediate Successor, the RIGHT REV. IGNATIUS ALOYSIUS REYNOLDS.* Baltimore: J. Murphy. 1849. 5 vols. Large 8vo. Double columns.

THE wide-spread fame of Dr. England as an orator, a divine, a patriot, and a scholar, will doubtless be greatly enhanced by the publication of his works. Some acquire a high reputation for oratory in the pulpit or at the bar, whose discourses, when published, leave us astonished at the weakness of their reasoning, and the flimsiness of those ornaments of speech which fascinated multitudes. Not so with those of the illustrious Bishop of Charleston. His arguments are such as bear the severest scrutiny; his discourses are the compositions of a skilful artist, who combines each part with the other in close union and harmony; his images are natural and striking. It may, indeed, be a matter of surprise to those who peruse the solid and persuasive sermon which he delivered in the hall of Congress in 1826, and which we take to be a fair specimen of his doctrinal discourses, that he could succeed in arresting the attention of popular assemblies on matters better suited to a highly intellectual audience, such as that which he then addressed; but the fact is widely known, that the unlearned, as well as the philosophical inquirer, hung with delight for hours on his lips, whilst he descanted on the evidences of Christianity, and that children fancied they understood what he propounded. This

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is accounted for by the plain and clear language which he employed, by his illustrations, which brought sublime truths down to the level of the humblest intellects, and by the life and spirit which breathed throughout, since he acted, but without affectation, all that he spoke. The maxim of Demosthenes, that delivery is the chief qualification of an orator, was illustrated in him, since his long and profound discourses, without this charm, would necessarily have fatigued the attention of his hearers. His gesticulations were almost too animated for the pulpit ; but they were perfectly in character, and they gave charm and effect to his appeals. As he stood, with folded arms, pausing at the close of some luminous argument, and surveying his audience, to discover whether they felt and acknowledged its force, all remained entranced. The effect of the oratorical pause was never seen to more advantage. The mind, surveying the chain of reasoning which, link by link, had been formed, admired its beauty, and felt happy in being encircled by its magic power, and made captive to truth. Interrogatories, with the responses, opportunely intermingled, relieved the seriousness of logical exercise, and fixed the attention of all on the point under consideration. We recollect to have heard him in the first Council of Baltimore, above twenty years ago, when he presented the claims of the Church to be our guide in the things of salvation, with a combination of argument and authority not easy to be resisted. At the close, he asked himself in the name of some votary of liberty, — “ Do you mean, then, to establish the despotism of authority ? Will you have us to renounce reason, and follow blindly the dictates of erring fellow-mortals ? Will you deprive us of the liberty of thought ? ” To each of these questions he emphatically answered, “ No. ” “ What then ? ” said he. “ I will only, ” he replied, “ that man be subject to God. ”

His descriptions were picturesque and animated, bringing, as it were, under the eyes of his audience the scenes which he represented. In treating of the evidence of miracles, he observed that the reality of death can be ascertained beyond all doubt, and, as if a corpse lay before the audience, he pointed to each symptom, — the stiffened limbs, the glazed eyes, the absence of all pulsation, the commencement of decomposition ; and, as he proceeded in his scrutiny, he demanded with earnestness, “ Is he dead ? ” The oratorical pause which ensued, and which was wonderfully expressive, left the audience in deep reflection ; but on one occasion it was wellnigh being disturbed by almost ir-

repressible laughter, produced by a somewhat ludicrous reminiscence. There sat in front of the pulpit the revered *proto-sacerdos* of the United States, who had been an actor in a scene not dissimilar. In the earlier part of his ministry in Kentucky, he had attended many times a chronic patient, whose sufferings made such an impression on his imagination, that his sleep was disturbed with the painful idea that the afflicted man was buried alive. The man died at length, during the absence of the missionary, who, however, returned in time to assist at the burial. Just before the coffin was deposited, its lid was raised to give the friends for the last time the opportunity of looking on the face of the departed. The priest demanded with earnestness, "Is he dead?" All stood silent and motionless, astonished at the unusual interrogatory, and unaware of the dream that disturbed the imagination of the good father; but, on the repetition of the question, one of the by-standers, who was deemed half-witted, and whose pronunciation was nasal, replied, "I reckon he is; he don't speak." This curious occurrence had long passed away from the remembrance of the aged father; but it was brought fresh to the mind of the younger priest, who sat at his side, and who in his boyhood had assisted at the interment. The vivid description of the Bishop would have infallibly convulsed him in any other place, but a sense of the sacredness of the temple and the solemnity of the occasion enabled him to preserve his gravity, and leave the audience under the influence of the powerful eloquence of the orator.

The outline of his general reasoning on this subject is found in the admirable discourse delivered in the hall of Congress, to which we have already referred. His arguments on the authority of the Church are dispersed throughout the collection of his works. "An Essay and Letters on Infallibility" are, with great propriety, placed at the commencement of the first volume, which will be found to exhibit that accuracy of statement and strength of reasoning which so eminently characterized him. We should be pleased to see it published apart, in pamphlet form, for general distribution, as one of the clearest and strongest essays adapted for general use. The letters to the Rev. Hugh Smith, a Protestant Episcopal minister in Georgia, "On the Judicial Office of the Catholic Church," treat of the same subject under a different point of view, with such happy variety of method, that the reader is not wearied by repetition, but finds delight, as well as an increase of information, in the new phases of the discussion. The same observation ap-

plies to the many essays contained in these volumes, in which the subject recurs. The author seems always to have had present to his mind all he had written, and when he found himself obliged to repeat the substance of former statements, he varied his expressions, or chose a new mode of argument directed to the same end. In his reasoning he appears like a builder engaged in the erection of a colossal monument ; he piles argument on argument till the logical structure rises in fair proportions to a height that surprises and overawes the beholder. We know of no work in which the authority of the Church, as a tribunal of doctrine, is treated with greater clearness of diction and power of reasoning, as well as variety of method.

We must, however, take leave to express our regret, that, whilst scrupulously tenacious of the defined doctrines, the illustrious prelate, in the early part of his career, was tinged with those theological opinions which pass under the name of Gallican. Our readers are aware that, ever since the Declaration of the French Assembly in 1682, as to the limits of Papal authority, these opinions have been generally ascribed to the clergy of France, although we believe the majority of that illustrious body never cordially accepted them. In their mildest form they are characterized by a narrow spirit of nationality, which claims for the French Church certain privileges, as immemorially enjoyed, and not to be interfered with or set aside by the Sovereign Pontiff. The most effectual refutation of these pretensions to restrict the exercise of the supreme authority was given by Divine Providence, which so disposed the course of events, that it became necessary, in order to preserve the Church of France from extinction, that Pius VII. should remove her ancient landmarks, and displace the occupants of her sees, to create a new hierarchy, and give her a new organization. This unprecedented act of sovereign ecclesiastical power was performed with the applause of the Catholic world, and with the acquiescence of most of the French prelates, who acknowledged its wisdom and necessity. In ordinary circumstances none are more willing than the pontiffs to respect the ancient usages of local churches. St. Gregory the Great, writing to Dominic, Bishop of Carthage, declared, that, as " he defended his own prerogatives, so he maintained inviolate the rights of the respective provinces."

The relations of the Church to the civil power were, in truth, the great point at stake at the time of the Assembly of 1682. Louis XIV., in the pride of absolute sovereignty, had

encroached on the rights of several bishops, who invoked pontifical interference to prevent the extension of the royal prerogative, styled *regalia*, to matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Innocent XI. acted on their solicitation ; but in the strife which ensued, the bishops, overawed by the sovereign, weakly undertook to circumscribe the Papal power. No attempt had been made by the Pontiff to revive the claims of some of his predecessors to a paramount authority over princes, nor was there any likelihood of their revival ; but Louis, feeling that it would annoy Innocent to have them formally denied, urged the prelates to declare against them. This declaration was offensive, as well as unnecessary ; it was an implied censure on the holy pontiffs, who, in the Middle Ages, had struggled against tyranny by wielding a power which, from whatsoever source it was derived, they actually possessed, and it was calculated to render the civil authority absolute and despotic, by removing moral restraint. Those who deny that the Pope had any divine right over civil governments, cannot on this account close their eyes to the evidence of history, that he was for ages appealed to by princes and their subjects, and that his judgment was sought as to the moral obligations by which they were mutually bound. It was scarcely fair, in these circumstances, to emit a declaration, which, even if true to the letter, was injurious to the memory of illustrious pontiffs, and prejudicial to royalty itself, by the irresponsible character which it ascribed to it. For our own part, we believe that the sanguinary scenes of the French Revolution may be traced to the absoluteness of the monarchy as it existed in the Great Louis, whose maxim was, “ L'état c'est moi.” The penalty paid by his unfortunate descendant is an atonement for the pride which spurned any superior but God in matters of temporal administration. Monarchs, as well as their subjects, are bound by the moral law, and the abuse of power, if not remedied by the legal deposition of the sovereign, according to the jurisprudence of the Middle Ages, provokes rebellion and bloodshed.

The learned prelate willingly acknowledged that the dispensing power, as it was called, was no usurpation, whilst he denied that it was held by divine right, and traced it to the concession and the institution of the princes and the people of Christendom.* We think it has a higher source. It may not be easy to prove the alleged acts of concession, much less the formal

* Vol. I. p. 168. Vol. II. p. 405.

institution of this power by all the Christian princes and nations. The simplest and justest mode of accounting for its origin is in the nature of the moral ties which bound rulers and their subjects. Allegiance was due to those in power, and it was sanctioned by an oath. Protection and good government were promised by the rulers under the same solemn sanction. There were necessarily limits to the duty of obedience, as it was pledged on conditions which might be violated. When the nations generally professed the Catholic faith, they instinctively were led to appeal to the judgment of their common father to determine whether they were released from the duty, and from the oath by which it had been confirmed. The Pope, whose judgment and interposition were implored, did not, necessarily, exercise any divine right over the temporal powers ; he acted only as the authoritative expounder of moral obligation ; he was the proper judge of its extent and its limits, and, as interpreter of the moral law, he released subjects from the oath of allegiance, so that his decree was declaratory of an exemption to which the facts of the case entitled them. His absolution from the oath would have been of no account whatever, had not the enormous abuse of power already destroyed the intrinsic force of the obligation, and warranted the sentence. His act was not an exercise of temporal power, direct or indirect, but of spiritual authority, regarding a moral point, on which he was called to pronounce by both, or either, of the parties. Ordinarily the popes and bishops confine the exercise of their authority to the exposition of general principles, which they apply to individual cases only when these are submitted to them by those concerned, or by others having a right, or interest, in their decision. The popes did not act merely in the capacity of spiritual advisers, but as filling the highest judicial station in the Church, and they approached the delicate investigation with all the caution which its importance demanded, and pronounced sentence with that assurance which the facts seemed to warrant, and that tone of authority which their office gave to their judgment.

The integrity of Bishop England's faith on the Primacy, and his devoted attachment to the Holy See, are evident from his erudite essay on "St. Peter's Roman Episcopate," which is found in the second volume, and from other portions of his works ; but it was his lot to have pursued his ecclesiastical studies under circumstances not favorable to a just estimate of the pontifical prerogatives. In the struggles of the Catholics of

Ireland, in the early part of this century, for the attainment of their civil rights, the strongest ground of opposition to their claims was the alleged incompatibility of allegiance to the crown with the acknowledgment of the Papal supremacy. The advocates of emancipation, laboring to remove every pretext for this calumny, undertook to circumscribe the pontifical authority within the narrowest limits which the defined dogma would permit. The acts of various popes being objected to them, they were not content with observing, that these were not accompanied with a declaration of the right, or that the declaration was not of that solemn character which constitutes a doctrinal definition. They chose the bolder position of denying the infallibility of the Pontiff. This, if understood of his personal opinions, might be denied without suspicion or censure ; but when embracing his most solemn decrees addressed to the whole Church on doctrine, under penalty of excommunication, it clashes with the very general opinion of divines, and the settled convictions of the great body of the hierarchy, founded, as we believe, on Scripture and tradition. We are free to confess, with the eminent author, that it is not an article of Catholic faith, because it has not been formally proposed by the competent authority ; and as long as the Church does not attach to its denial the forfeiture of her communion, we dare not cast censure on those who question its correctness : but we deprecate all attempts to forestall her judgment, and embarrass its exercise by unnecessary statements, which may hereafter be alleged as tokens of an adverse tradition. When the civil government, through weak jealousy, demands such a declaration, it may be admissible, since it is a mere statement of fact, which cannot be withheld without serious loss or suffering ; but to embody it formally into the constitution of the churches intrusted to his charge was, we think, improper. But for this blemish, these documents, which display much legal as well as ecclesiastical knowledge and great ability, might have received that attentive consideration at Rome to which their intrinsic merit entitled them, and that approbation which the distinguished prelate never could succeed in obtaining, notwithstanding the high personal regard which was cherished for him by the Pontiff.

The official infallibility of the Pope in his doctrinal decisions is necessarily to be presumed, even on Gallican principles. The French clergy, in their famous Declaration, admitted that he was entitled to take a leading part in defining the revealed

doctrines, whilst they denied that his judgment was incapable of being amended, as long as the consent of the Church at large had not ratified it. As the question regards only decrees of faith addressed to the Church generally, it is clear that the consent is to be presumed, unless opposition be speedily and formally manifested. This presumption is especially necessary on the part of the faithful, whom it would ill become to question the judgment of the chief bishop, intrusted by Christ with the feeding of his lambs and sheep, and the confirmation of his brethren in faith. In every government official infallibility is necessarily supposed in the supreme tribunal, from which no appeal lies, since otherwise litigation would be endless. In the Church, whatever questions may be raised as to the relations of the Pope to general councils, the Holy See is the only permanent tribunal, which, if it be not endowed with the prerogative of infallibility in judgment, becomes nugatory for the decision of controversies, since it cannot command the assent of the mind. Yet in all ages it has been deemed competent to decide such questions ; recourse has been had, from all quarters of the Church, to its judgment ; the decrees of local or national councils have been sent to it for examination ; and when a solemn confirmation issued, the prelates of the Church, everywhere, were ready to exclaim, in the words of Augustine, — “ The cause is now finally decided.”

Thirty years before the holding of the French Assembly, Innocent X., at the solicitation of the bishops of France, had condemned the five propositions which formed the basis of the book of Jansenius. No sooner had the condemnation issued, than eighty-six of their number addressed the Pontiff, declaring that his dogmatical decrees “ rest on a divine and supreme authority throughout the whole Church, to which all Christians are in duty bound to give even the homage of the mind.” The artifices of the Jansenists, whereby they strove to elude the force of the condemnation, derived coloring from the subsequent declaration of the Assembly, that the judgment of the Pope admitted of amendment, until it had received the assent of the body of bishops ; for it was by no means easy to establish the fact of the express and deliberate adhesion of the bishops generally ; and the tacit consent was not satisfactory. We may, perhaps, appear superstitious, or enthusiastic, in our frequent remarks on providential interference ; but we appeal to the calm judgment of the reader. Does it not look like a special Providence, that, at the very time when lines were drawn

to circumscribe the pontifical authority, its intervention was found necessary and effectual for the extirpation of a most subtle heresy, in the very country wherein the rash attempt was made? The Apostolic See has the glory of crushing Jansenism, as well as the opposite extreme of Semipelagianism, without the aid of a general council, a fact which far outweighs the Declaration of the Assembly.

In the expression of our sentiments on this subject, we feel that we owe no apology to the admirers of the French clergy, or of Bishop England, since we leave to others the liberty which we claim for ourselves, to speak freely where the definite judgment of the Church has not imposed silence. We do not complain because the learned prelate stated, what we ourselves avow, that the official infallibility of the Pontiff is not an article of faith; but we regret the statement in a document like that of the constitution of the diocese of Charleston, and we rejoice that it has been modified and corrected by a note bearing the initials of the present distinguished incumbent of that see: — “The infallibility of the Pope is not of *faith*, i. e. has not been defined and declared an article of faith; but it is generally taught by theologians, and believed by the secular and regular clergy, and by the Christian people, that the *successor* of him for the preservation of whose faith Christ prayed never errs when he speaks *ex cathedra* in declaring the Christian doctrines, or the principles of Christian morality. — I. A. R.”

Without wishing to renew the contest on doctrinal developments which some time since was carried on in this periodical with a friend of Mr. Newman, we take leave to express our conviction that this prerogative may hereafter be formally defined. We do not regard it as a mere inference logically drawn from a revealed premise, or as an idea suggested by the Holy Spirit to the mind of the Church in her meditation on the divine truths. The prayer of Christ for Peter especially, that his faith may not fail, strikes us as a revelation of his inerrancy in the office of confirming his brethren. It is manifest that the Holy See has always been acknowledged by the whole Church as a doctrinal tribunal, at which controversies about faith were decided, and the decision was proposed to all the faithful under the highest penalty that the Church can inflict, — separation from her communion. The confidence with which the Jeromes, the Ambroses, the Augustines, and the Peters of Ravenna had recourse to this oracle of Christian truth, shows the deep conviction of its unfailing orthodoxy. It may be

wondered that God permitted any doubt to be entertained of that authority, which he decreed should serve as a pillar of light to guide wanderers in their pilgrimage ; but it is still more wonderful, that, amidst the storms of human passion, which beat around the Holy See, its right to judge of doctrine was always admitted, and its decisions were always received by the great body of bishops, so that the harmony of his brethren proved to all that the successor of Peter had faithfully delivered the tradition preserved in his see from the days of the great Apostle. Bishop England himself defied its adversaries to show a single instance of error in a doctrinal decision.

The fact, that no false doctrine has ever been solemnly promulgated by any of the two hundred and fifty or sixty individuals who have occupied St. Peter's chair, is itself a presumptive proof of the strongest character that the Holy Ghost specially assists the actual incumbent, that Peter may always speak by his mouth, and that he lives and teaches in each one of them. A tribunal, which has been in the constant exercise of its judicial powers in matters of faith during eighteen centuries, and is acknowledged, even by many who are unwilling to recognize its prerogatives to their full extent, never to have pronounced an erroneous judgment, is fairly presumed incapable of error. On no human principle can this invariable correctness be explained. Neither the learning nor the piety of the Pontiffs can account for their felicity in judgment : and when we reflect that some few were deficient in personal qualifications, we are forced to admit the superintendence of a special Providence, which has always maintained the doctrine of truth in the chair of unity.

The language used in some places by the illustrious prelate, in regard to the power of the Pope and his relations to general councils, would, no doubt, have been corrected by himself, had he lived to prepare a complete edition of his works. He denies that the Pope has greater power in the Church than the President of the United States exercises in the Union, or than Governor Troup, whose extravagances drew his special attention, claimed in Georgia. He compared the relations of President Monroe to Congress with those of the Pope to a general council. All must admit the inaccuracy of these comparisons and statements. It did not please the Divine Founder of the Church to give her a written constitution, by which the powers of her rulers should be defined. He chose one among his apostles to be his

special representative and vicegerent, to whom he gave a plenitude of authority in the most express terms, and under symbols the most significant. No limits to its exercise are assigned; but those which arise from right, justice, and the general good are essentially implied. We do not find any record of the institution of a paramount authority to check the abuse or control the exercise of the sovereignty thus delegated to Peter; confessedly no permanent tribunal of this character exists in the Church, and it would be an anomaly in government, that the supreme executive should be subject to the control of an assembly for whose convocation no provision was made, or the right of convoking which was vested in the sovereign. We venerate the doctrinal definitions of general councils as we venerate the Gospels of Christ, for the same divine truth is manifested in both, although the words in which it is declared by councils are not inspired; but we cannot discover the character of general councils in any assemblies of bishops, where Peter is not present, in the person of his successor, or by his legates, for, as St. Ambrose remarks, "where Peter is, there is the Church." With great respect, then, for the memory of Bishop England, we take leave to dissent from the positions which, in his earlier writings, he has laid down on the subject. The Pontiff, according to the definition made in the Council of Florence, has full power of governing the Universal Church; which plenitude of power cannot be ascribed to the President in reference to the Union, or to the governor of a State.

At a time when Gallicanism, as it has been styled, is repudiated by the body of the French clergy, who with all their heart cling to the See of Peter, it were to be lamented if it should be revived among us, where no narrow jealousy on the part of civil power exists to foster it. Since the Constitution leaves religious sentiment free, and interferes in no way with the exercise of Church authority, we need not labor to circumscribe it, in order to satisfy the prejudices of individuals. Limit it as we may, it will always appear odious to those who conceive that opinion should be unrestrained; whilst, to those who prize unity, no power will seem excessive which is directed to the maintenance of truth and the building up of the body of Christ. We, indeed, have no fears of the spread of these views, which Divine Providence effectually checked in France by successive revolutions, loosening the ties which bound the Church to the state in servile dependence, and put-

ting the clergy in the happy necessity of looking up to the Father of the faithful with filial confidence and attachment, for guidance, support, and consolation. The Councils of Paris and of Soissons, which have been recently held, furnish unquestionable evidence of devotedness on the part of the French hierarchy to the See of Peter, since they have loudly proclaimed her unfailing faith, and have adopted measures to establish the most perfect harmony, even in ritual details, with the Roman Church, mother and mistress of all churches.

It is a remarkable fact, that a layman shares the honor of exposing the fallacy of that system which received support from an assembly of clergy, with the illustrious Bossuet in their midst. Count de Maistre in his immortal works, *Eglise Gallicane*, and *Du Pape*, has triumphantly vindicated the pontifical prerogative, placed in clear light those facts of history which had perplexed inquirers, and demonstrated that the vaunted liberties of the Gallican Church were but a flattering name for the subjection of its priesthood and prelacy to parliaments and princes. The happy sallies of his wit, the deep cuts of his satire and irony, combined with his luminous reasoning, entertained and enlightened many, who would not have yielded to the profound arguments of Orsi or Gerdil, or to the stringent logic of Capellari. The action of Divine Providence concurred to dissipate prejudices, which more than once threatened schism, — the solemn assemblies of the French clergy, which for a time vied with Rome in pronouncing judgment on erroneous propositions, could no longer be held, — the Sorbonne became a nullity, — the very existence of the French hierarchy and Church was endangered, — and all became conscious that there must be an authority to guide, to govern, to teach, equal to all emergencies, and which, when councils were impossible, could assuredly declare the truth as it is in Christ, and summarily provide for the Church's necessities.

The disputes which have been raised on this point may be accounted for, in part, by the necessary distinction to be made between the personal opinions of the Pope and his solemn definitions of faith. As many Papal acts are not marked by those characters which, by the confession of all divines, are necessary to give them the highest degree of authority, it is not strange that questions should arise as to the circumstances in which a decision should be regarded as final. The concordant acceptance of the decree by the body of bishops, is evidence that it has all the necessary characteristics ; and the unity and

strength of Catholic faith are manifested in the harmony of the episcopal college with their head, so that the decision is thereby invested with an extrinsic and adventitious authority ; but its value in the mind of the believer is derived from the guidance of the Holy Spirit, by which the chief bishop is directed in the discharge of the important duty of feeding the lambs and sheep of Christ. Prophets and apostles were individually inspired, and their declarations were entitled to belief on the authority of God, in whose name they spoke. The Pope lays no claim to inspiration ; but the Holy Ghost, who guides the pastors of the Church into all truth, enlightens him in his solemn judgment, that he may discriminate the ancient faith from human innovation, and maintain it, pure and entire, against every form of error.

The vindication of the moral character of the popes, which is furnished towards the end of the second volume of the works of our author, is a most valuable essay, although, in some few instances, it might be more positive and triumphant. Various other pieces, replete with information and most logical in their texture, will be perused with profit and delight, not only by the ecclesiastical student, but by the general reader. The inquirer after religious truth, whose mind is still clouded with the prejudices of education, or who has drunk from polluted streams of history, can find the solution of every difficulty in the elaborate letters on Blanco White, or in some other of the controversial writings which are contained in these volumes. The local usages of Spain in regard to dispensations and pecuniary contributions are admirably explained in the letters on the Bull of the Crusade. The amount of information, historical as well as theological, contained in the letters on Transubstantiation, addressed to Dr. Bachman, is extraordinary. Our theological students, by an attentive perusal of the works of Dr. England, will be furnished on all points with weapons to resist the adversaries of the faith, and will be prepared for rightly handling the word of truth. Nothing trivial is found in his discourses or writings ; but facts and arguments are spread before the reader in clear language, occasionally adorned with imagery, and rising to the highest order of eloquence. To preach with dignity and effect, it is not sufficient to be master of dogmatic and moral theology, and to have fluency of expression : a knowledge of the history of the Church and of the sects, of the laws and usages of the country, of the modes of thought and of the feelings of those whom we address, is highly important. Bishop England had made a profound study of the prin-

ciples of law, having been originally destined for the bar ; he was thoroughly acquainted with the constitutions of the United States and of the various States ; he was familiar with our laws and institutions in great detail ; he had early observed and justly appreciated the peculiarities of the American character ; and his varied acquirements qualified him for addressing the most enlightened classes of the community, as well as the most unlettered, with ease and effect. He was heard with profit and delight by professional men, politicians, and statesmen. The humblest slave was instructed by his teaching, and consoled by his exhortations ; whilst senators stood astounded at the depth of his researches, and the commanding character of his oratory. He treated of controversy without bitterness ; he confounded his adversary without mortifying him ; and when he had brought him to the ground, the benignant smile which lighted up his countenance almost persuaded the fallen foe that it was rather a playful exercise than a feat of chivalry. The last adversary with whom he was engaged was Mr. Fuller, of Beaufort, a Baptist preacher, formerly a lawyer, a man of considerable information and ability. The subject under discussion was the Roman Chancery, against which this gentleman had made a most outrageous charge of pandering to crime. Notwithstanding the exciting nature of the topic, the Bishop conducted the investigation with the most delicate courtesy, as well as with immense Bibliographical erudition ; and such was the impression made on the mind and heart of his adversary, that, on reaching Charleston, just after the demise of the learned prelate, he shed tears on receiving the melancholy intelligence. But few controversial writers win the affections of those whom they confute.

Although the Bishop treated with respect the prejudices of the public, he by no means flattered them. He was the fearless advocate of truth, ready to brave all opposition and encounter every danger in its maintenance. He had

" A heart where dread was never so impress'd
To hide the thought that might the truth advance,
In neither fortune lost, nor yet repress'd
To swell in wealth, or yeeld unto mischaunce."

He felt it, indeed, to be his duty to meet the popular prejudice against the Church, by showing the democratic features of her institutions, in which respect he had been occasionally betrayed by his zeal into some of the most violent discourse delivered at Boston, on May 14th, 1840, during the general fast

throughout the United States, he thus refuted the charge of their inconsistency with republicanism:—"The principle of republicanism is the equality of men. We teach that all Christians have a common Parent; that all are equally redeemed by the blood of the Saviour; that all must appear before a common God, who knows no distinction of persons; where, then, is the inconsistency? Look through the records of the world, and see where the principles of true republicanism are first to be found. They had their origin in Christianity, and their earliest instance is in the Church of which we are members. Her institutions are eminently republican. Her rulers are chosen by the common consent; her officers are obliged to account strictly to those over whom they preside; her guide is a written constitution of higher force than the will of any individual. What call you this? Aristocracy? Monarchy? It is republicanism." Here we must acknowledge an oratorical flourish; for in sober truth we cannot affirm that the institutions of the Church are purely republican. The illustrious prelate, on other occasions, distinctly stated that they combine the advantages of each form of government, without the usual evils attendant on them. The Church, we have heard him say in a discourse before the provincial council, has the energy of monarchy, without its absolute character; the wisdom of enlightened aristocracy, without the incubus of hereditary nobility; the equality of a republic, without the fluctuation of popular caprice. Monarchy is represented in her supreme executive; an aristocracy, not of birth nor of wealth, but of merit, encircles the throne; and the democratic element pervades her whole system, because the general good is the object of her government, and all her children are equally eligible to her highest offices. He particularly dwelt on the manifestation of this principle in various religious orders, in which the noble and the peasant stand on the same level; are chosen to offices of trust by the free votes of their fellows, and hold them for a limited period, lest the perpetuity of the charge might generate abuses, and render their remedy impossible. In various parts of his works, the development of these views may be found, which will lead the reader to acknowledge their correctness, and acquit the prelate of any sacrifice of principle to public prejudice, or of any wilful misstatement of facts, to gain for himself an evanescent popularity, or for the Church adherence under the influence of narrow views of her affinity with any particular form of government. He quoted with approba-

tion the words of Hussey, the eloquent Bishop of Waterford : —
“ As the Catholic faith is a religion preached to all nations, and to all people, so it is suitable to all climes and to all forms of government, monarchies or republics, aristocracies or democracies.” *

The letters on Domestic Slavery, which Bishop England addressed to Mr. Forsyth, then Secretary of State of the United States, may create an impression on the minds of European readers, that he yielded to the difficulties of his position by advocating the slave system. We wish he had been spared to continue these learned essays, as he intended, by pointing out to masters the duties which they owe to their slaves, and placing in bold relief the many ecclesiastical enactments made to mitigate the evils of the system. His object was, not to flatter Southern prejudices or to rivet more strongly the chains of the slave, but to relieve the Pontiff and the Church from the odium of disturbing existing relations, with danger of involving society in a servile war. The bull of the late venerable Pontiff against the African slave-trade was represented by the Abolitionists of the North as a condemnation of domestic slavery ; which impression was likely to retard the progress of the Catholic religion in the Slave States, perhaps even to expose the churches and clergy to popular violence, from which they had narrowly escaped a few years before in Charleston. Under these circumstances the zealous prelate undertook to point out the precise object of the Papal document, and the wise economy which the Church had observed in ancient times, on which point he displays vast stores of erudition ; but, at the same time, he fearlessly declared that he was not friendly to the continuance of slavery. We applaud his zeal, admit the correctness of his statements, and unhesitatingly acquit him of all subserviency to local prejudices or interests ; although we should have admired him still more as the advocate of the slave, pleading his cause in the name of humanity and religion. We are not of those who would claim the praise of philanthropy at the expense of social order, and with danger of insurrection and bloodshed ; we know the difficulties by which slaveholders are beset, but we regret their extreme sensitiveness on this point, and the readiness of some to visit with vengeance the mildest expression of sentiment. Their best safeguard is the influence of religion, which would reconcile the slave to the order of Providence,

secure for him his spiritual privileges and natural rights, and, by ameliorating his condition and mitigating the severity of his lot, prepare him gradually for the enjoyment of liberty. Whatever extenuation of the system may be found in the circumstances in which it originated, or the manner of its exercise, or the dangers attendant on its abolition, the contrast which it presents to liberty — our country's boast — is such as to give us in foreign nations a character of inconsistency, not easily explained away. The principles which form the basis of the Declaration of Independence seem to be forgotten or ignored in regard to our slave population. All friends of the honor and prosperity of the Southern States must desire them to be relieved from the odium of a system which is not in harmony with the general feelings of our age, and which notably retards their advancement. Had Ohio been embarrassed by it, she could never, in so short a period of time, have outstripped her sister States, and attained to the third rank in the Union. The moral considerations, which are of a still graver kind, are easily understood by those who have passed some years in the South.

Bishop England was uniformly kind in his treatment of slaves, and evinced the greatest solicitude for their religious instruction. For this purpose he opened a school at Charleston, under the care of the Sisters of Mercy, whom he had established there; which, however, he was forced to close at a period of unusual excitement. His acceptance of the mission from the Holy See to the republic of Hayti gave such offence to many, that he received an intimation from some leading men, that, if he continued his relations to the colored population of that island, the churches and religious institutions of his own diocese would be endangered. His true Christian philanthropy and independence of character appeared in his pursuing the good work intrusted to him, until the Pope thought proper to release him from a charge highly troublesome, and rendered fruitless by the wily policy of the government of that country. The frankness of his character and the ardor of his temperament ill prepared him for the cold and unprincipled chicanery of mongrel statesmen, who trifled with his generous confidence; as they afterwards sported with the good faith of his successor in the negotiation, — the late Bishop of St. Louis. It was highly honorable to Bishop England to have been chosen by the Holy See for this arduous mission, and invested with legatine powers, and to have received warm commendations from the Pontiff for the zeal and ability which he had dis-

played in the discharge of his high functions. Nowhere is character so justly appreciated as in the court of Rome. National and individual peculiarities are regarded with kind indulgence, — theological opinions which do not harmonize with the teaching of Roman divines are treated respectfully, — and, where faith is entire, morals unblemished, zeal pure, learning and talents eminent, the individual is honored and cherished. In the course of a few years the Bishop of Charleston crossed and recrossed the Atlantic several times, on business of his diocese or in his legatine capacity, and visited the See of Peter, where his talents and virtues, with his admirable candor and affection, won him the esteem and love of the highest dignitaries. The prejudices of his education and political associations in regard to the pontifical prerogatives gave way to the mild influence of learned divines, and to the inspirations which are imperceptibly imbibed at the tombs of the Apostles. His first sermon on his return from Rome, preached in St. Peter's, New York, was on the power given by Christ to Peter.

It is known that Dr. England was the intimate friend of the illustrious O'Connell, with whom he took a conspicuous part in Irish politics. Many persons may imagine that the reverence due to the priesthood is easily forfeited in the struggle for civil rights, and that the voice which proclaims the Divine law should never resound in political assemblies; yet the circumstances of the Irish people and clergy should be thoroughly understood, before judgment be passed on them for the share they have taken in peaceful agitation. They felt that their influence would animate the laity to hope for their just rights, and to seek them in a legal and constitutional way, whilst it would restrain them from acts of violence and bloodshed. When a child, John England had been conducted by his grandfather to the dungeon in which the aged man had been immured under the operation of the penal laws to prevent the growth of Popery, and, as the youth advanced in years, his spirit burned with an indignant sense of the wrongs of his ancestors and country. With his ardor of temperament and brilliancy of genius, it was impossible to feel no sympathy for his fellow-sufferers, or to restrain its expression. Religion achieved a triumph of which his country might be jealous, when she led to the altar the youth who might have espoused the cause of liberty on the battle-field; but, although a bondman of Christ, the floods of his eloquence beat against the pedestal of the column which was the memorial of the subjugation of Ireland by the Saxon. In

the vigor of life he came to this country, deeply imbued with those political principles which had guided him in his opposition to English misrule. His sympathies with the Democratic party were soon manifested. He exercised his privilege of voting, and otherwise showed the interest which he felt in the cause of his adopted country ; but he did not become an active politician, or forget for a moment the high duties of his ministry. At the crisis which threatened the integrity of the Union, he avowed his opposition to the doctrines of nullification, regardless of the popularity which he might have acquired by flattering the pretensions of the State in which he lived. His letter to the Roman Catholic citizens of Charleston, which is found in the fourth volume of his works, is a model of prudence and impartiality, and well calculated to guard the Catholics against the abuse of the privileges of freemen. He wished them to vote freely and conscientiously, without bias or influence of any kind, according to their best judgment, for the interests of their country. Those who would impose on clergymen entire silence in regard to politics, virtually proscribe them, denying them the rights of the most humble citizen. It is seldom, indeed, that it is advisable for a clergyman to identify himself with a political party, as it is wholly unsuitable for him to become an active partisan, — still less a tool ; but he has rights in common with other citizens, of which, if he exercise them calmly and inoffensively, with a view to the public good, no one should censure or envy his enjoyment. It is his duty to teach his people the moral obligation of using their rights conscientiously, without suffering themselves to be tampered with or deceived by interested and unprincipled politicians, and to caution them against strife, violence, and outrage, that they may act as freemen, and not as making liberty a cloak for malice. We know of no better moral lecture on the eve of an election than the letter just referred to, or the discourse pronounced by him at Boston.

The organization of the diocese of Charleston, which was effected by the late lamented prelate, is developed in the constitutions of the local churches of the various States which composed it, in the addresses of the Bishop to the conventions assembled from year to year, and in the proceedings of those bodies, as reported in the fifth volume. The praise of much legal knowledge, and great skill in adapting the ecclesiastical system to local institutions and usages, must be awarded to the learned author of the constitutions. The candor of his statements, the

force of his appeals, the beauty of his descriptions, the thrilling power of his eloquence, will be acknowledged by all who read his addresses. The proceedings themselves bear a formal and solemn character, which, in some circumstances, would have been highly impressive. The assembling of the lay delegates in one house, and of the clergy in another ; the declarations of adhering to the constitution, formally made by the officers in the hands of the Bishop, who presided with princely bearing ; the conferences and reports of the two houses ; and the confirmation of their acts by the prelate ; — all these forms and acts would have been of the most imposing character, had the Catholic population been great, the resources of the diocese considerable, the representatives numerous and influential, and the building in which they assembled suited to the grand occasion. But where the Catholics were few, and scattered over a vast territory, with limited means, the system could not be tested to advantage, and a feeling of disappointment necessarily arises on finding that scarcely any thing was accomplished by the committees charged to raise funds for general purposes. One great benefit, however, resulted from these annual assemblies. The trustee system, which had inflicted such dire evils on the diocese of Charleston, as well as on several other dioceses of the Union, was curbed and broken ; the unlimited control of laymen over church property and funds was subjected to the provisions of a constitution which regulated their rights and privileges ; and the representative system was adopted in a way to satisfy the cravings of a few for distinction, and yet to make them weary of the trouble and formality. In the mind of the illustrious prelate the constitution was the sovereign remedy for the pretensions of laymen who encroached on sacred ground ; and such, in fact, it proved to be, when managed by one who possessed so much energy of character and such personal influence. But we hold it to be a dangerous experiment to ingraft popular institutions on those of the Church, and place the laity in a relation to the clergy, which, if it give them no real power, must prove dissatisfactory. The calamities which at that time afflicted the church of Philadelphia, and that of Charleston, led him to devise this plan, which he no doubt would have submitted to the judgment of his colleagues, had it been then customary for them to assemble in council for the common interests of the ecclesiastical province ; but his importunate solicitations for this purpose failed of success until after the constitution had gone into full operation, when the

rights legally regulated could no longer be disturbed. The laity, by the law of Christ, are dependent on the clergy in all that regards the revealed doctrine and the administration of the sacraments ; and under no circumstances can they claim rights over the temporalities of the Church in such a way as to check and control the clergy in the exercise of their spiritual privileges. The simplest way of preventing such interference seems to us to be by general disciplinary enactments, to be made by provincial or national councils, and applied to each diocese by synodical statutes. These could assume a form which even the public tribunals would respect, should unfortunately the necessity exist of seeking the protection of the law against the usurpations of ignorant or bold men who overstep the limits of their office, and seek to lord it over those whom Christ appointed to be their fathers and guides.

The interposition of Dr. England, to remedy the disorders occasioned by the unfortunate Hogan and his partisans in Philadelphia, is an evidence of his zeal and kind intentions, as well as of his unsuspecting charity and confiding honesty ; although, as his letters themselves show, by the contrivance of unprincipled men, it aggravated the evils which then afflicted the congregation of St. Mary's. It is not necessary for us to dwell on so painful a topic, which many will regret to see presented again to the public consideration, so long after that schism has been extinguished ; but history, which is no respecter of persons, does not cast the mantle of oblivion over past disorders. Her lessons are derived from the scandals of former days, as well as from examples of heroic virtue, and she summons from the dead the actors in every variety of scenes, to teach us, by the different results of their conduct, what we should shun, as well as what we should imitate.

" Là, retraçant leurs faiblesses passées,
Leurs actions, leurs discours, leurs pensées,
A chaque état ils reviennent dicter
Ce qu'il faut fuir, ce qu'il faut imiter."

The Church in this country owes to Bishop England the celebration of provincial councils, which have given form and consistency to her hierarchy, and order to her internal economy. The venerated Carrol, the first Bishop of Baltimore, when this see was raised to the metropolitanical dignity, held a meeting of his colleagues, then newly created, and adopted some few arrangements for their harmonious action. Nearly nineteen years passed without any other episcopal assembly. The distance of

several of the suffragan prelates from the chief see, their poverty, the need of their presence in their vast dioceses, ill provided with missionaries, were serious hindrances to their coming together in council; but it cannot be dissembled, that the weightiest impediment arose from the fear which some excellent men entertained, that such an assembly would occasion agitation among the clergy and people, and lead to rash innovations. The ardent character of the Bishop of Charleston was not calculated to diminish this apprehension. The ceaseless activity of his mind, his peculiar views on certain points of discipline, and his power in debate, were subjects of misgiving, so that little regard was paid to his suggestions, until Archbishop Whitfield was raised to the see. In the first council which he summoned, in 1829, Bishop England used with great moderation the success which crowned his efforts. The ease, the dignity, the power, the beauty of his language, in the unstudied effusions of the council-chamber, or in the conferences with the theologians, were more admirable than the flashes and thunders of his eloquence which amazed the crowded audiences in the public sessions. His moderation of sentiment and courtesy of manner surprised such of his colleagues as had known him only by his reputation as a bold, uncompromising patriot and prelate. Notwithstanding the caution with which his suggestions were received, he succeeded in inducing the adoption of many measures originating with himself, and he readily modified his own views to harmonize with those of his brethren in the episcopate. At his instance, it was resolved to hold the next council after the lapse of the canonical period of three years; but when the appointed time was approaching, the worthy metropolitan shrunk from the responsibility of a second experiment, and it was not until the Sovereign Pontiff intimated his express will, that his repugnance was overcome. We state these facts in no offensive spirit; we respect the motives of the prelate and his advisers; but it is right that the praise of originating and promoting these most important assemblies should be given to the eminent Bishop of Charleston. "Honor to whom honor is due."

We could have wished that the admirable letter to the clergy, and another of great beauty and force to the laity, which were published in the name of the first council, as also the letters of the second and third councils, which are known to be all from the pen of Dr. England, had found a place in the collection of his works. Besides their intrinsic value, they possess an adventurous authority as the expressions of sentiment of these venera-

ble assemblies through their eloquent organ. Should the sale of the works call for a second edition, as we fervently hope, this deficiency may be supplied. It may be right, however, to correct a mistake into which his biographer has fallen, in ascribing to him the Latin letters to the Archbishops of Cologne and Posen, which beautiful productions, worthy of a Cyprian or a Bernard, are from the pen of the lamented Rosati, the late pious Bishop of St. Louis. Dr. England, although an excellent scholar, did not possess that command of the Latin language which would enable him to write it with ease and dignity. His power lay in the use of the English, which he effectually employed in the defence of truth and of his father-land, as well as of the institutions of his adopted country.

ART. II.—*The Philosophy of Religion*. By J. D. MORELL, A. M. New York : Appleton & Co. 1849. 16mo. pp. 359.

MR. MORELL is, we believe, a Scotchman, and a minister of the Scottish kirk. He first made himself known to our community by a *History of Modern Philosophy*, written from the eclectic point of view, and which we have heard spoken of as a very clever performance. Some views advanced in that work touching the mutual relations of religion and philosophy were supposed to favor modern Rationalism, and the volume before us has been written to develop them, and to show that they are defensible on psychological principles. The volume has attracted no little attention among British and American Protestants, and though it contains nothing new or striking to one familiar with the later developments of Protestantism on the Continent of Europe, or even in our own country, and though it is written in a dry, hard style, without much regard to idiomatic grace or propriety, we have read it with a good deal of interest, and, considering the source whence it emanates, we cannot help regarding it as a remarkable production.

Mr. Morell belongs to the progressive party among Protestants, the party that labors to continue the work of the Reformers of the sixteenth century, and carry it on to its legitimate termination. He retains, indeed, many traces of his Presbyterian and Evangelical breeding, but he departs widely from the formal teach-

ings of his sect, and appears to be fully aware that the formal or scholastic theology of the elder Protestant teachers is without vitality, is, indeed, an anomaly in Protestantism, and at best superfluous in the Protestant economy of life. He seems, also, to be convinced that religion itself cannot be maintained on the ground ordinarily assumed by Protestant theologians, and that, if they continue to retain the rule of private judgment, they must either reject all religion, or else exclude from religion, as unessential, whatever transcends private reason. Determined, or apparently determined, to retain that rule at all hazards, he adopts the latter alternative, and labors with all his learning, energy, and power of analysis, to prove that religion originates in and is determined by an element of our nature; that, in all that is essential to it, it comes within the scope of individual reason, and that it is as philosophically explicable and verifiable as any other psychological fact that passes under our observation. In this he is, unquestionably, faithful to the Protestant spirit, and deserves great credit for his courage and consistency. But although he in this strikes a mortal blow at all dogmatic Protestantism, and, in reality, resolves modern Evangelicalism into mere sentimentalism, which is all very well, he goes, perhaps, farther than he intends, and certainly farther than we can go with him. We cannot bring all religion within the scope of private reason, without excluding as unessential all that is supernatural, and therefore not without excluding all that is peculiarly and distinctively Christian. Mr. Morell, then, whatever his intentions, really rejects the Christian religion itself, and is even a more dangerous enemy to it than he would be if he confessedly arranged himself on the side of its open and avowed enemies. However conclusive his work may be against his own sect, we cannot, therefore, commend it, for even Presbyterianism is better than total apostasy, — than absolute incredulity.

The very title Mr. Morell gives his work, *The Philosophy of Religion*, proves that he is either consciously hostile to religion, or totally ignorant of its real nature. There is and can be no philosophy of religion. Religion must be regarded either as natural religion or as revealed religion. As natural, since philosophy is simply natural theology, it and philosophy are identically one and the same thing, and it is as absurd to talk of the philosophy of religion as of the philosophy of philosophy. As revealed, religion is above philosophy, not accountable to it, nor explicable on its principles. A philoso-

phy of religion is conceivable only on the supposition that religion is below philosophy; a special discipline, like physics or æsthetics, under philosophy, deriving its principles from it, and bound to apply them according to its commands. The author sees this, and therefore attempts to relegate religion to a single department of human nature, and to confine it to a single class of human emotions. But this is manifestly false and absurd; for religion, if any thing at all, is no special discipline, but the queen of all disciplines, giving the law to all special disciplines, and receiving it from none.

The author does not lack ability and industry, and we cheerfully concede him considerable philosophical aptitude; but, with all his pretensions, he is no real philosopher. He is misled by the psychological method of modern philosophy, and mistakes philosophy no less than Christianity. He is a mere psychologist, or rather psychologue, and gives us as the result of his painful philosophizing only miserable psychologism, which, we need not tell our readers, is as far removed from philosophy as any thing well can be. Taking the human soul, or, in modern language, the facts of consciousness, for its point of departure, and the Cartesian doubt for its method, psychologism necessarily, as we have heretofore shown, results on the one hand in sensism,* and on the other in pantheism, both of which, in their turn, necessarily result in Pyrrhonism and nullism or nihilism. That Mr. Morell is a mere psychologue, even in religion as well as in philosophy, is evident enough from the very design of his book, and is proved by the following extract from his opening chapter.

"Whatever may be the religion proper to man, its real nature, and its possible intensity, must depend upon the constitution of the human mind. If the human faculties were of a lower order than they really are, it is obvious that our religious consciousness could never reach the standard to which it now rightly aspires. The reason of this becomes manifest, when we consider, that under such circumstances the real objects of religious worship could not be in the same sense accessible to us; and that, as a natural consequence of this, the emotions arising from their contemplation must be proportionably modified and diminished. If, on the other hand, we

* We venture to introduce *sensism* from the scholastic Latin *sensismus*, or the Italian *il sensismo*, as more appropriate than the French *sensualisme*, which, though the more ordinary term, has, in English, a practical rather than a speculative sense. *Psychologism* and *psychologue* we use in a bad, and *psychology* and *psychologist* in a good sense, agreeably to the practice of some recent writers in our language.

possessed a combination of faculties of an order superior to those which the human mind now enjoys, then our enlarged powers of thought and feeling, and the widened range of our actual experience, would naturally elevate our whole religious being, when once awakened, to a proportionally higher degree of development. Accordingly, since the whole aspect of our religious experiences must depend upon the natural capacities with which we have been endowed, our first object in discussing the *philosophy of religion* must be to make some inquiry into the powers and faculties of the human mind.

"By this process of analysis we find at length that the central point of our consciousness — that which makes each man what he is in distinction from every other man, — that which expresses the real concrete essence of the mind, apart from its regulative laws and formal processes — is *the will*. Will expresses power, spontaneity, the capacity of acting independently, and for ourselves. If this spontaneity be withdrawn, our life sinks down at once into a mere link in that mighty chain of cause and effect by which all the operations of nature are carried on from the commencement to the end of time. Without will man would flow back from the elevation he now assumes, to the level of impersonal nature, — in a word, we should then be *things*, and not *men* at all. Spontaneity, personality, will, self, — these, then, and all similar words, express as nearly as possible the *essential nature or principle* of the human mind. We do not say, indeed, that we can comprehend the very essence of the soul itself, *apart* from all its determinations; but that, by deep reflection upon our inmost consciousness, we can comprehend the essence of the soul in connection with its operations; that we can trace it through all its changes as a *power* or pure activity; and that in this spontaneous activity alone our real personality consists. If, therefore, in our subsequent classification of the faculties of the mind, little appears to be said about the will, it must be remembered that we assume the activity it denotes as the essential basis of our whole mental being, and suppose it consequently to *underlie* all our mental operations.

"Between the intellectual and the emotional activity, however, there always subsists a direct correspondency. Just on the same principle as we saw that a higher development of our whole intellectual capacity would imply a possibly higher development of the religious nature; so also in every succeeding stage to which the consciousness, intellectually speaking, attains, there is always associated with such an advancement a proportionally higher order of emotion. Our intellectual and our emotional life, in fact, run parallel with one another, and develop themselves correlatively; so that we may draw out a table of the successive stages of human consciousness in the following manner : —

MIND commencing in MERE FEELING (undeveloped unity) evinces a TWOFOLD ACTIVITY.		
	I. <i>Intellectual.</i>	II. <i>Emotional.</i>
1st Stage.	The Sensational consciousness (to which correspond)	The Instincts.
2d Stage.	The Perceptive consciousness	Animal Passions.
3d Stage.	The Logical consciousness	Relational Emotions.
4th Stage.	The Intuitional consciousness	Æsthetic, moral, and religious Emotions.
	meeting in	
	FAITH — (highest or developed unity)."	

— pp. 35–38.

This extract, to the intelligent reader, proves not only the psychological character of the work, but that its psychology, even as psychology, is defective and false. That such would be its character was to be expected from the author's method. M. Cousin holds that it is possible to rise by psychological analysis to ontology, or the science of being, but this the author, in what he says of the "intuitional consciousness," very properly rejects; yet he does not seem aware that psychology no more than ontology can be psychologically constructed. To be of the least value, our psychology, as well as our ontology, must be ontologically derived; for, as we shall have occasion before we close to repeat, it is the object that determines the subject, never the subject that determines the object. All evidence is objective, must be in the object instead of the subject, or knowledge is impossible, and all real certainty out of the question. To suppose, as Mr. Morell does, that the subject determines the object, and that the object must vary as varies the subject, or as varies the intellect that apprehends it, is to deny all objective certainty, to make the object the creature of the subject, and to reduce all existence for us to the soul and its subjective affections; which is to deny the soul itself, for none of its faculties actually exist without their appropriate objects. If man could exist and operate, save in relation with his appropriate object independent of himself, or if he were his own adequate object, that is, adequate to a single act, he would be pure act, and therefore not man, but God, who is termed pure act, because he is in himself his own adequate ob-

ject. But as man is not pure act, is not God, he can actually exist only in relation with his object, and then not at all if that object is removed, or does not itself exist.

It is the folly of modern philosophers to suppose that we are capable of independent action, and can know dependent beings without knowing that on which they depend, or the creative being from whom they derive their being. Only that which *is* can be an object of knowledge, and what *is* only from and by another, since it is not in and of itself, cannot in and of itself be intelligible. Hence that which is only from, by, and in another, is intelligible only mediately through the intelligibility of that from, by, and in which it is, or has its being. As the human soul is only by virtue of the Divine creative act, and as that act is only from God as real being, and therefore cognizable only in the cognition of God, it follows that the human soul itself is cognizable only in the cognition of God, from whom, by whom, and in whom it is, or has its being, and therefore its intelligibility. Psychology, which is the science of the soul, is then possible only in ontology, which is the science of being, that is, the science of God. The science of God, or ontology, is learned from the Catechism, and whoever disdains to study that will never be able to attain to either an ontology or a psychology deserving the least reliance. He who does study it, and constructs his psychology in the light of the ontology it teaches, will fall into no gross psychological errors. Indeed, as a matter of fact, nearly all the errors which vitiate modern psychology originate in doubt of the ontology of the Catechism, and in the effort of philosophers to defend or justify that doubt; that is, philosophical errors are in general the result of a departure, and of the insane attempt to justify departure, from the faith. Philosophy, whenever regarded as an independent discipline, distinct from theology, and as capable of being constructed without revealed theology, or as any thing more than a collection of rules for the right use of reason in the service of theology, indicates a heterodox tendency, if not absolute incredulity.

But be this as it may; a single glance at Mr. Morell's psychological table is sufficient to show, that, whether psychology is or is not attainable psychologically, his psychology is not worthy of our acceptance. He mutilates human nature, and misrepresents the faculties which he recognizes. The will he resolves into the general activity of the soul, and makes it equally underlie all our mental operations. He acknowledges only two faculties, the intellectual and the emotional; and thus

necessarily reduces all our mental operations to cognitions and emotions. Man is, then, simply a being that knows and feels, and therefore differs only in degree from any of the animal tribes; for they all know and feel to some extent at least. But by what authority does the author exclude volitions? When one wills to do or not to do a thing, to resist or to follow inclination, to obey or to disobey God, is the mental fact simply an emotion or a cognition? A child knows better. The difference between cognition and emotion is not greater or more evident than the difference between either of them and volition, and the fact of volition is as certain as that we know or feel.

The author, doubtless, fancies that he recognizes volitions, because he professes to recognize the will; but he does not recognize the will as a distinct faculty, or as the principle of a distinct class of mental facts. He resolves it, as we have seen, into the general activity of the soul, and gives it only the intellectual and the emotional modes of action. He must, then, either deny all voluntary activity, or else assert that all activity is voluntary. We have just shown that he cannot do the former; is he prepared to assert the latter, — that all our sensations, perceptions, intuitions, instincts, and animal passions are volitions, and therefore acts for which we are morally responsible, even though we have not deliberately excited or assented to them? This were, indeed, to go the full length of Calvinism. Calvinism, we are aware, confounds will with the simple power to act, and freedom with liberty a *coactione*. Hence it declares the simple motions of concupiscence to be sins, not only the effects of original sin, and inclining to sin, but sins themselves, for which we may be brought into judgment, even when actually resisted. It makes all instinctive and indeliberate actions, not proceeding from grace, mortal sins, and allows no distinction between what we do deliberately, and what we do indeliberately and unintentionally. This is the real doctrine of Jonathan Edwards's famous *Treatise on the Affections*, and it makes sanctity consist in having no internal struggles, and diminishes our merit just in proportion to the internal obstacles we have to overcome, or spiritual conflicts to maintain. But this is manifestly false as well as horrible. We are responsible only for what we do voluntarily; and only that act is voluntary which it depends on the will to do or not to do. Nothing is more absurd than to term an act which we cannot but do a voluntary act; and nothing is more certain than that our cognitions and emotions do not always depend on our will, —

are not always subject to our control. They not unfrequently come and go unbidden, in spite of our most strenuous efforts to the contrary. How often do we grieve at the intrusion of unwelcome thoughts, and at emotions which we would, but cannot, suppress? Who that knows any thing of the spiritual life, who that has attempted to live in thought, word, and deed a pure and holy life, needs to be told that not a few of his thoughts and emotions are indeliberate and involuntary, and occur in spite of his firmest resolutions, and most unremitting vigilance in guarding the avenues of his mind and heart? Who needs to be told that the Christian's life is an unceasing warfare?

But our objections to Mr. Morell's psychology do not end here. Leaving by the way, for the moment, what he says of the emotional side of his table, we assure him that we cannot accept the intellectual side without important modifications. The mind, according to the author, begins in mere feeling, and passes successively through four degrees or stages of development; namely, the sensational, the perceptive, the logical, and the intuitional. In sensation, the sensitive subject and sensible object are confounded; the soul seizes, indeed, the sensible object, but does not distinguish itself from the object, or external cause of its sensitive affection. In perception, the soul apprehends the sensible object, and apprehends it as external and distinct from both the apprehension and the subject apprehending. In logic, or reflection, the soul generalizes, or applies its own abstract forms to the objects which it has perceived. That is, by perception we learn sensible objects, and by logic apply to them the abstract forms, or, as Kant would say, the *categories*, of the understanding. But our knowledge is not limited to our sensible intuitions and the subjective forms of the logical understanding. Above the logical understanding, which adds nothing to the matter or "content" of knowledge, is the intuitional consciousness, in which the soul apprehends another and a higher order of truth, — supersensible, necessary, and absolute truth, — pure Being, or God himself. This the author explains in the following passage.

"The mathematical sciences, for example, have as their essential foundation the pure conceptions of space and number; or, if they be of the mechanical order, the conceptions of power and motion. Moral science, again, is based upon the fundamental notions of good and evil; æsthetical science upon that of beauty; theological science upon the conception of the absolute, — of God. Now, these primary elements of all the sciences can never be communi-

cated and never *learned* exegetically. Unless we have a direct consciousness of them, they must ever remain a deep mystery to us, — just as no description could ever give to a blind man the notion of color, or to a man who has no organ of taste the idea of bitter or salt. We do not deny but that means may be employed to *awaken* the consciousness to these ideas, but still they can never be known by definition, — never communicated by words to any man who has not already felt them in his own inward experience. Here, then, we have the actual material of all scientific truth, and that material, it is evident, must be *presentative*, coming to us by the immediate operation of our intuitional consciousness." — pp. 69, 70.

There is little here, in the sense of the author, to which we do not object; but we restrict our comments to his doctrine of intuition. By the "intuitional consciousness" it is clear that he means the *reason* of Jacobi, Coleridge, and Gioberti, who very unreasonably distinguish reason as a faculty from understanding. It is the *Vernunft* distinguished from the *Verstand* and *Empfindungs-vermögen* of the Germans, and is held to be a power or faculty of the soul to apprehend immediately supersensible truth, — in our terminology, the intelligible as distinguished from the sensible, the Idea, in the language of Plato, which, as we showed in our last Review,* is identically God as *Ens reale et necessarium*. But to this we object, — 1. That it supposes the order of truth intuitively revealed comes to the mind only in the fourth stage of its development, instead of the first; and 2. That it makes intuition a faculty of the soul, and asserts for man the natural subjective power to see God.

1. The solidity of the first objection we established in our Review for last January, in the article just referred to, by showing that the order of knowledge must follow the order of being, since what is not can be no object of knowledge, and where there is no object there can be no fact of knowledge. That is to say, we cannot know without knowing somewhat, and cannot know somewhat unless somewhat is, — no very startling proposition, we should suppose, and very much like a truism. The intuition of God, then, if the order of knowledge follows the order of being, must precede all knowledge of existences, because existences are from God, and subsequent to him, and because without him our existence is not, is nothing, and one term of a relation always connotes the other. To affirm ourselves as simple being, as *ens reale*, is to affirm a falsehood, for *ens reale* is God, and we are not God. To af-

* *Quarterly Review*, January, 1850, Art. I., pp. 24–26.

firm ourselves as existence, taking the word, as we must if we distinguish it from real being, in its strict etymological sense, (from *exstare*,) is to affirm that we are from God, and are only as we are in him, by virtue of his creative act, and therefore is to distinguish ourselves from him, and to assert our dependence on him and relation to him as his creatures ; which is impossible, unless we know that he is, and has created us. Perception, in Mr. Morell's sense, cannot precede intuition of the intelligible, for it is only by virtue of intuition of the intelligible, that the sensible is perceptible, or any thing to us but a mere sensitive affection or mode of the soul itself. Nor can the logical operation described, but, by the way, inaccurately described, precede intuition ; for logic cannot operate without *data*, and without the intuition of the intelligible it can have no *data*, that is, can have no principles, no premises ; for no man a little versed in philosophy can seriously maintain that the categories are mere subjective forms of the understanding. The error of the author grows out of his confounding the order of intuition with the order of reflection. Intuition follows the order of being, and presents us the ontological order as it really is, independent of us, as it is revealed by God himself, and taught us in the Catechism, and therefore presents being before existence, the Creator before creatures, because such is the real order. Reflection, which is rethinking, reverses this order, begins where intuition leaves off, and leaves off where intuition begins. It takes the creature from intuition, and by analysis rises to the reflex cognition of God. It is the neglect to distinguish between these two orders of knowledge, and fixing attention mainly on the fact of reflection, undistinguished from intuition, that so woefully misleads our modern philosophers, and renders obscure and doubtful what in itself is clear and certain.

2. We ourselves, indeed, hold that God reveals himself intuitively to us, but we do not admit that intuition is a faculty, nor that we have the natural, inherent power to see God. The distinction between reason and understanding, contended for by Kant, Jacobi, Coleridge, Gioberti, and others, is imaginary ; for to know is always one and the same fact, and demands, on the side of the subject, only one and the same faculty. To suppose that we must have one power by which to know sensible objects, and another by which to know God, is as superfluous as to suppose that we need one voice with which to sing the praises of our Redeemer, and another with which to sing

the praises of a conquering hero. All the facts of knowledge have not, indeed, the same conditions, nor the same objects, but, as facts of knowledge, they all depend, by the very force of the word, on the same cognitive principle. Can there be a cognition which is not cognition, which is more or less than cognition? — or knowledge that is intellectual, but not rational, — rational, but not intellectual? Can there be a man that understands but does not know, or knows but does not understand? There is, and can be, only one cognitive faculty. Intuition is simply a mental fact, not a mental faculty, or power of the soul.

But we do not admit that we have the inherent power to behold God intuitively. In the first place, what is intuitively revealed to us of God is not his *quidditas*, is not *what* God is, but simply that he is; that is, he is made known to us simply as QUI EST, He who is, and who creates existences. In the second place, this cognition of God, although intuitive, is not by virtue of our own inherent intellectual force or created light; for till God is present to the mind as its intelligible object, it has no intellectual activity. Prior to the intuition of God, the intellect is not constituted, is not actual intellect, is at best only *intellectus in potentia*. It is only the moment when God presents himself as the *creative* intelligible object, that the intellect is objectively formed, — is *intellectus in actu*. The power or activity that reveals and affirms God is his, not ours, and the revelation or affirmation of himself as intelligible object is only the completion of that creative act, which, from nothing, creates us, not only existences, but *intellectual* existences. As it is only by virtue of the intimate presence and immanence of God as *ens reale*, *mediante* his creative act, that we are existences, or continue to exist, so it is only by the intimate presence and immanence of God as the intelligible, *mediante* the same act, that we are and continue to be *intellectual* existences; for it is only in him that we live, move, and are, or are able to perform any function whatever. It is not, then, we who by our power behold God, but he who, by his own agency, makes himself known to us; and our intuitive apprehension of the fact that he is, is by virtue of an act as truly an act of divine revelation as is the revelation of the Christian mysteries themselves, differing from that only in the respect that it reveals what, when revealed, is evident *per se*, whereas that reveals what, when revealed, is evident only *per alia*. This distinction between the two revelations, we remark by the

way, is important ; for if we neglect it, we shall attempt, either, with De la Mennais, to base science on faith, or, with the Rationalists, to reduce faith to science.

Intuition, we have said, is a fact, not a faculty, and we use it simply in contradistinction to discursion or ratiocination. First principles are never discursively obtained, for the mind must have them before it can operate discursively. They must be known, or else discursion is valueless ; for conclusions drawn from unknown premises are as conclusions drawn from no premises at all. *De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio*. They must, then, be given intuitively. Now God is the first principle of all science as of all existence, and therefore must be known as the indispensable condition of all science, and therefore intuitively known. This is all we mean by saying that our knowledge that God is, and is the creator of existences, is intuitive. But we do not suppose him the *passive* object of our intuition ; we are ourselves rather the passive recipients of his own revelation and affirmation of himself. We are the spectators, and he is the actor. We assert that he must be known in this way, because, unless he is, the fact of knowledge in any order is, not merely inexplicable, but absolutely inconceivable.

Now Mr. Morell's doctrine of intuition of God is widely different from this. He supposes that prior to the intuition the intellectual faculty is formed and already in active operation, and therefore that there may be knowledge, science, without recognition of God. He supposes, also, that we have a *vis intuitiva* adequate to the immediate apprehension of God, without his active revelation of himself. He makes no account of the very important fact, that in actual cognition the object must concur actively no less than the subject. He places the intelligibility, not in the object, but in the intellect itself, which is the radical principle of all skepticism. If the intelligibility is in the intellect, in the subject, nothing is intelligible *per se* ; then nothing is evident *per se*, and then all evidence is purely subjective. Then we can have only subjective certainty, which is sufficient neither for science nor faith. Here is the fatal error of Cartesianism, which has plunged the whole modern philosophical world into real, if not formal, skepticism. Descartes placed the evidence in the subject, that is, in our own conceptions, and consequently denied to himself all possible means of objective verification ; for he retained only his conceptions with which to verify his conceptions, and concep-

tion can never be more evident than conception. If his conceptions were called in question, he had no remedy ; for the conceptions he might be disposed to allege in support of the conceptions questioned, could themselves be questioned in turn, and thus on *ad infinitum*.

It is this grave error of placing the evidence in the subject, the intelligibility in the intellect, instead of the object, that has embarrassed all modern philosophers, and led to those interminable and fruitless discussions as to the objective validity of our conceptions, whether there be or be not an external reality corresponding to the internal conception, or *idea*. It is also this that creates the grand difficulty we have in proving to liberal Protestants that they ought to assent to the Divinely instituted authority of the Church. "Private judgment has, no doubt," say they, "its inconveniences, and is, unquestionably, no adequate rule of faith. It gives rise to as many different doctrines as there are doctors, and leaves all things floating and uncertain. But what is the remedy ? You propose authority. Very good. But what is the authority for your authority ? That must be taken either on the authority of private judgment or on none. The real sense, too, of its teachings and definitions, inasmuch as they are addressed to the individual, can be determined for the individual only by his private judgment, and will be in his mind only what he judges it to be. Words themselves mean to the mind only what it interprets them to mean. So, after all, if you by authority diminish in some degree the external manifestation of the evils of private judgment, you do not in the least remove them. At bottom, under authority, there is all the diversity that there is elsewhere." No scientific reply to this is possible, if you place the evidence in the conception, the intelligibility in the subject, instead of the object. The real answer is in showing that this reasoning proceeds on a false assumption, because the object concurs as actively as the subject in the production of a fact of knowledge, and the intellect never does and never can act, save in concurrence with an object intelligible and evident *per se*, and therefore never does and never can know any thing which is not immediately or mediately objectively intelligible. The object is not intelligible because we know it, but we know it because it is intelligible.

According to Mr. Morell's doctrine, as we understand it, man has the inherent power to see God, and in the fact of intuition God is intelligible to us, not by his own act, not by virtue of his own intelligibility, but by virtue of our created light.

It is, then, we who, by our intellect, make him intelligible to us, not he who makes himself intelligible to our intellect by his own intelligibility. What we assert is, that God by his own creative act places the intellectual power with which he endows us in relation with his own being as its intelligible object, as the object intelligible *per se*, and as the light by and in which our intellect sees and knows all that it does see and know. According to this view, man can no more be intellectual without the intimate presence and immanence of God as intelligible object, than he can simply exist without the intimate presence and immanence of God as creator. Mr. Morell overlooks this important fact. He supposes that, in the natural order at least, our intellect is complete in itself, and sufficient for itself. In other words, that God has created us, given us certain powers, and constituted us capable of acting, within a given sphere, independently. He does not seem to be aware that in this he virtually adopts the old Epicurean philosophy, which supposes that, God having made us, we can now, as the excellent Dr. Evariste de Gypendole would say, "go ahead on our own hook." If this were so, we might sing, —

" Let the gods go to sleep up above us, —
We know there is no god for this earth, boys."

But we cannot so far separate man, either in his existence or his intellect, from his Maker ; we cannot conceive him in any respect capable of performing a single independent action. It is by the immanent presence of God that he denies God, and by the immanent light of God that he blasphemes God. In him we live, and move, and are, and in the natural order, no more than in the supernatural, are we any thing, or can we do or know any thing, without him. Our intellect is not the intellect of pure Being, but the intellect of a dependent being, of a created existence, which is nothing save by virtue of the immanence of the creative act, any more than my volition is something independent of my willing. Suppose my intellect capable of an independent act, of one fact of knowledge, the sole product of its own inherent power, and you suppose it the intellect, not of man, but of God. The human intellect as the intellect of a creature can, in the very nature of the case, know only what is made intelligible to it by a light not its own ; that is to say, a created intellect is simply the faculty to be taught, or to receive, actively, what the Creator chooses, immediately or mediately, to communicate to it, and the primal sin of man

is in aspiring to know independently, to know as God knows, in and of himself, without a teacher.

We have dwelt thus long on this point, because we have wished to distinguish the ontological intuition, which we hold in common with the Fathers and great Doctors of the Church, from the psychological and transcendental doctrine sometimes confounded with it, that the intelligibility of the object is in the intellect, and that our intellectual power is adequate to the intuition or direct and immediate vision of God, which implies that man may, if he chooses, enjoy the beatific vision even in this life. In the beatific vision the blessed see God as he is in himself, but in this life we cannot so see him. Here we see him, as to what he is in himself, only through a glass darkly, as in an enigma. All we can see here is that he is, and is creative. This is all that is evident to us *per se*, and this we see only because he so far reveals and affirms himself to us. All beyond, not logically deducible from this, that we believe of him, we know only by his supernatural revelation, coeval and parallel with the intuitive. The one revelation is, in reality, as old as the other, and, indeed, they are two revelations only in regard to us ;—in regard to God they are one and the same, and made by virtue of one and the same Divine act. In regard to us, they are distinguishable, and should always be distinguished, but never separated. The object of faith is God as superintelligible,—the object of philosophy is God as intelligible ; the matter of faith is what is contained in the supernatural revelation,—the matter of philosophy is what is contained in the intuitive revelation, or what is evident *per se* ; but the two form, in reality, only one whole, and neither is complete in fact without the other ; for the root of the intelligible is in the superintelligible, and the supernatural presupposes the natural.

The error of philosophers in all ages has been in not rightly understanding the fact we here state, and in attempting to separate philosophy, or natural theology, from supernatural theology, and to erect it into a distinct and independent discipline. In our times their effort is, not only to erect it into a distinct and independent discipline, but to make it the mistress and judge of faith, forgetting that the supernatural is above the natural, the superintelligible above the intelligible, and therefore that faith, not science, is sovereign. Philosophy is only the handmaid of faith, and has no right to aspire even to freedom, or to act save as bid. A right use of reason is essential, and the right use of reason in theological and religious matters is all

is an almost universally acknowledged axiom in psychology, that the *principles of action* (those which give aim and direction to all our energies) are the feelings or emotions, which on that account have been frequently called the *active*, in opposition to the intellectual powers. We may conclude, therefore, even by the rules of the disjunctive syllogism, that the essence of religion belongs to that class of phenomena which we term *emotional*.

"This conclusion, we find upon due consideration, is borne out by the very same kind of reasoning by which the other cases we rejected. Neither intelligence nor activity, viewed alone, can become the measure of our religion; but there are certain forms of emotion which can readily become so. If, for example, we could find some determined form of emotion, which causes all our thoughts, desires, actions, — in a word, our whole interior and exterior life, — to tend upwards towards God as their great centre and source, we should have little hesitation in saying that such an emotion would precisely measure the true religious intensity of our being, and little hesitation in fixing *there* the central point, the veritable essence, of religion itself.

"The most able and earnest thinkers of modern times, who have attempted to solve the problem now before us, have in fact almost universally considered the essential element of religion to consist in some of the infinite developments of feeling. We shall adduce *two* of them as examples. Jacobi, who was one of the first to see the full worth and signification of *feeling* in the domain of philosophy, defines religion to be 'a faith, resting upon feeling, in the reality of the supersensual and ideal.' The other author to whom we refer is Schleiermacher, than whom no man has ever pursued with greater penetration of mind and earnestness of spirit the pathway of a Divine philosophy; and he places the essence of religion in *the absolute feeling of dependence*, and of a conscious relationship to God, originating immediately from it. All our former considerations, accordingly, as well as the great weight of authority amongst the best analysts, lead us to place the primitive and essential element of religion in the region of human emotion." — pp. 88, 89.

"These considerations give us a safe clew to the solution of the problem we have now before us, — to determine, namely, the precise mode of feeling in which religion essentially consists. Let us recapitulate the steps and draw the conclusions. Every state of consciousness involves in it the opposition of subject and object: in the emotions, the predominance of the subject gives a sense of freedom, the predominance of the object a sense of dependence. On the side of freedom, our feelings cannot reach the infinite, for the subject, *self*, is always circumscribed. On the side of dependence, however, we *can* reach the sphere of infinity; for the moment our consciousness attains that elevation in which our finite self

becomes nothing in the presence of infinity, eternity, and omnipotence, the accompanying state of emotion is one which involves an absolute object; *and such an emotion must be equivalent to a sense of Deity*. Hence we infer that the essential germ of the religious life is concentrated in the absolute feeling of dependence, — a feeling which implies nothing abject, but, on the contrary, a high and hallowed sense of our being inseparably related to Deity; of our being *parts* of his great plan; of our being held up in his vast embrace; of our being formed for some specific destiny, which, even amidst the subordinate and finite pursuits of life, must ever be kept in view as the goal of our whole being.

"In describing this absolute sense of dependence, as containing the essential element of religion, we do not mean that this *alone*, without the coöperation of the other faculties, would give rise to the religious *life*. To do this there must be intelligence; there must be activity; there must be, in short, all the other elements of human nature. But what we mean is this, — that the sense of dependence *accompanying* all our mental operations gives them the peculiar hue of piety. Thinking alone cannot be religious; but thinking accompanied by a sense of dependence on the infinite reason is *religious thought*. Activity alone cannot be religious; but activity carried on under a sense of absolute dependence upon infinite *power* is religious action. In a word, it is this peculiar mode of feeling pervading all our powers, faculties, and inward phenomena, which gives them a religious character; so that we may correctly say, that the *essence* of religion lies exactly here." — pp. 93, 94.

These extracts show clearly enough that we do Mr. Morell no injustice in saying that he makes religion originate in the emotional side of our nature, and its essence consist in sentiment, or sensible emotion. The emotional element is distinguished clearly, as we learn from the author's psychological table, from the intellectual element, and the will, we have seen, is the soul itself, in its essence, the *vis agendi*, underlying alike intellect and emotion. So the particular emotion in question cannot be regarded as an affection of the will, in the sense of our theologians, therefore not as an affection of the rational soul at all; otherwise the author would be obliged to identify it with cognition, from which he expressly distinguishes it. Nothing, then, remains but sensible emotion, or affection of the inferior or sensitive soul. This is evident, again, from the fact, that the author makes the emotional element, which, according to him, is the seat of religion, the seat of instinct and of *animal* passion. This is what, when reviewing Mr. Parker, we showed is the fact with all Transcendentalists. This emotional nature is what is commonly called the inferior soul, sometimes

that the philosopher can aspire to. This he should aspire to ; but even this he can attain to only under the infallible direction of the society to which God has committed his supernatural revelation. In other words, we need and can have no independent system of philosophy ; and natural theology can escape error, and be worthy of our reliance, only as subjected to the supervision of supernatural or Catholic theology ; for it is only by virtue of orthodoxy in faith that we can preserve orthodoxy in science, and it would not be difficult to prove that all modern scientific heterodoxy has grown out of the religious heterodoxy professed by the Reformers of the sixteenth century. Descartes only gave to Luther's heresy its philosophy, as Rousseau afterwards gave it its politics.

Thus much we have judged it proper to say of philosophy in general, and of Mr. Morell's philosophy, or rather psychologism, in particular. We proceed now to consider the author's application of philosophy to the explanation of religion, or rather, to the explanation of the facts of religious experience. We do Mr. Morell, in the outset, the justice to say, that he disclaims being a Rationalist. A Rationalist he defines to be one who places religion in the logical faculty as its subject. The logical faculty deals not with the matter but with the forms of knowledge, which are merely forms of the subjective understanding. These forms are abstract, without "content," and have no objective validity. To place religion in them is to make it a mere formal thing, a dry, dead abstraction, destitute of all objective truth. Such, according to him, is Rationalism, and, indeed, all scholastic theology, or logical statement of doctrine ; in which he agrees precisely with our countryman, Dr. Bushnell. We of course do not accept this definition either of Rationalism or of the logical faculty. Logic deals, indeed, only with the forms of knowledge, but these forms are real, exist *in re*, not merely *in mente*. But let this pass. We agree that Mr. Morell is not a Rationalist, and must tell our Puseyite friends of *The Christian Remembrancer*, that they are wrong in maintaining that he is. But he is generically a Humanist, and specifically a Sentimentalist.

We have seen that Mr. Morell's psychological table has two sides, the intellectual and the emotional, which run parallel with each other in their respective stages of development. The intellectual side we have already considered. On the emotional side we find, placed in the order of their development, instinct, animal passion, relational emotion, and æsthetic, moral, and re-

ligious emotions. Now on this emotional side of human nature, that is, the inferior or sensitive soul, the author places religion as in its subject, which, after Jacobi and Schleiermacher, he defines to be "the absolute feeling of dependence, and of a conscious relationship to God, originating immediately from it." This is not Rationalism, but it is something far below it. Rationalism errs in denying all truth not intrinsically evident, or evident *per se*, that is, in rejecting the Christian mysteries outright, or attempting to explain away their supernatural sense by treating them as symbols of truths or facts of the natural order. This last we see in Pierre Leroux, really one of the profoundest thinkers, as well as the most perverse, that we are acquainted with among the enemies of our holy religion. He does not, like ordinary unbelievers, regard Christianity as a fiction and her mysteries as falsehoods. He maintains that Christianity is true, and that all her mysteries cover great ontological facts or truths, but facts or truths of the primitive creation, not of the new or supernatural creation. Here is his error, and a no vulgar error it is. But Mr. Morell falls far below him, degrades religion from the rational nature altogether, to grovel in concupiscence, or mere sensitive affection, differing only in degree from instinct and animal passion. We let him speak for himself.

"Inferring, then, from the foregoing considerations, that religion cannot be a form of pure intellection, we proceed to inquire next, *Whether it can consist essentially in action?* The superficial and degrading idea, that religion consists in the mere external performance of certain duties, can hardly merit the serious attention of any reflective mind. No outward actions can possibly answer to the most feeble notion we possess of real piety; for we invariably look beneath the outward phenomena to the spiritual life within, before we pronounce upon the religious attributes of any agent whatever. And if we take the term action in an inward and spiritual sense, yet it only presents to us the aspect of a blind and indeterminate *energy*, until it is regulated and directed by some specific purpose or feeling. Action, then, *as action*, cannot be religious; it only becomes so when we show that it springs from a *religious* impulse or emotion. The measure of our mere activity, whether external or internal, can never be the measure of our religious intensity; it is activity *in some particular form* which alone can determine it. The essence of religion, accordingly, cannot consist in the activity itself, for that is indifferent to the question; but in the peculiar element, whatever that may be, which influences our activity so as to direct it towards the Infinite and the Divine. Now it

is an almost universally acknowledged axiom in psychology, that the *principles of action* (those which give aim and direction to all our energies) are the feelings or emotions, which on that account have been frequently called the *active*, in opposition to the intellectual powers. We may conclude, therefore, even by the rules of the disjunctive syllogism, that the essence of religion belongs to that class of phenomena which we term *emotional*.

"This conclusion, we find upon due consideration, is borne out by the very same kind of reasoning by which the other cases we rejected. Neither intelligence nor activity, viewed alone, can become the measure of our religion; but there are certain forms of emotion which can readily become so. If, for example, we could find some determined form of emotion, which causes all our thoughts, desires, actions, — in a word, our whole interior and exterior life, — to tend upwards towards God as their great centre and source, we should have little hesitation in saying that such an emotion would precisely measure the true religious intensity of our being, and little hesitation in fixing *there* the central point, the veritable essence, of religion itself.

"The most able and earnest thinkers of modern times, who have attempted to solve the problem now before us, have in fact almost universally considered the essential element of religion to consist in some of the infinite developments of feeling. We shall adduce *two* of them as examples. Jacobi, who was one of the first to see the full worth and signification of *feeling* in the domain of philosophy, defines religion to be 'a faith, resting upon feeling, in the reality of the supersensual and ideal.' The other author to whom we refer is Schleiermacher, than whom no man has ever pursued with greater penetration of mind and earnestness of spirit the pathway of a Divine philosophy; and he places the essence of religion in *the absolute feeling of dependence*, and of a conscious relationship to God, originating immediately from it. All our former considerations, accordingly, as well as the great weight of authority amongst the best analysts, lead us to place the primitive and essential element of religion in the region of human emotion." — pp. 88, 89.

"These considerations give us a safe clew to the solution of the problem we have now before us, — to determine, namely, the precise mode of feeling in which religion essentially consists. Let us recapitulate the steps and draw the conclusions. Every state of consciousness involves in it the opposition of subject and object: in the emotions, the predominance of the subject gives a sense of freedom, the predominance of the object a sense of dependence. On the side of freedom, our feelings cannot reach the infinite, for the subject, *self*, is always circumscribed. On the side of dependence, however, we *can* reach the sphere of infinity; for the moment our consciousness attains that elevation in which our finite self

becomes nothing in the presence of infinity, eternity, and omnipotence, the accompanying state of emotion is one which involves an absolute object; *and such an emotion must be equivalent to a sense of Deity.* Hence we infer that the essential germ of the religious life is concentrated in the absolute feeling of dependence, — a feeling which implies nothing abject, but, on the contrary, a high and hallowed sense of our being inseparably related to Deity; of our being *parts* of his great plan; of our being held up in his vast embrace; of our being formed for some specific destiny, which, even amidst the subordinate and finite pursuits of life, must ever be kept in view as the goal of our whole being.

“In describing this absolute sense of dependence, as containing the essential element of religion, we do not mean that this *alone*, without the coöperation of the other faculties, would give rise to the religious *life*. To do this there must be intelligence; there must be activity; there must be, in short, all the other elements of human nature. But what we mean is this, — that the sense of dependence *accompanying* all our mental operations gives them the peculiar hue of piety. Thinking alone cannot be religious; but thinking accompanied by a sense of dependence on the infinite reason is *religious thought*. Activity alone cannot be religious; but activity carried on under a sense of absolute dependence upon infinite *power* is religious action. In a word, it is this peculiar mode of feeling pervading all our powers, faculties, and inward phenomena, which gives them a religious character; so that we may correctly say, that the *essence* of religion lies exactly here.”— pp. 93, 94.

These extracts show clearly enough that we do Mr. Morell no injustice in saying that he makes religion originate in the emotional side of our nature, and its essence consist in sentiment, or sensible emotion. The emotional element is distinguished clearly, as we learn from the author's psychological table, from the intellectual element, and the will, we have seen, is the soul itself, in its essence, the *vis agendi*, underlying alike intellect and emotion. So the particular emotion in question cannot be regarded as an affection of the will, in the sense of our theologians, therefore not as an affection of the rational soul at all; otherwise the author would be obliged to identify it with cognition, from which he expressly distinguishes it. Nothing, then, remains but sensible emotion, or affection of the inferior or sensitive soul. This is evident, again, from the fact, that the author makes the emotional element, which, according to him, is the seat of religion, the seat of instinct and of *animal* passion. This is what, when reviewing Mr. Parker, we showed is the fact with all Transcendentalists. This emotional nature is what is commonly called the inferior soul, sometimes

the sensitive soul, the animal soul, and is termed by St. Paul the *flesh*, in distinction from the *spirit*, — the *carnal mind*, not subject to the law of God, — concupiscence, which the Holy Council of Trent declares remains after baptism to be combated. Mr. Morell, perhaps, little thinks, that in making this the seat of religion, and the very essence of religion to consist in one of its affections, he virtually raises the flesh above the spirit, and sense above reason, — the very thing Satan is perpetually tempting us to do, and against which the Christian is obliged to struggle as long as he lives, and against which, without grace, he must struggle in vain. There can be no doubt that this nineteenth century is the age of progress, and has already advanced far enough to warrant us in applying to it the words of the holy prophet,—"Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter. Woe to you that are wise in your own eyes, and prudent in your own conceits." — Isaiah v. 20, 21.

There is another doctrine in these extracts worth remarking, namely, that the character of an action is determined by the feeling or emotion with which, or from which, it is done; or, what is the same thing, that "the aim and direction of our energies" are given by our feelings and emotions, instead of being given by reason and free will, as we had supposed should be the case. This doctrine would have made some of our old moralists stare not a little. The character of an action is determined by its motive, or by the end for which it is performed, and we had supposed it a censure rather than a commendation to say that a man's activity receives its "aim and direction" from his feelings and emotions. These are blind, and activity, the author himself says, is blind, and therefore true wisdom consists in the blind leading the blind! Has the author forgotten that, "if the blind lead the blind, they shall both fall into the ditch"? Does he not see that his whole doctrine puts reason and will to the service of the feelings and emotions, and makes their proper position that of mere instruments or slaves of the passions? Does he mean this? We know not; but if his words are a true index to his sense, he certainly does mean it, and intends to teach the doctrine of Charles Fourier, that the passions are the governing power, and that intellect and will are merely instrumental faculties, to be employed in the service of the passions, having no office but to do their bidding; that is, man is in his normal state only

when he is the slave of his passions ; for passion is only feeling intensified, or emotion prolonged !

Mr. Morell's definition of religion, borrowed from Jacobi and Schleiermacher, is a real curiosity. "The essence of religion is the absolute feeling of dependence, and of a conscious relationship to God, originating immediately from it." Why does the author add the epithet *absolute* to feeling ? Can feeling be more or less than feeling ? Are there feelings which are feelings only *secundum quid*, feelings which are not absolutely feelings, but only relatively feelings ? What is the meaning of "feeling of dependence" ? Does dependence feel ? The phrase must mean, either that dependence is the subject of the feeling, or that feeling is an obscure perception of dependence, and therefore of that on which we depend ; for relation is unintelligible without intuition of the terms related, since without the terms it is nothing. The author cannot mean the former, and the latter contradicts his own doctrine ; for feeling, as a perception, however obscure, is an intellectual operation, and the author would imply by it that the essence of religion is in cognition, in which he says it is not. But the essence of religion is not in the absolute feeling of dependence alone, but also in the absolute feeling "of a conscious relationship to God." What is the sense of absolute feeling of a conscious relationship ? Feeling, distinguished from intellection, perception, or intuition, is purely subjective, and has and can have no object. It may have an external cause, but it is the intellectual, not the emotional element, that takes cognizance of it. *Feeling of relationship*. What is the difference between the feeling of *relationship* and the feeling of *dependence* ? Is not dependence a relationship, and the dependence in question precisely our relationship to God ? How can the two feelings then be two ? Again, the absolute feeling of a conscious relationship to God is said to originate immediately from the absolute feeling of dependence. How can one absolute feeling originate from another, or how can a feeling be derived and yet be absolute ? "The absolute feeling of a *conscious* relationship." Is the relationship conscious, or are we conscious of it ? The latter we presume is meant. But *to be conscious* is to know, is an intellectual act, and a *conscious* relationship must mean a *known* relationship. What is the meaning of the absolute feeling of a *known* relationship, originating immediately from the absolute feeling of dependence ? Or what is the meaning of *feeling of consciousness* ? We may be conscious of a feeling, that is, know that we feel so and so, but *to feel* that we

know this or that is something we do not understand. We do not feel that we know; but if we know, we know we know. A feeling of conscious relationship can mean no more nor less than that we are conscious of it. The absolute feeling of dependence, the author elsewhere says, is equivalent to a sense of the Deity, that is, to an obscure perception of God, for *sense*, as here used, means obscure perception, and is an intellectual, not an emotional fact. The author says the essence of religion is not in the intellect; but his definition, if rendered intelligible, necessarily asserts that it is; for the only intelligible meaning of his definition is, The essence of religion is in the feeble or obscure perception of God, and of our absolute dependence on him. But this is, we take it, precisely what the author means to deny, in denying that religion is any form of knowing, and asserting that it is essentially emotion. Really, Mr. Morell, as well as Plato, becomes inconsistent and puerile the moment he breaks from the traditions of the Fathers.

Mr. Morell's real inquiry, as we understand it, is, What is the peculiar psychological principle of religion, regarded, not as doctrine, but as a virtue? He considers religion on its subjective side, as a simple fact or phenomenon of human experience, and wishes to determine, psychologically, what it is generically and differentially, what constitutes a fact or phenomenon of experience religious, and distinguishes it from every fact or phenomenon that is not religious. If he had not been misled by his psychologism, he would have known beforehand that this is not psychologically determinable, for, as we have already remarked, the faculties of the soul are not themselves psychologically determinable. They are all ontologically determined, that is, characterized by their respective objects. Religion, as a purely psychological fact, does not exist, is not conceivable, as the author himself, if he understands himself, implies in his very definition; for he includes in his definition cognition of the object, — "conscious relationship to God." The essential and distinctive character of religion is derived from its object, and its psychological principle is determinable only in the determination of its ontological principle; for, till it is known what it is that religion requires of us, we cannot know what special faculty of the soul must be exercised in order to fulfil its requisitions.

Here is the fact that our neologists, reared under Evangelical influences, overlook; and hence, in spite of their talents, learning, and industry, their failure to attain to any thing solid or val-

uable. Evangelicalism, a species of pretended illuminism, is itself nothing, at bottom, but mere psychologism, and proceeds always on the supposition, that the subject determines the object, — that the object, or objective truth, is to be concluded from the conception, the internal sentiment, or affection. We need not be surprised, then, that Jacobi, Fries, Schleiermacher, De Wette, Parker, Bushnell, Morell, and others, who have outgrown the earlier Protestant dogmatics, should follow the psychological method in religion, as well as in philosophy. These men have discovered, what all their brethren are beginning to discover, that the earlier Reformers, by asserting that man lost his spiritual faculties in the Fall, virtually denied grace, which they professed to extol, by leaving no subject of grace, and that, in order to be the subject of grace, man must retain his spiritual faculties ; they have also discovered that the sensist philosophy, so rife in the last century and the beginning of the present, really denied all knowledge by denying all cognitive subject, and that in order to be instructed, and instructed to some end, man must have the inherent power to receive and use instruction. Thus far they have done well. But they conclude, from the necessity of asserting the spiritual faculties in order to assert man as the subject of grace, that these faculties suffice without grace, and thus run into pure Pelagianism, the very error of denying grace they intended to escape. They conclude, also, that the power to receive and use instruction suffices without instruction, and that, to possess such power, man must have in himself the germs of all truth, needing only external influences for their development. They thus make all knowledge purely subjective, which is virtual skepticism, and reach, by another route, the very error of the sensists, which they proposed to avoid. They wished to get rid of the Protestant dogmas and the sensist philosophy, which made man nothing, and to substitute for them a doctrine which should make man count for something ; but, misled by their psychologism, they have seen no way to do it, but by making man count for every thing ; and in making him count for every thing, they make him, in their turn, count for nothing, and fall into pure nullism.

Unaware of the conclusions which an enlightened and vigorous logic must draw from their premises, and taking it for granted that all religion, faith, science, and truth are in the soul, needing only to be developed, brought out, they proceed by way of psychological analysis to detect and determine the pe-

cularly religious phenomena, and from them to determine their peculiar psychological principle, or, in other words, to determine what must be religion by determining what is its psychological subject. Yet we should suppose that a moment's reflection would suffice to show them that nothing can be more unscientific than their method. How are you to know what are religious phenomena, if you know not their principle? and how are you to know their subjective, if you know not their objective principle? Suppose you find, by analysis, that we have cognitions, volitions, emotions, and various classes of emotions, how are you to decide in which of these is the subjective characteristic of religion? You may say it is in this or that, — is not in cognition, and is in emotion; but how do you know that what you say is true? Is religion something independent of man, or is it nothing? If nothing, what is the use of your inquiry? Man is man, and religion is the same, whatever the conclusions you may draw, or in whatever class of psychological facts you may place it or not place it. If something, how, unless you know what that something is, determine its psychological principle? If you know not what religion requires you to know, to do, or to feel, how are you to be sure that you do not mistake its psychological seat? Nothing, then, can be more evident, than that it is religion as object that must determine for us the psychological principle of religion; and if Mr. Morell and others prove to be right in the account they give, it can only be by a happy accident.

Religion as a virtue cannot differ essentially from virtue in general. Virtue is not a cognition, nor an emotion, but an act, and, as the word itself indicates, a human act, that is, an act performed by the human person. The human person is all in the rational nature, for person is, by its very definition, "an individual substance of a rational nature." Virtue is, then, a rational act, and therefore cannot have its seat in the emotional element, for that element is irrational, is the animal as distinguished from the rational nature, as Mr. Morell himself must concede, since he distinguishes it from the intellectual element, and makes it the seat of "animal passion." This is conclusive against the sentimentalists or emotionalists. The rational nature has two faculties or modes of activity, understanding and will, or free will. Rational nature must be intellectual, and its characteristic as activity is to act *propter finem*, — not simply *ad finem*, which is common to all animal nature, but *propter finem*, that is, in view and for the sake of an end, — and therefore it must be free activity, or free will. As understanding, it presents the end and the motives for seeking it as free will; it

elects, wills the end, or rejects it. To virtue both faculties are necessary, the understanding to present the end and its motives, and the will to elect it ; but as the act is specially in the act of election, the virtue is placed primarily in the will, and no act is virtuous except it is an act of free will. Hence, when we inquire whether a man is virtuous or vicious, we look always to his will, and seek not what he has done externally, but the will with which he has done it, and we pronounce him virtuous or vicious according as that proves to have been virtuous or vicious. The act, as the subject of the predicate virtue or vice, as praiseworthy or blameworthy, is purely an act of the will, and hence moral theologians throw out of the account all except the internal act. Thus they speak of acts of faith, of hope, of charity, of contrition, which are pure internal acts, and may be performed any time, and as often as one chooses. The virtue of religion partakes of this general character of virtue, and is always an act of free will, done in view and for sake of an end, as is and must be every act of free will.

But we have not yet the distinctive character of virtue, — have not yet found that which makes an act virtuous, and distinguishes it from all other acts. Virtue is an act of free will, a voluntary act for an end intellectually apprehended. But not all voluntary acts for an end, or acts of free will, are virtues ; for every sin is an act of free will, a voluntary act, done for the sake of an end intellectually apprehended ; and therefore, by psychological analysis, do our best, we can make no valid distinction between virtue and its opposite. Hence it is, that psychologism results usually, and, with not a few of its cultivators, avowedly, in the denial of all distinction between virtue and vice, as well as between truth and falsehood. To determine the distinctive mark of virtue, we must look beyond the subject to the object ; for the character of the act is determined by the end for which it is done, and the end for which an act must be done in order to be virtue can be determined only as we are taught, mediately or immediately, by our Creator. According to Christianity, and even philosophy or reason itself, man can no more exist without a final than without a first cause, and nullity can no more be his end than his beginning. No created existence can be its own finality, or the final cause of any thing, and therefore the final cause of all existences is and must be God. God is the origin and end of creation. The irrational portion of creation tends to him by its intrinsic and necessary laws ; the rational portion are required to seek him

voluntarily, as their freely chosen end. If they do, they gain the end for which they were made, and find their supreme good, the Supreme Good itself; if they do not voluntarily, if they voluntarily refuse to do it, their action bears them from God, that is, away from their supreme good, away from all good, into unmitigated darkness and evil, which is hell; for men create their own hell, and damn themselves. The end we are to seek is our final cause, and hence the end we must seek in order to be virtuous is God. A virtuous act is therefore an act of free will, done for the sake of God as its end; or, more simply, virtue is voluntary obedience to the will of God because it is his will, or the voluntary compliance with his commands because his commands.

The virtue of religion is distinguishable from other virtues only by the fact that God is the immediate object to which it is directed. All virtues are acts done for God as the end, or ultimate end; but some are directed to God immediately, and others immediately to ourselves, or to our neighbour. The immediate object of morality, as distinguished from religion, is the preservation of our own life and health, the proper care of our families, the assistance of the needy, the preservation of society, the promotion of social and political well-being, &c. But these acts, whatever they may be, and however conducive they may be to the welfare of ourselves or our neighbour, are virtuous only in so far as they are done for God's sake, with the intention, explicit or implicit, of fulfilling his commands, because his. If I preserve my life and my health only for my own sake, my act is selfish, not virtuous; if for the sake of being serviceable to my neighbour, or to my country, it is benevolent, or patriotic, but still not virtuous; and my act rises to virtue only when I do it because God commands me to do it. There must be always reference to God as the ultimate end of the act, — the intention of doing his will, because his will. This, too, must be the case in those acts which are specially religious, done immediately for the honor and glory of God. If I perform the external duties of worship, but not for the sake of God, my act wants the essential character of virtue; for God is always the ultimate end of all virtuous acting. This granted, whatever distinction we may for convenience' sake make between religion and the other virtues, or between religion and morality, no real distinction between them exists, and we should always bear in mind that the specific acts of religion, such as prayer, praise, thanksgiving, private or pub-

lic worship, assistance at the Holy Sacrifice, partaking of the Sacraments, are an integral part of morality, or general ethics, — as truly so as succouring the needy, practising temperance, fortitude, and prudence, and giving to our neighbour his dues. No man is moral except he fulfils the law of God, and to fulfil that law is to keep all its precepts, whether they are made known to us through natural reason, or by supernatural revelation. He who refuses to believe the mysteries which God has revealed, if we rightly consider the matter, is, to say the least, as immoral as he who picks his neighbour's pocket, or violates any of the precepts of justice. We insist on this, because there is in our days a tendency to institute a divorce between religion and morality, and it is important to show wherein the two are identical, rather than wherein they are distinct. No divorce between them is admissible or conceivable. An immoral religious man, or an irreligious moral man, is a contradiction in terms. Morality is nothing but the practical application of theology, or of religious dogmatical teaching. Religion, as doctrine, is the supreme law, and conformity to it in practice is morality, or religion as virtue. In practice all virtue is religious, and all religion is virtue, though no act is religious or virtuous, in the full Christian sense, unless done from divine grace, which elevates the actor above the natural order, and places him on the plane of a supernatural destiny.

We are saying nothing new ; we are only repeating, in our own imperfect way, what all Christian moralists have uniformly taught from the beginning. But the view we present is precisely that which offends Mr. Morell and his fellow-neologists. It is precisely to get rid of the conclusion to which we come, that they psychologize, and seek a new definition of religion. They have been brought up in modern Evangelicalism, and find themselves unable or unwilling to believe the Evangelical theology, and they wish to be free to reject it without forfeiting their religious character. They confound the theology of their sect or sects with Christian theology, and therefore, for the same reason and on the same condition, wish to be free to reject all theology, or doctrines addressed to the understanding. Their real aim is to secure all the freedom of denial claimed by unbelievers, and at the same time not forfeit their Christian character in the estimation of their co-religionists, and perhaps in their own, for it is not improbable that they are as unwilling to think themselves unbelievers as they are to be thought so by others. They therefore, after the example of the early Prot-

estant Reformers, confound free will with liberty a *coactione*, define it as the general activity of the soul, or the soul itself, the *vis agendi*, and represent it as underlying all the mental operations. As nobody of any note thinks of making religion a mere cognition, or supposing that the mere hearers and not the doers of the law are religious, they place the essence of religion in emotion, feeling, or sentiment ; for, after understanding and free will, there is no other psychological element in which they can place it. Placed in emotion, which is purely subjective, a mere sensitive affection, which demands no distinct cognition of the object, and no exercise of the understanding in regard to objective truth, they feel themselves able to assert that they have, providing they have the sentiment, all that is essentially and distinctively religious, whatever the intellectual doctrines they believe or disbelieve. Hence Schleiermacher, in his *Reden über die Religion*, resolves the Church into general society, and religious worship into the kind feelings and pleasant conversation of friends casually meeting of an evening at a neighbour's house ; and maintains that belief in the personality of God and the personal immortality of the soul is by no means essential to true and acceptable religion. Dr. Bushnell, our own countryman, if he follows out the principles he adopts, must go as far. M. Cousin reproaches the pantheist Spinoza with being too devout, too much absorbed in the thought of God. We have heard some of our Protestant friends term the poet Shelley, who ostentatiously wrote "Αθεος, Atheist, after his name, one of the most devout worshippers God ever had on earth. And we have known others go so far as to call the pagan Goethe a second Messiah, and to praise his lascivious *Wahlverwandschaften* as eminently pious, and admirably adapted to spiritual edification. And, indeed, there is an unmistakable tendency among the most eminent of modern Protestant authors to rehabilitate all the ancient pagan superstitions, not excepting disgusting fetishism, and to place them, as religion, on a level with Christianity. Intellectually considered, these superstitions may have been very defective, and, no doubt, bear witness to a low state of culture, and the rudeness of the tribes or nations that professed them ; but as religion, as evincing the activity of true and acceptable religious feeling, they were to their adherents all that Christianity is to us. The negro worshipping his Mumbo Jumbo is as truly worshipping God, as the Christian saint offering up the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, or prostrating himself in devout prayer before the altar of the Almighty. Not

only do our Protestant authors, philosophers in their own estimation, divorce religion from morality, but they also divorce it from knowledge, and suppose a man may be truly religious who is ignorant of every article in the Creed, and breaks every precept of the Decalogue, — making it necessary for us to defend against them, not only the orthodox faith, but even ordinary intelligence and morality, the very elements of civilization.

But, after all, these neologists do not quite succeed in their attempt. Mr. Morell, as much as he wars against intellect or understanding, — the logical understanding, as he calls it, — finds himself obliged, as the indispensable condition of religion, to assert intuition of God, as its object, and he can frame no definition of religion that excludes cognition. He cannot, for a moment, maintain his pretence, that the activity of the emotions is the will, for nothing is more certain than that emotions are neither voluntary nor rational, and that we are, morally or religiously speaking, no farther interested in them than we deliberately excite or assent to them. Man is not to be regarded as one simple nature, but, so to speak, as two natures united in one person, the rational and the animal. The rational acts *propter finem*, and therefore rationally from free will; the animal acts *ad finem*, according to its own intrinsic necessity, as does all animal nature. It is only on the supposition of these two natures in one person, that we can explain the fact of temptation, or that internal struggle between reason and passion, judgment and inclination, which, since the Fall, rends the bosom of every man. Not otherwise is the language of St. Paul, in the seventh chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, susceptible of an intelligible meaning, or is there sense in the often-quoted words of the heathen poet, —

"Video meliora, proboque :
Deteriora sequor."

To place religion in the animal nature, though our author does it virtually, is too gross a violation of common sense for any one with his eyes open. Then it must be placed in the rational nature. Then all religious action is for God as final cause, and then it is necessary to know God, as the end, and also the means of attaining unto him or gaining our end. To know our end we must know our origin, for our final cause is unintelligible without a knowledge of our first cause. Here is all theology, for theology is nothing else than the knowledge of our origin and end, and of the means of gaining our end. It is idle, then, for a man to fight against theology, or

to pretend that knowledge is not requisite to religion, — not only to its perfection, but even to its existence. It is a hard case that we, benighted Papists, who are accused of maintaining that ignorance is the mother of devotion, should have to defend the common cause of intelligence against the philosophers who claim to be the great lights of the age. Perhaps by light they mean darkness, and suppose that forgetting is acquiring knowledge.

The difficulty our Protestants feel arises, not from the necessity of theology, or doctrinal instruction, to the religious character, but from the false theology taught by their sects, and which they mistake for Christian theology. We are not surprised that Protestants rebel against Protestant instruction, or regard Protestant theology as a let and hindrance, at best as superfluous; for it really is an anomaly in Protestantism, and has no relation to the general economy of Protestant life. The Christian doctrines which Protestants profess to retain and incorporate into their theologies are really incredible and absurd when taken as Protestant doctrines, severed from the body of truth to which they belong, and on private judgment or private interpretation. This is a point of great importance, and one which cannot be too often insisted upon. We find Protestants professing certain doctrines which they have retained from us, and we are apt, at first sight, to suppose that these doctrines mean for them what they mean for us, and are as credible when they profess them as when we profess them; or, if we do not so suppose, Protestants themselves do, especially those Protestants who admit to themselves that they are unable to believe these doctrines. But the fact is, that the Christian mysteries professedly held by Protestants are not really the mysteries we believe; for they are taken as isolated doctrines, and differ as much from ours as a branch severed from the trunk, withered and dead, differs from a branch united to the trunk, living and bearing its fruit. On Protestant principles, they serve no purpose in the economy of religious life, they have no connection with Protestant notions of sanctity, are destitute of that beauty and grandeur which pertain to them when seen in their proper place as parts of an organic whole, which rests on a solid and adequate foundation. With us they receive a practical meaning by virtue of their relation to other truths which we hold, but which Protestants reject, and are credible because asserted on a sufficient authority. With Protestants no peculiarly Christian truth has any practical meaning, or is

supported by any authority sufficient for a revealed doctrine. Hence it is that in the bosom of every Protestant sect we see always a party protesting against the nominally Christian doctrines retained by the sect, as relics of Popery, denouncing them as anomalies, inconsistent with Protestantism, and calling upon the sect to clear them away. This is as it should be, and we see not how an intelligent Protestant, not wishing to profess to believe what he does not and cannot, as a Protestant, believe, can do otherwise. To be called upon to believe a mass of doctrines which have no practical connection with life, throw no light on our duties, and furnish no motives to their performance, is an affront to good sense; and we wonder not that so many are found to resist, and labor either to reject or to explain them away.

But, if these intelligent and consistent Protestants — consistent, we say, for they are consistent as Protestants — could be persuaded to look at the Christian doctrines in their unity and integrity, as an organic and living whole, as held by those who have been commissioned to keep and teach them, they would at once see that all their objections are misplaced and puerile. They would then see that he who wars against the understanding, or doctrines addressed to it, is too unreasonable to be called a madman. We grant the doctrines they reject are incredible as Protestant doctrines, but nothing is more credible as Catholic doctrines, because as Catholic doctrines they are in their place, and receive their true significance.

There is much more in Mr. Morell's book on which we might remark, especially his application of his philosophy to the explanation of inspiration and the Christian mysteries; but we have said enough to show that his doctrine is fundamentally false, and hostile to the very conception of religion, and it is not necessary to pursue and refute it in detail. The whole book affords us only a melancholy instance of the impotence of great abilities and respectable scholarship to construct, without the aid of that scientific and theological tradition which has come down to us from Adam, any thing deserving the name of a moral or a religious code. The greatest ability, the most creative genius, and the most varied and profound erudition, operating outside of the traditional wisdom of the race, can produce nothing that can abide for a moment the test of enlightened criticism. Man out of unity is weak and helpless, and can originate nothing but puerility and absurdity. The reason

of this is, that man has not the source of knowledge and wisdom in himself, and is nothing save as he is taught and educated by his Maker. Pride may revolt at this, and men, puffed up by a vain philosophy which only darkens the understanding and perverts the heart, may revolt and blaspheme, but the experience of six thousand years proves that it is true.

Our Maker has never deserted us, and has always been near us to instruct us, if we would but sit down at his feet and listen. Some he has always instructed, and always have those who chose to learn been brought to the knowledge of his will, and informed with his truth. The great body of true doctrine, revealed and natural, has been from the beginning within the reach of all men, is incorporated into the speech of all nations, and preserved in its unity, purity, and integrity in the infallible speech of the Church. There we may learn it, and if we learn it not there, we shall learn it nowhere, and be as heterodox in philosophy as in theology. We have neither to create nor to invent truth; we have only to consent to be taught it. What fools we must be to refuse to learn! What greater fools we must be to suppose that all who have preceded us have been fools, that science and wisdom were born only with us, and that our minds are the first on which truth has ever dawned! There were brave men before Agamemnon, and wise men before Schleiermacher and Morell. The race has not lived six thousand years without a moral or religious code, or with one that now needs to be reversed. Let our philosophers reflect on this, and know that they can reverse the wisdom transmitted us only by putting evil for good, folly for wisdom, and darkness for light. It has been only to arrive at this moral, and to enforce it by a striking example, that we have introduced Mr. Morell's work, and called our readers to its false and immoral teachings and speculations. Such works are instructive, and teach us wisdom as the Spartans taught their sons temperance, by exhibiting the disgusting spectacle of the drunken Helots. From the folly and impiety of even the distinguished among Protestants, let us learn to love our Church still more, and still more humbly adore the grace that permits us to call ourselves *her* children.

ART. III. — *The Mercersburg Review: devoted to Theology, Literature, and Science.* Mercersburg, Pa. January, 1849–1850. Bi-monthly. 8vo.

THIS is a periodical recently established by "the Alumni of Marshall College," Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, as the organ of what is called "the Mercersburg system" of theology, and is conducted with spirit, learning, and ability. Its writers are strong men, apparently in earnest, and they present Protestantism in as plausible a form as it admits, and give it the most respectable vindication that it receives in our language. Whoever would see Protestantism in its least irreligious form, and learn the best that can be said in its favor, will do well to study the pages of this new review. Its modes of thought and expression are, perhaps, a little German, but its pages are rarely dull or uninteresting.

We call the attention of our readers more especially to the number for January last, which contains a long and elaborate article on ourselves, designed to set aside our arguments for the Church, and to vindicate Protestantism, as the writer understands it, from our attacks. The article is ably written, in a tone and manner as acceptable as rare in those who write against us or our Church. The writer is a Protestant, but no vulgar Protestant; he is a gentleman and a scholar, and makes as near an approach to being a Christian as is to be expected from one who opposes the Christian Church. He aims to be fair and candid, and has evidently done his best to state our arguments correctly, and to urge only grave and solid matter against them. It is refreshing to meet such an opponent, and we are sorry to add, that he is almost the only direct opponent we have ever had that we did not feel it a sort of degradation to meet. He is one we can respect, and whom we should dread to encounter, if we had no advantage in our cause to make amends for our own personal inferiority.

The Reviewer very frankly concedes, in the outset, that, as against popular Protestantism, taking private judgment, with or without the Bible, for its rule of faith, our arguments for the Church are conclusive, and that there is no answer to be given to them. He concedes, moreover, that the Protestantism which we have attacked, whether under the special form of High Church or Low Church, Presbyterianism or Methodism, and which has nothing to reply to us but cant and sophistry, is

and long has been the dominant form of Protestantism, and the only form that has been set forth prominently as the rival or the antagonist of Rome. We have, then, he must farther concede, the right to regard this in the judgment of Protestants themselves, as genuine Protestantism, and therefore as its more solid and defensible form. If, as he concedes, we have refuted this, we may conclude *a fortiori* against those minor and less solid forms, that have never been able to make themselves generally acknowledged by Protestants themselves. As the Reviewer contends that the Church is true against no religion, and all religions but the Protestant, he must concede, then, that we have, by his own concessions, the right to conclude its absolute truth.

But, without insisting on this, we remark that the Reviewer contends that there is a higher doctrine than either prevailing Protestantism or Catholicity, and against which our reasoning is not, in his judgment, conclusive. If we had known this doctrine, or been in a condition to appreciate it, we should not, he thinks, in rejecting Unitarianism, have swung to the opposite extreme of Romanism. We were right, he says, in renouncing Rationalism, but we have gone to as great an extreme, though a less dangerous one, in going to Rome. Our fault lies in abandoning private judgment for authority, instead of seeking and finding a doctrine which reconciles them, and preserves them both. But with all respect to our learned and philosophical critic, we were not, if we understand his doctrine, ignorant of it, but were detained by it a considerable time outside of the Church. It is in substance, though not in all its details, the doctrine we sketched in the last number of the *Boston Quarterly Review*, in refuting Mr. Parker's notion of the Church; which we developed at some length in *The Christian World*, during the winter of 1842-43; and which we established our present journal expressly to explain, propagate, and defend.

The attempt to reconcile private liberty and public authority did not escape us. This reconciliation in a supposed higher doctrine than either Catholicity or Protestantism was the precise problem with which we were engaged for the ten or twelve years next preceding our conversion. The attempt to get a satisfactory solution of this problem is the key to all our writings and sermonizing during that long period, and no greater mistake can be committed than to suppose, that, even when we were a Unitarian, we accepted in theory, however closely we may have followed it in practice, the Protestant rule of private

judgment. We never, after 1832, and before that we were too young to be of any account, adopted individualism, but uniformly opposed it, and contended, as our published writings bear witness, for a catholic authority both in church and state, although we erred grievously as to its seat and constitution. Indeed, if there is a single problem that we have studied with any degree of thoroughness, it is this very problem which our Mercersburg friend accuses us of having neglected, namely, the reconciliation of the so-called rights of the individual mind with legitimate public authority. At no period after we began to be known as a Unitarian were we any more prepared to give up authority than we were to give up liberty ; or when, if it should appear that we could not retain both, and that one or the other must be sacrificed, we would not have sacrificed liberty rather than authority. It shows no little want of acquaintance with our personal history, and a gross misapprehension of our published writings, to assert that we went in our conversion from extreme Rationalism to Catholicity, or from extreme individualism to authority. We went to the Church from a theory which was invented to retain them both, and to reconcile them systematically and really one with the other.

We may not have exhausted all possible theories for the reconciliation of liberty and authority, — in the Reviewer's language, "the liberty of the individual subject with the binding force of the universal object," — but we were not ignorant of "the new religious principle and theory" which he proposes, and which he says "the case demanded for its solution." If we understand him, he advances little that cannot be found, in substance, in our own publications prior to our conversion, and, if we did not know that the theory had been advocated by several eminent German authors, and that it was entertained by him, in part at least, at as early a day as by ourselves, we should be half tempted to suspect him of having plagiarized it from our own writings. Of course, we are far from pretending that we set it forth with the systematic fulness and consistency, or with the philosophic depth of thought, the various learning, and the clearness and vigor of expression, with which he does, for in these respects we readily confess our inferiority ; but we did set it forth in its principles, and in what he has said we have found nothing that has taken us by surprise, or with which we do not seem to ourselves to have been tolerably familiar. Whether true or false, adequate or inadequate, we are greatly deceived if the theory has not once been ours, and

if we have abandoned it, we must still be treated with some leniency, since the Reviewer winds up his article against us, by virtually conceding, with a candor that does him honor, that, after all, it is rather a statement than a solution of the difficulty.

As the Reviewer concedes that we are right against popular Protestantism, the question between him and us is not a question between us and Protestantism in general, but between us and his specific form of Protestantism, and if that specific form turns out to be untenable, he must accept our Church as the Church of God. The ground he takes is, either our Church or his form of Protestantism, and therefore, if his form be refuted, so far as he is concerned, we are free to conclude the truth of our Church against every form of Protestantism, nay, the absolute validity of her titles against every claimant. If he is wrong, we must be right. Whether we prove him wrong by direct evidence of the truth of our Church, or by direct evidence of the falsity of his own, can, therefore, make no difference, for in either case the truth of our Church is concluded. The latter is the more proper method of conducting the argument; for the Church is the prior occupant, and must be presumed true until the contrary is made to appear. If the Reviewer's doctrine is removed, ours remains, and he has, therefore, no possible means of disproving our doctrine but by proving his own; and, as the presumption is on our side, his failure to prove his own is, so far as we are concerned, its disproof. Moreover, he must prove his doctrine, not in what it has in common with ours, for, since we precede him, that is our own; but in that which is peculiar to it, which distinguishes it from Catholic doctrine, and makes it a doctrine opposed to it. Has he done this? If he has not, he has done nothing to his purpose, and we stand where we should have stood if he had not undertaken to allege any thing against us.

The Reviewer concedes authority and asserts private liberty in matters of religious faith; for his aim is to accept both, and to reconcile them one with the other. His theory, then, is eclectic, and intended to embrace and reconcile "the liberty of the individual subject with the binding force of the universal object," which, he says, are, on the Catholic system, antagonists, and mutually destructive one of the other. He proposes to do this, not by a shallow and absurd syncretism, which, after the manner of Anglicanism, accepts both in their mutual exclusiveness, and follows arbitrarily first one and then the

other, playing off authority against those who accuse it of believing too much, and liberty against those who accuse it of believing too little ; but, by dissolving both in " a new religious principle and theory," higher and broader than either taken separately.

The theory by which he proposes to do this, simply stated, is, in its generative principles, that Christianity is a new and a higher life in the world, and that this new life is literally " God entering into human nature," or the Word made flesh and dwelling among us, full of grace and truth. In an article on *The Relation of Church and State* (November, 1849, p. 576), he says, the *ideal* of the Christian Church is " a higher order of Divine life in the world, which, in its developments, takes to itself a body from the elements of humanity. The principle of this new life is the Lord Jesus Christ, the incarnate Saviour, who is very God and very man in one person, and in whom dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. In him the human and Divine natures are united as they never were before. The union is deep, mysterious, vital. The growth of the Church is the development of Christ's life in the world." Again (July, 1849, pp. 314, 315), he says, the confession of Peter, " Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," " utters, in the most immediate and direct way, the fact of Christianity, the new order of life it has brought into the world, as apprehended in its most general character in the person of Christ. The object so apprehended, and thus at once brought to utterance, is no doctrine or report simply concerning Christ, but the glorious reality of the Incarnation itself, as exhibited in him under an historical and enduring form. Christianity resolves itself ultimately into this mystery. It has its principle and root in Christ's person. . . . The Word reveals itself, not by outward oracle or prophecy, but by becoming *flesh* ; he is the living comprehension of the truth he proclaims, the actual world of grace which he unfolds and makes known. . . . The new creation, which is at the same time the end and completion of the old, starts from the mystery of his person. The Incarnation is the deepest and most comprehensive fact in the economy of the world. Jesus Christ authenticates himself, and all truth and reality besides, or rather, all truth and reality are such only by the relation in which they stand to him as their great centre and ground. In him are hid thus all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. He is the absolute revelation of God in the world. . . . As all this he is primarily no object of intellection, but can be apprehended only by faith ; and

in this form he constitutes the sum and substance of Christianity, as it lives in the consciousness of the Church, and finds its expression in the Creed."

It is clear, we think, from this, that the Reviewer's theory is, that the new creation, the Christian order, Christianity, is throughout Christ himself, the "Word made flesh,"—not Christ as the universe is God *mediante* his creative act, or act creating, sustaining, and governing it, but Christ himself, identically in his own substance and person,—and is indistinguishable in its substance from him. Thus he says (*Ibid.*, p. 316),—"The new creation grows forth actually from the mystery of Christ's person, being from first to last the *evolution* or development simply of capabilities, relations, and powers, that are treasured up in him from the beginning." And again (January, 1850, p. 4),—"The Lord is perpetually born anew in the hearts of believers; his life is reproduced in their life; and their formation into his image involves an inward adunation also into the very *substance* of his mediatorial person. . . . Christ and his people are joined together in a *common* life, which starts from him as its source, and is carried over to them by real *organic* derivation," and is in them "an actual participation in his living substance. . . . The union between Christ and his people actually inserts them spiritually into the substance of his life. They are a new creation in Christ Jesus, not a new creation out of him, and beyond him, by the *fiat* of *Omnipotence*, bearing some resemblance to him in a different sphere, but a new creation whose original seat and fountain is Christ's own person, and which conveys over to them, accordingly, with true reproductive force, the vitality which belongs to it [Christ's person] in this form."

These passages, and many more like them might be adduced, seem to be conclusive that our *Mercersburg* friend holds and teaches that the new creation is indistinguishably the Incarnate God; and that we are Christians, are introduced into the Christian order, only by being literally, organically, physically, adunated into his living substance. How this theory is supposed to solve the difficulty as to liberty and authority, it is not difficult to understand. "The mystery of the Incarnation," says the Reviewer (July, 1849, p. 323), "as it stands before us in the person of Christ, includes two sides, which must both enter steadily into our faith to make it complete. We must apprehend, in the first place, the presence of a truly Divine life in the fact, the entrance of God into the world as he had not been

in it before ; in the second place, this life must be admitted under a true human form, and in such relation to the previous constitution of the world, that it shall not violate its order, but be felt rather to fall in with it organically, and complete its sense." Christ is the object, and affirms himself immediately to the apprehension of faith ; he, affirming or authenticating himself immediately in the act of faith, is authority, and constitutes "the binding force of the universal object." But as he affirms himself under a human form only, in the way of human thought and will, as the complement, in some sort, of the natural order of the world, he recognizes the activity of the individual subject ; and as he propounds nothing to the mind, imposes nothing upon it, but simply generates faith in and through it by its own activity, the freedom of the individual is preserved, in the same way that it is preserved in the operations of interior grace.

Whether this be or be not a real solution of the difficulty will, perhaps, appear as we proceed ; for the moment we ask the attention of our readers to the assumptions it makes ; namely, Christ, Christianity, or the Christian order always affirms or authenticates himself from within the believer, and always under a strictly human form. These two assumptions are fundamental in the theory proposed, underlie all the Reviewer's reasoning against us, and give to it whatever of pertinency and force it may have. That reasoning, as far as we comprehend it, is, — 1. That, by maintaining that Christianity is the supernatural object of faith, and as such is extrinsic to the soul, and credible only by means of an extrinsic authority to propound it, we deny the activity of the soul in its reception, and therefore violate the rights of the mind, or the liberty of the individual subject ; 2. That, by asserting that faith is elicitable only by means of an external authority sufficiently accredited to reason, we make faith a conclusion of logic, fall into sheer Rationalism, and lose the supernatural, and therefore authority, or "the binding force of the universal object"; and, 3. That making Christianity an external object, propoundable by an external authority to reason, as something to be believed or done, we deny that it always presents itself in a true and proper human form, we exclude all human activity in its elaboration or growth, foreclose development, and therefore deny history to be a continuous revelation of God's mind and will, the evolution or realization of the capabilities, revelations, and powers treasured up in the Incarnate God, or God preparing his Incarnation, and actually becoming incarnate. This reasoning, though that

of a no vulgar mind, cannot strike the Catholic as of much force against his Church ; but all will agree that it is valuable as illustrating and determining the theory of the author ; and it proves clearly enough, that, if it be not true that Christ affirms himself always from within, and only from within, and always and only under a proper human form, that theory cannot be sustained.

The Reviewer professes to object, not to the assertion of Christianity as an object of faith, but simply to its assertion as an *outward* object propoundable from without ; nor does he avowedly object to authority, as such, but to that authority which is extrinsic, operating on the mind and commanding it, instead of operating from the mind, in the way of its own intelligence and will. To Christianity and authority, as he understands us to assert them, he objects that they violate the rights of the mind, and operate only in a mechanical way, and by magic. Christianity, according to us, he says, " is taken as a revelation of supernatural truth, which men are to receive as something wholly out of themselves, that is brought near them for their use in a purely outward way. As it has its source and seat beyond their proper nature altogether, so it cannot be allowed to find in this any rule or measure whatever for its apprehension. It must be taken as a matter of mere authority. The relation between the receptivity of faith on the one side, and of the propounded truth on the other, is held to be in no sense inward and living, but mechanical only and juxtapositional, the one remaining always on the outside of the other." (January, 1850, pp. 53, 54.) Again : — " As a supernatural constitution, it [Christianity] must not conform to the order of nature. It must be neither organic, nor historical, nor *human* in its higher sphere, but one long monotony rather of mere outward law and authority, superseding the natural order of the world, and contradicting it, from age to age, to the end of time. The Roman system carries in itself thus a constant tendency to resolve the whole force of Christianity into magic, and to fall into the snare of the *opus operatum* in its bad sense." (*Ibid.*, p. 62.)

What the Reviewer here objects to our doctrine is, in substance, — 1. That it places Christianity, as supernatural object of faith, out of the subject ; 2. That it places the supernatural wholly above the sphere of the natural ; and, 3. That it makes faith the mediate, instead of the immediate, apprehension of the truth of the matter believed. These objections throw light on his own doctrine, and prove that he either has no right to bring them, or holds the exact contrary ; namely, — 1. The

supernatural object of faith is in the subject, not out of it ;
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The Reviewer identifies, as we have seen, Christ and Christianity, and regards the whole Christian order, the new creation, as the Incarnate God, or Word made flesh. He places this order in the believer ; it is God entering into human nature as he was not in it before, the insertion of a new principle of life in our life, in the very constitution of our nature ; and hence “ Christianity, as far as it prevails, is the actual elevation of our general life into a higher sphere of existence.” Christ is not an outward teacher, or model, as the Unitarians vainly imagine, but an inward principle, from which all flows forth as from its fountal spring. “ If Christ be no *principle* of life for humanity, if he be not, in truth, the power of a new creation in its constitution, it follows necessarily that it needs nothing of the sort for its redemption. This is at once Pelagianism.” (January, 1850, p. 11.)

It must not be supposed that our Reviewer is merely endeavouring to prove that Christ must be in us, by his gracious operations moving and assisting us to believe and love him as out of us and before us, as the object and final cause of our faith and love ; for this is Catholic doctrine, the very doctrine he is professedly warring against. Hence he objects to our doctrine, which makes the object of faith, as object, extrinsic, that “ the general law of our nature is, that mind must fulfil its mission, not by following blindly a mere outward force of any sort, but by the activity of its own intelligence and will. . . . It must move in the light that springs from itself, by a power it continually generates within.” This law, he contends, must hold good in the Christian order as well as in the natural. “ Christianity claims to be the perfection of man’s life ; this, in its ordinary constitution, unfolds itself by its own self-movement in the way of thought and will ; but just here all this is superseded by another law altogether ; the supernatural comes in as the outward complement of the natural, in such sort as to make the force of this last null and void in all that pertains to its higher

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sphere." (January, 1850, p. 56.) Hence he tells us that "all revelation, as distinguished from magic, implies the self-exhibition of God, in a real way, through the medium of the world in its natural form. To a certain extent, we have such a revelation in the material universe. The outward creation is the symbol, mirror, shrine, and sacrament of God's presence and glory as a supernatural fact in the most actual way. The word of prophecy and inspiration is the gradual coming forth of eternal truth into time, in a like real way, through the medium of human thought and speech; a process which completes itself finally, in the full domiciliation, we may say, of the Infinite Word itself in the life of the world by Jesus Christ." (*Ibid.*, p. 65.) Christian faith, what we call Christian doctrine, is not something propounded to the reason of man, but is the out-birth of the new life placed by the Incarnation in men, the expression or utterance, by believers, of the life that is in them, and which they live by having the great realities of faith in their own conscious life through organic union with the person of Christ. In treating of the Apostles' Creed, the Reviewer says, — "The Creed is no work of mere outward *authority*, *imposed* on the Church by Christ or his Apostles. It would help its credit in the eyes of some, no doubt, if it could be considered in this view. Their idea of Christianity is such as involves, prevalently, the notion of a given, fixed scheme of things, *to be believed and done*, propounded for the use of man, on the authority of Heaven, in a purely mechanical and outward way." (May, 1849, p. 201.) But all this is false. The Creed "was not exhibited as a formulary imposed by outward authority, nor as the result of any process of reflection. It presented itself to the world, simply as the firm affirmation, on the part of the Church, of what Christianity was in her living consciousness in the way of direct and immediate fact. . . . It has its very being in the element and sphere of faith; and it holds there in the character of a direct spontaneous witness, with the mouth, to the great central realities of faith as they are immediately felt in the heart. . . . It is the product of the early Christian life." (*Ibid.*, pp. 214, 215.) "No man can be said to have composed it; it is no work of bishops or synods; it must be taken rather as the grand epos of Christianity itself, the spontaneous poem of its own life, unfolded in fit word and expression from the inmost consciousness of the universal Church." (*Ibid.*, p. 217.) So faith springs from the life of believers, not the life of believers from faith!

We might multiply citations to the same purport without end, but these suffice to show that the Reviewer's theory is, that Christianity, as supernatural object, as the living truth, in some way inserts itself in the believer, and is in the believing subject, operating in the act of faith from the subject's own centre, in the way of his own thought and will, and therefore, in regard to the act of faith, is not object, but subject, in the same sense, and on the same principle, that auxiliary grace is subject. In denying, then, that the object of faith is extrinsic, or out of the subject, and contending that it is in the subject, acting in the direction of the soul's own action, and coalescing with it, he denies the object itself; for whatever is objective is out of the subject, and whatever is in the subject is subjective. He, then, loses the act of faith itself; for the creditive subject can elicit the act only in concurrence with the credible object. He also fails to solve his problem, for he cannot deny the object, and still assert its binding force.

The Reviewer admits no proper supernatural, as is evident from the fact that he objects to us for making it transcend the natural, and from the fact that he holds that we have an original natural capacity for the direct and immediate apprehension of it. He confounds the supernatural with the supersensible, and understands by it nothing but the intelligible or *noetic* world as distinguished from the sensible, the *noumenon* as distinguished from the *phenomenon* of Kant. He objects to the way in which we oppose faith to reason, that is, distinguish faith from reason. "Its opposition," he says, "is properly to sense, and to nature as known by sense; to reason only in so far as taken for the understanding in relation to such knowledge. Faith is the capacity of perceiving the invisible and supernatural, . . . which as such does not lie on the outside of reason, . . . but opens to view rather a higher form of . . . its own proper life. It requires, of a truth, in our present circumstances, a supernatural *influence* to call faith into exercise; . . . there must be for this purpose a new life by the spirit of Christ; but all this forms at best but the proper *education* or *drawing out* of the true sense of man's life as it stood before." (Jan., 1850, p. 67.) "Faith stands just in the apprehension of invisible things in their true and proper reality. The direct and immediate communication of our nature with this higher world, in virtue of its original capacity for such purpose, the state or activity in which this communication holds, is itself precisely what we understand by faith." "Our

nature is formed for such direct communication with the world of spirit ; carries in itself an original capacity for transcending the world of sense, in the immediate apprehension of a higher order of existence, and can never be complete without its active development." (May, 1849, p. 209 and p. 208.)

Here it is undeniable that no reality is allowed to be held in faith that transcends the original capacity of our nature, and that nothing above the intelligible world is apprehended. This is not supernatural, for it is a contradiction in terms to say the supernatural does not transcend the capacity of the natural. Undoubtedly, we have a natural faculty of apprehending the supersensible. Certainly, the human mind, as naturally constituted, is not confined, as Locke maintains, to the knowledge derived from sensation and reflection. There is for us an intelligible world above the sensible, and it is only by virtue of this intelligible world that the sensible itself becomes intelligible, or is for us any thing more than a mode or affection of our own sensitive subject. In this intelligible world, the being, though not the essence, of God, is apprehended, and the invisible things of God from the creation, or foundation, of the world, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, being understood, that is, known, *intellecta*, by the things that are made ; and therefore the very heathen were inexcusable for lapsing into idolatry ; but all this lies in the order of nature, the primitive creation, and is included in God's revelation of himself as the Intelligible. The supernatural is above this, above the whole order of the natural universe, regarded either in its first cause or in its final cause, and is God's revelation of himself as superintelligible, as the Author of the new creation, the order of grace, not promised in the order of nature, not included in its original plan, nor necessary to complete it in its own order. The new creation presupposes the old, and grace presupposes nature, and as both proceed from the same Creator, there must of course be a congruity between them, for God can never be in contradiction with himself ; but the new creation is strictly supernatural, and therefore in a sphere outside of reason and infinitely above it. We have no natural power to apprehend either what it is, or that it is ; and we know absolutely nothing of it, except what is communicated to us, not from within, but from above, by God himself. This is the supernatural in the sense of Catholic theology, and we must be elevated to its order, before we rise above mere natural religion. The Reviewer, by confounding it with the supersensible, shows that he only fol-

lows in the wake of American and German Transcendentalists, and remains, with all his lofty pretensions, in a sphere below the lowest distinctively Christian sphere of thought.

The Reviewer, it is well to notice, by the way, restricts expressly all the supernatural he recognizes to a simple *influence* which calls faith into exercise, and this influence he supposes to be necessary only in our present circumstances. The power is in us by nature, and nothing is needed but to render it active. So the new and higher principle, which, we have seen, is Christ himself, God entering into the world as he was never in it before, the new creation, the whole Christian order, is, then, at most, simply prevenient grace, revealing nothing, teaching nothing, commanding nothing, doing nothing, but simply exciting one of our dormant powers to activity! Here are great words, and a tremendous preparation for comparatively a small affair. Really our Mercersburg friend must have been napping when he invented this part of his doctrine. But let him not be too much depressed. Homer sometimes nods, as Horace says, and human inventions are frequently dreams.

That the Reviewer understands by faith the immediate, not simply the mediate, apprehension of the matter believed, is evident from the passages just cited to prove that he confounds the supernatural with the supersensible, for in them he defines it to be the direct and immediate communication with the realities it holds; and if he did not so understand it, his objection to us, that we make it mediate only, would be irrelevant and absurd. What we maintain is, that, in matters of faith, as distinguished from matters of knowledge or science, the objective truth, though extrinsically evident, is intrinsically inevident, and therefore, in itself considered, is no immediate object of intellectual apprehension. This we had supposed follows from the nature of faith, which, by its very definition, is assent to a proposition on testimony, or the authority of another, and from the fact, which every Christian at least must acknowledge, that mysteries are credible. But it is precisely the intrinsic inevidence of the revealed truth, and the necessity of receiving it on authority, or of any motives of assent which the mind does not draw from immediate contemplation of it, that we understand our Mercersburg theologian to deny. Our doctrine, he says, "carries with it a wrong conception of the nature and power of faith. . . . It goes on the assumption that the supernatural, with which faith has to do, is so sundered from the natural as to admit of no approach or apprehension from

that side ; that truth in such form is *inevident* for the mind wholly, in its own nature, and without force of reason *intrinsically* to engage its assent ; that the mind is moved to such assent, not by any motives either in itself or in the object set before it, but by something extrinsic to both, — the weight of an intermediate authority, which is felt to be fully valid as a ground of certainty, without regard to the nature of what is thus taken on trust, one way or another. ‘In belief,’ says Mr. Brownson, ‘I must go out of myself, and also out of the object, for my motives of assent.’ Subjective and objective come to no union whatever. The gulf between them is sprung only by means of outward *testimony*. The case requires, indeed, Divine testimony. Still it is always as something between the subject and object, in a purely separate and external way.” (Jan., 1850, pp. 66, 67.) Even Divine testimony is not to be credited, it seems, according to our German Reformed Doctor, till we have examined what it testifies to, and satisfied ourselves by our own light that it is true, and worthy to be believed. “It will not do,” he says, “in the face of such a fact as the *Incarnation*, to say that the realities with which faith has to do, in distinction from reason, are wholly without light or evidence for this last, in their own nature, and as such to be taken on the mere authority of God, ascertained in some other way ; in such sense that a man might be supposed to be infallibly sure, first, that he has this authority to go upon, and so be prepared to accept any and every proposition as true, on the strength of it, with equal readiness and ease.” (*Ibid.*, p. 64.) “Faith stands in rational correspondence with its contents, makes the mind in some measure actually in their sphere, touches its object as truly as sense,” (*Ibid.*, p. 67,) and “is led by motives of assent in its object, and not simply by motives drawn from some other quarter ; in other words, the authority of God moving it is not on the outside of the object, but comes to view in and by the object bearing its proper seals.” (*Ibid.*, p. 70.) There is no need of further extracts, for these prove clearly that the Reviewer rejects as faith the apprehension of truth through the medium of testimony, even that of God himself, and will not allow the object to be credible, unless the mind immediately perceives its truth. Hence he censures us for maintaining that we must take the word from the speaker, not the speaker from the word, and holds (*Ibid.*, p. 68) that Christ’s miracles do not accredit him, but he accredits them. Clearly, then, he holds faith to be, in

some way, the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed, especially since, in a passage we shall cite again soon, for another purpose, he asserts that "faith without truth for its contents can no more be in exercise or existence, than natural vision can be where light is wanting." But such immediate apprehension of truth is intuition, knowledge, not faith. So it follows that the Reviewer's new principle and theory of religious life, which he says we needed when we left Rationalism to spare us the labor of going to Rome, lose the object of faith by resolving it into subject, the supernatural revelation by resolving it into the supersensible, and faith itself by resolving it into knowledge or intuition; that is, since he recognizes the supernatural at all only as an exciting influence, — a mere stimulus, — if even so much, his system is substantially the very Rationalism he applauds us for having rejected.

It is easy enough for us, who have had personal experience of the Reviewer's theory, and who have the light of Catholic theology to guide us, to comprehend his difficulties, and to see the source of his errors. He does not clearly understand that things must have an outside as well as an inside, and that he cannot deny their outside without also denying their inside. It is always well to try to get at the "inmost" heart of things, but it is necessary, that, in the effort to do so, we do not destroy the life of things themselves. We are far from believing that our Mercersburg Doctor intends to deny all faith objectively considered, but he is confused by his German pantheism, or rather, Oriental doctrine of emanation, and his mystical philosophy, exaggerated by his Calvinistic training. He intends to acknowledge both subject and object, but he does not appear to see clearly that they are necessarily the one outside of the other, that subject stands opposed to object, and object to subject, that the subject is the human soul, and that object, if object at all, is something distinct from the soul, out of the soul, and independent of it. The subject, indeed, cannot act, or exist even, independently of its object, for it is not God, — who alone is from and by himself, or is his own object, — but the object can and does exist without the subject.

Hence the object is always authoritative, and all evidence is objective; and we beg leave here to correct one of our assertions, made in 1845, cited by the Reviewer, but not used or objected to by him, that in the fact of intuition the evidence is in the subject. This, though true enough in relation to the purpose for which we asserted it, is, nevertheless, not strictly accurate.

All we there meant to assert was, that in intuition the assent is immediate, not discursive, as in demonstrative science, nor by the mediation of another, as in faith; but the language naturally bears a Cartesian sense, to which we object. The evidence is never in the subject, but is always objective, as we have shown in the foregoing article. The subject never affirms the object, but the object is always affirmed, either *per se* or *per alia*, to the subject. In knowledge it affirms itself, is evident, or intelligible *per se*; in faith it is inevident *per se*, and is affirmed only by a witness to whom it is not so inevident, but evident. Hence, as in the case of Christianity, when it is supernatural, it can be affirmed only by a supernatural witness; for to none but a supernatural witness can the supernatural be evident or intelligible by itself.

But the Reviewer either denies or misapprehends all this, and makes the subject and object mutually dependent one on the other, or rather, following Fichte, regards the object as the product of the subject. "The word lives," he says, "and is the word truly, only by faith." (May, 1849, p. 209.) "The existence of truth is objective, and in such view, of course, universal and independent of all private thought and will; but as thus objective, it must be at the same time subjective, must enter into particular thought and will, in order to be *real*. As object merely, without subject, it becomes a pure abstraction. Mere single mind can never be, in and of itself, the measure of either truth or right; it must be ruled, and so bound by the objective, or authority of the general. On the other hand, the general as such, mere law or object, is no such measure either, in and of itself; to be so, it must take concrete form in the life of the world, which resolves itself at last into the thinking and willing of single minds." (Jan., 1850, pp. 56, 57.)

It is difficult to conceive greater confusion of thought than we find here, or to compress more, or more fundamental, error into the same number of words. The writer says, indeed, that "the existence of truth is objective," but he resolves it as objective into the general, and distinguishes it from the particular, and therefore, though he seems not to be aware of it, denies the existence of particular, concrete objects. Only the general is objective; then particulars are subjective. Man exists, indeed, independent of my private thought and will, but men exist only as I think and will them! But the object without subject is unreal, a pure abstraction. A pure abstraction is a nullity; then existence can be predicated of nullity. This equals He-

gel's assertion of the identity in the last analysis of *das Seyn* and *das Nicht-seyn*, of *to be* and *not to be*, *being* and *non-being*. This cannot be said. Consequently, if the objective is a pure abstraction, the truth that is said to be objective is no objective reality at all. Then all reality is subjective, — which is simply Kantism as developed by Fichte, that is, pure autotheism. By resolving the object, which, we must remember, is Christ, God Incarnate, into the general, and denying it to be authoritative, or the measure of truth and right, till it "takes concrete form in the life of the world, which resolves itself at last into the thinking and willing of single minds," he makes God himself dependent on the thinking and willing of these minds for his reality, his very being, and implies that if it were not for them there would be no God. He thus denies God, or, what is the same thing, resolves him into infinite void, mere abstract possibility, seeking to become *plenum*, full, or real in the life of the world, — pure Buddhism. But abstract possibility, infinite void, is a nullity, and can do nothing, neither create the world nor realize itself in its life. Then there is no world, and if there is no world, and God is a nullity, nothing is or exists, — pure nullism, or nihilism, to which, we have shown over and over again, all Protestantism, whatever its form, has an invincible tendency.

The Reviewer, we doubt not, intends to be a true Christian believer, and fails to see that these consequences follow necessarily from his principles; but he must permit us to suggest that he is misled by modern philosophy, which teaches that God is real being only in that he is creator, and actually creates *ad extra*, as well as by his Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone, which he wishes to be able to understand in a real inward sense, not in a purely forensic sense, as is the case with Protestants generally. He misconceives the language of St. Paul (Heb. xi. 1), "*Est fides sperandarum substantia rerum*," and interprets it to mean, not that faith is the substance of things hoped for, that is, beatitude, because in the order of their acquisition it is their inchoation, or beginning, as the principles of a science are said, and very properly, to be its substance, because that from which all in the science follows, but that it substantiates them, renders them real, or gives them substance, in the sense in which the word is taken in the category of substance. But this is absurd. The Apostle declares faith to be "the substance of things hoped for," *sperandarum substantia rerum*, not of things already possessed; yet, as faith is

possessed by the believer, if it were their substantiality, they would be things already possessed, and not things hoped for. What is hoped for by the Christian is beatitude, that is, the possession of God as the Supreme Good. To say that our faith is the substance of this, or gives to it its substance, is to say, either that our faith is God, or that it makes God, creates the Sovereign Good; neither of which can be said. We applaud the Reviewer for his wish to get rid of the Protestant doctrine of forensic justification, which is only a sham justification, and no real justification at all; but we cannot applaud him for attempting to do it, either by asserting for us beatitude in this life, or by assuming that we are, or that we make, our own final cause.

Following modern philosophy, which teaches that God is real only in that he is creator, the Reviewer can assert that God lives, is living God, only by asserting that he lives in the life of the world, that is, as he explains it, "in the thinking and willing of single minds." His system seems to us to be based on the supposition, that God comes to reality only in the life of the universe, and that the universe, whether natural or supernatural, is simply the evolution or development, that is, realization, of the abstract potentialities or possibilities of the Divine nature. The two orders completed are the realized or completed God. Thus he says, "The new creation grows forth actually from the mystery of Christ's person, being from first to last the evolution or development simply of the capabilities, relations, and powers treasured up in him from the beginning." (July, 1849, p. 316.) If the new, then the old, or there would be no congruity between the two orders, on which the Reviewer so strenuously insists. Hence the significance and sacredness of history. It is God's realization of his own potentiality, in space and time, or his *coming* to reality. It is, then, the manifested God, and whoso censures it is a blasphemer. Assuming that it starts from the Incarnation, either as preparatory to it or as realizing it, and flows on since the Incarnation, under the forms of the Roman Church, down to the sixteenth century, and thence on through the Reformers and the central life of Protestant nations down to our times, he condemns as unhistorical, and as real blasphemers of God, all who denounce the Catholic Church prior to the Reformers, and also all who defend it since. Such seems to us to be the Reviewer's theory, and our readers will see at once that it is, substantially, the very theory we refuted in our critical examina-

tion, last year, of Mr. Wm. H. Channing's Discourse on *The Christian Church and Social Reform*. It is decidedly pantheistic, at best nothing but an imperfect reproduction of the old Oriental doctrine of emanation, which teaches that the universe is evolved from God, or flows forth from him, not as the effect from the cause, but as the stream from the fountain.

The error, under a theological point of view, lies in making faith the substantiality, or substantialization, of the things hoped for, instead of their first principle in the order of attainment; and, under a philosophical point of view, in conceiving God, primarily, not as *Ens reale*, or real being, but as *Ens in genere*, or mere abstract possibility. If our Mercersburg friend had understood clearly that divine truth, or the faith as object, however much it may, by being believed, impart to the believer, is itself, as Divine reality, always the same, whether believed or unbelieved, and that God is absolutely real, most pure act in himself, as real, and as complete, without the universe as with it, and that, while it is absolutely dependent on him, he in no sense depends on it, he would have seen that his doctrine, that the truth as objective must at the same time be subjective in order to be real, is the grossest absurdity, to use a mild term, into which the human mind can fall.

Will the Reviewer reply, that we misunderstand his language, and hold him responsible for principles which he repudiates? It is barely possible. It is barely possible that he does not intend to deny the reality of truth, considered in itself, when unbelieved, but merely that it is real as a fact of our life, that is, real to us. This would seem to follow from his assertion, that "faith does not create truth," and that "the existence of truth is objective." Much that he says is easily explained, and easily explained only, on the supposition that all he means to assert is, that truth, when not believed, though not a pure abstraction considered in itself, is a pure abstraction in regard to our actual life, and, as to us, is as if it were not. But this is only saying, in other words, that the truth when unbelieved is not believed, and when separate from us is not united to us. We cannot persuade ourselves that so able and learned a man could have supposed it necessary to assert, much less to go into an elaborate argument to prove, so obvious a truism. His labor, on this supposition, at least so far as Catholics are concerned, would have been "much ado about nothing." That the truth is not real as a fact of our life when not believed; that in the act of believing, the creditive subject and credible object are,

in some way, brought into direct contact, and the assent in the last instance is immediate ; that, in believing, the mind takes hold of the object, appropriates it, is united to it as the true, in like manner as in charity it is united to it as the good ; and that, in believing and appropriating it, the mind is active, not passive, are facts that we have never expressly or by implication denied, or dreamed of denying. Besides, we are unable to reconcile this view of the Reviewer's meaning with his theory of development and of history, which is undeniably pantheistic ; with his assertion, that faith is the primitive form in which Divine truth comes to its proper revelation among men, that the relation between faith and truth is that between form and its contents, and that the truth is no doctrine received by believers, but a fact uttered or expressed by them ; with his denial of Christianity as a supernatural revelation of truth, or doctrine, extrinsically propoundable to the mind ; or, in fine, with his censure of us for allowing the human mind no activity in elaborating Christianity, in forming what we are to believe, and in constituting or enacting the law we are to obey. These all imply something more than the simple truism we have pointed out, if the Reviewer were, as he is not, a man to deal in mere truisms.

"The theory of Mr. Brownson," he says, "requires us to assume that in the highest form of religion, that which is reached in Christianity, the human mind ceases to be directly active in the accomplishment of that which is *brought to pass in its favor*. . . . The difficulty is, that no activity is allowed it in the *realization* of Christianity itself." (Jan., 1850, p. 56.) He objects that, according to us, "Christianity is taken to be of force for the world only under an abstract form ; an outwardly supernatural revelation, transcending the whole order of our common life, and not needing nor allowing the activity of man himself, as an intelligent and free subject, to be the medium of its presence and power." (*Ibid.*, p. 57.) "Certainly the theory before us is ready to say, the law must be obeyed freely, by the option and choice of the obeying subject ; but this requires no *autonomy* of the subject in the *constitution of the law*, no voice in its legislation ; all the case demands or allows is, that, on grounds wholly extrinsic to its constitution, the subject be rationally persuaded that obedience is wise and right." (*Ibid.*, pp. 58, 59.) There is here a confusion of thought, a vagueness of expression, that perplexes us ; but it is clear, that, whatever be the writer's precise meaning, he certainly means this much, that man ought to have a hand in forming the truth believed, and a

voice in constituting the law he is to obey. "Freedom is more, a great deal, than any such outward consent to the authority of law. It is life *in* the law [that is, activity in constituting it], the very form in which it comes to its revelation in the moral world. Place law as an objective force on the outside of the intelligence and will of those who are to be its subjects, and at once you convert it into an abstract nothing. This is the natural extreme of Romanism." (*Ibid.*) It would seem to be evident enough from this, that the Reviewer means literally that the truth as objective must at the same time be subjective in order to be in any sense real, and that, when he says the object without subject is a pure abstraction, he means that it is an abstraction in every sense, not merely an abstraction as to our subjective life. This follows from the two fundamental assumptions on which his whole theory rests, namely, that Christ always affirms or authenticates himself from within, and always under a human form. Thus he says, — "The relation between perception and object is of the most inward and necessary character. It is the relation which holds between contents and form. Faith is the form in which Divine truth comes to its proper revelation among men." (May, 1849, p. 208.) Faith is subjective, for the Reviewer calls it sometimes an original capacity of our nature, and sometimes "an inward form or habit" of the soul. The contents, without form, are simply the *materia informis* of the Schoolmen, mere potential existence; consequently truth becomes *materia formata*, or real existence, only by virtue of the formative power of faith, that is, of the subject. This proves clearly that the Reviewer holds the truth, when not believed, when not formed by the human mind, to be in fact a pure abstraction, a simple abstract possibility; for it is the form that gives reality, or renders the possible actual. Consequently, the author's theory must be what we have supposed it, and lead, as we have shown, to nullism. It is the object that gives the form or species, and to contend that it is the subject is simply making man, if creation is supposed, the creator, and God the creature, — that is, man makes God, and not God man!

The Reviewer seems to us, not only to confound natural and supernatural, running the one alternately into the other, but to overlook the distinction between first cause and final cause, and to forget that God alone is both first cause and final cause of all things. The universe presents us two cycles, — the one the procession of existences by way of creation, not

emanation, from God as first cause ; and the other, the return of existences, without absorption in him, to God as their final cause, or ultimate end. God has made all things for himself ; that is, as first cause he makes all things for himself as final cause ; that is, again, he makes all things as creator for himself as the *Summum Bonum*, or Sovereign Good. In the first cycle, whether in the new creation or the old, the supernatural order or the natural, God alone is active ; for he creates all things out of nothing by himself alone, by the sole word of his power, and the assumption of human nature by the second person of the ever-adorable Trinity forms no exception, because the Incarnation is remedial, and the share or merit of the human nature of Christ as an instrument in our redemption is due solely to the *gratia unionis*, or grace of union, as it is called, which is God himself. To claim for man or for any creature any activity, direct or indirect, in this first cycle, either in the procession of nature or in the procession of grace, would be to convert the creature into creator, — if not at once formally to supplant God, at least, to give him a rival, companion, or assistant, which is little better, and in the last analysis comes to the same thing. Hence all creatures owe their entire existence to God, and to God alone ; and hence, too, in the new creation, we can do absolutely nothing towards our salvation without Divine grace moving and assisting us. The Reviewer sins against this truth, when he censures us for excluding human activity from all share in forming, developing, or realizing Christianity as the new creature, and contends that the new creation subsists only in a human form, and has reality only in our intelligence and will.

In the second cycle, or return of existences, God stands as the terminus *ad quem*, as in the first cycle or procession of existences he stands as the terminus *a quo*. Nullity can no more be final cause than it can be first cause, and the creature can no more be or create the one than the other ; for the final cause must, logically speaking, precede in the mind of the creator the act of creation. The intellect must present the end before the will can command it, for the will, taken distinctly, is a blind faculty, and cannot act in reference to an end not apprehended, and an end that is not, cannot be apprehended. God is in himself the Sovereign Good, and therefore eternally the Sovereign Good in itself ; therefore the Sovereign Good is no creature, no creation ; and to suppose it a creature would deny God as creator, by deny-

ing to him the Sovereign Good for which to create. The first cause and the final are then both increate, eternal, self-subsisting, and self-sufficing. In regard to the production of either, the creature has and can have no activity. The Reviewer sins against this undeniable truth, when he censures us for allowing man no autonomy, no right, collectively or individually, to be governed only by his own will, no voice in constituting the law to which he is to be subject. Nothing can be worse than this, for it supposes the law is created, and in part at least by man himself. But this cannot be. The law is not created at all ; it is eternal, and, as a rule, has its seat, not in the creative will of God as such, not precisely in God regarded as first cause, but in God as final cause, that is, in God as the Sovereign Good, and is promulgated and enforced by God as Supreme Ruler, because he always rules as he creates, in accordance with and for himself as the Sovereign Good. The law is not only eternal, but immutable, and God himself cannot change it ; for he cannot change his own immutable nature which is it. To suppose God creates it, is to suppose that he creates himself ; to suppose that man creates it, is to suppose that man creates God ; and to assert man's autonomy, or right to be governed only by his own will, is to deny that he is under law, or bound at all to seek God as the Sovereign Good. Does the Reviewer maintain that we are not morally bound to seek God as our ultimate end ? Does he deny all morality, and assert that man is free to live as he lists ? Is he an Antinomian ? We cannot believe it. Then God is himself man's law, and then man is morally bound to will what God wills, that is, to love what God loves, that is to say, God himself, as Supreme Good, and has no right to will or to love as his ultimate end any thing else. How, then, pretend that man is his own legislator, his own lawgiver ? As well might you say, man is his own maker, that man is God, nay, that man is God's maker. No laws that are not transcripts of the Divine law, the eternal and immutable law, which is God himself, have any of the essential characteristics of law.

It follows from this, that, as God is both our first cause and our final cause, he is also our law, and therefore in regard to our origin, our end, and the law by which we proceed from God, and by which we are to return to him, we have no voice, no will, no activity. All here is either God himself, or the work of his infinite, eternal, and immutable goodness and love. To claim activity in regard to our origin is the fundamental error

of Pelagianism,—to claim it in regard either to our end or to the law is at once Pelagianism and Antinomianism,—and in both cases is to fall into that sin of pride for which the angels lost their first estate, and our first parents were expelled from paradise. The Reviewer, we fear, has suffered himself to be seduced by the flattering words of the serpent, “Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil,” and, in the unconscious pride of his heart, refuses to obey a law which comes to him from God, or one which he has had no voice in enacting.

This premised, it follows that the activity of the creature, whether we speak of the natural order or the supernatural, is confined to the second cycle of the universe, of the *cosmos*, and all its rightful activity consists in seeking, according to the law, and by the means and conditions imposed, or granted, by the Divinity, to return, without absorption in him, to union with God as Ultimate End or Supreme Good. All creatures in their several degrees, and according to their respective natures, tend, mediately or immediately, to this end, the rational immediately, the irrational mediately in the rational, for the irrational is for the rational creation. Hence to man is given full dominion under God over the lower world, and he may lawfully appropriate it to his use. The rational creation is subject in its return to a moral law, and therefore must return voluntarily, from choice, that is, love. Here in this second cycle of creation, its return to God as Ultimate End, or Supreme Good, is the sole sphere of man’s activity, and it consists in voluntary obedience to the law of God, in concurring or coöperating with the Divine grace moving and assisting him to fulfil it, that is, to return to his union with God as his Supreme Good, and as the Supreme Good in itself.

Christianity, in its largest sense, is the entire supernatural order, the supernatural *cosmos*, or new creation, and supposes God as its creator and end, therefore the first cause, the final cause, and the law of the Christian. But it presupposes the natural or primitive order, according to the well-known maxim, *gratia præsupponit naturam*. It is not nature, is not necessary to complete nature, as nature, but it is for nature, a new creation in its favor, proceeding from the superintelligible and ineffable love and goodness of God, as infinitely transcending the love and goodness in nature, and therefore apprehensible only as it is supernaturally revealed, and even then only as a mystery, that is, only as truth or reality intrinsically inevident, and only extrinsically evident to us ; that is, again,

evident to us only through the medium of God as the intelligible, distinguishable as to us from God as superintelligible, but who in himself is indistinguishably both. Hence the Reviewer's objection, that the natural and supernatural, if constituting two distinct spheres, can never coalesce or come to real inward union, unless he understands by union identity, has no foundation, for they are linked together in the unity of God and the simplicity of the Divine act regarded in its terminus *a quo*. The natural creation proceeds from the essence of God, for in God there is no distinction between essence and being, but it does not, so to speak, exhaust or reveal that infinite essence. In other words, in the natural order God is not as to his essence evident *per se*, though the fact that he is and creates is thus evident. As the intelligible has its root in the superintelligible, so God can, as superintelligible, extrinsically evidence to it, and through it, what he is as to his infinite essence. The medium is adequate thus far, because, *ex parte Dei*, the intelligible and the superintelligible are identical, and because on our part, in receiving the revelation of God as the intelligible, we receive also the certification of the fact that he is also, as to us, superintelligible, that he must be in his essence infinitely more than appears to us, or that he infinitely surpasses our comprehension, as we assert in asserting, as we do by natural reason, his incomprehensibility. Hence all Christians assert that the possibility of a supernatural revelation, and therefore of a supernatural order or new creation, is provable by the light of nature; that it is possible for God, if he has created such an order, to reveal the fact, and the character, the laws, elements, contents, demands, of that order to us, as an object of faith; and also that it is possible for the revelation to be so accredited as his, that we shall be bound in reason to believe it.

The Reviewer, we presume, is not prepared precisely to deny this, for he professes to believe in Divine revelation; but he denies that the revelation is any doctrine or report concerning God, holds that God is himself his own revelation, asserts that his revelation is his mere self-exhibition, and that faith is simply the expression by the believer of what is immediately apprehended of him. Hence he denies that the Christian revelation is any thing that can be proposed to the believer. But this, if he examines it, he will see is the denial of Divine revelation, and of the new creation itself. He makes, as we have seen, Christ, that is, God himself, not the author of the new

creation, but the new creation itself. This is what we showed in the outset. Consequently, he admits no supernatural *created* order, and hence we have found him resolving the supernatural into the natural. If there is no created supernatural order, then no such order can be revealed, and then no revelation of supernatural truth can be made or propounded for our belief. But Christ is the new creation no more than he is the primitive creation, and if he is declared to be identically the one, then he must be the other, which is pure pantheism, into which we have already seen the Reviewer's system logically resolves itself. He starts with a false assumption, that Christ is the new creation, and that the new creation consists precisely in his assumption of human nature. Christ is God, and is the new creation, as he is the old, only *mediante actu creativo*, only in that he creates it; and though it is nothing without him, he is all without it that he is with it. Either there is a new creation or there is not; either there is a supernatural order, or there is not. If there is not, it is idle to talk about Christianity, for its very existence is denied. If there is, although we can know by the revelation of God to us as the intelligible, that is, by the light of natural reason, that a new creation is possible, yet that there is a new creation in fact, and if so, what it is, we can know only as God himself supernaturally informs us. Clearly, then, there are matters — namely, the things hoped for, and the means and conditions of attaining them — distinguishable from God, if we suppose the fact of a new creation, and matters which are not revealed by the simple self-exhibition of God, for God is a free creator, and his act *ad extra* is always a free act, an act of the Divine free will, and therefore they are contained in him only as the effect is contained in the cause, not as the consequence is contained in the principle, since this last would make him necessary cause, and thus assert pantheism. He must, in order to reveal them to us, reveal himself, or, in the language preferred by the Reviewer, exhibit himself as their first cause and their final cause, which implies a specific or formal revelation of them. If, then, the Reviewer does not elect to insist on the pantheism, and therefore the nullism, which he asserts, without being aware, we presume, that he does assert it, and if he does not choose to deny the fact of the Christian order altogether, he must admit the supernatural order as a created order, a new creation, as distinct, as such, from God as is the natural creation itself; and then he must concede the possibility and need of a supernatural

revelation of what it is, and of what God himself is as its first and last cause. Then he must retract his reasoning against us, and concede that Christianity is supernatural truth supernaturally revealed to us, and by its very revelation propounded *ab extra* to us as an object of faith.

But even restricting the new creation, as the Reviewer improperly does, to the fact of the incarnation or assumption of our nature by the Word, this conclusion must still be conceded. This fact takes place in time, — is a fact, therefore, distinguishable from God himself; it is also a fact quite out of the order of nature, and therefore in itself above our natural intelligence. That it is a fact can be known to us only as it is supernaturally revealed. The simple exhibition by the Word of himself in the world, is not the authentication of himself as God having assumed human nature, for by simply beholding Jesus, men did not know, and could not know, that he was God, as is evident of itself, and also from the answer of our Lord to Peter. Peter confessed him to be “Christ, the Son of the living God”; and Jesus answered, *Beatus es Simon Bar-Jona : quia caro et sanguis non revelavit tibi, sed Pater meus, qui in celis est.* (St. Matt. xvi. 17.) What Peter immediately believed was not that the person before him was Christ the Son of the living God, but God himself revealing and asserting it, and asserting it *ab extra*, too, as distinguished from Peter’s own thought and will. Otherwise it would not have been true that flesh and blood did not reveal it to him. Doubtless it was revealed by immediate inspiration, but inspiration is not *expiration*, — is a breathing in from without, not a breathing out from within. In no way could Peter, or could any of the disciples, know that Christ was God, the “Word made flesh,” but through a supernatural revelation of the fact, — by God himself supernaturally proposing the fact to their minds, and infallibly assuring them that he who thus proposes it is God. If we must say this of those who were inspired to reveal truth, then *a fortiori* of those who were not so inspired.

But passing by those whom our Lord personally instructed through the medium of speech, or whom he chose to instruct by direct and immediate inspiration, what are we to say of those who were to believe in him through *their word*? *Non pro eis autem rogo tantum, sed et pro eis qui credituri sunt per verbum eorum in me.* (St. John xvii. 20.) How were these to believe Christ through the word of his Apostles, if there is no Christian truth to be extrinsically propounded and accredited? Certain

it is some have not believed, certain it is that some are not believers, and certain it is, also, that all who are believers have once been unbelievers. Do believers believe nothing? Is there, or is there not, supernatural truth revealed by God, which all are commanded to believe? There must be, according to the Reviewer's own doctrine, that the assumption by the Word of our nature is a new, therefore a supernatural, creation. How is this fact to be believed by those who are not believers, if it is not propounded or proposed to them? "Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How, then, shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe him, of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how can they preach unless they be sent? Faith, then, cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ,"—*ergo fides ex auditu, auditus per verbum Christi*. (Rom. x. 13–17.) These are St. Paul's words, not ours; and if the Reviewer refuses to yield to their authority as Divine inspiration, we trust it will not be too much to ask him either to yield to their logic or to refute it.

Indeed, the Reviewer is, after all, unable to avoid contradicting himself, and asserting, even while denying, the Christian order as something to be extrinsically propounded for belief. His Review itself is established as the organ of the so-called *Mercersburg* system of theology, and it is certainly intended to propound, propagate, and defend that system, — a system which he, at least, it is fair to suppose, identifies with Christian truth. What is he doing in writing against us, but attempting to prove that our doctrine is not Christian doctrine, and that his is? Are we rash in supposing that he holds that he has a revealed truth of some sort, which we do not accept, but which he wishes to induce us to accept? Or shall we say that he regards the matters involved in the controversy between us, not as revealed truths, but as mere human opinions? We cannot do him the wrong to adopt this latter supposition. He must, then, assume that he has some revealed truth which we have not, and which he is really proposing to us, in an outward way, and thus is doing the very thing which he contends cannot be done.

The Reviewer, in fact, asserts, in principle, the very things which, in his reasoning against us, he so severely censures. Discussing the *Rule of Faith* (July, 1849, p. 371), he says, — "Taking these facts together, and summing up their import, we shall find that the Christian religion lays down the com-

bined *testimony* of the Word and the Church, past, present, and to come, to all fundamental articles and essential ordinances as the only rule of faith. To these all men are *bound*, on pain of eternal exclusion from all the privileges and blessings of the Church, here and hereafter, to yield hearty faith and support ; and, with reference to all things not so *defined* by them, all men are left to the upright exercise of their own judgment, enlightened by a faithful use of all the means of knowledge within their reach." We do not accept this as a correct statement of the rule of faith, but it contains every principle objected to in us, and is, if it is any rule at all, as stringent as any thing we have contended for. It is outward, for the Word and the Church are external to the believer, and it is authoritative, for it defines what is or is not a fundamental article, or an essential ordinance, and allows private judgment only in the matters not defined. What more does the Catholic contend for ?

But, asserting the authority of the Church to define what are fundamental articles and essential ordinances, and leaving the individual free only in matters not defined, and binding him even there by the moral law, it is plain the Reviewer fails to obtain a solution of the problem with which he starts ; that is, to reconcile liberty and authority. Indeed, he seems to be fully aware of this fact. Thus he says, — " To preserve due harmony between freedom and authority is an exceedingly difficult problem in any sphere. But it seems to be more so in the Church than in the family and the state. *That She, holy and catholic, is possessed of Divine authority, which cannot be resisted without sin, admits of no question ;* that this authority may be grossly abused to the destruction of individual liberty, is also clear. That the individual has rights to be sacredly respected, and may exercise his private judgment in stout resistance to the abuse of power, we are not disposed to deny ; but, on the other hand, the lawless setting up of particular private judgment in defiance of the universal Church is manifestly schismatic and sectarian." (September, 1849, p. 515.)

It is clear from this, that the Reviewer conceives liberty and authority only as opposed one to the other, and, consequently, has not been able to dissolve and recombine them in a new and higher principle. Aside from this, the extract we have just made is something of a curiosity in its way, and has evidently proceeded from a frank, honest-hearted man. The writer asserts not only the authority, but the *Divine* authority, of the Church, in the strongest and most unqualified terms.

"That she, holy and catholic, is possessed of Divine authority, which cannot be resisted without sin, admits of no question." That is positive and universal, and corresponds to what our Lord said, — "He that heareth you, heareth me ; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me ; and he that despiseth me, despiseth him that sent me." (St. Luke x. 16.) "That this authority may be grossly abused to the destruction of individual liberty is also clear." But, with the Reviewer's leave, that cannot be. The authority is Divine, and we do not understand how Divine authority, that is, God's authority, can be abused. If, as the Reviewer asserts, the Church possesses Divine authority, it is God who teaches and commands in and through her. How is it possible, then, for her to abuse her authority ? His word is pledged that she shall not abuse it, and can you have a better guaranty than that ? Can God's word fail ? Can God abuse his authority ? To assert that the authority of the Church is Divine, is to assert that it cannot be abused by her, — is to offer the highest guaranty the individual can possibly have, that his rights will be sacredly respected ; for he has no rights but those which God has given him, and God never contradicts himself. We are vehemently inclined to believe that our rights have far more security in the justice and love of God, than they have, or can have, in our own private judgment ; and we do not find it very humiliating to acknowledge that we are far more likely to have the truth when we rely on the judgment of God than when we rely on our own. No ; it will not do, after you have conceded that the Church possesses Divine authority, which cannot be resisted without sin, to contend that she can abuse her authority. You must either deny her Divine authority, or concede that for her to abuse her authority is impossible.

The objection on which the Reviewer seems to place his principal reliance is, that, if we conceive the supernatural as wholly out of the sphere of the natural, no authority can mediate it, and bring the two into real union. The objection is specious, but will not bear examination ; for it implies that a supernatural revelation of supernatural truth is impossible, which we have already shown is not true, in showing that the intelligible and superintelligible in God are identical, and that, in knowing God as the intelligible, we know, not, indeed, what he is as superintelligible, but that he is superintelligible, that is, infinitely above, in his essence, both our comprehension and our apprehension. That the supernatural cannot be so evidenced to the natural, that the natural shall apprehend or believe it su-

pernatually, we concede ; but that it cannot be so evidenced as to be apprehended, or believed, with what is called human faith, as distinguished from Divine faith, we deny, for reasons just assigned. To apprehend the supernatural as supernatural, or to believe it with supernatural faith, *ex parte subjecti*, the subject must, no doubt, be supernaturally elevated, by the *donum fidei*, or gift of faith, which places the creditive subject, as to the form of his act, on the plane of the credible object. But, if this be so, the Reviewer asks, in substance, why faith cannot be elicited without, as well as with, the authority of the Church propounding the object ? We answer, — 1. Because the act of faith is not elicited or elicitable without the credible object, and the gift of faith does not propose the credible object ; it only prepares, by supernaturally elevating it, the natural creditive subject to believe it supernaturally when it is proposed. 2. Because the authority of the Church proposing, though extrinsic in part to the *material* object of faith, is yet included, integrally, in the credible object, as the *formal* object of faith, and must, therefore, itself be believed in believing it. And, 3. Because *gratia præsупponit naturam*, and though the act of faith demands more than natural reason to be elicited, it yet cannot be elicited without natural reason, and therefore not without such authority as is *in se* satisfactory to natural reason. The will can do nothing in the work of sanctification without grace, and yet grace does nothing without the concurrence of the will ; and hence we address to the will the motives naturally fitted to move it. It is the same with reason as intellect. It can do nothing in the order of supernatural faith without the appropriate grace ; but as the grace, in turn, does nothing without the intellect, we address to intellect the motives naturally fitted to convince it. Without such motives, motives proper to convince reason as reason, the grace of faith would supersede reason, the supernatural would dispense with the natural, and faith would be no reasonable act, but mere Illuminism or Enthusiasm, and piety mere fanaticism. If the Reviewer had penetrated a little deeper into the principle of his objection, he would have seen that he was really objecting to our doctrine, not that it does, as he asserts, but that it does not, “ supersede the natural order of the world, and contradict it, from age to age, to the end of time.”

But the Reviewer contends, further, that if we demand for eliciting faith infallible authority, infallibly accredited to reason, we make faith a conclusion of logic, and fall into Rationalism. This objection seems to us to be urged without due con-

sideration. Rationalism is not the assertion of the legitimacy or sufficiency of reason in its proper sphere, but the assertion of the sufficiency of reason in all spheres, and the denial of the necessity and the fact of grace. Rationalism is developed Pelagianism. We do not assert it, for we deny the sufficiency of reason without grace, and acknowledge its sufficiency only when it acts from grace, and in concurrence with it. To call this Rationalism or Pelagianism is to fall into the opposite heresy of Calvinism, which denies all exercise of reason, and loses the natural, as Pelagianism loses the supernatural; or which, in losing the natural, loses also the supernatural, — decidedly the more destructive heresy of the two. The only way of avoiding both extremes, and of reconciling faith and reason, authority and liberty, is to accept the maxim of our theologians, that grace presupposes nature, and therefore, in effecting our faith and sanctity, while reason does, and can do, nothing without grace moving, elevating, and assisting it, grace itself does nothing, save in concurrence with reason, that is, reason as both intellect and will. It is singular enough that the Reviewer should object in us to the very principle he himself needs, is striving after, and actually condemns us for *not* holding!

If the Reviewer clearly apprehended the principle expressed in the maxim, Grace presupposes nature, of which he catches now and then a faint glimmer through the darkness of his Calvinistic mysticism, and which, not understanding much of Catholic theology, he supposes we deny, he would see that the problem, which he contends needs a higher than the Catholic principle for its solution, is solved by this very Catholic principle itself, and can be effectually solved only in the Catholic Church, for she alone, at the same time that she is the medium of the grace, presents the motives of credibility satisfactory to reason. Out of the Church you can have only reason without faith, or faith without reason. Thus the whole Protestant world alternates eternally, as every one knows, between Pelagianism and Calvinism, Rationalism and Illuminism, Fanaticism and Impiety, Despotism and Licentiousness. The Reviewer, in principle, does the same. When he objects that we, in placing the supernatural above the sphere of natural reason, deny natural reason itself and wrong the individual mind, and when, in opposition, he asserts faith as a natural capacity, and that we are naturally able to apprehend immediately the supernatural, he assumes and maintains the radical principle of Rationalism, or Pelagianism. When, on the other hand, he objects that faith in the super-

natural, elicited on a supernatural authority, accredited by motives satisfactory or convincing to natural reason, Divine grace moving and assisting the reason to elicit it, is Rationalism, he asserts the radical principle of Calvinistic Illuminism, or, as it is now called, *Evangelicalism*, and on the Continent of Europe, ordinarily, Methodism; and, to be consistent, he must assert irresistible grace, and, if he does not choose to be a Universalist, particular unconditional election and reprobation, — mere vulgar Calvinism, which, as the Reviewer must be aware, is the denial of the natural, of reason and will, and the assertion of man's absolute passivity in conversion and sanctification; thus making justification purely forensic, and giving the one justified a *carte blanche* to live as he lists after justification, with absolute impunity. Here are the two extremes, Calvinism and Rationalism, not Rationalism and Catholicity, as the Reviewer erroneously alleges, for Catholicity saves both terms, the natural and the supernatural, by the principle, *gratia præsupponit naturam*.

The Reviewer, notwithstanding the many grievous errors which flow logically from his principles, has done well in protesting against sham, and in demanding reality. He also has really some dim and indistinct view of the principle he needs in order to solve his problem; but he misapprehends that principle, as we ourselves did before knowing Catholic theology. He seeks this principle in the mystery of the Incarnation. Unquestionably, the Incarnation has given to the world the principle of a higher life than the life of the natural order, whether sensible or intelligible; but it has not, properly speaking, inserted a new principle into the constitution of human nature as such. The Reviewer misapprehends this sacred mystery. It was not the introduction into human nature of any principle that it had not from the first. The "Word was made flesh," not in the sense that God was converted into man, or that man assumed God, but in the sense that the Divine nature assumed the human. Strictly speaking, God did *not* enter into human nature in a new sense, or in any sense in which he was not always in it; he simply took human nature up to himself; but they remained each *secundum rationem suam* as distinct after the assumption as they were before. There was in the Incarnation no conversion or transformation of nature, whether human or Divine; there was no intermingling or confusion of the two natures; for there remained and remain for ever in Christ two distinct natures, two natural operations, and two natural wills in one person. To deny this, is to fall into the Eutychian and Monothelite heresies,

which the Reviewer's school, both at home and abroad, we are sorry to add, seem to us strongly inclined to revive. Indeed, these heresies underlie not a few of the errors of our age.

It is also a great mistake to suppose, as the Reviewer does, that our Lord came to complete the natural, or as the complement of human nature in its own order ; for the human nature our Lord assumed was not incomplete ; it was perfect human nature, since he is perfect God and perfect man, and the human nature he assumed was man's nature as it was before, as well as since, the Incarnation. He came not as the complement of the natural as natural, otherwise the Christian order would not be an order of grace, or a new creation ; but he came as the complement of the supernatural, to complete the order of grace, instituted as early as man's fall, — to consummate the realities promised to our first parents and to the patriarchs, and which were prefigured in the institutions of the old law, so that life might be had, and had more abundantly ; that is, he came to make real the life hitherto held only by promise, and to render grace more easy and abundant. That grace is more abundant, and its means facilitated and multiplied, under the new law is most true ; but this does not imply the creation of a new principle in our nature, for the *ens supernaturale* is given us only in *patria*, and grace remains always a *habitus*, or an *auxilium*, enabling us to do what without it we could not do, but continuing always distinguishable from our nature, changing the form of its activity, indeed, but never transforming the nature itself ; for it may be resisted by the will and wholly lost, and our nature remain physically what it was before. The inamissibility of grace is a heresy ; but if grace transformed our nature it would be inamissible, without the destruction of our nature itself. As in the Incarnation there is no conversion, mixture, or confusion of the two natures, so is there no intermingling or interfusion of nature and grace, in such sense as to form a new nature ; and hence what we do in grace, it is not we that do it, but the grace that is in us ; and therefore it is that our acts performed from grace, by its aid, and in concurrence with it, are estimated, not by the nature which is assisted, but by the grace that assists, and rewarded accordingly, for, in rewarding us, as St. Austin says, God simply crowns his own gifts. Overlooking this fact, the Reviewer loses his new principle by converting it into a natural principle, and regarding it, not as a supernatural habit or aid, but as a mere completion of the original sketch or design of man's natural constitution.

The Reviewer also misconceives the real character of our Lord's intimate presence and immanence in the new creation. Certainly, the Christian, as such, is inseparable from Christ, and we most firmly hold, as Catholic doctrine, that Christ must be in us as well as out of us ; for we can do nothing, absolutely nothing, without him, as he himself says, "Without me, ye can do nothing." But Christ is both the first cause and the final cause of the new creation. As first cause he is in us, creating in us the power to believe and love him as final cause, or to believe what he teaches and to do what he commands, and to believe and do it for his sake. It is the same Christ who is in us that is out of us, and before us ; but the same Christ in diverse respects, as God as Creator of the universe is considered in a diverse respect from God as its final cause, or the end for which he creates it. In the former, he is the first cause of all things ; in the latter, he is the final cause, or end, of all things. The distinction is valid *quoad nos*, for to us there is necessarily a distinction between God as loving, and God as the object he loves. Christ as final cause, or end, is before us, not as an end gained, but as an end to be gained ; and as first cause he is in us, moving us to him as before us, and assisting us to reach him. Thus it is not only he whom we believe, but it is he by whom and for whom we believe. Thus the act of faith is defined to be *credere Deo, credere Deum, credere in Deum*. In charity, it is Christ by whom we love, whom we love, and for whom we love. All this we certainly hold, and have clearly expressed or implied, whenever we have had any occasion to touch the subject, and if the Reviewer means this, and only this, he has unwittingly opposed to us our own doctrine.

But this is not the doctrine the Reviewer advances, although it is undoubtedly the truth he is striving after, and of which he catches, now and then, a dim and confused view. He evidently gives the Incarnation a pantheistic interpretation, and none of his objections to us are pertinent, if he simply understands our Lord to be in us, but distinct from us, — in us, not as a new principle in our natural constitution, but simply by his gracious operations. He is present in every Christian, personally present, present and immanent in his substance, in his Divine essence, but only as he is present and immanent in the natural order, that is, *mediante* his creative act. His presence and immanence in human nature, in any stricter sense, implies an identity of the human and Divine, which cannot for a moment be conceded in the supernatural any more than in the natural order.

We are *united* to him as first cause of grace in us, and through grace, as its final cause; but we are not made one with him in the sense of identity with him, nor are we *deificated*. As led by the Holy Ghost, we are truly sons of God, but sons by adoption, not natural sons of God, as is Christ our Lord, who is not only the first, but the *only*, begotten Son of God.

The Reviewer's theory of history has so often been discussed in our pages, that we have no occasion to discuss it again, and as applicable to Christian doctrine, we disposed of it in our reviews of Mr. Newman's Essay, and replies to *The Dublin Review*. The theory, even as contained in Mr. Newman's Essay, is pantheistic, and flows from the assumption that man co-operates with God in the work of creation, or rather, that creation itself is an emanation from God, a development, evolution, or realization of God. We cannot concede this, nor are we prepared to pronounce all history sacred and divine. We do not believe in the modern historical optimism, whether propounded in the dry abstractions of Hegel, or the brilliant eloquence of Cousin and our friend the Reviewer. We believe there is sin in the world, and that history records crimes, events which have not been approved of by God, and which are no indications of what he wills men should believe and do. We shall not do truth or common sense the gross dishonor of supposing it necessary to prove this. The Reviewer thinks that we are very unhistorical, and ridiculous even, in not seeing the hand of God in Protestantism, and in venturing to regard it as the work of the Devil. "Unless we choose," he says, "to give up all faith in history as the revelation of God's mind and will, we must bow before this great fact of three hundred years with earnest reverence, and admit that it has a meaning for the kingdom of God in some way worthy of its vast proportions." (Jan., 1850, p. 44.) That God will overrule the Protestant movement for good, and cause it to redound to the glory of his Spouse, the *Roman Catholic Church*, whom he loves, and whom he hath purchased with his own blood, we do not doubt; but that Protestantism has any thing good in itself, even the Reviewer cannot seriously expect us to believe, for he immediately adds, — "Suppose the worst even, in the case, that Protestantism is destined to prove a failure, still it would be in the highest degree unphilosophical and irrational to deny its significance, at least in this point of view, as the medium of transition for the Church to a better and brighter state, that could not have been reached without such a period of inward contradiction going

before." A sensible man, having much inward respect for Protestantism, would hardly allow us to make a supposition so much to its discredit. Are the works of God destined to prove failures? And are we to suppose that God's Church needs mending, or that, if it does, he cannot mend it without taking it to pieces, and leaving the whole world for three hundred years and more without any Church, without any religion, without law or order, without faith, without hope, without charity, to worry and devour one another as dogs, — to live like swine, and die like beasts? How know we that God did not make his Church perfect at first? Certainly, if the principles we have established in the course of this article deserve any consideration, man is no church-builder, or church-reformer, and his proper sphere of activity lies in believing what God's Church teaches, and in doing what she commands, and the only development that can be asserted is growth in the understanding and appropriation of the truth, and in the practice of Christian perfection, by single minds and wills, or individual believers. It is ours to perfect ourselves by the Church, not to perfect her by us.

Then, as to the magnitude of Protestantism, we are not much impressed by it. We have had too near a view of it for it to loom up very large in our eyes. It is far inferior in the magnitude of its results to the sin of our first parents; it is not so great an event as the lapse of nearly the whole ancient world into idolatry; it is not greater than Brahminism, than Buddhism, or than Arianism, and it dwindles into insignificance before Mahometanism, — all manifestly of the Devil. Why, then, not Protestantism also? Wherefore pronounce them the work of the Devil, and it, on account of its magnitude alone, the work of God? Protestantism is nothing but what it is in individual minds and hearts, and we see nothing unphilosophical or irrational, taking into the account the depravity of human nature, or men's proneness to evil, in supposing that so considerable a number of persons as there are Protestants should fall into error and sin, leave God to follow their own foolish pride, vicious appetites and propensities, corrupt passions and sentiments. Its influence on modern civilization has not been such as to command our respect. It has everywhere been deleterious, tending to draw off the mind and heart from God, to fix the affections on the low and transitory, the material and the sensual, to corrupt morals, to dry up the springs of spiritual life, and to prepare the way for the return to barbarism. Whatever advance modern civilization has made, has been

made in spite of it, by virtue of principles and influences drawn from Catholicity. Indeed, the most severe condemnation of Protestantism is to assert the necessity of divinizing all history in order to be able to divinize it, or to take it out of the category of the works of our great Enemy.

There are some other points of minor importance, as made by the Reviewer, on which we would comment if our space permitted, and we were not already fatigued ; but we have said enough, if it is understood, to prove that the Reviewer has not made out his case, has not established a theory that meets the difficulties he acknowledges ; and we are therefore entitled to conclude our Church against him. In what we have said, we have aimed to treat him with respect, and we certainly do respect him as a man, a scholar, and a writer. He is nearer the truth in his spirit than in his words ; he has generous impulses towards something better than vulgar Protestantism, and we trust in God that he will persevere till he finds it. If what we have said, although strongly put, more strongly than may be pleasing to him, enables him to understand better his own doctrine in its relation to ours, and to form a more correct judgment of Catholic theology, we shall have done him and many others no mean service. At any rate, if he choose to rejoin, he will hardly fail to see the points he must make and defend, what he must prove and disprove, in order to feel that he can have any hope of salvation, without abandoning his theory, not for another of man's concoction, but for the glorious old Catholic Church, which, though assailed continually by the folly of men and the rage of devils, stands firm as ever upon the Rock on which her Lord has founded her.

ART. IV. — *Conversations of an Old Man and his Young Friends.* — No. II.

F. ALL you say seems plausible enough, and perhaps follows logically from principles that cannot very well be denied ; but there is always danger in pushing matters to extremes. I am a Catholic as well as you, and, unlike you, have been one from my infancy, and I would rather die than give up my Church. I am a "Catholic of the Catholics," and have no

need to be instructed by neophytes in my religion, however much my seniors in years. Pushing the principles of our religion to their last consequences, and taking extreme views of all questions of practical life, can do no good,—is impolitic, subjects our Church to unnecessary odium, and imposes too heavy a burden upon us who mingle in the world, and have more or less to do with “our separated brethren.” Virtue, the Philosopher tells us, is the mean between two extremes.

B. I am very happy to hear my young friend say that he is a Catholic,—a fact which I own I had not even suspected. As a neophyte I stand rebuked. But I have heard of Catholics who will fight to the death for their religion, as a point of honor, who yet will not live it. The test of a man’s love of Catholicity is in living it. If ye love me, says our Lord, keep my commandments; and this we must do, if we would enter into eternal life. Extremes are dangerous, no doubt; but it is always well to understand our terms. Virtue, in a certain sense, may be the mean between two extremes, but I have never understood that the extremes were more and less of virtue itself. Too little virtue to be virtue is not virtue at all, and I have never been aware that a man can have too much virtue to be virtuous; at any rate, I do not think any of us are likely to sin by an excess of virtuous action. Extremes are not in pushing true principles to their logical consequences, but in false principles themselves. A man can no more have an excess of truth than he can of virtue.

R. But what we object to is, that you are ultra. You were always, we have been told, even when a Protestant, disposed to be ultra in every thing. You would push your Protestantism, your notions of government and society, to such extremes, that no one could act with you. And now you push your Catholicity to extremes.

B. Beyond Catholicity itself?

R. No; I do not precisely say that; but you push it farther than it seems to me necessary to go. You are too rigid, too uncompromising,—nay, to be plain, you are too bigoted and intolerant.

B. Bigotry is the obstinate adherence to one’s own opinions, without any solid reason for them, and a blind intolerance of whatever contradicts them. If half that is said of my frequent changes be true, I must have very little obstinate attachment to any opinions, and in those matters which are really matters of opinion, it might be difficult to adduce an instance

in which I have shown myself intolerant. Nor am I aware that in matters which are mine, and of which I have the disposal, I have been thus far in my life remarkable for my rigidness, or want of liberality. The tendency to push matters to extremes has never been one of my besetting sins, and I have always been ready to accept any compromise that seemed expedient, if it involved no compromise of principle or dereliction from the truth. But I confess I am not and never was one of those who could say, "Good Lord," and "Good Devil," not knowing into whose hands I might fall. As to *ultra* Catholicity, I do not understand it. You might as well call a man *ultra* orthodox, as if one could be orthodox, and at the same time more or less than orthodox. Orthodoxy is a definite quantity, and one has it, or has it not. It is not a creation of mine, nor of yours, and all that either of us has to do is to accept it as prescribed to us by the Church. You can either hold it or not hold it, but you cannot both hold it and not hold it at the same time. You are bound to go as far as your religion requires you to go, or you sin by defect; and if you go beyond what it permits, you sin by excess. The medium is not something arbitrary, left to your will and caprice or to mine; it is determined by the truth itself. If I go beyond the truth, I certainly go too far, and you, if you go not as far as the truth, go not far enough. As you concede that I do not go beyond Catholic truth itself, it strikes me that, instead of charging me with the sin of ultraism, you would do much better to humble yourself and do penance for your short-comings.

F. All this looks plausible, I grant, and yet I see no need of being so *very* strict. There is no need of exaggeration.

B. All exaggeration is wrong, and to be condemned; but as long as one is within the bounds of truth, I do not see how he can be guilty of exaggeration. Then I do not understand what you mean when you say that there is no need of being so *very* strict. I must be as strict as truth and virtue, or I fall into error and sin. You doubtless remember that the early Christians were so very strict as to choose rather to undergo the most cruel tortures, to suffer death in its most frightful shapes, than to offer a single grain of incense to Jupiter or to the statues of Cæsar. Do you think they were foolish, *ultra*, more strict than their religion required them to be, and that they might, with credit to their religion, and without sin in themselves, have offered incense as the pagan magistrate commanded?

M. That was all very well in the Martyrs, and we honor them for it ; but what your young friends contend is, that it is not necessary to place ourselves in opposition to our age, and to shut ourselves out from all communion with our kind, because they do not happen to be of our way of thinking.

B. I was not aware before that Catholicity, the Catholic Church, the Immaculate Spouse of God, the Mother of all the faithful, is a way of thinking. "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly, nor stood in the way of sinners, nor sat in the chair of pestilence" (Ps. i. 1); but I do not remember that a blessing is anywhere pronounced upon those who follow the counsels of the ungodly, or hold communion with the workers of iniquity. "What participation hath justice with injustice ? or what fellowship hath light with darkness ? or what concord hath Christ with Belial ? And what part hath the faithful with the unbeliever ?" (2 Cor. vi. 14, 15.) In matters not of religion the faithful may, no doubt, have intercourse with such heretics as are tolerated, and they are certainly not required or permitted to oppose the age in any respect in which the age is right. But we cannot conform to the age wherein the age is wrong without sin, for that is precisely what is meant by sinful conformity to the world. That would bring us into bondage to the world, into bondage to sin, from which it is the design of our religion to free us. This setting up the age as a standard is by no means Catholic, and to fall in with the children of this age in their worship of it is as much idolatry as that which the early Christians resisted unto death.

F. You mistake our meaning. We do not advocate full conformity to the age ; all we mean is, that, as the age manifestly tends to popular institutions, to the extension of popular liberty, it is an exaggeration of Catholic doctrine to contend that we should resist this tendency, fight against the people, and exert ourselves to uphold old abuses and despotic rulers.

B. My young friend certainly does not sin by an excess of clearness and precision in his ideas. If he would take a little pains to distribute things according to their categories, and to keep those things distinct in his reasoning which are distinct in their nature, I cannot believe that it would do him any serious harm. Catholic truth does not, of course, require us to uphold abuses or despotic rulers. In asserting things are *abuses*, and rulers despots, you assert your right as a Catholic to resist them, and, within the limits of prudence and charity, your duty to resist them. All that is clear enough. But before

you can pronounce a ruler a despot in the bad sense of the word, you must prove that he is not a legitimate ruler, that he is a usurper, a tyrant, an oppressor; and before you can call things *abuses*, you must know that they are not legitimate *uses*.

O. But it must always be right to favor the democratic tendency, to support popular institutions, and to struggle even unto death for liberty. What more glorious than to die fighting bravely for liberty, equality, fraternity?

B. Our company is too small, my young friend, to make it worth our while to get into the heroics. You can leave "Cambyses' vein" till you come before the crowd. It demands very little expenditure of thought to move a large audience; wind is the chief thing requisite for that. But in a small company, where each one present is cool, declamation is out of place. There it is necessary, if you would produce a favorable impression, to have clear and precise ideas, and to clothe them in appropriate language. When you address only a dozen, you speak to a dozen critics. When you address five thousand, all individuality is merged in the crowd, and you speak not even to one. Save your big words, liberty, equality, fraternity, till you have the mob before you. I heard those words, and screamed them in a tolerably strong voice, from the very top of my lungs, long before you were born. They were as popular in my boyhood as they are in yours, and they who screamed them then had as little love or understanding of them as have those who are loudest and foremost in vociferating them now. To tell you the honest truth, those big words are rather stale, and in very bad taste. You must wait till a new crop of fools is produced, before you can commend yourself by using them. Liberty, understood as the liberty of reason, of justice, of truth, is always a good, always to be defended, always to be asserted at all hazards; but understood as the liberty of passion, of man's inferior nature, it is any thing but good; it is only another name for slavery, for neither the individual nor the community is, or in the nature of things can be, free, save in governing and restraining the passions, as I never cease repeating to you, and as all young men, and, I am sorry to say, some old men, are always prone to forget. Liberty is in justice, and so is equality. Of each, justice is the measure. What is just is equal, and he who is subjected to no unjust restraint is free. And fraternity is only in the Catholic communion.

O. But you evade the question of democracy, and do not tell us whether it is or is not always right to fall in with the democratic tendency.

B. I have the example of the early Christians before me, and I have read the lives of many martyrs, who would not have been doomed to death for their religion, but who would have been permitted to live, and even have been loaded with honors, if they would only sacrifice to Cæsar, that is, to the state, or temporal authority, to which they owed civil allegiance. I am persuaded, nay, I know, they did well, and I would rather be crowned with them, than enjoy the pleasures of the senses for a season, and be sent to hell at last. I never sacrifice to the temporal authority. I obey it for God's sake, in all things it commands, which are not of sin, which are not incompatible with my love and duty to God. Beyond that, I have only one answer to give it, — "We ought to obey God rather than men." Where democracy is the law I obey it, not because it is democracy, but because it is the *law*; and I hold that I am bound to sustain popular institutions, simply for the reason that I am bound, and to the extent and only to the extent that I am bound, to sustain the laws of my country. Where monarchy or aristocracy is the law, I say precisely the same of it, as I very plainly intimated in our former conversation.

O. But suppose the people in an undemocratic state, in a monarchy or an aristocracy, should come to the belief that their condition would be essentially improved by changing the existing form of government, and adopting the democratic, would they not have a right to do so, and ought not every one, as a friend to liberty, to wish them success, aid them in the attempt to do so, and sympathize with them if defeated.

B. That depends on the sense in which you understand the word *people*, and on the fact whether their belief is well or ill founded. If you mean by *people* the state, they have, undoubtedly, the right to make such changes in the form of their civil polity, not suicidal, as may seem to them good; but I am not bound to wish them success, or to aid them in effecting such changes, or to regret their defeat, if the changes are foolish, uncalled for, and likely to be productive only of evil. If you mean by *people* the people not as the state, but as subjects of the state, they have no such right, for they are, in that sense, bound to obey the law.

R. Then you deny popular sovereignty, — that the people are sovereign.

B. That, again, depends on the sense in which you take the word *people*. If by *people* you mean the state, I do not deny their sovereignty, under God; for I admit that the state is

sovereign, and, within the limits of the moral law, may do what it pleases. If you mean by *people*, not the people as the state, but the people as subjects of the state, I deny their sovereignty; for it would be a contradiction in terms to assert it. They who are held to obey the law, in the sense in which they are held to obedience, are not free to abrogate or change the law. You cannot very logically assume democracy, and from your assumption conclude it.

F. Here is where I complain of you. You admit, indeed, that you are bound to uphold a democratic government where it is the law, but only because it is the law, not because it is the inherent right of every people.

B. That is to say, you complain of me, not because I refuse to obey *Cæsar* where he has legitimate authority to command, but because I will not sacrifice to him as God. Decidedly, my young Catholic friend, you would have been in little danger of martyrdom, had you lived even in the reign of Nero, Decius, Maximianus, or Diocletian.

F. You are too severe. We live in a democratic country, and you know that the great charge against our Church is, that she is hostile to democracy; and the interests of our Church herself require us to refute that charge, by showing that she is favorable to democracy.

B. The great charge against the Church in the time of the pagan Emperors was, that she was hostile to the heathen gods. Suppose some liberal-minded Catholic had risen up and said to his brethren, We live in an idolatrous country, and the great charge against our Church is, that she is hostile to idolatry; her interests therefore require us to refute this charge by burning incense to *Cæsar*. What would the old Saints have replied to him, do you think?

M. The cases are not parallel. Democracy is lawful, but idolatry is never lawful.

B. Precisely. Idolatry can never be tolerated, because it is never lawful; but we may conform to democracy because it is lawful. Certainly, where it is the law democracy is lawful, and there the Church commands us to sustain it; but where it is not the law, but monarchy or aristocracy is, there democracy is not lawful, and to undertake to show that there our Church favors it would be to attempt to show a falsehood, and to prove that our religion favors sedition and rebellion, and that by becoming Catholics we are emancipated from the civil law,—no great recommendation of Catholicity to

statesmen, I should think. It would be a much better reason for expelling her from the state, than for introducing her. In a word, my young Catholic friend, it would be well for you and me to remember that the Church does not rest upon our shoulders, that she has a more powerful supporter than either of us, and that the most effectual method we can adopt of serving her interests is to demean ourselves as her faithful children, believe what she teaches, do what she commands, and leave the care of protecting her to Him whose spouse she is. The best security we can give our heretical countrymen, or which they as lovers of our institutions can ask, is, that our Church is wedded to no particular form of civil polity, and commands us always to obey the law, and to discharge faithfully and conscientiously our duties as citizens and as subjects.

For my part, I pity the blindness and malice of those who urge the charge to which you refer; and I pity still more the silly Catholic, who, in order to get rid of it, tries to prove that his Church is democratic, runs into the wild extremes of radicalism in order to prove that his religion has no influence on his politics, throws up his cap and grows frantic with joy whenever he hears of a rebellion, and hails as a patriot and a saint every despicable scoundrel, whose only merit is that he is a rebel, and has succeeded in kindling the flames of civil war in his country. He may call himself what he pleases, but he is a disgrace to his religion, a living scandal, and unworthy the name of man, much less that of Catholic. No, no, never applaud yourself for being a Catholic of that stamp; call yourself a heathen at once, put on avowedly the livery of the Devil, so that all men can see and mark you for what you are.

F. You may be as severe as you please; but I shall never be persuaded that I cannot be a good Catholic and a good democrat.

B. You can be a good Catholic and a good democrat, if you properly understand yourself. A firm and loyal supporter of democracy, where it is the established order, that is, where it is the law, you not only can be, but, if a good Catholic, must be; but a democrat in the sense that democracy is the inherent right of the people everywhere, and that the multitude in every country has the right, when it chooses, to overthrow existing legal governments for the sake of introducing it, or, in other words, that democracy is universally the legitimate and only legitimate form of government, and that every other form of government is illegitimate, tyrannical, a usurpation, and

therefore null and void from the beginning, — which is the modern European, and, to some extent, American, sense of the word, — you cannot be, and at the same time a good Catholic. If you take the word in this sense, you make Cæsar God, and can worship him only by disavowing the law, and falling into sheer idolatry.

F. But suppose the government of a country dissolved, to have wholly forfeited its rights, so that there is no legitimate government existing; would not the people have the right, in such country and in such case, to establish a democracy, although the previous government had been monarchical?

B. If, as you suppose, the previously existing government is really and totally dissolved, and no political constitution remains in force, the people are thrown back under natural law, and are free to reconstitute the state as seems to them good, — in the democratic, the aristocratic, or the monarchical form, just as they please. The right of the multitude, where there are no legal institutions, to establish the democratic order is no more to be questioned, than their obligation to sustain that order where it is the law. What I deny is, that every form of government but the democratic is, in itself considered, illegal, illegitimate, or tyrannical; and that the people, as subjects of a state, have the right to rebel against any existing legal government not democratic, for the sake of introducing democracy. The right to resist tyranny I am not the man to deny, and that the tyranny of the prince, according to the reasoning of the American Declaration of Independence, absolves the subject from his allegiance, I have always held, and, as a Catholic, must hold, unless I would condemn the principles and practice of my own Church. It is only on this principle that I defend, or am able to defend, the power which she has claimed and exercised of deposing Catholic sovereigns when they became tyrants, and absolving their subjects from their allegiance. The doctrine of the Divine right of kings and passive obedience, as preached by Anglican ministers of the seventeenth century, I no more hold than did Bellarmin, Duperron, or the Spanish Jesuit, Suarez. No Catholic, without temerity, could hold it; for every Catholic must hold that civil power is a trust, and, like all trusts, may be forfeited, and is forfeited when exercised manifestly against the legitimate end of government, that is, the public good. The inamissibility of political power has just as little credit with Catholics as the inamissibility of grace. I have no respect for the memory of Dutch William, but I have never felt that,

were I an Englishman, I should be obliged to uphold the cause of the Stuarts, or refuse allegiance to the Guelfs. I do not believe in the legality of the present French republic, for the Constituent Assembly was not freely elected; but I do not feel it necessary to make myself the champion of the Bourbons, or the enemy of the Bonapartes. The Bourbon family have done enough, a hundred times over, to forfeit their original right to the crown of France, and Louis the Eighteenth was in my eyes no more a legitimate French sovereign than was Napoleon. If the Bourbons, after the Restoration, had given the Church her freedom, and abandoned the old Gallican traditions, they would hardly have been driven a second time into exile. A new restoration may take place, and become legitimate, but nothing in my judgment necessarily prevents either the republic or the empire from also becoming legitimate. For my own part, not being called upon to legislate for France, or to decide what her interest requires, I have no preferences on the subject, except that I must prefer any thing to Red Republicanism. Nor do I bring under the rule I have laid down colonies and conquered nations. A conquered nation, as long as it remains a nation, retains the right to assert, when it can do so with prudence, its national independence; for the right of self-government is inherent and inalienable in every nation as long as it is a nation, that is, as long as it has not by its own consent, expressed or implied, become merged in another. With regard to colonies the case is less clear; but I have no doubt that they *can* arrive at majority, and when they do that they may throw off the authority of the mother country and set up for themselves. What I deny is simply what in modern times is called the "sacred right of insurrection," or the right of the multitude to rebel against a government that only exercises its constitutional powers, and to seek, by way of revolution, to change the administrators or the form of the government, for the sake of what they regard as political or social amelioration. But after a revolution has been effected, the old order destroyed, and a new order established, capable of answering the just ends of government, I hold myself bound to accept and obey the new government, not, indeed, because the people had a right to effect the revolution and introduce it, but because, now it is established, it cannot be opposed without compromising the public good, which I am bound in morals to consult.

I am not opposed to popular governments as such, but I am opposed to the principles on which you young democrats

defend them ; for those principles are repugnant to all government, — to democratic governments themselves, as well as to others. It is just as easy to defend what is good on sound as on unsound principles. If you want merely to sustain your democratic institutions, it suffices to put them under the safeguard of law, and of that religion which makes it binding upon us in conscience to obey the law. But if you wish, under the pretext of establishing democracy, merely to assert the right of rebellion, insurrection, revolution, then I grant my principles will not aid you. And here is precisely why I oppose you. I find no fault with you for believing that democracy is the best form of government for every nation, though I myself believe no such thing ; but what I do find fault with you for is the assertion of the right of the mob in every nation to introduce it against existing law and order, whenever they judge it expedient. This would be to assert the universal right of rebellion, which is the negation of all government, and as incompatible with the maintenance of democratic as of any other government, as I should suppose the democrat himself might see and understand.

You young and unreflecting democrats defend democracy on the Jacobinical or revolutionary principle. It is to that principle I object, and we may have, as we have had, in our own country occasion to see and deplore its mischief. It manifests itself in various sections of our country, and ever and anon we are threatened with a dissolution of the Union. Just now, one class of fanatics are threatening to dissolve the Union, because slavery is legalized in some of the States ; and another class threaten to dissolve it, because there is resistance made to extending slavery where it now does not legally exist. The ring-leaders of both, if not madmen, would deserve punishment for their disloyalty, and would not be suffered to run at large, if public sentiment had not already sanctioned the revolutionary principle, and taken from power all its sacredness. With the revolutionary principle fermenting in the minds and hearts of the people, there can be no government, or none but a government of mere physical force. Abandon your revolutionary doctrines, reassert loyalty as a virtue, and advocate your democratic institutions on the ground that they are the law, and that every man is bound to obey the law, and I am as good a democrat as any of you. But as for advocating democracy on principles which deny law, undermine all government, and leave every one at the mercy of the irresponsible will of the majority, I cannot

do it ; and if you maintain that I must, or be no democrat, then I am, and thank God that I am, no democrat. I demand a government of law, not of arbitrary will, whether your will or mine, — the will of the majority or of the minority.

N. What you say is very just, but your distinctions are too subtle and abstract for the popular mind ; and you will be generally supposed to maintain doctrines that you do not.

B. Possibly so. But you offer in this a strong argument against democracy itself. It is true, any distinctions that do not lie on the surface, that require a little patient thought and power of discrimination, are too subtle and abstract for the popular mind taken collectively, although within the comprehension of almost every one taken singly. Here is the difficulty you always have in popular governments, unless the people are Catholics, and have that intellectual culture which the hearty love and practice of their religion is always sure to give, and not otherwise to be obtained. The great body of the poorest and least educated class of our Catholic population, the "ignorant Irish," as people are fond of saying, can understand any of the distinctions I have made, although never taught to read or write ; and no Catholic, except a mongrel Catholic, who, because he has mingled with heretics, read their books, listened to their political harangues, and caught up a portion of their slang, fancies he is learned, and a bit of a philosopher and politician to boot, will stumble at any of them. I have had some experience in this matter. I have addressed, on the subject of which we have been speaking, both Protestant audiences and Catholic, and have even been astonished at the difference between them. To the Protestant I am obliged to simplify my language, to multiply my illustrations, and use all the precautions I would if addressing a class of pupils on one of the lower forms, and yet find that I make myself only imperfectly understood ; while, to a Catholic audience, made up in no small part of laborers and servant-girls, I can speak right on in my own natural way, as I do to you, and feel always sure of being very generally understood, and of having my distinctions marked and appreciated. My audience are religious, and their religion has given them understanding. If one has got something to say of serious importance, something that is really worth saying and necessary to be said, something not superficial, but solid and profound, it is a pleasure to address a genuine unsophisticated Catholic audience. Your words are sure to tell ; they do not bound back to you, as does your axe when chop-

ping cork. It is my experience in this respect that has convinced me that a Catholic country, a really Catholic country, can be well governed under a democracy, and that a Protestant or an infidel country cannot be.

A Protestant country cannot be, because Protestantism is illogical, unintellectual, both in itself and in its influence. Ask a Protestant what he believes; he can tell you, within certain limits, what he does *not* believe, but in vain does he try to tell you, in any clear or precise manner, what he does believe. In mere worldly matters, or material interests, he may be shrewd, and show intellectual acuteness and clearness, but in all other matters, in all that pertains to great principles of justice, or the higher order of intellectual and moral truth, he no sooner opens his mouth to speak, than you see that his mind is darkened, that his mental perception is dull, and his ideas are muddy and confused. He even regards all mental clearness, distinctness, and precision of thought as scholastic subtilities, to be despised by every man of common sense. Indeed, if you show a tendency to distinct, clear, and exact thought, he will make it the ground of reproach to you, and will applaud himself that he is above such littleness. Hence it is that Protestantism and Protestant culture, however powerful they may be in overthrowing an old established order, or obscuring and rendering ineffectual well-settled principles, are peculiarly unfitted to sustain popular institutions. Hence, as a general rule, popular freedom has little prevalence in Protestant countries. England is the freest Protestant country in Europe, and she is less free than she was when Catholic. Ours is the only really free country in the world where the majority of the people call themselves Protestant, and we owe our freedom to the accidents of our situation, and to the fact that the colonists were very generally dissenters from the Anglican Establishment, identified with the Anglican monarchy, not at all to Protestantism as such.

Nothing will save freedom here but the prevalence of Catholicity. Wild and reckless fanaticism is at work with our institutions, undermining law, and preparing the way for anarchy and despotism; principles are widely disseminated by all parties, that are incompatible with the existence of society itself; ever and anon, parties growing more and more formidable for their numbers and influence, spring up amongst us, and seek to translate their false principles into facts, or to make the country practically conform to them. In vain do you seek to arrest the evil. To do so you must draw, now and then, even

nice distinctions, and call upon the people to discriminate. But your distinctions are condemned as vain subtleties, as above the comprehension of the people, as unpopular, and making you unpopular; and the very men who see and feel their importance will make them subjects of ridicule with the people, and bid the rabble hoot at you for expressing them. Democracy itself has a natural tendency to merge the individual in the crowd, to bring every thing down to a common-place level, and to superinduce the habit of asking, not, What is true and just? but, What will the people say? What will go down with the people? It is only by virtue of the presence of a highly intellectual religion, like the Catholic, — a religion that leaves us neither to reason without faith, nor to faith without reason, but gives us reason with faith, and faith with reason, that is adapted to the human soul, appeals to man's spiritual nature, and by its august offices, its solemn prayers, its public instructions, and private meditations, keeps the mind and heart in constant exercise on the highest order of truth, — that the leveling and deadening influence of democracy can be neutralized, and the mental activity and discrimination necessary to its preservation and wholesome operation can be secured. The very objection you urge against me is conclusive against your favorite democracy, unless you have the Church present as the religion of the great majority of the people. Protestant or godless democracy, like that which is popularly preached at home and abroad, would very soon plunge the most civilized nation into barbarism.

The considerations you suggest only show the necessity of the Catholic Church, under a political and social point of view no less than under a religious, to the salvation of society as well as to the salvation of the soul. It is necessary to inspire that spirit of self-sacrifice, that heroic virtue, without which society becomes a field of blood, or a mere charnel-house. All the evils of society spring from pride and the predominance of the flesh, and no greater absurdity was ever sent up to us from the pit, than that of attempting to maintain order and social prosperity by playing off the pride and lust of one against the pride and lust of another. Less absurd were those grave philosophers of Laputa, who attempted to extract sunbeams from cucumbers. You cannot extract virtue from vice, nor develop social order and well-being from the elements of disorder and ruin. You can remove the evils only so far as you succeed in removing or in subduing the pride and lust from

which they spring. It needs no great philosophy to know this, and still less, one would suppose, to perceive that you neither remove nor subdue the causes by employing them and providing for their universal activity.

Your modern reformers, socialists, communists, Red Republicans, and radical democrats, are a stupid race of mortals, and as blind as they are destructive. They all undertake to obtain from unmitigated selfishness the results, which, in the nature of things, can be obtained only from the severest and most self-denying virtue. All their schemes are based on the principle, that selfishness is to be made to produce the results of the most perfect disinterestedness, or that pure selfishness, having a perfectly open field and fair play, is the equivalent of pure disinterested affection. What falsehood ! What nonsense ! Yet these men call themselves philosophers, — the great lights of our age ! Alas ! “if the light that is in you be darkness, how great is that darkness !”

As long as ignorance and sin remain, as long as men retain their vicious propensities and passions, there will be evil in the world, and there is not a more consummate fool than he who looks for a perfect civil polity, or a perfect state of society. Something to mitigate, even to ameliorate, no doubt, may be done, but can be done in no merely outward way. Nothing can be done further than you can reach the individual mind and heart, and bring them into harmony with the will of God, as he has revealed it in his word, and proclaims it through the voice of his Church. Men will never succeed in ameliorating their earthly condition till they learn to live for heaven alone, till they see all things in the light of God as their supreme good, and seek to modify them only at the bidding of divine charity.

You young men, even some of you who call yourselves Catholics, forget this. You have suffered yourselves to be seduced by the tempter. Protestantism and infidelity have no power over you, when they attack directly your Church or her dogmas ; there you are on your guard and are firm ; but you have not been equally on your guard against their indirect attacks, their attacks through your social affections and sentiments, your love of political liberty, — intensified by long ages of Protestant misrule and oppression in the countries of your birth or descent, — and your desire of worldly prosperity and social position. Through these the tempter assails you ; through these he whispers to you honeyed words, makes you sweet promises, and excites brilliant hopes, only to undermine

your faith, to entangle you in his snares, and to drag you down to hell, — to hell both here and hereafter. Here is your danger ; here is your weak side. You listen with the open hearts of generous youth, with the confidence of unsuspecting innocence, to the soft words of the betrayer, as to an angel of light. You are caught, you are led on from step to step, till you find yourselves far from the home of your fathers, far from the affectionate embrace of your mother, in arms against your Church, false to all your vows to God, false to yourselves, a grief to all good men and angels, and a joy only to the enemies of religion, who, while accepting the treason, despise the traitor. The very devils despise those they are able to seduce, and so do their children and servants, infidels, heretics, and schismatics.

Nay, my young friends, if you would be free and noble, and honored even, listen never to the siren voice of the charmer. The entrance of the career into which she would seduce you may be bright and flowery, but its progress grows darker and rougher at every step, till it finally ends abruptly in the blackness of eternal despair. I know that career which you are tempted to believe opens into life. I entered it as innocent and as full of hope as yourselves, and, as I fondly trusted, with motives pure and holy. Alas ! how was I deceived ! I lost my innocence, my virtue, every thing that a man should hold dear and sacred, found myself the companion of scoffers and blasphemers, a chief among the revilers of God's truth and God's law, and have gained only a stock of bitter experience, and a source of continual regret. Fear God, my young friends, and keep his commandments, for this is the whole of man. Be true to God, and he will never abandon you ; serve him as he commands, with promptitude and fidelity, and fear nothing for your earthly prosperity, or for the spread and maintenance of liberty.

ART. V. — *The Plan of the American Union, and the Structure of its Government explained and defended.* By JAMES A. WILLIAMS. Baltimore : Sherwood & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 168.

[This article was originally prepared for the *American Review*, at the request of the talented and accomplished editor of that highly

respectable journal, and in great part appeared in its number for August last. But as the editor omitted certain portions, and as his printers greatly disfigured, by serious typographical errors, the portions accepted, the writer of the article wishes us to insert it as it was originally prepared; which we do without any hesitation, for its views are our own. — *Ed. B. Q. Review.*]

THIS work appears to have been written with an honest intention, and it bears evident marks of talent and serious study. It contains many just views on the Constitution of the United States, clearly, though not very vividly, expressed, but appears to us to err in its general theory of government, by overlooking the fact, that the necessity of government does not grow wholly out of the depravity of human nature, and that government itself is not restricted in its functions merely to the repression of violence, or the unjust encroachment of one man upon the rights of another. The maintenance of justice, or the repression and redress of injustice, is, no doubt, a chief function of government; but government has beyond this a positive mission to perform, positive benefits to confer or secure, which in no sense grow out of the wickedness of man, and which would be the same whatever the intelligence and virtue of individuals. Man is by his essential nature a social being, and demands society; and society demands social as well as individual labors. These labors have for their end, not merely the negative, but the positive, benefit of the whole community, and cannot be performed without government, by which society is made a corporation, capable of acting as an individual person.

But our present purpose is not to criticize this little work itself; we have introduced it simply as an occasion for offering some remarks on the subject of the presidential or executive veto,—a subject which we should be happy to see discussed more generally than it has been, in a calm, philosophic spirit, from the point of view of the statesman, rather than from that of the demagogue or the partisan.

There is, and, as long as human nature remains as it is, will be, under popular governments, a strong tendency in the party that has succeeded to exaggerate the intrinsic importance of the constitutional provisions to which it owes its success, and also in the party frequently unsuccessful, to depreciate or unreasonably oppose those provisions, which, in their operations, have thwarted its wishes. We like that which aids us; we are hostile to that which defeats us. The men who can look be-

yond the passions of the moment, and judge of the merits of an institution by its average results, are, always and everywhere, comparatively few ; the great majority look neither before nor after ; they fix their eyes on the present ; what favors that is for them good, — good in all times and places, and under all circumstances ; what here and now impedes or thwarts them is bad, — can never be of service to them, must always work against them, and should nowhere, and under no circumstances, be tolerated for a moment. Constitutions are designed to maintain a fixed and permanent rule, and, if they answer their purpose, must not unfrequently control popular wishes and tendencies, and often restrain the majority, and prevent them, for a time at least, from adopting measures which they may be persuaded are for the interests of the country. Hence we must always expect under popular governments a party that will be dissatisfied with the constitution, now with this provision and now with that, and ready to agitate for its amendment, alteration, or total suppression.

It can hardly, as yet, have been forgotten, that, under the administration of General Jackson, the constitution of the Senate of the United States was the object of virulent attacks from the Democratic party of the time. That party denounced the Senate, as the aristocratic branch of the government, as repugnant to the genius of free institutions, and demanded its essential modification, because, just then, it happened not to be in their favor. Yet that party to-day find the Senate a purely democratic institution, and their chief reliance to prevent the administration from adopting a policy to which they are opposed ; for they happen to have just now a majority of Senators on their side. They no longer denounce it as aristocratic, and no longer demand that its constitution be modified. On the other hand, it is remembered, that, in consequence of the use or abuse of the executive veto by General Jackson and Mr. Tyler, to defeat important measures which had received the sanction of a majority of Congress, many in the Whig party who were strongly in favor of those measures, believing them really demanded by the industry and business of the country, took up the notion that the veto power is anti-republican, exceedingly liable to be abused, and in its abuse throwing such undue influence into the hands of the executive as to endanger our free institutions, and therefore a constitutional provision that should be either abolished or essentially modified. Yet who is prepared to say that the time may not

even soon come when these same politicians will find the executive veto their best, perhaps their only, safeguard against measures which in their judgment would be ruinous to the country?

The tendency, when we are disappointed or defeated by some constitutional provision, to complain of the constitution itself, and to propose its amendment to suit our wishes for the moment, is strengthened and apparently justified by certain false notions as to the origin of constitutions and as to the rights of majorities, which have become, or are becoming, quite prevalent in our country, as well as in some others. It was pretended by some men in the last century, who then passed for philosophers, that to make a constitution is the easiest thing in the world; that nothing is simpler or more feasible than for a people, without government, or irrespective of it, acting as if in a state of nature, to come together in person or by their delegates in convention, and give themselves any constitution they please, and provide for its wise and beneficent practical operation. They put forth the most extravagant follies on the excellence and perfectibility of human nature, and virtually deified the people. They disdained, indeed, to believe in God, blasphemously alleging that they "had never seen him at the end of their telescopes"; but they did not hesitate to transfer to the people all the essential attributes of the Deity, and to fall down and worship them as a divinity. The people could remedy all evils; the people could make no mistake; the people could do no wrong; and we had only to clear the way for the free, full, and immediate expression of the popular will, in order to have a perfect civil constitution, and a wise and just administration. Hence there need be no hesitancy to overthrow existing institutions, to break up established order, or to trust to the unchecked will of the people for a wise remodelling of the state, or the reconstruction of society. In consequence of the prevalence of such a pleasant theory, all fear of change was removed, all prudence in experimenting or in introducing innovations rendered superfluous, and all attachment to old institutions or to a long-existing established order foolish, if not wicked. Nothing in heaven or on earth was to be henceforth sacred or inviolable, but the will of the people, — that is, the will of the demagogues who could contrive to speak for the people, — and we were to surrender ourselves to that will with as much confidence, and with as little reserve, as the Saint surrenders himself to the will of God.

Into this silly and impious doctrine the fathers of our repub-

lic did not fall. They were no vague theorizers, no mad visionaries ; they were plain, practical men, who looked at realities, and dealt with things as they found them. But this doctrine, which has for the last sixty years convulsed all Europe, overturned thrones, displaced dynasties, and left few things standing, except despotism on the one side, and the mob on the other, has finally found its way amongst us, and spread far and wide its subtle poison through our community. Our people, in large numbers, forget that constitutions are generated, not made, and that no convention can draw up and impose a constitution, which shall be really a constitution, unless its essential principles are already, through Providence, established in the wants, the habits, the usages, the manners and customs of the people for whom it is intended ; that the constitution can never be arbitrarily imposed, but must always grow out of the preëxisting elements of the national life ; and that when once formed, it is to be henceforth modified only according to its own internal law, through the most urgent necessity, and with the greatest delicacy and the most consummate wisdom and prudence. Hence they cease to regard the constitution as sacred, and look upon it as a thing that may be changed with as much facility, and almost for as slight reasons, as a gentleman changes the fashion of his coat, or a lady the make of her bonnet. To change it is not only the easiest, but the safest, thing in the world. Consequently, the thought of submitting to a present inconvenience, of suffering a constitutional provision which restrains their will or thwarts their present wishes, rarely occurs to them ; and whenever things do not go to their mind, they clamor for a change of the constitution. The danger of this state of the public mind hardly needs to be pointed out to the statesman. It is incompatible with every thing like established order, with every thing permanent or stable in government, and keeps every thing unsettled and fluctuating.

From the fact, that under our political order the greater number of questions are determined by the will of the majority, a large class of our politicians — seldom accustomed to look beneath the surface, or to trace facts to their principles — conclude that the majority have a *natural* right to govern, and that whatever tends to hinder the free and full expression of their will is contrary to natural law, and smells of usurpation and tyranny. They are exceedingly scandalized when they find the constitution opposing a barrier to the will of the majority, and call out with all their force, from the

very top of their lungs, for its amendment. Is it not the essential principle of all republicanism, say they, that the majority must govern? What, then, can be more anti-republican, more really undemocratic, than to uphold a constitution that hinders the majority from doing whatever they please? But these sage politicians would do well to remember that the right of the majority to rule is a *civil*, not a *natural*, right, and exists only by virtue of positive law. Anterior to civil society, or under the law of nature, all men are equal, respectively independent, and no one has any authority over another. Each is independent of all, and all of each; and both majorities and minorities are inconceivable. Civil society must be constituted before you can even conceive the existence of a *political* majority or a political minority, and when it is constituted, neither has any rights but those the particular civil constitution confers. Deriving their existence and their rights from the civil constitution, it is absurd to pretend that the majority are, or can be, deprived of any of their rights by any constitutional provision whatever. If, then, a given constitutional provision should restrain the majority, or prevent them from making their will prevail, that is no just cause of complaint; for no law is broken, no right is violated; and where no law is broken, no right violated, no injustice is done.

Setting aside these false notions or pretensions of modern radicals and socialists, which are revolutionary in principle, and incompatible, not only with all stable government, but with the very existence of the state (*status*), of *legal* order itself, we must always approach every established constitution with the presumption, as the lawyers say, in its favor, and as bound to accept and sustain it as it is, unless good and sufficient reasons are forthcoming for its alteration or amendment. On no other condition can we be distinguished, in principle, from radicals and destructives, and consistently profess to be conservatives, or friends of liberty, because friends of order. The presumption is universally in favor of authority; that the constitution, as it is, is right; that the law is just; and before we can have the right even to entertain a proposition to alter it, we must be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is wrong, that it is unjust. The fact that the veto power is in the constitution is to us, therefore, a presumption that it ought to be there, and a sufficient motive for retaining it until a valid and sufficient reason is shown for abolishing it. We insist on this view of the case, because we are anxious that the principle we indicate

should be regarded. The opposite principle is rapidly gaining ground amongst us, if, indeed, it has not already become predominant. The fashion is now to presume every man guilty till proved innocent ; to hold every charge true till it is proved to be false ; all government, all law, all authority, in the wrong, till the contrary is established. The popular tendency is to arraign government before the bar of anarchy, and compel it to vindicate its own innocence ; thus reversing all the maxims of law, of justice, and of logic hitherto recognized and held in respect by the common sense of mankind. It is well, therefore, to remind the public, occasionally, that the presumption is always on the side of the constitution and the authorities holding under it.

The value of the veto power is not, however, left to be merely presumed. It is a vital element in our general system of government, which is not so much an original system, as an original and peculiar modification of the English system, well known to be a government of *ESTATES*, as distinguished from what has received the name of *CENTRALISM*. The characteristic feature of the English Constitution is the separation, on the one hand, of the bodies represented in the government, and, on the other, of the powers of government itself, each with a veto on the others. It is solely in this separation of the constituent bodies, and of the several departments of government, each with its veto, that consist the beauty and excellence of the English system ; and it is this alone that constitutes the safeguard of English liberty. These divisions and veto power attaching to each are not in themselves, it is true, favorable to the efficiency of administration, nor are they intended to be so ; they are intended to serve as checks or restraints on power, and to prevent it from becoming despotic, or hostile to the liberty of the subject ; and the peculiar merit of the English system is, that they serve this purpose without impairing, in too great a degree, the unity and force of authority.

This system we inherited with the Common Law from our English ancestors, and have retained with simply such modifications as the circumstances of our country and the elements of our society rendered necessary or expedient. In interpreting our institutions, we are always to seek our principle of interpretation in this system, and are never to resort to any of the ancient republican, or to any of the modern democratic theories. Our government is republican in the sense that it is not monarchical ; it is democratic in the sense that it recognizes

no political aristocracy, and treats all men as equal before the law ; but in no other sense is it, or was it ever intended to be, either republican or democratic, — save as all governments that are instituted for the public weal, instead of the private benefit of the governors, are republican, whatever their form. The people with us are the *motive* power, but not the *directive*, the governing power ; the government vests in the constitution rather than in them ; for outside of it they have no political existence, and they have no political authority, except from it, and in and through it. The government, in principle, is the government of law, not the government of mere will, whether of the one, the few, or the many. The constitution governs the state, or the people in their collective and associated capacity ; the ordinary laws govern the people as individuals.

It is well to bear this fact in mind, especially in these times, when the rage is to abolish law, and introduce everywhere governments of mere will. Law is the will of the sovereign regulated by reason, the expression of power united with justice ; will without reason is power disjoined from justice, and therefore the essential or the distinctive principle of despotism. Every government which is a government of mere will is despotic and incompatible with freedom, whether the will be that of the king, of the nobility, or of the democracy, — of the minority or of the majority. Strange as it may seem, there is not the least conceivable difference in principle between autocracy or Oriental despotism, and the pure absolute democracy which is just now the fashion in Italy, in France, in parts of Germany, and, we are sorry to add, in our own country. There can be no more true liberty under the one than under the other ; in each the sovereign authority is absolute, unlimited, and under both, the law, or what is to be regarded as law, is nothing but the expression of mere arbitrary will. Practically, we should prefer the Russian or Oriental despotism to that which our fashionable democrats are laboring to establish here, both in the several States and in the nation, and which the National Assembly have done their best, in the ridiculous constitution they have just promulgated, to fasten upon France ; for we would much rather be subject to a single despot than to a mob of despots. In consequence of mistaking the real character of our government, of overlooking the fact, that what its framers most sedulously guarded against was that of making it, or leaving it to become, a government of mere will, and of seeking to naturalize amongst us a wild and destructive democracy im-

ported from abroad, from the radicals of Europe, who are born despots, and have not the least imaginable conception either of the nature or of the conditions of true liberty. Our democratic politicians have created, or suffered to be formed, in our community, a public opinion which already hinders the regular working of our political system, and threatens, at no distant day, if not soon arrested, its very existence.

The separation of the constituent bodies, represented in king, lords, and commons, adopted in England, we have not adopted, and could not have adopted if we had wished, because there was nothing in our society which rendered it either necessary or practicable. We had no king, and no lords ; for, as Mr. Bancroft has well remarked, royalty and nobility did not emigrate. Only the third estate emigrated. Of the three estates represented in the English government, we had only one, the commons, and of course could not represent what we had not. Having but one estate, we necessarily approached nearer to centralism in representation than the English, and so far their constitution has an advantage over ours. Nevertheless, in consequence of the division of the country into separate States, we have been able, in some degree, to escape centralism in the constitution of the national Senate, and we have also done it to some extent, though not as far as we might and ought to have done, in the several States, by dividing the representatives into two chambers, each with a different electoral basis. But in regard to the separation of the powers of government into legislative, executive, and judiciary departments, we have in the general government, and in most of the State governments, conformed exactly to the English model.

This separation of the powers of government into distinct and mutually independent departments, by which we escape the worst form of centralism, is fundamental in our political system, and to change it would destroy the essential character of the system itself, and, by centralizing all the powers of government in one and the same department, would render freedom wholly impracticable. To the maintenance of this separation, and of each department in its independence, the executive veto is indispensable, as every statesman—we say not every politician—must readily perceive and admit. It was given by the Convention, mainly, though not exclusively, to enable the executive to maintain its independence in face of legislative encroachments. Without it, there would be no independent, no efficient, and no responsible executive. All

the powers of government would be absorbed by Congress, and the President would cease to be the President of the United States, responsible to the public for his acts, and become merely an officer of Congress, with no functions but to execute blindly its mandates. The balance between the several powers intended could not be preserved, and the government would in principle, and very soon in practice, degenerate into a parliamentary despotism, like that of the Long Parliament in England, that of the Convention in France, and that which the latest French constitution contemplates, and will secure, if it lasts without essential alterations.

We are as strongly opposed to the "one-man power" as are any of our contemporaries, and as anxious to guard against every tendency towards monarchy as any body can be; but there is no less to be apprehended from legislative than from executive encroachment. Perhaps, under our peculiar system, the danger of legislative usurpations is even more imminent than any other, and executive usurpations themselves are chiefly stimulated by them. Against legislative usurpations the people are seldom on their guard; they are always usurpations which receive the support of the majority, and opposition to them is never raised, except from the minority, who are always impotent to resist, and still more impotent to redress them. Experience proves that legislative bodies always seek to absorb in themselves all the powers of government. The failure of the French during sixty years of experimenting to establish a free and stable government, has been due to their mad attempts to concentrate all the powers of government in the legislature, to their blind confidence in the wisdom and integrity of legislators, and their insane distrust of an efficient executive. In all their efforts we see them aiming to make the legislature omnipotent, and the executive a nullity. Aside from his patronage, and means through that of exerting an indirect and corrupting influence, the present executive of France has as little power as a Virginia governor. No government can be stable or efficient without a strong and independent executive. A weak executive, especially in a large state, is a great curse, alike impotent to do good or to prevent evil. An administration that wants power to protect itself, that trembles every moment for its own existence, that has no discretion, no responsibility, is as mischievous as it is contemptible; for its resort is always to low cunning, to craft, to corruption. The history of the English Parliament proves to moral demonstration the tendency

of all legislative bodies, and the most serious danger to which the English constitution is now exposed is from the omnipotence of the legislature. The Revolution of 1688, which consisted in the final triumph of the Parliament over the crown, had it not been for King William's Dutch troops, and the Tory influence on the side of the executive in some measure holding the Whigs in check, and preventing them from realizing the last consequences of their victory, would have been not less disastrous for Great Britain than the Revolution of 1789 has been for France. The executive lies even now at the mercy of Parliament, and were it not for its patronage, and means of influence by appeals to interest, cupidity, the love of place or emolument, it would have scarcely the shadow of power. Were we subjects of the English government, we should seek to weaken the legislative department and to strengthen the executive; for of all despotisms the legislative is the most intolerable, more especially when the legislature is but the tool of an odious oligarchy.

So deeply impressed were the Convention of 1787 with the tendency of legislative bodies to absorb in themselves all the powers of the state, that many of them were for giving the executive even an absolute negative on all the acts of Congress; and some, fearing the executive would want the firmness to interpose his negative as often as it might be necessary, were for strengthening and encouraging him, by joining with him in a council of revision the supreme judges themselves. It is well they did not; but their proposition to do so is instructive, as showing how much the Convention distrusted legislative bodies, and how much importance they attached to the veto power, as enabling the executive to maintain his independence and respectability, and save himself from becoming the mere slave of Congress. No subsequent experience proves them to have judged hastily or unwisely. We need no argument to prove the importance of maintaining the independence and respectability of the executive. If he should cease to be independent, if his functions should be reduced from those of President of the United States to those of a mere executive officer of Congress, he would feel himself relieved of all responsibility of government; he would take no oversight of affairs, would make no efforts to maintain a wise and efficient administration; but would throw all responsibility upon Congress, and either enjoy his ease, as a *roi fainéant*, or exert all his craft, cunning, and opportunities, to abuse power to his own selfish pur-

poses. And how, without the veto power, he is to maintain his independence, and Congress is to be prevented from combining in itself both the legislative and the executive or administrative powers of government, is more than we are able to comprehend.

But the executive veto is necessary, not only to prevent the centralization of the powers of government, and to preserve the independence and respectability of the executive department, but also as a check on hasty and unjust legislation. There is, perhaps, far more need of such a check than the mass of our people now-a-days suspect, — at least the framers of the Constitution believed it to be highly necessary. They were, in the modern sense, no democrats, and had not the slightest tendency to radicalism. They were practical statesmen, who sought not to carry out a theory, but to establish a wise, strong, and durable government, which, in its practical operations, should secure the blessings of union, liberty, and internal peace, maintain justice, and promote the common weal. They held in horror all absolute governments, whether royal, noble, or popular, and, aware that power, in whatever hands it is lodged, may be abused if there is an opportunity to abuse it, they sought to guard against the tyranny of the sovereign at the same time that they secured the obedience of the subject. They had not learned to reject all the lessons of experience, and were far from accepting the doctrine of the impeccability of man, or of the divinity of the people. They believed that the people could err and do wrong as well as kings and nobles, in their collective as well as in their individual capacity, and that tyranny and oppression are tyranny and oppression when proceeding from a popular, no less than when proceeding from a royal or a noble source. They believed, strange as it may sound to the unfledged politicians of the day, that majorities can err and oppress as well as minorities, and that, although the rule that the majority must govern is adopted, it is necessary to subject the majority to such restraints, that, to be able to govern at all, it must govern justly. Here we may see their practical wisdom. They did not seek merely to enable the majority to govern, — so to organize the government that no will but the will of the majority should ever prevail, — but they went farther, and sought to establish limits to that will itself.

A government in which the will of the majority is unlimited, in which it can always prevail, is just as much an absolute government, and just as despotic in principle, as the most absolute

monarchy that ever existed. There is under it no guaranty of the liberty of the subject in face of power, — the essential element in all free governments. Modern democrats are aware of this, and seek to blunt the force of the objection, by assuming that the will of the majority is the will of the people, and that the people are always just and never will abuse their power. But we might as well say that the absolute monarch is always just and will never abuse his power. If it comes to deifying, we may as well deify the king as the people. Experience no more proves that the people can do no wrong, than it does that the king can do no wrong. There is never any guaranty for liberty where there is nothing that limits or restrains the exercise of arbitrary will, or sets bounds to the sovereign power; and, even if the people were not themselves capable of abusing their power, we know perfectly well that demagogues can usurp and abuse it for them. The Convention perfectly understood this, and throughout they were as anxious to provide for a limitation of authority, as they were to provide for the supremacy of the law itself, — for governing, if we may so speak, the government, as for governing the subject. The majority, indeed, must govern, directly or indirectly; but it must govern only under certain conditions, according to certain rules, within certain bounds.

But the Convention did not consider it enough to mark these bounds, and to prescribe these rules and conditions, on paper. "Experience," said Mr. Madison, "has taught us a distrust of that security, and that it is necessary to introduce such a balance of powers and interests as will guaranty the provisions on paper."* Paper constitutions are mere cobwebs, unless the organization of powers under them is such as to render it impossible for any power to violate them. Power will be sure to violate them, if able, whenever it has a sufficient motive to do so. If power is lodged in the majority, impose on it what paper restraints you please, you are no better off than if you had no constitution at all, unless you have somewhere in the state a force that guaranties them, that rises up and effectually resists the attempted violation. The Convention, therefore, while they engrossed the Constitution on parchment, took care to register it in the effectual organization of the several powers of government. The separation of the powers of government into distinct departments, each pro-

* *Madison Papers*, p. 1167.

vided with the means of self-defence, the separation of the legislature into two houses, the peculiar constitution of the Senate, the senatorial term for the long period of six years, and the necessity of the concurrent vote of both houses to an act of Congress, were all designed to operate as so many checks on the will of the majority, and to prevent, by restraining its action, hasty and unjust legislation. It was not enough to write on paper that Congress shall pass no laws hastily or without a due regard to justice; it was necessary to go farther, and to subject the enacting of laws to such conditions, to so many forms and processes, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to get a law hastily enacted, or enacted at all if contrary to justice.

The executive veto is integral in the system of checks on the will of the majority, of restraints imposed on the exercise of sovereign power, which the Convention saw proper to establish. The Convention installed the majority as sovereign, but as a limited, not as an absolute sovereign; and the executive veto is an integral part of the limitation which they imposed. They wished to make legislation, not easy, but difficult; and were far more anxious that the laws should be wise and just, than that they should be numerous. Their study was to subject every measure proposed to be adopted to the most rigid scrutiny, and to render it impossible for any measure to become a law till after it had been thoroughly sifted, and had received the approbation of the best minds and the highest wisdom of the country. To this end they required to the enactment of a law the concurrence of all branches of the government. They gave to each house a negative on the other, and to the executive and judiciary departments each a negative, at least a qualified or conditional negative, on both. The negative of the judiciary answers its purpose as far it goes; but it is insufficient, because the judiciary cannot take cognizance of the policy of a measure, and can interpose its negative only on the ground that the measure is unconstitutional. The system of checks would, therefore, have been incomplete, without the executive veto, which can negative an act, not only for its unconstitutionality, but also for its impolicy.

That the system of checks established has proved too strong, that it has rendered legislation too difficult, no statesman can pretend. Our danger lies, as experience amply proves, in too much legislation, not in too little. The tendency to over-legislate is quite too strong, and we make quite too little of wise and efficient administration. Nothing more distinguishes

modern times from antiquity than our excessive legislation, and tendency to make legislating, instead of administering, the chief business of government. The facility with which old laws are repealed or modified, and new statutes enacted, and not in our country only, is really frightful ; and what the end thereof will be, men of stronger nerves than we may well tremble to think. The utmost contempt for law and the wildest disorder would prevail, even now, if it did not happen that our courts preserve the common law, the *lex non scripta*, which, happily for us, serves as a public conscience, and regulates the greater part of the relations between man and man. If the party among us opposed to the common law should succeed in abolishing it, and in reducing the whole law of the land to the *lex scripta*, or statute law, we should soon find ourselves as bad off as if we had no law at all. No man could tell for six months what the law would be. We scarcely, in the State or the nation, enact a law before we modify or repeal it, and especially if it is a law likely to prove of some utility in its practical operation. We have no settled policy ; we are disputing about the simplest elements of both civil and criminal law, and multiplying statutes by steam, which would throw every thing into confusion, if the courts did not now and then go the full length of their prerogative in interpreting them, so as to get an innocent meaning where the legislature had either no meaning, or a meaning subversive of all the legitimate ends of legislation. Surely no statesman, especially no lawyer worthy of the name, can wish for greater facility of legislation than we now have, or regard the actual constitution as rendering it too difficult.

It is strange, we remark by the way, that at this late period of the world's history this rage for legislating should obtain, and whole communities should act as if law had now for the first time to be created. Has nothing been settled, and have we existed as a civilized people for these two hundred years without law, or without law adequate to the wants of a free and thriving people ? Do we need to be told that law, as a science, was perfected even centuries before we were born, and that the modifications necessary to adapt it to what there may be novel or peculiar in our condition and circumstances are very few ? Are we aware how many of the evils we are compelled to suffer spring from the rejection of old law science, and from experimenting in legislation as if we had the whole science to build up anew ? Do we need to be told that our foolish legislative experiments

are the principal cause of the constant convulsions of our business world, and that, had it not been for the youth and vigor of our community, our experimental legislation would long ere this, by the insecurity to property it causes, and the frequency with which it makes it pass from its owners to others, have proved our total ruin? Surely, if we trace the history of our legislation for the last twenty years, we shall not doubt that checks on sovereign power are needed, and all the checks, and more than all the checks, the Constitution provides.

The Convention felt that there would be a tendency to hasty, unnecessary, and ruinous legislation; but that tendency has proved to be stronger even than they apprehended. They had no great confidence in the people or in majorities at best, but they did not foresee how majorities would be manufactured, nor anticipate the introduction of that perfect party discipline and party machinery which we have since introduced, and which render the people either a nullity, or the blind tools of irresponsible party managers. This discipline and machinery, when adopted by one party, has to be adopted by the other in self-defence, and we have now arrived at the point when all the affairs of government are managed by party; and a power, through party, unknown to the Constitution, is installed as sovereign. This power is vested, nobody can say where, or precisely in whom; it is wielded by no public law, by no responsible chiefs, and though all-controlling, you can nowhere lay your finger on it. It is at once the slave and the master of every body. This power, acting without public recognition, without public responsibility, dictates the policy of the government, and selects the candidates for office. The officers, when chosen, find themselves subject to it, hemmed in by it, obliged, they can hardly tell why or wherefore, to obey it; and, having no employment for their own judgments, they give themselves up to it, and merge their own responsibility in its irresponsibleness, and never trouble themselves to ascertain whether what they do is for the good of the country or not; it is enough for them that it receives the sanction of their party. The consequence is, that we do not get in the acts of government an expression of the popular reason, nor the personal convictions or conscientious judgments of even the men who are nominally clothed with authority; we get only the wishes or interests of party, or rather of the unnamable and irresponsible managers of party, one-sided and selfish, and rarely compatible with the interests of the country at large. Nothing is or can be more important,

then, than an organization of restraints which render legislation difficult, and prevent the possessors of power from rushing, in their madness and irresponsibleness, into measures absolutely ruinous to the country. You have some moral hold of a man as long as there is nothing between him and the public, as long as he feels that he must answer directly to the public for his acts ; but when there stands a party between him and the public, and his reliance is on his party and not on his country, you have none at all. If he does the will of his party, that will uphold him and vindicate his acts ; and that is all that his interest or his reputation requires. Consequently, the more predominant is partyism, the more necessary are constitutional checks on power.

It is true, that the very reasons which render the executive veto the more necessary tend to render it less adequate ; because the same doctrine of party operates on the executive with hardly less force than on the members of Congress themselves, and tends to withhold him from employing it against a favorite measure of his own party, — perhaps the very measure of all others against which he ought to employ it. This is an evil, a great evil, but not an objection to the veto power itself. It is an objection only to its sufficiency, and proves, not that it is injurious, but that it does not do all the good or prevent all the mischief it should. The executive that refuses to employ it when he should is as an executive that has it not, and his refusing to employ it when its employment would do good is, as far as it goes, an argument for it, not against it. This evil, which we admit, will, no doubt, subsist as long as parties continue their present policy of selecting as candidates for the chief magistracy of the republic, not their greatest and best men, — men well known to be fully qualified for the office, and able to stand of themselves without being held up by party discipline and machinery, — but their most available men, — men who will run the best, because they carry the least weight. This is a bad policy even for the party itself, as well as for the country, though sometimes, perhaps, necessary, in order to avoid the greater evil. When one party adopts it, such is the feebleness, short-sightedness, and silliness of the mass of every party, that the other is often obliged to do the same. But the consequence is always bad. The executive wants self-reliance ; conscious of his own inexperience, perhaps of his own inability, to discharge properly the duties of his high office, he is afraid to act independently, from his own convic-

tions, on his own responsibility, and therefore throws himself back on his party, merges his individuality in it, yields blindly to its dictation, and throws upon it the entire responsibility of his acts, which it must assume, or else go out of power, and let the opposition come in. The consequence is, that he surrenders his independence to his party in Congress, and, if that party is in the majority in both houses, brings about that amalgamation of the executive and legislative functions of government, which the Convention hoped by means of the executive veto to prevent. The terrible evil will be remedied only when we have an executive who adopts and *acts* on the sound principles proclaimed by our present worthy chief magistrate in his letters before his election, and in his noble Inaugural Address. But it is not easy in the present state of public opinion to act on those high and independent principles, and will not be, till the public mind by means of the press shall be brought more into harmony with those great conservative principles of government which have been so generally neglected for the last twenty years, but without which our liberties exist only in name, and wise and just government is but a dream.

It may be objected to the veto power, that it is seldom likely to be employed, except against such measures as secure a majority in Congress only by a union of some members of the party to which the executive belongs with the opposition, and which, since they combine, in some degree, the support of both parties, are the least likely to be hasty or unjust. That is, the negative will not be employed when it should be, and will be when it should not. Experience does not fully bear out this objection, but we grant that it has some force. In several instances the veto has been applied in the manner here supposed, and it is this fact that has led some of our Whig friends, contrary, as we must believe, to their general principles, to propose its abolition or modification. But we are conservatives, and we are loath to lay a rude hand on the Constitution. Experiments in amending constitutions, State or national, have not thus far proved very successful; and, in general, we find the *amended* constitution more in need of amendment than the original constitution itself. In almost every instance that has come under our knowledge, the so-called amendments adopted have proved a serious injury to the constitution, — have impaired its symmetry, rendered it less efficient, and made new alterations necessary; besides weakening in the public conscience that sacredness which should always attach to

the constitution of the state. Obvious anomalies which tend to defeat in practice the general design or intent of the constitution, or clauses originally good, but rendered injurious by social changes or revolutions which have subsequently occurred, we would, of course, have removed ; but beyond that we believe it never prudent to venture. Nothing is more unwise or unstatesmanlike, than to alter a constitution for the sake of harmonizing it with changes which may have taken place in mere public opinion, or of conforming it to the demands of some newly invented or newly revived political theory. No constitution constructed in accordance with a political theory ever worked or ever will work well, for the simple reason that every theory is despotic, and no man, much less the mass of men, ever did or ever will act throughout life in accordance with a theory. Every man's life is full of anomalies, and it is far more with the anomalous in life and society than with the normal, or what comes within the rule, that government must deal. A constitution that preserves a systematic consistency throughout, is necessarily either impracticable or despotic. Governments are founded in practical reason, not in speculative reason; and good sense, aided by large experience, must determine their constitution, not speculation. The English, who have much good sense, but very little speculative genius, and who care little for systematic consistency, maintain a comparatively free government ; the French and Germans, who are far their superiors in speculative science, and who draw out constitutions perfectly satisfactory to speculative reason, for ever alternate in practice between anarchy and despotism. No constitution will avert all evil ; for what works evil to-day may work good to-morrow. By attempting to remove the evils which we occasionally suffer, we not seldom lose the good we are in possession of, and open the door to greater evils from which we are as yet free.

There is no question but the executive may employ his negative against measures in themselves wise and just, but if they are measures of great public importance, and such as the country is really prepared for, he can at best only delay them for a short time. The exercise of his negative is on the part of the executive an act of great personal responsibility, and one that he can forego if he chooses. The easiest way for him is to throw the responsibility on Congress, and approve whatever act Congress choose to pass ; and he always will do so, unless he has some motive to do otherwise. If he does

otherwise, it must be either from a sense of duty, or from the hope of gaining public applause or support. In the first case, the example, in times like ours, of a president of the United States hazarding his popularity, staking his reputation, at the demand of honest conviction, or a conscientious regard to his oath of office, would, of itself, be a moral benefit to the country equal to any injury that could result from the temporary loss of the most important public measure he is likely to negative. Indeed, a few examples of the sort are much needed, to keep alive among us the memory of public virtue, and convince us that it is not entirely the dream of the romancer, or the fiction of the poet.

If we suppose the executive by his veto seeks popularity, we must suppose there is a strong probability, at least, that his act will be sustained by the country, and therefore that there is not a clear, decided, and reliable majority in the country in favor of the measures negatived. If such be the fact, the measures, if of any great importance, ought not to pass; if of no great importance, it is of no great importance that they are defeated, and the matter is not worth quarrelling about. Measures of great importance, such as relate to finance, trade, and industry, and seriously affect the whole business and industrial interests of the country, in order to be beneficial must be permanent, and should never be adopted in the face of a minority which may be the majority to-morrow and repeal them. They should never be pressed, unless there is a reasonable prospect that they will so far meet the approbation of the country, that no party, on coming into power, will think of disturbing them. All measures of this sort produce an evil on their first adoption of no small magnitude; for they affect the standard of value, the relation of debtor and creditor, and operate, in some measure, as agrarian laws, though indirectly, and without its being perceived by every one. The oftener they are changed, the more insecure do they render property, and the more frequently do they take money from one man's pocket and put it into another's. We boast of the security of property in this country, and it is secure so far as direct attacks on it are concerned; but the fluctuations in the policy of the government for the last twenty years have really made it more insecure here than in any other civilized country, as we may see in the immense number of fortunes made, and a nearly equal number lost. The policy of the government will continue to be thus fluctuating as long as there is an attempt to fasten upon

the country any policy which has the support of only an accidental or temporary majority, a policy in which, when once adopted, all parties will not generally acquiesce. A measure, the repeal of which the opposition shall attempt as soon as passed, should never pass at all; because it can never work well, and will tend only to exasperate party spirit, to convulse the country, to corrupt the purity of elections, and by heated and violent contests destroy public virtue, and consolidate the despotism of party, as our experience too conclusively proves. To what else is due the party discipline and machinery now so ruinous? We say, then, if the executive is right in supposing the country will sustain him, and that the application of his negative will be popular, the application of it is not an evil; for it is better for the country that, under such circumstances, the measure, though good in itself, should be defeated, than that it should be suffered to pass. If the executive is wrong in his supposition, if the country does really demand the measure, or is prepared to sustain it, all the harm done is a little delay. Things are made no worse than they were before, and all that can be said is, that a good hoped to be realized is put off for a short period. This delay will, after all, be rather a benefit, for it will give time to consolidate public opinion, and to secure for the measure a greater likelihood of being permanent, when the new elections shall have prepared the way for its adoption. Taking this view of the question, and checking that impatience of our country which needs some checking in regard to legislation, as well as to other matters, we confess that we can see no serious evil that can result from the employment of the executive veto against even such measures of public policy as, if they could be adopted with the general approbation of the country, and with a reasonable prospect of being permanent, would be of great public utility, — the only case in which it can ever be pretended that the exercise of the veto power can do harm.

It should be borne in mind, that the veto power is purely negative. It gives to the executive no positive power of legislation, enables him to fasten no objectionable policy on the country, but merely gives him a conservative power, — a power to preserve to some extent laws already in force, and to prevent or delay the adoption of new measures and a new line of policy. It is a power perfectly in accordance with conservative principles of government, and is repugnant to Democratic, but not to Whig doctrines. Opposition to it could come consistently enough from the Democratic party; from the

Whig party, it strikes us, not without some inconsistency. True, it has been used to defeat favorite measures of the Whig party ; but it is no Whig doctrine to seek to carry measures in spite of the Constitution, or to attack the Constitution when it operates against us. We are sworn to the Constitution "for better or for worse," and we trust we are prepared to forego every public good not to be attained under it, and in accordance with its provisions.

It is said by some, that the executive veto cannot be legitimately employed except on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the measure negatived. This, we apprehend, is a mistake. No restriction of this sort, or of any sort, is to be found in the Constitution itself. The power to negative extends to all acts of Congress, and nothing is said as to the grounds on which it is to be applied. The executive is left sole arbiter of his reasons for applying his negative, save that he is to communicate them to Congress. Congress may judge of their sufficiency ; and if by a majority of two thirds they judge them insufficient, they count for nothing, and the measure becomes a law in spite of them. It is clear, from the debates of the Convention, that the Convention did not intend to restrict the power to the simple constitutionality of the acts of Congress ; that power is in the judiciary, and the executive veto, if so restricted, would have been superfluous. The Convention believed that acts might be passed, not absolutely unconstitutional, which, nevertheless, would tend to impair the independence of the executive, or would be impolitic or unjust, and it was to provide a negative on such acts, which the judiciary could not reach, that they gave the executive his qualified negative. The policy and justice, as well as the constitutionality, of acts of Congress are, then, we must believe, proper subjects for the executive to consider ; and since to confine him to the question of constitutionality alone would deprive him of the power to maintain the independence of the executive department of government, we must hold that he not only is not, but ought not to be, so confined in the employment of his negative.

Our readers will perceive that we have given ourselves a considerable latitude of discussion. Our object has, indeed, been to defend the veto power, but at the same time to draw attention to those general principles of our Constitution and government, which, in the democratic excitement of the times, and the bustle and confusion created by party struggles, we are in danger of forgetting. We have wished to point out the place

of the executive veto in our plan of government, and incidentally to lay open and defend that plan itself. The writer of this is no political theorist; he is an American, and an American conservative, both from principle and from inclination, and is opposed alike to innovations in the system of government established, and to the experimental legislation which has become so much the rage. He believes that the Constitution is too little studied, and that the real character of our institutions is too little understood and appreciated. If what he has said shall excite any of our gifted and learned young men to a more diligent study of the American Constitution, his purpose will have been answered, and he will not have written in vain.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

— *The History of the Old and New Testament, interspersed with Moral and Instructive Reflections, chiefly taken from the Holy Fathers.* From the French. By Rev. J. REEVE. Boston: Donahoe. 1849. 12mo. pp. 478.

THIS work is too well known, and too highly appreciated by the Catholic public, to render any notice of it at our hands at all necessary. It is an admirable compend of sacred history, and compresses within a small compass a great amount of most useful and interesting information, together with highly important and edifying moral reflections. It should be in the hands of every Catholic family.

2. — *Preparation for Death; or Considerations on the Eternal Maxims. Useful for all as a Book of Meditations, &c.* By St. ALPHONSUS M. LIGUORI. Translated from the Italian, by a Catholic Clergyman. 2d Edition. Boston: Sweeney. 1850. 18mo. pp. 396.

THIS work is commended to the faithful by the Right Reverend the Bishop of Boston, and, like all the ascetic works of the illustrious St. Alphonsus, is a valuable aid to every one seeking Christian perfection. It is, no doubt, faithfully translated, but we cannot help feeling, as in the case of all the ascetic works of the same author translated into our language, that the translator has failed utterly to preserve any thing of the life and unction of the original. There is a coldness, an abruptness, a crispiness, in the translator's style, that belongs to the style of no Saint, and which is almost unpardonable

in the translation of the works of such a Saint as St. Alphonsus de Liguori. Setting aside this consideration, this little work is most excellent, and if used daily as a book of meditations, can hardly fail to prove a real "preparation for death."

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3. — *The Key of Heaven, or Manual of Prayer.* By the Right Reverend J. MILNER, D. D. A new Edition, revised, corrected, and enlarged. By Rev. JAMES FITTON. Boston : Sweeney. 1849. 32mo. pp. 422.

THIS is a very neat and convenient edition of a well-known manual of prayer. In addition to the devotions contained in other editions, the present contains an explanation of the priest's vestments, the ornaments and ceremonies used at Mass, an abridgment of Christian doctrine, a prayer for the souls in purgatory, another for one's confessor, Vespers for the Festival of the Blessed Virgin, Devotion for the Scapular, and several hymns. Among the hymns, we are sorry to see included some three or four from the heretical Watts.

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4. — *The Devout Manual : or a Collection of Prayers, tending to direct and promote the Practice of Solid Piety.* New York : Dunigan & Brother. 1850. 32mo. pp. 384.

THIS is, we believe, a new manual. It is published with the approbation of the Right Reverend the Bishop of New York, in the Messrs. Dunigan's best style, and is a very judicious collection of prayers. It will, no doubt, take a high rank among the many excellent manuals of devotion in circulation, and prove quite a favorite.

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5. — *The Spiritual Consoler, or Instructions to enlighten Pious Souls in their Doubts, and to allay their Fears.* Written originally in Italian. By FATHER QUADRUPANI, Barnabite. First American Edition. Boston : Joseph A. Copes. 1850. 18mo. pp. 136.

THE fact that this little work is in great part made up of selections from the all but inspired writings of the illustrious Bishop of Geneva, St. Francis de Sales, is itself a sufficient guaranty of its excellence, and the following approbation by the Right Reverend the Bishop of Boston leaves nothing for us to say. "The English translation of Father Quadrupani's little work, entitled *The Spiritual Consoler*, has appeared to us, after due examination, sound in doctrine, and full of instruction and counsel, most useful to souls seeking advancement in piety and Christian perfection. We have,

therefore, approved its publication, and recommend the use of it to the faithful." We can add nothing, and it would be impertinence on our part to attempt to add any thing, after this. We will only say, that we have found it one of the very best works of the sort we are acquainted with. Mr. Copes has done well in selecting it for his first publication.

6. — *Remarks of Mr. Charles C. Kelly, in the Convention, on the Native American Question.* A. G. Hodges & Co., Printers.

IN what convention, when or where held, these *remarks* were made, we are not told; and of Mr. Charles C. Kelly himself we know nothing, except that he tells us that he is "the son of an Irishman," is "a Catholic in faith, though not a member of the Catholic Church," that "he would die sooner than yield" his faith, and that he has "contributed more to the support of Protestant churches than to the support of Catholic ones." From the fact that the pamphlet has been sent to us by a friend in Kentucky, we presume the convention intended in the title was the convention recently held in that State for the purpose of amending its constitution, and we should conjecture, from the character he gives of himself, that Mr. Kelly is a real Kentuckian, of "the half-horse, half-alligator, with a spice of the snapping-turtle," breed. He does not appear to lack volubility, or "a gude conceit o' himsel'," and probably he has, as he professes, really meant to defend the Catholic Church, and to strike a death-blow at the Native American party; but his speech seems to us admirably adapted to render the Church ridiculous in the eyes of intelligent heretics, and to create a distrust of the class of persons he wishes to vindicate. He is far too ignorant of Catholicity to be able to speak of it with credit to himself, and the arguments he urges against the silly and fanatical Native American movement are just such as are calculated to induce the mass of the American people, this side the Alleghanies at least, to think favorably of it. It is such men as he that have created the greatest part of the hostility of the American people to the naturalization of foreigners, and it is such miserable defenders of Catholicity that have made many persons believe that a Catholic never regards truth where his Church is concerned. We would not speak harshly of this poor man, but we would tell him, that the demagogical spirit is the farthest removed possible from the Catholic spirit, and that a nominal Catholic turned demagogue is an animal of those unclean habits which disgust, not only all good Catholics, but even heretics themselves. The man who is not incapable of pandering to the prejudices of the mob, be they prejudices of what sort they may, lacks the essential ingredient of a

freeman, and the louder he screams in behalf of democracy, the louder and more unequivocally he proclaims his slavery. He who dares not, be true to his God, who calumniates the fearless and unswerving friends of his Church, in order to gain the momentary applause of its enemies, is incapable of giving any guaranty that he will be true to his country and faithful to her institutions. The man who will betray his religion to obtain political promotion, will betray his country the moment he fancies it for his interest to do so. If we had had in this country no political demagogues of foreign birth or descent, we should never have heard of a "Native American Party." Let Catholics be good Catholics, let them fear God, and show, as they should, that they are incapable of fearing any one else; let them adhere firmly to their faith, and to the practice of their religion, without apology, and without asking any man's permission, and there will be no Native Americanism to disturb them. But multiply such orators as Charles C. Kelly, and such papers as *The Truth-Teller* and *The Nation*, and you will have Native Americanism, and more than you will be able to manage. There are demagogues, radicals, and infidels enough of native growth, without any importation from abroad. The distrust of the Catholic population arises chiefly from the facility with which they suffer themselves to be imposed upon by such orators and papers as these we mention, and the American people will never have any confidence in them, so long as they suffer themselves to be preyed upon, as they heretofore have been, by a set of political harpies, whether native-born or foreign-born, whether sailing under the Catholic flag or that of heresy. No man is our friend who wishes merely to use us for his own selfish purposes; no man should be trusted by us who places the state before the Church, a political theory before Catholic faith, or his passions before his religion. Let every such man be marked and avoided. Trust no man who seeks to conform his religion to the age or the country, who has the impudence to apologize for his Church, or to express his regret for deeds she has approved, and boasts of his having done what she forbids. He who believes himself wiser than his Church betrays his folly or his hypocrisy, and the less you have to do with him the better. Can one touch pitch and not be defiled?

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7. — *The Seaside and the Fireside.* By H. W. LONGFELLOW. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 16mo. pp. 141.

WE have so lately spoken of Mr. Longfellow as a poet, and at so great length, that it is not necessary for us to enter here into any consideration of his merits. We have always esteemed him more highly than we have found him esteemed by our literary friends.

He is not in our judgment a great poet, but he has a truly poetic temperament, and, if there is seldom a thought in his writings that recurs to the memory, there is a melody in his verse that charms us, and recurs to our hearts as the half-forgotten strains we loved in the remote days of childhood and youth. We like him because he always brings back to us our young feelings, mellowed by time and distance, and pleases us in our manhood, as Mother Goose did in our childhood, without demanding too much intellectual labor. *The Building of the Ship* is a pleasing poem, half an allegory, conveying a very useful moral just now.

The translation of *The Blind Girl of Castèl-Cuillè*, from the Gascon of Jasmin, strikes us as very happy, and pleases us far better than the original, — perhaps because the Gascon is to us pretty much an unknown tongue; but we cannot award the poem itself so high a rank as the critics generally seem disposed to assign it. The attempted suicide at the close offends us, and we have no patience with the poet who makes a well-instructed Catholic girl express a hope that God will pardon suicide under any circumstances, and certainly not for killing herself because deserted by a faithless swain. Piety would have taught her resignation, and made her thankful that she had escaped being wedded to one undeserving; never would it have led her to commit the horrible crime of self-murder. The conceit of the interposition of the guardian angel is idle; for though the poor girl does not actually kill herself, she dies with the intention of doing so, and therefore is really a self-murderer before God. Is it any consolation to think that the poor girl escaped her earthly sufferings by plunging herself into the eternal tortures of hell? But why talk of such things to men who have no faith, and no religion, but whimpering sentimentalism? The volume, however, upon the whole, has pleased us as much as any of the author's volumes that we have seen, and, if it does not add to his reputation, it certainly will not diminish it.

8. — *Der Deutsche Kirchenfreund. Organ für die gemeinsamen Interessen der Americanisch-deutschen Kirchen.* Herausgegeben von PHILIPP SCHAFF, Professor der Theologie zu Mercersburg, Pa. Mercersburg. 1849. Zweiter Jahrgang. 8vo. pp. 464.

THIS is a monthly periodical, published at Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, by Professor Schaff, of the Mercersburg Theological Seminary. Its aim is to be a central organ for the theological and moral interests of the American-German Church, Lutheran, Reformed, and United Confession; and to contain, among other matters, leading articles on the questions of the day, with special reference to the wants of the American-German Church, ecclesias-

in the translation of the works of such a Saint as St. Alphonsus de Liguori. Setting aside this consideration, this little work is most excellent, and if used daily as a book of meditations, can hardly fail to prove a real "preparation for death."

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3. — *The Key of Heaven, or Manual of Prayer.* By the Right Reverend J. MILNER, D. D. A new Edition, revised, corrected, and enlarged. By Rev. JAMES FITTON. Boston : Sweeney. 1849. 32mo. pp. 422.

THIS is a very neat and convenient edition of a well-known manual of prayer. In addition to the devotions contained in other editions, the present contains an explanation of the priest's vestments, the ornaments and ceremonies used at Mass, an abridgment of Christian doctrine, a prayer for the souls in purgatory, another for one's confessor, Vespers for the Festival of the Blessed Virgin, Devotion for the Scapular, and several hymns. Among the hymns, we are sorry to see included some three or four from the heretical Watts.

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4. — *The Devout Manual : or a Collection of Prayers, tending to direct and promote the Practice of Solid Piety.* New York : Dunigan & Brother. 1850. 32mo. pp. 384.

THIS is, we believe, a new manual. It is published with the approbation of the Right Reverend the Bishop of New York, in the Messrs. Dunigan's best style, and is a very judicious collection of prayers. It will, no doubt, take a high rank among the many excellent manuals of devotion in circulation, and prove quite a favorite.

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5. — *The Spiritual Consoler, or Instructions to enlighten Pious Souls in their Doubts, and to allay their Fears.* Written originally in Italian. By FATHER QUADRUPANI, Barnabite. First American Edition. Boston : Joseph A. Copes. 1850. 18mo. pp. 136.

THE fact that this little work is in great part made up of selections from the all but inspired writings of the illustrious Bishop of Geneva, St. Francis de Sales, is itself a sufficient guaranty of its excellence, and the following approbation by the Right Reverend the Bishop of Boston leaves nothing for us to say. "The English translation of Father Quadrupani's little work, entitled *The Spiritual Consoler*, has appeared to us, after due examination, sound in doctrine, and full of instruction and counsel, most useful to souls seeking advancement in piety and Christian perfection. We have,

therefore, approved its publication, and recommend the use of it to the faithful." We can add nothing, and it would be impertinence on our part to attempt to add any thing, after this. We will only say, that we have found it one of the very best works of the sort we are acquainted with. Mr. Copes has done well in selecting it for his first publication.

6. — *Remarks of Mr. Charles C. Kelly, in the Convention, on the Native American Question.* A. G. Hodges & Co., Printers.

IN what convention, when or where held, these *remarks* were made, we are not told; and of Mr. Charles C. Kelly himself we know nothing, except that he tells us that he is "the son of an Irishman," is "a Catholic in faith, though not a member of the Catholic Church," that "he would die sooner than yield" his faith, and that he has "contributed more to the support of Protestant churches than to the support of Catholic ones." From the fact that the pamphlet has been sent to us by a friend in Kentucky, we presume the convention intended in the title was the convention recently held in that State for the purpose of amending its constitution, and we should conjecture, from the character he gives of himself, that Mr. Kelly is a real Kentuckian, of "the half-horse, half-alligator, with a spice of the snapping-turtle," breed. He does not appear to lack volubility, or "a gude conceit o' himsel'," and probably he has, as he professes, really meant to defend the Catholic Church, and to strike a death-blow at the Native American party; but his speech seems to us admirably adapted to render the Church ridiculous in the eyes of intelligent heretics, and to create a distrust of the class of persons he wishes to vindicate. He is far too ignorant of Catholicity to be able to speak of it with credit to himself, and the arguments he urges against the silly and fanatical Native American movement are just such as are calculated to induce the mass of the American people, this side the Alleghanies at least, to think favorably of it. It is such men as he that have created the greatest part of the hostility of the American people to the naturalization of foreigners, and it is such miserable defenders of Catholicity that have made many persons believe that a Catholic never regards truth where his Church is concerned. We would not speak harshly of this poor man, but we would tell him, that the demagogical spirit is the farthest removed possible from the Catholic spirit, and that a nominal Catholic turned demagogue is an animal of those unclean habits which disgust, not only all good Catholics, but even heretics themselves. The man who is not incapable of pandering to the prejudices of the mob, be they prejudices of what sort they may, lacks the essential ingredient of a

freeman, and the louder he screams in behalf of democracy, the louder and more unequivocally he proclaims his slavery. He who dares not be true to his God, who calumniates the fearless and unswerving friends of his Church, in order to gain the momentary applause of its enemies, is incapable of giving any guaranty that he will be true to his country and faithful to her institutions. The man who will betray his religion to obtain political promotion, will betray his country the moment he fancies it for his interest to do so. If we had had in this country no political demagogues of foreign birth or descent, we should never have heard of a "Native American Party." Let Catholics be good Catholics, let them fear God, and show, as they should, that they are incapable of fearing any one else; let them adhere firmly to their faith, and to the practice of their religion, without apology, and without asking any man's permission, and there will be no Native Americanism to disturb them. But multiply such orators as Charles C. Kelly, and such papers as *The Truth-Teller* and *The Nation*, and you will have Native Americanism, and more than you will be able to manage. There are demagogues, radicals, and infidels enough of native growth, without any importation from abroad. The distrust of the Catholic population arises chiefly from the facility with which they suffer themselves to be imposed upon by such orators and papers as these we mention, and the American people will never have any confidence in them, so long as they suffer themselves to be preyed upon, as they heretofore have been, by a set of political harpies, whether native-born or foreign-born, whether sailing under the Catholic flag or that of heresy. No man is our friend who wishes merely to use us for his own selfish purposes; no man should be trusted by us who places the state before the Church, a political theory before Catholic faith, or his passions before his religion. Let every such man be marked and avoided. Trust no man who seeks to conform his religion to the age or the country, who has the impudence to apologize for his Church, or to express his regret for deeds she has approved, and boasts of his having done what she forbids. He who believes himself wiser than his Church betrays his folly or his hypocrisy, and the less you have to do with him the better. Can one touch pitch and not be defiled?

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7. — *The Seaside and the Fireside.* By H. W. LONGFELLOW. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 16mo. pp. 141.

WE have so lately spoken of Mr. Longfellow as a poet, and at so great length, that it is not necessary for us to enter here into any consideration of his merits. We have always esteemed him more highly than we have found him esteemed by our literary friends.

He is not in our judgment a great poet, but he has a truly poetic temperament, and, if there is seldom a thought in his writings that recurs to the memory, there is a melody in his verse that charms us, and recurs to our hearts as the half-forgotten strains we loved in the remote days of childhood and youth. We like him because he always brings back to us our young feelings, mellowed by time and distance, and pleases us in our manhood, as Mother Goose did in our childhood, without demanding too much intellectual labor. *The Building of the Ship* is a pleasing poem, half an allegory, conveying a very useful moral just now.

The translation of *The Blind Girl of Castèl-Cuillè*, from the Gascon of Jasmin, strikes us as very happy, and pleases us far better than the original, — perhaps because the Gascon is to us pretty much an unknown tongue; but we cannot award the poem itself so high a rank as the critics generally seem disposed to assign it. The attempted suicide at the close offends us, and we have no patience with the poet who makes a well-instructed Catholic girl express a hope that God will pardon suicide under any circumstances, and certainly not for killing herself because deserted by a faithless swain. Piety would have taught her resignation, and made her thankful that she had escaped being wedded to one undeserving; never would it have led her to commit the horrible crime of self-murder. The conceit of the interposition of the guardian angel is idle; for though the poor girl does not actually kill herself, she dies with the intention of doing so, and therefore is really a self-murderer before God. Is it any consolation to think that the poor girl escaped her earthly sufferings by plunging herself into the eternal tortures of hell? But why talk of such things to men who have no faith, and no religion, but whimpering sentimentalism? The volume, however, upon the whole, has pleased us as much as any of the author's volumes that we have seen, and, if it does not add to his reputation, it certainly will not diminish it.

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8. — *Der Deutsche Kirchenfreund. Organ für die gemeinsamen Interessen der Americanisch-deutschen Kirchen.* Herausgegeben von PHILIPP SCHAFF, Professor der Theologie zu Mercersburg, Pa. Mercersburg. 1849. Zweiter Jahrgang. 8vo. pp. 464.

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tical intelligence from the Old World and the New, communications from German missionary districts, in the western part of our country, and critical notices of the more remarkable productions of German and Anglo-German theology. It is Protestant, mainly after the *Mercersburg Review* stamp; but, as far as we have examined it, appears to be conducted with industry, ability, and good temper. The articles on the *History of the German Church in America* we have read with a good deal of interest. We wish the work all the success we can wish any heretical work, and consider it superior to most Protestant works that fall under our notice.

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9. — *New-Yorker Sion.* Herausgegeben von einem Vereine von Katholiken. Redigirt von L. VOGELE, Prof. February 16, 1850. 4to. Jahrgang I., Nr. I.

THIS is a new Catholic paper, published weekly, in the city of New York, in the German language. Judging from the numbers already issued, it is an excellent paper, conducted with ability, energy, zeal, and in a true Catholic spirit, well adapted to the wants of our German brethren, who form so large and so important a part of our American Catholic population. The editor speaks the language of a freeman, in tones which gladden the freeman's heart. He dares tell the truth, which the men of the age, struggling for the liberty of passion, do not like to hear. And he does not fear to assert the right of religion to rule over our politics; that man is as much bound to obey God when acting in the political field, as when assisting at the Divine offices. It would be well if such men as Mr. Charles C. Kelly, noticed above, would read his bold and energetic assertion of the rights of religion, of the man, and of the citizen. We rejoice that our German Catholics have so able and so truly a Catholic journal as this promises to be. It is necessary to protect them against the false notions of liberty so rife in our age and country, and which those not on their guard may imbibe before suspecting their dangerous character. We wish it all success, and warmly recommend it to the support of all who read the language in which it is published.

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10. — *Poems.* By SARAH A. NOWELL. Boston: Tompkins. 1850. 12mo. pp. 208.

THIS is a very unpretending volume of poems, by one of our near neighbours, but is far superior to many which make much greater pretensions, and are commended by the newspaper critics. Mrs. Nowell possesses a good deal of facility in versification, has much

poetic feeling, and a mind of a high order. The poems seem to have been written mainly for her own amusement ; but were she to devote more time and thought to the cultivation of poetry, she could easily place herself far above the Sigourneys, the Osgoods, and the Welbys.

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11. — *Poems*. By JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL. Boston : Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1849. 2 vols. 16mo.

WE have recently expressed our general estimate of Mr. Lowell as a poet. He has written no poem that we much admire, but he has written occasional passages of as exquisite poetry as are to be found in any American poet. He is now and then a little cockneyish, and babbles of nature as one to whom nature is unfamiliar ; but he does not lack either the poetical temper or the poetical heart. He is, we are sorry to say, a philanthropist ; and of all poetry, the philanthropic species is the least endurable, as of all men philanthropists are the most intolerable. Poor Dr. Channing has much to answer for. His everlasting preachments about the "dignity of human nature" has corrupted our literature, as it has our morals ; and if philanthropy, which received such an impetus from him, continues to rage much longer in this Commonwealth, it will be necessary for every honest man and peaceable man to emigrate from it. What with our moral-reform societies, our anti-hangman societies, prisoners' friend societies, abolition societies, temperance societies, there will soon be no living here for a man who wishes to mind his own business, and to let his neighbours mind theirs. Really the evil is becoming insufferable, and we are fast retrograding to the days of the old colonial sumptuary laws, which even our fathers could not bear. Mr. Lowell would be a great poet if he were not a great philanthropist.

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12. — *The Second Advent : or what do the Scriptures teach respecting the Second Coming of Christ, the End of the World, the Resurrection of the Dead, and the General Judgment ?* By ALPHEUS CROSBY. Boston : Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1850. 12mo. pp. 173.

WE have not read this book : we broke down before we had got beyond half a dozen pages.

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13. — *The War with Mexico reviewed*. By A. A. LIVERMORE. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. 1850. 12mo. pp. 310.

THIS volume is written with ability, and contains a good deal of information, together with a much greater amount of childish prattle

and nonsense. No work coming out under the patronage of the American Peace Society could by any possibility be really worth reading. We dislike war, and disliked the Mexican war in particular; but not for the nonsensical reasons set forth by your namby-pamby peace men, your Worcesters, Ladds, Burritts, and Cobdens. Mr. Livermore is a Unitarian minister, a man of respectable attainments and commendable industry; but he is a philanthropist, that is, the lover of man in general, and the hater of all men in particular, — unless they chance to be rogues and criminals. Leave your philanthropy, man, and learn *charity*, the good, old-fashioned Christian virtue of charity, and then you may write things that it will not sicken a sober man to read.

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14. — *Circassia, or a Tour to the Caucasus.* By G. L. DITSON, Esq. New York: Stringer & Townsend. 1850. Svo. pp. 453.

THIS is a work of lofty pretensions, but of feeble performance. Who the author is we know not, and have no wish to know. His style is inflated, stilted, and altogether uncivilized, and his book tells us very little which we could not have learned without going out of the room in which we are now writing. The author, it appears, entered two or three huts in Circassia, saw a woman or two with breasts uncovered and with bare and dirty feet. This is about all the addition he makes to our previous knowledge of the Caucasians. Yet, though the reader is every moment on the point of throwing the book in the fire, he continues to read on to the end. Why, he can hardly explain to himself. If the author had more simplicity, if he made fewer pretensions, and retained some respect for religion and morals, we are not sure but he might write a very pleasing book of travels. Even while he disgusts us, he throws a sort of interest over his work which we cannot shake off, but which we are at the same time ashamed of feeling.

15. — *Poems.* By ROBERT BROWNING. A new Edition. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 2 vols. 16mo.

WE have read only one or two of Browning's poems, and must reserve our judgment of these volumes till we have succeeded in reading the rest. Mr. Browning is too weighty to be despatched in a light literary notice. We will only add, that the Messrs. Ticknor & Co. have issued these volumes, as they do all their poetical publications, in a style becoming a poet of the first order.

BROWNSON'S QUARTERLY REVIEW.

NEW SERIES—No. XV.

JULY, 1850.

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BROWNSON'S
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1850.

ART. I.—*St. Peter and Mahomet ; or the Popes protecting
Christendom from Mahometanism.*

WHEN the Apostles were sitting at the feet of Christ for the last time before his passion, they began to dispute among themselves ; and the question was, which of them would be the greatest. Our Lord settled this dispute, and then he turned to the Apostle who was soon to become prince of the sacred college, and said to him, "Simon, Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat. But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith may not fail. And thou, being converted, confirm thy brethren."

St. Peter knew not at that moment in how many ways Satan would sift the Church, — from how many quarters he would lead forth the united strength of earth and hell. He saw the Devil, not as a serpent, nor as an angel of light, but as a roaring lion. His conception of the whole matter appears in his answer : — "Lord, I am ready to follow thee to prison, and to death." And the first sifting which the Church received at the hands of Satan was precisely that which St. Peter expected. The world for three hundred years groaned beneath the tyranny of Rome, and during that long period the worship of Christ was proscribed, and his children hunted to the death ; the prisons were choked with them, the wild beasts were glutted with their flesh, the ground was red with their blood ; they were pitilessly murdered, sometimes singly, sometimes by hundreds, sometimes by thousands. This was the first great sifting ; it was a trial of the Church by fire and the sword, a determination to crush her by treating her children as convicted enemies of the Empire

and of the immortal gods. The yet uninspired fisherman was ready for all this, but he had no notion of the far more terrible storms which would issue from the womb of time, and burst upon the Church. He could not foresee the day when heresy would sit upon the throne and trample the altar, when the astonished world would find itself Arian, when the true faith would be denied by the East, and scarcely find a resting-place in the West except in the bosom of Leo the Great. He did not suspect that Scribes and Pharisees would sit again in the chair of Moses,—that some of his successors would be ambitious, cruel, and licentious men, incapable of denying the faith simply because Jesus Christ had promised the world that his Vicar should never lead the people to believe a lie. He did not see the tide of barbarism issuing from Northern Asia with resistless force, and failing to destroy civilization only because it could not destroy the parent of all true civilization, the Church of God. In the days of St. Peter the Emperors were the high-priests of paganism, and after a thousand years had rolled away, the German Cæsars bethought themselves of this fact, and straightway they claimed some of the inalienable rights of the High-Priest of Christianity. A long struggle served to evolve an undeniable right of the Holy See ; the refractory Emperors were stripped of the purple, until they would consent to render to God the things which are of God. The Western schism threatened to leave the Church a dismembered corpse upon the plains of Europe ; the captivity of Babylon, as the stay of the Popes in France was justly called, nearly ruined Italy, and produced the most deplorable effects in the Western Churches ; and the Protestant rebellion tore whole nations from their mother's arms. St. Peter was ready for imprisonment and death, but he was not prepared to meet storms like these. What if he could have heard modern doctors proving that he had never been in Rome ! What if he could have heard the wise disciples of Strauss gravely say that he never lived, that his Master was an Idea !

If the Church ever could really fear an enemy, she would have been hopelessly affrighted at Mahometanism. All her other trials were accompanied with some solace for her wounded heart. The persecutions were bitter, but she often had a little time to breathe ; she felt that such a violent state of things could not endure long, and she knew that the surest way to enlarge her fold on earth was to send crowds of martyrs to heaven. No man ever sowed tares in her fields as Arius did, but in three

hundred years the heresy which had stolen the throne, the temples, the palaces, and the cities, had fallen to pieces; it was a lost Babylon, — no one could tell where it was. The awful irruptions of the Northern barbarians seemed to have thrown upon the plains of Europe a great mass of soulless human flesh, which would corrupt the air, and make the country a wild desert; but the Church took these things to her bosom, and her supernatural warmth made those bones live again; she made them Christians, and they became men. It was not so when she fought the new enemy. The powerful genius of Mahomet made him dream that he could do what Cæsar and Alexander did, — that he could enslave the world; and he matured his plans with care. The political aspect of the world was very inviting to an ambitious impostor, for the Western Empire had fallen, and the strong arm won the spoils; the Eastern was getting old and crazy, and all Asia was nearly independent of the Greek Emperors. Mahomet gave laws which were singularly adapted to please man's corrupt nature, and his laws were piously kept. He won his soldiers to his party by promising them rich booty, and by keeping his promises. The captains always shouted with Mokanna, —

“Thrones to the victors, heaven to him who falls.”

He did not give them thrones, — common soldiers would not know what to do with them; but they were always ready to exchange the promised throne for present license to unmitigated avarice and lust, and the soldier was satisfied. It is true that the slain did not ascend to heaven, but they never came back to tell their surviving comrades so.

Some say that Mahomet was a reformed drunkard; others ascribe his law against wine-drinking to the fact that he could not use it. They do him injustice; he was an ambitious captain, and he knew that he could do nothing with a drunken army. Yet he had no easy task, for the Arabs were a nation of sots. Death was as common at their dinners as drunkenness at ours. But they consoled themselves with a gluttony that made their former drunkenness ashamed. In our own times, death from excessive eating at a genuine Turkish dinner is an event too common to attract much notice. “God is great, but Mustapha was a good eater. Who will die next?”

Soldiers and slaves must not think too much, or they will become captains and members of Provisional Governments. Cæsar knew it when he looked so at the lean and hungry Cassius. The Prætorian guards had much time for making and

bearing speeches, and the end of it was, that they became auctioneers, and sold the empire to the highest bidder. The Janizaries cared not who held the sword and purse, while they held the bowstring and dagger. A few years of idleness taught them that the word Sultan, when interpreted, means a strong army. From that moment the Grand Turk sat under the Janizaries as uneasily as Damocles did under the sword, until Mahmoud eased his mind by cutting their throats. Now Mahomet made war the rule, not the exception, of his public policy, and of course it followed that his people would have little time to cultivate their minds. He knew that the breathing intervals would be given to beastly indulgence, and in order to make their ignorance profound, he gave them the Koran, and told them to read nothing else. They treated it as Native Americans treat the Bible;—they swore by it, but scarcely opened it. The views of Mahomet touching mental improvement were practically illustrated by Omar, when he burned the Alexandrian library. What a monument he would have, if every curse of the learned were a stone upon his grave!

Tell men that they can serve God and Mammon at the same time, charge them to indulge their passions freely, secure to them a heaven whose first law is sensual gratification, make ignorance the first commandment, and erect this scheme of lust and rapine into a religious system, and what remains to insure it long life? Punish apostasy with death. This stern law of the Prophet is as faithfully kept now as it was under Al Raschid. We have often seen converted Turks, whose return to their own country would be instantly followed by their assassination. It is true, that the Sublime Porte issues firmans of toleration, but secret assassins are numerous, and justice is seldom obtained in the capital, elsewhere never.*

* A striking instance occurred in the year 950, when Otho, king of Germany, sent an embassy to Abderrahman, chief of the Spanish Moors. St. John of Veidieres was chosen for the dangerous undertaking. He was instructed to give the Moor a proper answer to some attacks which he had made upon Christianity in a letter to Otho.

When it was known that the despatches contained religious matter, John was detained until the Moor could be consulted. After some weeks he was permitted to go to the capital, but he was required to suppress the religious document, as a preliminary to an audience. John refused. It was represented to him that the laws condemned even the king to death, if he should hear a Christian concerning religion without punishing the offender with instant strangulation. John was inflexible. The king liked the stern honesty of John, and swore by his beard that he should not die. A messenger was sent by Abderrahman to Otho, begging him to

So Mahomet unfurled his banner, and in a twinkling it waved over a great host. He went forth to make converts and subjects. The process was quite simple. He held his tablet of laws in one hand, and the sword in the other, and in most cases the people chose to live and believe in one God, and in his prophet, Mahomet. The Jew was not forced to abandon all his venerable observances; the renegade eased his conscience by observing that Jesus ranked next to Mahomet in the new order of things; the idolater forswore his graven images, and changed the names of his gods. But this synthesis in theology was too ostentatious to be real. The spiritual headship of a minority, with the political sovereignty of nations differing in every thing excepting in the human shape, did not suit the purposes of Mahomet. He did not want an Ireland, an India, or a Canada, in his empire. He knew that his Christian and Jewish converts would never disturb the commonwealth, but he was not so sure of his many-colored Gentiles. Their Penates would make them quarrel among themselves, and then an easy process of reasoning would lead them to quarrel with him. He knew that the pagan who has no images forgets his theology, — that he becomes an animal, with just enough of humanity to prevent him from walking on all fours. So Mahomet became an iconoclast. The worship of strange gods was an effect of man's worship of his own self. Idolatry always began at home. The Prophet wished not to destroy the cause; he simply diverted the effect into a new channel. To read his Koran one would think that the ideal formula of his system was the purest theism. So a discourse of Spinoza begins and ends with God. Cousin often speaks of the Divinity in terms that would do credit to a Father of the Church. When Hegel talks of God, his words sometimes become a hymn which might be chanted by an immortal choir. But get Spinoza, Cousin, and Hegel into a corner, force them to tell you *what* God is in the last analysis, make them speak in words which you can understand, and they will answer, God is I.

An outward profession of faith always satisfied the Prophet. The language of Caliph Vathek to the captains of the Emperor Theophilus was in substance the standing sermon of the Moslems to their captives. "Why will you die when your lives

dispense John from offering the paper to the Moor. Otho moderated some of the phrases in his letter, and John was admitted into the presence of Abderrahman.

are in your own hands ? Why will you not leave the narrow way which the Son of Mary has marked for you ? Enter into the broad path which the great Prophet has opened for this life and for the next. Are not his words full of wisdom, when he says, that God has given every imaginable good to his servants in this life, and paradise in the other world ? God is good ; he knew that his children were too weak to bear the yoke of Jesus, and he sent Mahomet to free them from the irksome burden. The faith of the true believers is enough for their salvation." The Mahometans said, *Pecca fortiter, fortiter crede*, before Luther, and they were more consistent besides. Their caprice, or the soul's involuntary tribute to virtue, made them suffer a few great saints to live quietly in their midst. But they lost no opportunity for tempting these heroes. When St. Nilus met some of them, they tried to make him a true believer ; and when they saw that it was useless, they begged him to lay aside his austerities. " If you are resolved to torment yourself, wait until you are too old to enjoy the good things of this world."

The impostor ruled Arabia before he died, and he had the fortune which is commonly denied to political innovators ; he left men who were equal to the task of prosecuting the work which he had begun. Under Abubekir, Omar, and Ali, Palestine, Syria, and Egypt were enslaved, and although schism, which must distract and finally ruin every society not upheld by God, was even then dividing the true believers, nevertheless the cause went on and prospered. The great Caliphate, so celebrated in Eastern romance, was established at Bagdad ; then Persia became Mahometan, and the religion of the Prophet was professed along the shores and in the islands of the Indian Sea. The tide rolled westward ; desperate attempts were made by the enemy to obtain foothold in Europe, and they were too successful. The African shores of the Mediterranean submitted, and the piratical nests scattered along the coast from Egypt to the Straits enabled the true believers to begin a series of operations against Sicily and Spain.

Mirza governed Africa in the name of Caliph Valid. He had been plotting the conquest of Spain, when Count Julian invited him to make a descent upon the coast. The Count had a private quarrel with King Roderic, who had debauched his daughter. The Moor entered Spain with a great army, and destroyed the kingdom of the Goths, which had flourished three hundred years. The Moors made Cordova their capital ;

the Goths elected a new king, and retreated to the Asturias, when Pelagius began the war, which raged eight hundred years, until Ferdinand and Isabella drove the Moors back into Africa. The enemy crossed the Pyrenees, ascended the Rhone, and pushed their conquests in France as far as Sens at the eastward, leaving behind them ruined cities, wasted plains, and thousands of martyrs. At the westward they entered Aquitaine, where they were routed by Charles Martel. Two hundred years rolled away before the Church of France recovered from this blow. In Italy, Radelgise and Siconulph fought for the duchy of Benevento. The former called in the African Moors, the latter met them with the Saracens of Spain. It was a sore day for Italy. Rome was nearly taken; the Church of St. Peter was sacked, as well as the immense monastery of Monte Cassino. The infidels were bribed to go away, and the ornaments of the altar were sacrificed, as they have been often since. In 877, Pope John VIII. wrote to Charles the Bald, begging for aid. "The blood of Christians," wrote the Holy Father, "never flowed as it does now. If they are not murdered, they are sold into slavery. Cities, abandoned by their inhabitants, are masses of shapeless ruins; bishops beg their food from city to city. Rome itself is scarcely a safe asylum for them or for me; it is sitting in the dust, awaiting the moment of its destruction. Last year we sowed and our enemies reaped; this year we cannot hope for a harvest, for we dared not go outside our walls to throw seed into the ground." The Pope was forced to purchase the peace of his states by the annual payment of twenty-five thousand silver marks to the Moors. A few years after, they were encouraged to return by Athanasius of Naples, and they did not leave Lower Italy until it was so wet with blood that the flames of what were cities could scarcely dry the ground.

The Greeks stood condemned before the world of perfidy and injustice; before Heaven, of obstinate schism. They retreated towards Constantinople slowly; so slowly, that more than six hundred years passed on before the Saracens completed their work of destruction in the East. Nothing remained but the city of Constantine; and its hour came too. So the Mahometans came into the possession of a city which was more serviceable to them than any other in Europe; and they had scarcely taken possession of it when they turned their arms against the lower Slavonic provinces, and led their forces into Hungary, threatening Vienna with destruction, and Europe with

a darker night than that which settled over her when the Northern barbarians poured from their fastnesses, bringing with them certain ruin to every institution that was not upheld by the right hand of the Almighty God.

And thus, in six hundred years after the death of the Prophet, Mahometanism had nearly fulfilled its purpose; its universal sovereignty seemed to be only a question of time. It had blasted Asia; it had destroyed Africa; it was the terror of the Mediterranean; and it was advancing slowly but surely upon the last abiding-place of Christianity, converting, like a cancer, healthy flesh into a mass of corruption and hopeless deformity. The Church of God never saw such an enemy, for Mahometanism was evidently a heresy that would live for very many ages.

It sounds like a paradox, but it is, nevertheless, certain, that Catholic truth may be something more than the teleological consequence of heresy; it may be its logical result, when the heresy is stripped of its quibbles, and reduced to an ideal formula.

This is pretty clear *a posteriori*, for it is a fact that the disciples of the ancient heretics, one or two classes excepted, returned to the Church at last. One reason why these one or two classes were always so obstinate will be given directly. Another cause may, perhaps, be assigned. Heresy has rarely been hopelessly hereditary, excepting among the Orientals. It would be curious to inquire, whether the principle which makes Eastern idolatry and heresy so lasting be not the Manichean. Manes was not an inventor; he found the worst of his ideas already current in Asia. The only Western sect which has had any thing like Oriental persistence in hereditary error is Manichean. It has had various names. Men have called its followers Albigenses, Templars, Illuminati, Freemasons. They were Red Republicans in 1848.

It is true that this return of heretics to the Church was the work of Divine grace. But this is no objection; for we must bear in mind, that, while the nature of grace and its mode of action are mysteries, its subject and its effects are open to observation. It acts immediately upon the will, mediately upon the intellect. We do not here speak of illuminative grace,—*gratia illustrationis*,—which, as St. Augustine says, is given that we may know what is right,—*facienda noverimus*,—and whose immediate subject is the intellect of man; but of co-operating grace,—*gratia inspirationis*, or *gratia coöperans*,—which is given that we may *do* what we know to be right,—at

cognita faciamus, — and with which, whether it be sufficient or efficacious, the questions concerning merit and demerit are usually connected. It is plain enough that the grace which brings about the conversion of the *heretic* is coöperating grace, acting immediately upon the will, and finishing the work which was begun by the illumination of the mind, or, at least, providing sufficient means for its completion. So the mere vision of the truth is not meritorious ; we must give it free assent, and this is the doing of the will. The blessed in heaven merit nothing by seeing the Incarnate Truth ; the devils, too, believe, and tremble. This coöperating grace certainly acts upon the intellect, but it does not show it truth ; that is the work of illuminative grace ; it rather moves the will to overthrow an obstacle which man places between his intellect and the light. This is precisely what is wanting in those thrice unhappy Protestants who are invited to the feast, and who would come, were it not for a wife, a yoke of oxen, or a farm. *Diligenda credunt, sed credita non diligunt*. The one thing necessary to them is, not intellectual illumination, or sufficient coöperative grace, but the honest use of good eyes.

When a man denies a revealed truth, he takes a step as false in logic as it is in theology ; when he returns to the Church, he does it because he had opened his soul to the light that shineth upon every man that cometh into this world, but he can look back, and see a reason, a chain of antecedents and consequents which formed a logical process in his mind, as it came nearer to the whole truth. The Magi knew that the star would lead them to the Messiah, but it was not until the heavenly guide shone upon the place where the child was, that they knew the road from their home to Bethlehem.

It is true that this logical process never did, and never can, bring about a conversion, so far as it is a mere logical movement ; and if it does any thing, it is because it ceases to be purely natural. Reason and grace are in two distinct orders ; but grace can elevate reason so that it may coöperate in a supernatural work, such as conversion from heresy to the Church. Pure logic can beget nothing supernatural ; if it could, Theodore Parker would be a Christian, Dr. Pusey would be an Oratorian, the Devil would be again a morning star.

So the return of the heretic is a reasonable act, reasonable in its beginning, in its progress, and in its consummation. It cannot be otherwise, for true intellectual life is superhuman ; no one can live it outside of the Church, as the legitimate channel

of God's grace. And the grace of God is necessary to that life, because in the Church we are, in some measure, always children. A boy that obstinately refuses to hear his master will never know any thing, not because his intellect is dull, but because his will is perverse. If a man be emancipated from earthly schools, it is because in time he knows as much as his master does, perhaps more ; but this cannot be when the master is God, speaking in his Church. So the submission of the will, necessary to the boy when he is in school, is indispensable to the Christian until he dies.

The matter is equally clear, *a priori*. For pure falsehood is a metaphysical impossibility ; it cannot be an object of the intellect of God. The heretic cannot start from a postulate which is purely false. His error becomes intelligible, not of itself, but because of the intelligibility of the truth with which it is accompanied. Two things may be safely predicated of truth ; that it is essentially generative, and that it can only generate itself. All particular truths, objectively considered, have a natural affinity for one another, and they are all reducible to one formula, which shines in each of them like the sun in a million dew-drops, and by virtue of which they are one in their logical state, as they are one in their physical being in the intellect of God. 'This is the reason why man can abstract one particular truth, and from that alone deduce the others ; as Descartes pretended to do, when he began with the fact of personal existence, and from that drew his whole philosophy. When I hold in my hand only one link of a chain, I am in communication with every one of the others, no matter if the chain reaches to the stars. A drop of water that is absorbed from the ocean unites itself with other drops, falls upon the mountain, leaps adown the rocks, hurries along with the river, and rushes again into the bosom of its own ocean. The intellect, created to see all truth, cannot rest in one ; it is always impatient to know what comes next.

It is this affinity which makes a system of science possible. Descartes relied upon it, as we said before. So did Spinoza, when he built his pantheism upon a false definition of substance. So does a mathematician, who begins by showing you the properties of a straight line, and ends with proving to you that solar attraction is in an inverse ratio to the square of the distance. So does Gioberti, when he raises a sublime philosophical structure upon one postulate, — *L' ente crea l' esistenza*. All this holds good with truths of the natural order.

But no one of these can bring the mind to Catholic truth, because *nemo dat quod non habet*. Catholic truth is in the supernatural order. To arrive at it, two postulates are absolutely necessary. One is a point of Catholic truth to start from. The other is Divine grace, which gives that truth, and guides the soul *tanquam lucerna in caliginoso loco*. Until this be given, *Lucifer non orietur in ullo corde*. Ventura thinks that he has that starting-point, when he says that the logical basis of Catholic truth is the following postulate :— Christ was true God and true man. It may be that natural truth and the supernatural are more closely connected than is commonly imagined. No really sound philosophy can be formed without having recourse to some fact which only revelation furnishes. It may be inferred from this that merely human philosophy cannot be sound, but if so we cannot help it. The formula of Gioberti, above quoted, starts from the fact of creation. That is a fact which men knew not, but by the revelation in the first chapter of Genesis. That there is a bridge between truths of the natural and of the supernatural order is true enough ; but the soul of man needs a better guide than even an angel, or he will never pass it. His natural reason, without the positive evidence which establishes the fact of revelation, will avail him nothing. The grace of God may help him to pass by that causeway to eternal truth.

For common purposes, where exact language is not needed, it is well enough to say that error, too, is generative, and must generate itself. But this is not correct, for error has no entity ; then it has no activity, it does nothing ; it is not of itself intelligible ; then it has no predicates. Then it does not generate, neither does it generate itself. The apparent generation of error is the struggle of truth to eliminate it, and to stand alone ; a thing which truth necessarily tends to do, for its unnatural union with falsehood can do nothing but perpetuate error, which lives by it as the ivy by the solid wall. Then this struggle is a wholesome action ; as a fever is the effort of a body to throw off corrupt matter, and return to a healthy state.

The heretical formula must present a portion of truth, and it may lead to Catholic truth in two ways, — the truth which is in it may be considered alone, or the whole formula may be pushed to its ultimate consequence. The first case is that of a man who takes the article of the Incarnation, for example, considers it closely, and concludes that no church but an infal-

libe and Divinely appointed one has a right to propose such an article of belief. His difficulty, then, resolves itself into two questions of fact, namely, Is there such a Church ? and if so, where is it ? If he follows up the inquiry, and obeys the motions of grace, he becomes a Catholic at once.

This process is a short one, and our argument touches the other, where the whole formula of a heresy is pushed to its results.

Suppose that the formula reads thus : — The private study of the Bible gives the sum of revealed truth. It is pretty evident that two consequences must flow from the acceptance of this starting-point. There must be a variety of creeds, corresponding to the variety of the psychological phenomena in different men. Then there must be successive modifications of the creed by the same believer, to suit his altered temper, or the altered spirit of the age in which he lives. The portion of truth which was contained in his formula becomes less every year ; it is accomplishing its own law ; it is separating itself from the mass of falsehood with which it was unnaturally united ; the formula becomes more and more false ; it is hurrying towards pure falsehood. Heresy, then, inevitably leads to atheism. A little reflection upon the nature and workings of truth and falsehood proves this ; and if there were a doubt, the experience of the last three hundred years would settle the matter. Then we can accept the following syllogism.

The logical result of the presence of truth and of falsehood in a formula is the gradual elimination of the truth from the said formula. But this elimination is an approximation to pure falsehood ; hence, the logical consequence of the Protestant formula is an approximation to atheism.

Now, pure atheism is impossible ; it is a state of the mind at which man never has arrived, never will, and never can arrive, — always supposing that he be sane. We speak not of practical atheism, — that is too common ; nor of loud professions of atheism, for sane men will sometimes talk as if they were mad ; but of pure, speculative atheism. No man ever succeeded in thoroughly persuading himself that there is no God. Cicero was a pagan, but he felt this truth when he said, “ Many will deny God in broad daylight, when men are near to applaud their blasphemies ; but at night, when they are alone, their souls are full of doubt.”

Now, if *pejorem semper sequitur conclusio partem*, the heretic must go on examining, doubting, and denying, to the end of

the chapter. John Calvin must have Theodore Parker for a successor, and Theodore must admit that the goal is not yet reached, — that there is more denying to be done ; and he does in fact admit it, — he is too good a logician to doubt it. But that goal is the total elimination of the truth originally found in the formula ; it is, then, pure falsehood, it is metaphysical impossibility. Metaphysical impossibility is the negation of the Intelligible ; then it is the negation of the object of the intellect, created and increate. When the adequate object of a necessary power is denied, that power is included in the denial ; it is itself denied. Metaphysical impossibility is the negation of the intellect. But the logical result of the Protestant formula is the approximation to metaphysical impossibility. Therefore, the logical consequence of an heretical starting-point is the negation of the intellect.

Whatever a man may deny, he cannot deny his own being. He cannot doubt it, he cannot even commence a dubitative proposition concerning it ; for the subject of his proposition must be himself. His first emotion of doubt makes the would-be-doubted thing certain. The intellectual being struggles against death more fiercely than the body does, and more successfully, because it is immortal. Then the heretic who has pushed his first axiom to this result must necessarily recoil, retrace his steps, and deny the formula from which he started. This process is as logical as it is sternly necessary. When he began to deny, he took for his major the heretical formula, and the truth it contained became gradually eliminated ; it withdrew, but only that it might return unmixed with falsehood. When he reached the point beyond which negation cannot go, he took that point for his major, and reasoned thus : That which necessarily leads to denial of the intellect is false. But the Protestant formula does this. Therefore, the Protestant formula is false. It is false, then, that the private study of the Bible gives the sum of revealed truth.

The principle involved in this formula is the denial of infallible Church authority. Who denies the axiom denies the suppositum, and affirms its contrary. But its contrary is the existence of an infallible teacher, and, by implication, the assertion of Catholic truth. Then, who denies that formula affirms Catholic truth.

The formula supposes metaphysical impossibility, and the logical consequence of an attempt at this supposition is the denial of what led to it ; the starting-point of heresy led to it ;

the denial of that starting-point follows ; that denial affirms the Church ; then the denial of the Church is led back to it ; nay, his original formula contained principles which, when evolved, were found to contain the affirmation of the thing denied. This is what some people mean when they say that Protestantism is essentially illogical. It contains its own negation. St. Thomas said once, — “ It is true that an atheist may be a geometer ; but if there were no God, there would be no geometry, for its object would be impossible.”

The Protestant can, in some sense, accept a dogma of faith, but if there were no infallible Teacher he would have no object to accept. The only life he lives, if he can be said to live any life at all, is a participated goodness, and, like every *bonitas participata*, it points steadily to the source whence it came. All that approaches life in the Protestant is derived from the Church.

The deduction of Catholic truth from an heretical formula seems paradoxical, because palingenesis in logic, as well as in the creation, is not so apparent as genesis. Besides, the principle involved in the supposed paradox seems at first sight to be this : — Truth is the logical consequence of error. This is not only a paradox, it is an absurd and unintelligible saying, because the term *error* in the proposition is universal, and pure error cannot beget truth or any thing else, not even itself, the German pantheists to the contrary notwithstanding. The truth contained in the erroneous axiom drove the heretic to a process which forced him to reject all or accept every thing. He could not do the former, so he must take the other horn of the dilemma. Another thing must be noticed. Pure falsehood, being metaphysical impossibility, cannot be predicate, subject, middle term, consequence, or form of any thing, for it is pure non-entity ; if it could have a nature, it would be infinite negation of the Infinite. Then the heretic does not arrive at this result, and afterwards reconstruct Catholicity out of pure nothing ; that would be something worse than a paradox. He sees that he is tending thitherward, he knows that it is but a step removed from him, and he sees also that it is metaphysically impossible to take that step. What then ? Is his return to truth the result of the pure falsehood from which his spirit recoils ? O, no ; it is the result of the last portion of truth which had escaped elimination, and it reads thus : — That which leads to nonentity is false. This proposition contains, by implication, the assertion of Catholic truth.

But this logical process which leads from error to truth requires several conditions ; and one is, that the mind be allowed the free use of its faculties. Heresies of much consequence never arise, grow, and disappear, unless among a civilized people. Hence it was that the great heresies which afflicted the Church, before the Dark Ages, originated from the subtle minds of the Greeks and Egyptians, and those which have afflicted her since have arisen from the scarcely less acute Germans of modern times ; and hence it is, that, while schismatic storms were frequent during the same dark period, few new heresies of consequence deepened the gloom of the Christian skies. In enlightened times, the great minds, in their pride, were sorely tempted to invent new systems ; in the Dark Ages, learned men were content to copy the writings of antiquity. The exceptions which occur only prove the general rule. Of course, the nature and intensity of that darkness are wofully misunderstood and grossly misrepresented by Protestants. But let that pass. There was light enough to make people see the value of ancient monuments, and strain every nerve to preserve them, and the nineteenth century cannot do as much.

This explains why the errors of the Nestorian, Coptic, Greek, and Armenian churches are so slow in disappearing from the world. Some of them began in times when Asia and Northern Africa had not yet lost their civilization ; but by the time that these errors had become widely spread, a deluge of barbarism burst upon the land, and stupefied the intellects of the people, so that men were content to live and think as their fathers thought and lived. No doubt, the great distance of the Holy See, the almost insane jealousy of some of the Eastern Patriarchs, and the great difference between the genius of the Western barbarians and the Mahometans, strongly tended to accelerate the eclipse of the Asiatic churches. The Saracens have always held their Christian subjects in bondage, and slaves have few means and no time for mental culture. If this stupefaction of the human intellect could be consummated, men would act in the same way always ; they would be like the swallow, that builds her nest now precisely as the swallow did that flew out of the ark ; and the nearer man approaches to the condition of an animal, the more tenaciously does he cling to established customs and modes of thought, as the children of an enlightened age are apt to be wiser than the children of light. Hence idolatry is the most enduring of all heresies ; as soon as man became idolatrous, he waxed savage ; and idolatry is so

congenial to man's fallen nature that the sun of civilization, which shone for a season upon Egypt, Greece, and Rome, failed to penetrate the horrible cloud ; and as the savage state will scarcely disappear from the world, so it is probable that idolaters will be on earth when the trumpet shall sound, summoning them to meet that God of whom their fathers had heard, but in whom they stubbornly refused to believe.

Now Mahometanism is but a step removed from idolatry. A rigid analysis of that pestilent system shows that in substance it is no better than heathenism, notwithstanding the forms with which it is bedizened. Its heaven is grossly sensual, its God is invested with attributes which are wholly repugnant to the infinite nature of the true God. So the Church, in her struggle with Mahometanism, had to meet an enemy which was very like the one that possessed the whole world when she began her career, and which seemed likely to undo the work which she had been steadily doing for so many ages, in renovating the face of the earth, and in sending an innumerable company of pure virgins, holy confessors, and heroic martyrs to their home in heaven. This was the terrible enemy who had slowly but surely increased in strength as time rolled on, and who had become at least a giant, before whom the armies of the living God wavered and fled. Was there no David ? Was there no stone, detached without hands from the mountain, to roll down, and break the great image to pieces ? Where was the Pope ? He was kneeling at the tomb of the Apostles, and pouring forth his soul in prayer. We shall see what happened while he prayed.

The first serious check to their plans for the subjugation of Europe was given in France. Their army was divided into two bodies. One ascended the Rhone without opposition, when Eblo, Archbishop of Sens, after waiting vainly for some show of resistance to the enemy, marched forth and drove him from the walls of Sens. Abderrahman led the strongest division into Aquitaine. Charles Martel met him, and routed his army, leaving the Moor dead upon the field. This was the first of a series of battles which ended in the evacuation of France by the Saracens.

The Spaniards never suffered the enemy to rest, and deeds were done that seem like those of which we read in tales of enchantment. Under Alphonsus, Sancho, and Ramirez, Talavera and Madrid were taken from the Moors, and in the latter action eighty thousand of the enemy were slain. Abderrahman

III. in one day lost the fruits of an entire campaign. The Spaniards ascribed these victories to the intercession of St. James, whose relics were in their possession; and then the name of the Saint became the war-cry of Spain.

Still later, St. Gregory VII. interposed an effectual shield between Italy and the Moors. He had long meditated a crusade against them, but his controversy with Henry IV. forced him to defer the enterprise. But he confirmed the title of Robert Guiscard to the territories which this bold adventurer had won in Lower Italy. Robert swore fealty to the Holy See, and from that day the hardy Normans formed a strong bulwark against the Saracens. Victor III., the immediate successor of Gregory VII., carried into effect the plans of his great predecessor for the ruin of the Mahometan Colossus. He gathered together all the fighting men that Italy could furnish, and sent them to Africa, where a brilliant campaign was made. An army of a hundred thousand Saracens was routed, and several cities taken. The war did not lessen the miseries of the East. But it inspired the Christians with courage. The Popes knew that the salvation of Europe could be brought about only by carrying the war into the country of the enemy; the people were delighted to see the enemy of Christ, not only driven from Europe, but bearded in his own den. Pope Urban II. restored the Church in Sicily, and conferred extraordinary favors upon Count Roger, who had driven the Saracens from the island, occupied by them for two hundred years. Then the wars of the Crusades, which poets, apologists, and fanatical anti-Popery lecturers have made almost as well known to the people as battles fought at their doorsteps, kept the Saracens at bay for two centuries. They did no more, for the kingdoms and principalities founded by Godfrey and Bohemond, and the new dynasty of Baldwin at Constantinople, yielded to the irresistible pressure from without. But their mission was fulfilled.

Some have undertaken to justify the Crusades, by representing the great benefits which accrued to Europe in consequence. But the matter was one of sheer necessity. Europe would have become what Asia is, if the Mahometans had not been checked effectually. And the only way of doing it was to empty the West upon the countries of the enemy. As a war of reprisal, it would have been just. As the only way of saving Europe, it needs no apology.

It is probable that the peace of Europe would not have been much in danger from the Mahometans after the Crusades, if

the enemy had not received a new nation into their ranks. The race of the Prophet had become degenerate ; his people had been the terror of Christendom for six hundred years, and that is a long life for a bad nation. But the Turks, originally a horde of robbers, claimed for their Sultan the privileges of the Omniades. Under Othman, this people became terrible to Christianity, and in the middle of the fifteenth century Mahomet II., as great a captain as the Prophet ever numbered among his true believers, besieged and took the capital of the Eastern Empire, after a brave defence, in which the last emperor, Constantine XII., was slain. The crazy Empire had endured upwards of eleven hundred years. The Greeks had submitted to the Church a short time before, at the Council of Florence. But they kept the treaty of union with their usual faith. Pope Nicholas V. left no means untried in order to bring them back to the fold, but to no purpose. The Holy Father foretold their ruin. " Unless you cease to rend the seamless garment of Christ," exclaimed he, " after three years you shall be treated even as the barren fig-tree." This was said in 1451, and the Empire was finally destroyed in 1453.

The fall of the imperial city filled Europe with terror. Pope Nicholas V. immediately sent preachers everywhere. Nothing less than a new crusade was resolved upon. He exhorted the kings to lead their subjects against the common enemy. All the West was aroused ; two diets were held in Germany, the Duke of Burgundy and the king of Portugal sent fleets to the Pope, and Nicholas had gathered an army in Italy, when he died, and the enterprise was abandoned.

Calixtus III. succeeded to the pontificate. He revived the Crusade. Among his warlike measures he established a small navy, consisting of sixteen galleys, the first that a Pope had ever owned. The Cardinal of Aquileia commanded it, and he harassed the Turkish coast for three years. The Pope sent legates to France and Germany to arouse the sovereigns, but to no purpose. He sent ambassadors even to Persia, Tartary, and Armenia, hoping almost against hope that their sovereigns would do the work of the indolent kings of Europe. Hassan, king of Persia, sent an army against Mahomet, and overcame him in two fearful battles. Hassan then wrote to the Pope, thanking him for having with his prayers made the Omnipotent propitious to the Persian arms.

Mahomet led a hundred and fifty thousand men to Belgrade, which was the key of Southeastern Europe. His father, Am-

urath, had failed to take it, but Mahomet believed in himself. "There is but one God in heaven," he would say, "and the earth shall have no master but Mahomet." If Belgrade fell, the Sultan would find the gates of Servia, Hungary, Germany, and Italy wide open.

The Cardinal Carvajal and Capistrano, a Franciscan monk, raised a mob of forty thousand. Huniad, the general of the Hungarian armies, brought another body of men. But the forces were in such wretched condition in point of discipline, that no general could be induced to join the Hungarians; the kings were indifferent. "Perhaps it is as well," said the monk, as he reviewed them before the attack. "It is the cause of God, and he can lead ploughmen to victory, while he lays proud armies low." Prodiges of valor were performed on both sides, but, after twenty days' incessant fighting, the Sultan was wounded, and in a few hours forty thousand Turks fell upon the field. Mahomet tried to poison himself, but failed. This victory was regarded as the salvation of Europe.

Shortly after, the Turks attacked the island of Lesbos. The enemy were scaling the innermost walls, and the Christians began to fly. A young girl named Lesbia snatched a sword from a runaway, and rushed upon the Turkish ranks, calling upon the saints, and levelling a Turk at each invocation. The appalled Mahometans gave way, the Christians rallied, and the enemy was driven to his ships with great loss.

Pius II. succeeded Calixtus, and he turned his attention to the Crusade at once. Mahomet had taken Athens, Corinth, Lesbos, in a second expedition, Trebizond, the whole of Bosnia, and a number of inferior posts. Scanderbeg defended Albania successfully against the Sultan. The supreme Pontiff called a congress of the kings at Mantua, and went thither in person. After waiting five months, he found that the kings had sent ambassadors to meet him. They were waging war against one another, and they could not abandon their quarrels. The Pope soon found that the ambassadors had caught the humor of their masters. He appealed to the people of Europe, and after declaring that he would head the expedition, he named Ancona as the place of meeting. The novelty of this proceeding drew immense crowds from every country of Europe. The Pope saw himself surrounded with the raw material of an imposing army, but while he was engaged in devising means for its support, he sickened and died.

Paul II. did not sheathe the sword. His first act was to

encourage Scanderbeg to a rupture with Mahomet. The Turk entered Albania with a great force, and Scanderbeg repaired to Rome for aid. The influence of the Pope obtained 25,000 men. The lion of Albania returned, cut an auxiliary force of 20,000 horse to pieces, and then fell upon the main body of the Turks, with such success that few lived to carry back the tale. Then the old hero died. He had won the day in twenty-two battles against the Turks. Mahomet could not contain himself when he heard the news. "Now," he cried, "I will destroy the Christians. They have lost their sword and their shield." He then swore that he would not rest until every Christian from east to west should grovel beneath his horse's hoofs. In fact he overran Albania in a few days. He attacked Lemnos, Colchis, and Negropont, by land and sea. The Venetians answered the prayers of the Pope by sending a fleet to the *Ægean* Sea. Paul succeeded in awaking the Emperor Frederic, and a diet was convoked at Ratisbon. But the army was scarcely in marching order, when the Pope, who was the soul of the undertaking, died, and the body fell to pieces.

Sixtus IV. was the next Pope, and he was scarcely elected, when he despatched cardinal legates to Germany, Spain, and France, hoping that the sovereigns would suspend their private quarrels, and join against the common enemy. But he did not succeed. He despatched his own galleys, twenty-four in number, to Asia Minor. The Venetian and Neapolitan fleets joined in the expedition, and the Cardinal Caraffa set sail for Asia Minor, where he took Smyrna and some other cities. The king of Persia was again in the field; his most important operation was the capture of Trebizond. The Sultan was preparing a great blow, and it came in 1480. He entered Moldavia with 120,000 soldiers, and the Governor Stephen routed him with a handful of rustics, collected hastily from the fields. The Christians were as astonished as Mahomet was. But he seemed to call warriors from the earth at every stamp of his foot, and he overran Moldavia, Wallachia, and the neighbouring provinces of Poland. Then he ransacked Albania, and passed the mountains of Friuli. The enemy of the Church then stood upon Italian soil. When he retired, he promised that the next visit would be to Rome. He burned for revenge against the knights of Rhodes, who were the terror of his Asiatic governors. He assailed them as he had Constantinople and Belgrade; but after a siege of ninety days he retired, leaving his artillery and twenty

thousand men on the ground. His last enterprise was the capture of Otranto, a city in Calabria. Nearly the whole population were put to death. The Italians thought not of defending their country; the flying cowards were deserting the cities, when the Pope made his voice heard in the general confusion. He sent twenty-four galleys to the Adriatic Sea. It was time, for the Turks had turned their faces towards Loretto. There was no earthly reason why the Turk should fly before the small force opposed to him, but he did. The Pope availed himself of the momentary quiet. He besought the kings to lay aside their petty quarrels and repair to Rome. The congress was agreed to, but God summoned Mahomet to a higher tribunal, and Europe thanked Heaven that she was not yet enslaved.

Innocent VIII. prepared vigorously for a new Crusade, which frightened Sultan Bajazet so that he sent a renegade to Rome with a poison, mixed for the Pope's especial use. The villain was arrested, and suffered the penalty of his treason. Innocent strained every nerve to encourage and assist Ferdinand and Isabella, who had hunted the beast to his last den in Spain. He was finally expelled, after a stay of eight hundred years, almost every one of which saw deeds of arms which seem fabulous to our ears. After a few years of comparative quiet, Solyman II., a fine specimen of an infidel soldier, entered Hungary. His first action there was the capture of Belgrade. In his second visit to Hungary, he routed the army of King Louis, and beheaded fifteen hundred captives. He returned to Hungary at the invitation of John of Zapolya. This man disputed the right of the Archduke Ferdinand to the crown of Hungary, and he gathered an army, which was routed after a bloody action. Then John sold himself to the Turk. Solyman was a true believer, so Christian blood was sweet to him at all times. After he had taken twelve strong cities, he marched to Vienna, and besieged it. After twenty days' hard fighting he was compelled to retire; Solyman returned to Hungary, met the army of Ferdinand, cut it to pieces, and mortally wounded the king. Then, as his ally John was dead, he seized his wife and child, and sent them into exile; a just punishment for having called the enemy of the Church to settle a dispute between Christian kings.

The island of Rhodes, one of the strongest outworks of Christendom, had been held by the knights of St. John for two hundred years; and they gave the Turks no peace in Asia. Solyman besieged the island, and after a brilliant defence of

six months, during which a hundred thousand Moslems bit the dust, the island was yielded to the enemies of the cross. An action took place near Gerbi, where the Turks met the Spanish and Neapolitan fleets. The result was a total rout of the Christians.

The Knights of St. John, after their expulsion from Rhodes, encamped in the island of Malta, and Solyman sent Mustapha and Piali Pasha to dislodge them, and he already looked upon the island as won. It probably would have been, had the Sultan commanded in person. The siege lasted four months, the island was defended by a handful, and with a valor almost superhuman. The Grand Master, Valetta, was one of those generals whom God raises at times for the salvation of nations, and Europe, with her deadly enemy in full possession of her noblest city in the east, successfully assailed in the southeast, in imminent danger of losing Italy, and harassed along her southern shore, would have recited her preparation for death if the island of Malta, her best wall of defence in the south, had fallen into the hands of the infidels. Valetta and his little band disputed every inch of ground with the Turks; in the morning they prepared to die; and after they were strengthened by the Holy Sacraments, they marched to the walls, and when one Christian fell, ten unbelievers went with him to be judged. The Turks were almost past counting; — a thing that often happened, for they relied greatly upon numbers; they liked to overwhelm the enemy with a countless crowd; they were Egyptian frogs beneath a housekeeper's broom.

The Cæsar Ferdinand concluded a disgraceful truce with Solyman, paying to the Turk thirty million pieces of gold annually, that Hungary might rest in peace for eight years.

Solyman was succeeded by Selim II., and the new Sultan inherited the military genius of his father, and his determination to reduce Christendom. His first act was the storming of Cyprus. Nicosia was taken, and twenty thousand prisoners were savagely murdered, fifteen thousand sold. Famagusta capitulated after a brave defence. Mustapha made the Christians march before him, and every man was slain as he passed. After several conquests in the Archipelago, the general sent a large body against the island Curzola. This place was just then unaccountably abandoned by the men; not one was at home when the Turks appeared. But the women forgot for a time their natural timidity; they elected leaders, and made preparations for a vigorous defence. When the Turks came

near enough to distinguish objects, they were astonished to see that their opponents had no beards, and presently the word was passed that the place was defended by women, and that some serious trick was meant; so they advanced cautiously. Now it was said to be an article of the Turkish creed, that women have no souls, and that they were consequently incapable of doing any thing which requires serious thought and judgment; so they concluded that the men had placed their wives and daughters in the foreground to receive the shock of the battle, while they would annoy the besiegers from some safe hiding-place. Supposing, therefore, that they had only cowards and soulless women to meet, they raised a great shout, and rushed to the walls. But their shouts were in a twinkling changed to shrieks of pain, for the women saluted them with a storm of Greek fire, which killed many, and threw the rest into confusion. They advanced again, and the intrepid women poured upon them hot water, Greek fire, heated stones, and a well-directed discharge of all the artillery and fire-arms which could be gathered in the place. The Turks fled in the utmost terror, believing that the island was defended by evil genii just unchained. Their leaders succeeded in rallying them, and it was resolved to carry the place by storm, for they were sure that the women, if they were women, would run as soon as they could come to a close fight. But they made a fatal mistake; the same boiling and hissing shower of fire and water made them waver; the dead bodies lay in heaps under the walls; but the most intrepid pressed onward; they scaled the walls, and, ashamed of being beaten thus by women, fought desperately, and the Amazons met them like tigresses guarding their whelps. The contest was most bloody, but the women managed their knives as well as they did their kettles of boiling water, and the Turks fled, leaving a fourth of their number dead upon the field.

The hour had come, and the man. Pope Pius V. tried to arouse the sovereigns to a sense of their own danger, but his prayers were unheeded. He seemed to foresee the result of the approaching contest, and perhaps he thought that the Almighty had decreed the destruction of the infidels by a handful of Christians, as he did the downfall of the Midianites by three hundred of the children of Israel. He grew sanguine of success as its probabilities weakened; he had secured the coöperation of Spain, Genoa, and Venice, and with these he waited for victory. The fate of Christendom was decided by one naval battle. The Christian fleet was commanded by Don

John of Austria, who had for lieutenants Antonio Colonna, Barberigo, and Doria, the captains of the Roman, Venetian, and Genoese vessels. They met the enemy in the Gulf of Lepanto, and he did not hesitate to advance, for he expected an easy victory ; indeed, he believed that the Christians would not risk an action. When the hostile fleets drew near each other, the standard, solemnly blessed by the Pope, was displayed from the commander's vessel, and the Christians knelt to implore the countenance of the God of battles. "Soldiers," exclaimed the admiral, "behold your banner ! it is the cross of Christ. Remember that you are fighting for yourselves, for your homes, for your country ; above all, remember that you are the defenders of the Church of God. Onward, soldiers of Christ ! follow your banner to victory." The fleets met with a great crash, and the battle begun, and raged furiously for five hours. The wind had favored the enemy, but when the engagement commenced it changed to the opposite quarter, and blew the smoke into the faces of the Turks. Then the right wing of the enemy was broken, the Pasha Ali was killed, and his standard was taken. Don John commanded the soldiers to raise the hymn of victory, and the battle became a scene of carnage. Europe was saved. This was the most complete victory ever obtained over the Turks. More than thirty thousand perished, four thousand were taken, and fifteen thousand Christian slaves were restored to liberty. A hundred and forty vessels were taken, and the rest of the Turkish fleet was sunk or burnt. The Turks had sacked many cities, and nearly all the spoils were in these vessels, and returned to Christian hands.

It is impossible to conceive the terror which seized the Turks, when the news reached Constantinople. If the Pope had been near Lepanto, that great capital would have been retaken by the Christian army. For the Turks, expecting that the victors would immediately besiege the city, ran to the hitherto persecuted Christian residents, confided to them the greater part of their treasure, and implored them to permit the free exercise of the Mahometan worship in Constantinople, on the payment of a yearly tribute. If Don John had appeared, the city would have yielded without a struggle. But he returned to Italy, and Constantinople was lost to Christendom.

St. Pius V. seemed to know that the enterprise would succeed, but he knew that only God could give the victory, and the day and night preceding the battle were spent in prayer. While the battle was raging at Lepanto, hundreds of miles distant, the

Cardinals were assembled at Rome. Suddenly the Pope left his throne, and hastened to a window, where he stood for some time, with his eyes raised to heaven. Then he turned to his Cardinals, and said, — "Let us give thanks to God for the victory which he is giving now to his people." God had shown him the event. The holy Pontiff declared that it was owing to the prayers of the Mother of God, and he added to the Litany the words, "Help of Christians," and, as a further commemoration of the event, he established a feast in honor of Our Lady of Victory, which is observed throughout the Christian world. And thus the Mahometan power, which had been steadily increasing for a thousand years, received a mortal blow. The Turks have done little since to disturb the peace of Europe; their military genius disappeared by degrees, until it became a mere longing of the Janizary for plunder, of the pirate for a lonely sail, of the assassin for blood.

The war lasted five hundred years, counting from the pontificate of Hildebrand, who conceived the plan of saving Christendom by carrying the war into the countries of the enemy, to the Crusade of Pius V. Europe was soon to be shaken to her centre by rebellion clothed in religious garments, — by atheism, illuminism, and anarchy such as had never been seen before. It was necessary that the pressure from outside infidelity should not be overwhelming, for domestic confusion multiplied by successful invasion brings chaos, when the enemy is a barbarian, and the merciful God spared Europe such a wretched fate as overtook the Greek Empire. His chief instrument was the Holy See; — it has been his instrument in conferring upon Europe all the real good she enjoys. Such is Christianity, and such are its legitimate children, true civilization, civil order, and science. Children forget their parents, scholars forget their masters, whilom slaves forget their liberators; — what wonder that Europe, once a scholar, a child, and a slave, should forget its earliest and best friend? No matter. St. Peter did not look imprisonment and death in the face for the sake of an earthly reward, and his successors inherit his spirit. Pius IX. inherits it, else he would not be the first man of his age, but rather a poor, weak, ruined statesman. They say that the powers will restore him. Perhaps they may, but the surest power is that upon which the Pope is used to depend. It will be the prayers of his untold millions of children, that will ascend to heaven for him in the coming year of jubilee. God save Pius IX., as he leans upon the Rock of ages!

ART. II. — *The Christian Examiner and Religious Miscellany*. Boston : Crosby & Nichols. March, 1850. Art. IV.

THE number of *The Christian Examiner* — the literary and theological organ of the American Unitarians — for March last contains an attempted defence of no-churchism, in reply to an Article on *The Church against No-Church*, published in our Review for April, 1845. The author of the defence is James Freeman Clarke, founder of the Church of the Disciples, formerly one of the conductors of a monthly magazine called *The Western Messenger*, and is known to our readers as the author of a remarkable discourse on *The Church, — as it was, as it is, and as it ought to be*, — reviewed at some length in this journal for July, 1848.

The defence is not very remarkable for its solidity, and, though here and there a little clever, does not appear to us worthy of the high intellectual character aimed at by *The Christian Examiner*. If it were not for the esteem in which we have been accustomed to hold that periodical, as the organ of our old associates, and the possibility that some weak-minded persons might mistake the motive of our silence, we should pass it by unnoticed. Its author is not a man we should choose for our opponent, for we always wish for an opponent one who has some powers of discrimination, and some capacity to feel the force of an argument. But we have no choice in the case, and if the Unitarians are willing to make him their champion, and to risk their cause in his hands, we must accept him, and dispose of him as best we may.

The defence consists of two parts. The first is an enumeration and philosophical explanation of the various and extraordinary changes we are said to have undergone ; the second repeats, without our answers, some of the objections we have from time to time raised against ourselves and refuted. The first part is the more racy, and appears to have been written *con amore*. It has one or two clever hits, but, unhappily, the more *piquant* portion is untrue, and the rest has been repeated so often in conversation and the public press, that it has an ancient smell, more likely to disgust than delight its readers. The story of our changes is an old story, not worth reproducing, even with variations. Who has not been told, that we were formerly in the habit of changing our views, and refuting ourselves, once

a quarter? The explanation of our changes suggested by Mr. Clarke is, no doubt, ingenious, but it reminds us of the joke which Charles the Second of England played off upon the learned members of the Royal Society, and it might be classed with D'Israeli's chapter on *The History of Events that never happened*. However, the author must be permitted to speak for himself.

"We intend to speak in this present article of Mr. Brownson, and of his argument for the Roman Church. Mr. Brownson is an active thinker, an energetic writer, and a man who has assumed an important position in American literature by years of steady labor. He has devoted himself during that time to the highest questions of philosophy, ethics, and theology, and has treated none of these subjects in a superficial or commonplace way. He has also belonged for a time, after a fashion of his own, to our communion. He has repeatedly created sensations by his ultraism on several subjects, and he finally astonished our community by going over from extreme Neology and Transcendentalism to Romanism of the most Ultramontane kind. Since then, he has occasionally addressed some arguments to his old friends, in behalf of his new Church. He has sometimes referred to our own periodical; and in April, 1845, addressed us, in a somewhat elaborate argument, inviting us to become members of the Church of Rome, or to show cause why we reject the invitation.

"For all these reasons, it would seem proper that we should take some notice of his writings. When a man of no mean abilities assumes such a position, it seems proper for a journal like ours to consider it. And, indeed, we should probably have weighed his arguments long before this time, had we not been expecting a reply from an abler hand,—namely, from Mr. Brownson himself. We thought it hardly worth while to exert our ingenuity in exposing the fallacy of arguments, which, judging by experience, Mr. Brownson would himself be ready to confute in the course of a year or two. No man has ever equalled Mr. Brownson in the ability with which he has refuted his own arguments. He has made the most elaborate and plausible plea for Eclecticism, and the most elaborate and plausible plea against it. He has said the best things in favor of Transcendentalism, and the best things against it. He has shown that no man can possibly be a Christian, except he is a Transcendentalist; and he has also proved that every Transcendentalist, whether he knows it or not, is necessarily an infidel. He has satisfactorily shown the truth of Socialism, and its necessity in order to bring about a golden age; and he has, by the most convincing arguments, demonstrated that the whole system of Socialism is from the pit, and can lead to nothing but anarchy and ruin. *He has defended the course of Mr. Dorr in Rhode Island, and argued before*

a crowd in State Street, in this city, that the people of Massachusetts should aid him in taking possession of the government by force. Afterward, he confuted the whole argument of Mr. Dorr, showing it to be hostile to all true democracy, and fatal, if it should succeed, to republican institutions. In 1841 he defended Theodore Parker, and declared him to be a Christian, in an article on Mr. Parker's Discourse at South Boston; asserting that he was guilty of no heresy, but only of defects, in his view of Jesus. But in 1845, Parkerism is infidelity, and Mr. Parker stands in the ranks of the disobedient and rebellious, among proud, conceited, and superficial infidels, and is, to all intents and purposes, a rejecter of the Gospel. But especially in relation to the Church question has Mr. Brownson's change of opinion been the most radical and extreme. He labors now with great ingenuity and extraordinary subtilty to show that there must be an infallible church with its infallible ministry, and that out of this church there can be no salvation. But formerly he labored with equal earnestness to show that there could be no such thing as a church at all, no outward priesthood or ministry. His former arguments, then, for aught that we can see, were just as acute, plausible, and effective as his present ones. In the year 1840, he wrote a long article, proving, by a subtle chain of reasoning, the exact reverse of his present propositions. He then declared that it was necessary to destroy the Church and abolish the priesthood. He said, 'We oppose the Church as an Antichristian institution'; 'because we find no Divine authority for it; because we cannot discover that Jesus ever contemplated such an institution; and because we regard it as the grave of freedom and independence, and the hot-bed of servility and hypocrisy.' 'We object to every thing like an outward, visible church; to every thing that in the remotest degree partakes of the priest.' 'Christianity is the sublimest protest against the priesthood ever uttered.' 'Jesus instituted no priesthood, and no form of religious worship. He recognized no priest but a holy life. He preached no formal religion, enjoined no creed.' 'The priest is universally a tyrant, universally the enslaver of his brethren. Priests are, in their capacity of priests, necessarily enemies to freedom and equality. The word of God never drops from the priest's lips,' &c., &c." — pp. 227 — 229.

If this were true, we ought to be looked upon as an extraordinary man, the marvel of our age and country. But we cannot claim the merit it awards us. The author cannot afford to grant us so much, for his purpose is not, by magnifying our ability, to enhance the merit of his courage in attempting to defend himself against us, but to show, from our frequent changes and alleged ability to reason on one side of a question as well as on

another, that nothing we say can deserve a moment's consideration. But if what he asserts be true, since it must be conceded that, however frequently we may have changed our views, we have never been known to return to a doctrine which we have once held and rejected, it is certain that we did not embrace Catholicity blindly, nor renounce Protestantism without knowing the best that can be said in its favor. This, instead of being a reason for not weighing, would be a good reason for weighing, any argument we might offer for the Church, not only because it would be likely to be a good argument in itself, but because urged by one who knows and has said the best that can be urged against it.

We cannot understand why Protestants should dwell with so much fondness on our alleged changeability and changes, for whatever discredit may attach to them, it attaches to Protestantism, not to Catholicity, — to the Protestant minister, not to the Catholic believer. All the changeableness and changes alleged against us were exhibited, if at all, prior to our conversion, and nobody pretends to allege any thing of the sort against us since. We have resided in this community in all about sixteen years, — the whole of our life that can be considered of any public interest. During nearly six of these years, we have been a member of the Catholic Church, and have shown no changeableness or symptom of change. If during the previous ten years, while a Protestant, a Unitarian minister even, we were, as you say, in the habit of changing our views and refuting ourselves about once in every three months, how do you account for the fact, that we have as a Catholic remained firm and steadfast for nearly six years? Here is, if you are right, the most remarkable change of all. How do you explain it? You cannot say that it is owing to our ignorance, either of Protestantism or of Catholicity, for you concede that we have said the best things that can be said in favor of, as well as against, each; it cannot be an obstinate attachment to opinions once avowed, for your very accusation implies the total absence of such attachment; it cannot be any fear as to the sort of reception Protestants would give us were we to return to them, for nobody can doubt that they would hail our return as a god-send. Whence, then, comes this remarkable change in personal character? *The Examiner* suggests the answer (p. 232), in declaring it impossible for a man to disavow what he has once seen to be true, and in asserting that, "When a man tells us that he has changed all his convictions, he tells us that he nev-

er had any convictions to change." That, when a Protestant, we had not seen, and did not see, the truth, and therefore had no real faith, or what *The Examiner* calls convictions, is undoubtedly true, and this fact explains the change. As a Protestant we lacked the truth. We were seeking it without finding it, and therefore were restless, and continually changing; but as a Catholic we have found the truth, have it, are no longer seeking it, and therefore are satisfied, at rest, and change no more. But who, except the founder of the Church of the Disciples, would ever dream of adducing this as a reason why an argument constructed by us for the Church is not worth considering?

But suppose that our past conduct as a Protestant was altogether unworthy, that we were fickle and vain, as unstable as water, changing once a quarter, or even every month, — what then? The argument of *The Examiner* is a bad one. Let it be that we have changed too often to be depended upon. It amounts to nothing; for we have never proclaimed ourselves as one who could be depended upon, and we have never asked any one to believe the Church on our personal authority. If we professed to be the founder of our Church, to be ourselves "the ground and pillar of truth," and asked people to believe the Church for the simple reason that we believe her, it would not be amiss to ask who and what we are, and to make a rigid inquiry into our personal character, and our qualifications for arrogating to ourselves the Divine prerogative. But we have ceased to be a Protestant, and therefore do nothing of the sort. The Church was not founded by us, is not ours, and does in no sense rest on our wisdom and virtue. The arguments we have urged are addressed to the common reason of mankind; they speak for themselves, and depend not at all for their conclusiveness or want of conclusiveness on our personal character or personal authority. It is less conclusive than convenient to say, Mr. Brownson has changed his opinions often; therefore the argument he adduces for the Church against no-church is worthless.

We have, however, something to say to these alleged changes themselves. Some of them are fabrications, and others are perversions or exaggerations of very harmless facts. It is not true that we ever defended the course of Mr. Dorr of Rhode Island, or that we ever argued before a crowd in State Street, in this city, that Massachusetts ought to aid him in taking possession of the government by force. We never ad-

dressed a crowd in State Street on the subject, either for or against his course. It is not true that we have shown, or ever attempted to show, that no man can be a Christian except he is a Transcendentalist. We never had the honor of being a Transcendentalist, and there never was a time when the fact, that any principle we held involved Transcendentalist consequences, would not have been of itself a sufficient reason for us to reject it as false. The chiefs of Boston Transcendentalism were from the outset Ralph Waldo Emerson and S. Margaret Fuller, and the pages of *The Christian Examiner*, as well as those of our own *Boston Quarterly Review*, prove that we always opposed their peculiar views. It is well known by the writer against us, that *The Dial*, which we ridiculed in public and in private, not our review, was their organ; that we always contended that Transcendentalism was pantheism, and that we held pantheism to be unchristian and false. That we held, as does every Protestant, principles which lead to Transcendentalism, we do not deny; but whenever we discovered such to be the fact, we rejected them as false, and for that reason alone. If we ever defended the Transcendentalists against their enemies, it was not in their peculiar views, but in what they held in common with all of us who at the time were engaged in the war against Cambridge conservatism, and the sensism of Locke. *The Examiner* knows perfectly well that its statement is not true.

With regard to Mr. Parker, we own, that, when a Unitarian minister, we defended him, and maintained that his South Boston sermon might bear a Christian sense, and on Unitarian principles we should maintain the same thing to-day. In 1845, after our conversion, we wrote an article, in which we proved that no Unitarian had the right to pronounce his doctrine, all infidel as it is, unchristian. We understand no right in any Unitarian, nay, in any Protestant, to deny Mr. Parker, or any one else, to be a Christian, so long as he professes to be one. Our views of Mr. Parker have undergone no change, but in passing from Unitarianism to Catholicity our views of what is Christianity have of course changed.

That in 1840, while still a Protestant, we maintained no-churchism, as *The Examiner* alleges, is true, and we should maintain the same to-day, if we assumed, as we did then, that the Protestant movement was a *Christian* movement. We did it avowedly on Protestant principles, and we have written article after article, since our conversion, to prove that Protestants

have, and can have, on their principles, no church, no priesthood, in the proper sense of the terms. Assume those principles to be Christian, and you must be a pitiable reasoner indeed, if you cannot draw the conclusion, that every thing like a priest or a visible church is unchristian. We did but express, in clear and energetic language, what *The Christian Examiner* itself and all Unitarians do and must maintain. We were never so dull as not to see that the Protestant movement was directly opposed to every thing like a visible church or priesthood, in the sense in which we then denied them, or now hold them, or that, if there is a visible church or priesthood to be asserted as Christian, it is the Roman Catholic. At any time during the last twenty-five years, if it had been proved to us that our Lord did found a church and institute a priesthood, we should at once have said, as we say now, they are the Roman Catholic ; for they obviously can be no other ; and prove to us now that the Protestant movement, or Reformation, as it is called, was from God, and is to be held as a Christian movement, and we will repeat the essay on *The Laboring Classes*, which *The Examiner* cites, and say again, that "the truth never drops from the priest's lips,"—that "the priest is universally a tyrant, and the enslaver of his brethren." Doubtless we have changed on the Church question since 1840, but we have undergone on that question no change not necessarily involved in the conversion from Protestantism to Catholicity, and to object the change to us is only objecting, either that when a Protestant we were not a Catholic, or that now we are a Catholic we are not still a Protestant. How in the world were we to become a Catholic without changing ?

The Examiner thinks to overwhelm us, by applying to us prior to our conversion the language we have since employed in describing Protestantism.

"In fact, he has given the best possible description of his own creed before that time in the following passage :—'It is in perpetual motion, and exemplifies, so far as itself is concerned, the old heathen doctrine that all things are in a perpetual flux. You can never count on its remaining stationary long enough for you to bring your piece to a rest and take deliberate aim. You must shoot it on the wing ; and if you are not marksman enough to hit it flying, you will have, however well charged and well aimed your shot, only your labor for your pains. It is never enough to take note either of its past or its present position ; but we must always regard the direction in which it is moving, and the celerity with

which it moves ; and if we wish our shot to tell, we must aim, not at the point where it was, or where it now is, but at the point where it will be when the ball now fired may reach it.' Mr. Brownson thinks that he is here describing Protestantism. But he must allow us to say that he has merely given us a very happy description of the working of his own individual intellect. It is an old trick of proselytes to ascribe to the party they have left all the blunders and errors which were peculiar to themselves." — pp. 229, 230.

This retort would be happy, if it were not a retort upon one of the author's own brethren. He applies it to us as a Protestant, and not to us as a Catholic, and the more ridiculous he makes us appear as a Protestant, the more does he weaken his own cause. Let it be that we sat for the picture, and drew from our own experience, it was the Protestant that sat, and a Protestant's experience that was depicted. Suppose we did draw from our own Protestant experience, it does not follow that we concluded the description must be applicable to the Protestant world, because we found it applicable to ourselves ; for it is warranted by the history of the Protestant controversies, Protestant developments and variations, any time for the last three hundred years.

"When, therefore, we find that Mr. Brownson's mind is in the habit of experiencing such extraordinary revolutions, we may perhaps be excused for not paying much attention to his position at any particular time. In a land of earthquakes, men do not build four-story houses ; neither do we spend much time in refuting the arguments of a man whom we know to be in the habit of refuting himself about once in every three months. We are inclined to say with Mr. Emerson, 'If we could have any security against moods ! If the profoundest prophet could be holden to his words, and the hearer who is ready to sell all, and join the crusade, could have any certificate that to-morrow his prophet shall not unsay his testimony ! But the Truth sits veiled there on the bench, and never interposes an adamant syllable ; and the most sincere and revolutionary doctrine, put as if the ark of God was to be carried forward some furlongs and planted there for the succour of the world, shall in a few weeks be coldly set aside by the same speaker as morbid, — "*I thought I was right, but I was not,*" — and the same immeasurable credulity demanded for new audacities.' " — pp. 230, 231.

This would have been more appropriate five years ago. The author has kept his argument too long ; it has grown musty, and unfit for use. He appears to have lost the current of events, and fallen behind the times. Has he been taking a

nap, after the example of the celebrated Rip Van Winkle? The citation from Mr. Emerson would be to the author's purpose, if we asked people to believe Catholic doctrine on our personal authority, or on any authority liable to change or to be moody; but as it is, it is very much to our purpose, and faithfully and vividly depicts the sad condition of poor Protestants, who have only a human authority for their faith, and only an arm of flesh on which to lean.

"But it may be said, 'Will you not allow a man to make progress? May he not discover and correct his errors? Shall he not honestly say, "I was wrong, but I am wiser now"? Will *you*, who profess to believe in progress, think less of a man because he changes his opinions and cares less for consistency than he does for truth?' " — p. 231.

There was no need either of suggesting or of refuting the plea of progress, for we do not make it. We have never pretended that our conversion to Catholicity was a progress or the result of a progress in our Protestant life. It was a change, and consisted not in being clothed upon, as Mr. Newman would say, with Catholic truth, but in throwing off Protestant heresy, and accepting Catholic truth in its place. The only progress we lay claim to is a progress, by the grace of God, not *in* Protestantism, but *out of* it. Our conversion was a change, a real change, and the only real change we have ever undergone. It did not take place instantaneously, but was a gradual process, which continued for some three years. During those years we were in a transition state, our mind was unsettled, and our old Protestant notions were continually giving way, as snow and ice before the increasing warmth of the sun as the spring advances. Doubtless this manifested itself in our writings at the time, but all the changes we successively underwent were only the changes which every genuine Protestant must undergo in being converted to the Church. They consisted simply in throwing off what we had received from Protestantism, in which we were born and bred, and in no instance was there any other change than that of throwing off the first view we had embraced on the subject. We never betrayed any of that kind of change which consists in holding a doctrine to-day, renouncing it to-morrow, and taking it up again the day after. The doctrines we have once rejected we have seldom afterwards defended.

"The misfortune of Mr. Brownson, as it seems to us, and the explanation of his whole past course, is simply this; that he has

had no such central truths, no primal convictions. Acute as a logician, able to see the sequences and dependences by which one proposition is connected with another, his mind appears to have no power of intuition. He cannot see a truth, a principle; and he has therefore no insights, but only thoughts."—pp. 231, 232.

The Examiner is nearer the truth here than usual. We have very little insight; we are mentally weak and ignorant; we feel it and deplore it. We cannot come into comparison with those great men to whom nothing is hidden, dark, or difficult, and who have mastered all the secrets of nature and all the mysteries of revelation. All we dare aspire to is to learn some little of the wisdom of others, and to repeat it in our own stammering speech for the benefit of those who know less than we, because they have had less time and opportunity for study. There can be no question of our grievous lack of insight. If we had not lacked it, we should have escaped innumerable errors, and at a much earlier day discovered the unchristian character of the Protestant movement, and begged admission into the Holy Catholic Church.

No doubt, when a Protestant, so far forth as a Protestant, we had no great "central truths"; but this was hardly our fault. How could we "gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles"? We could not be expected to have what Protestantism has not to give; we had all it has, and more we could not have had, without ceasing to be a Protestant, for we always lacked the ability of our worthy opponent to maintain, that of contraries both may be true. Yet it is not true to say that we had no "primal convictions." The "primal convictions" which belong to every rational soul we certainly had, and it was those that gave us our trouble; for we never could make Protestantism harmonize with them. Had it not been for them, Protestantism, in some of its forms, might have satisfied us, and we might have settled down quietly in the sect in which we found ourselves,—perhaps have been a fellow-laborer with the founder of the Church of the Disciples. But having them, we could never persuade ourselves that all opinions are alike good, that there is no difference between truth and falsehood, between right and wrong, or that one can be safe, unless he loves and serves God in the way God himself wills; consequently we could not rest till we had found something better than Protestantism.

But after all, *The Examiner* is a little inconsistent with itself, in attributing our various changes to lack of insight,—to

the total want of intuition or apprehension of principles. It awards us a high intellectual character, says that we have devoted years of steady labor "to the highest questions of philosophy, ethics, and theology," and that we have treated none of them "in a superficial or commonplace manner." It places us in the front rank of all who have labored in defence, or in refutation, of Eclecticism, Transcendentalism, Radicalism, and Socialism, and it plainly implies that we have been surpassed by none of our contemporaries in the defence of no-churchism on the one hand, and of the Church on the other. It allows us great mental acuteness and extraordinary logical powers. We cannot understand how a man of whom this is to be said can be wholly destitute of insight, or have no intuition or apprehension of principles. How can a man who has no insight have great mental acuteness? or how can one who has no apprehension of principles reason logically? What sort of logic is that which can operate without principles?

"If our account of the working of Mr. Brownson's mind be correct, he has always, even when most a Protestant, been a Roman Catholic in principle. The main distinction between the Church of Rome and its opponents regards the final ground of our belief. The Protestant relies, in the last result, upon personal conviction; the Romanist, on outward authority. Individual faith is the principle of Protestantism; submission to an outward teacher, the principle of the Church of Rome. But Mr. Brownson, even when most a Protestant, took his first principles from some one else; and he does no more than that now. And certainly it is more satisfactory to rest on the authority of a Church claiming to teach in the name of God, than to rest on the authority of Victor Cousin or Claude Henri St. Simon. We think, indeed, that Mr. Brownson, loving fight as well as he does, must enjoy himself not a little in his present position. He there has an opportunity of fighting as much as he pleases, with all his old friends. He has not been slow in availing himself of this opportunity; and he has in turn attacked High-Churchmen and Low-Churchmen, Transcendentalists and Rationalists, Unitarians and Socialists, holding also an occasional argument with other Roman Catholics, not quite as orthodox as himself." — pp. 233, 234.

If we were always a Roman Catholic in principle, what becomes of the infinite number of changes we are said to have undergone? We can in that case have undergone no change in our principles, and a man who has never changed his principles cannot have been remarkably changeable. He can have

undergone no changes except such as relate to simple matters of fact, — changes to which every man who acquires information is liable, and which are never regarded as at all discreditable to one's constancy of character or solidity of judgment. We were, we concede, always a Roman Catholic, in the respect that we held that faith is necessary, and regarded the man who has no faith as in an abnormal condition ; that truth is something real, and not at all dependent upon or affected by our apprehension of it ; that in order to reason one must have principles, and therefore that first principles are neither obtained nor obtainable by reasoning ; that every one is bound by the legitimate consequences of his own principles ; and that one truth can never be in contradiction with another. These principles we always held, even when most a Protestant, and thus far were, no doubt, when most a Protestant, a Roman Catholic in principle.

Moreover, we were never enough of a Protestant to believe that we were ourselves the exact measure of truth and goodness, that we were personally infallible, that we had no need of being taught, or that we could spin all truth, spider-like, out from our own bowels. We were no genuine *arachnean*, and we always felt our need of masters. We had masters, — the best masters to be found out of the Catholic Church ; but, unhappily, they were very incompetent masters, who taught us more error than truth, — more ignorance than science. We made a mistake, not in having masters, but in the masters we chose. Had we known enough to seek out some humble Catholic priest, and submit ourselves to his tutelage, we should have had nothing to regret ; for he would have taught us more in five minutes than all our Protestant masters taught us in forty years.

But after all, we did not, in this matter of masters, practically differ so widely from the great body of Protestants as some may suppose. Protestant profession is one thing ; Protestant practice is another, and in general a contrary thing. All Protestants, except the founders of new sects, are the slaves of some master or masters, and the only liberty they have — and they by no means always have even that — is the liberty of choosing their masters, or of exchanging one for another. You may talk of Protestant freedom to the marines. A more servile set of mortals than the mass of Protestants it is impossible to conceive ; and what makes the matter worse is, that the poor slaves hug their chains, and fancy it freedom. The Catholic is

the only freeman, for he has no master but God. Even the self-sufficient founder of the Church of the Disciples had his masters as well as we, and has them still. The only difference between him and us in this respect was, that we could follow the teachings of our several masters only so far as we could, or thought we could, reconcile the teachings of one with those of another, while he made no reserve of the sort. He always appeared to be able to accept the grossest syncretism, and to swallow down in their crudest state the entire systems of all the masters he could light upon, however mutually contradictory they might be. As far as we could discover, he went on the principle of accepting all systems, all schools, all sects, all doctrines, and all opinions; of being an infidel with infidels, a pantheist with pantheists, a Quaker with Quakers, a Swedenborgian with Swedenborgians, a Unitarian with Unitarians, a Trinitarian with Trinitarians, an Evangelical with Evangelicals, a pagan with pagans, a conservative with conservatives, a Socialist with Socialists, and a Catholic with Catholics. We have found him fraternizing alike with those who believe Jesus of Nazareth to be the only Messiah, and with those who maintain that Wolfgang Goethe was a second Messiah, and who patronize S. Margaret Fuller and Bettine Brentano. He is a man of large sympathies, — sympathies wide as the world. Do not all these various systems, opinions, sects, and classes subsist in the world side by side? Why not, then, in the Church, especially in the Church of the Disciples? Would you have the Church narrower and less tolerant than the world?

But enough of this. If *The Examiner* had succeeded in this part of its defence, it would have availed it nothing; for the real question at issue is not our personal character, or our mental or moral constitution, but Church or no-church. We frankly admit that we are altogether unworthy to be a member of the Catholic Church, much more to write in defence of Catholic doctrine. But if the argument we have addressed to it proves her claims, *The Examiner* will in vain attempt to excuse itself for not having examined and yielded to its force, on the ground of our past instability or present unworthiness. The argument is before its conductors, and they owe it to themselves to forget who has laid it before them, and to give it all the consideration to which it is entitled by its intrinsic merits. Nothing is gained in the long run by seeking to substitute personal detraction or vulgar prejudice for solid argument. In our article against *The Examiner* we made no personal attack; we ap-

pealed to no popular prejudice against either it or its doctrine ; we reasoned fairly and conscientiously ; and it owed it to its own character, and to us, as one of its former contributors, to have met us in the same tone and manner. It has not done so ; and for its sake, for the sake of its readers, and for the sake of honorable and profitable controversy, we regret it ; but as far as we are concerned, we are prepared for all tones and all tempers, and have been too much accustomed to be publicly traduced to be disturbed. It is a little thing to speak slightly of us, after having calumniated the Church of God.

The second part of *The Examiner's* defence need not detain us long. The author has urged several objections against us, but not one which we have not heretofore ourselves raised in substance and refuted. It is, no doubt, a convenient way to refute an opponent, to take from him the objections he raises against himself, and omit his answers ; but it is not a very honorable nor a very satisfactory way ; and having once replied to the objections, we cannot be held bound to reply to them again, till the answers we have already given are shown to be insufficient. The author's objections, moreover, do not require any answer from us, because he virtually concedes, or rather contends, that they amount to nothing. He attempts to refute us by argument, and of course refutes us only on condition that the arguments he objects to us are conclusive against us, that is, make it certain that we are wrong. But this, according to him, they do not do, for he maintains (pp. 235, 236) that "the strongest argument ever made never produced any thing but a strong probability," and that "*certainty is never produced by any amount of argument.*" Then, we may add, *a fortiori*, not by such arguments as his. If no amount of argument ever produces certainty, it remains certain that his arguments have not invalidated ours, and therefore amount to nothing ; and if they amount to nothing, they require no answer.

The Examiner should remember that skepticism is a weapon as fatal to him who wields it as to him against whom it is wielded. If our arguments fail to prove the Church, on its ground that no argument is or can be conclusive, then its arguments, on the same ground, conclude nothing against ours, and therefore it has been very silly in urging them. But, remembering the controversies formerly carried on in its pages against the so-called Orthodox, we are a little surprised to find *The Christian Examiner* taking ground against all argument, and seeking refuge in skepticism. We remember the time

when it maintained a different doctrine ; when it did not decry reason ; when the Unitarians, whom it represents, boasted themselves the champions of reason against enthusiasm, and of rational piety against fanaticism ; when they were in the habit of saying, No man is against argument till argument is against him, and no one objects to reason so long as he has a good reason to give. Have they changed, turned a somersets, and undertaken to do what they accused their old Calvinistic enemies of doing, that is, to "reason against reason, use reason against the use of reason, and to give a pretty good reason why reason ought not to be used" ? Alas ! how have the mighty fallen ! Unitarians abandoning reason, rejecting argument, and seeking refuge in skepticism, or illuminism ! He who rejects reason abdicates his manhood, withdraws himself from the class of rational beings, and places himself in the category of irrational animals, as the dog, the horse, or the ass, which are manageable sometimes by our industry, but with which it is impossible to hold rational intercourse. If argument never establishes certainty, why do you attempt to argue ?

The Examiner's first objection to our argument for the Church is, that it is too subtle. "Is it possible," he asks (p. 235), "that we are left to find the true Church of Christ by means of such a subtle chain of reasoning ?" Yes, we answer, if heretics have so obscured the truth by their errors and sophistry, learned ignorance and conceited folly, that they are incapable of being convinced by plainer or simpler arguments. But what sort of right have Protestants, or any other class of heretics, — after having turned their backs upon the truth, after having exerted all their wit, ingenuity, skill, and malice in devising objections to it, and thus compelling us to resort to close, rigid, and even subtle reasoning to meet and refute their sophistry and subtilty, — to turn upon us, and tell us that our Church cannot be the Church of God, for if she was, no such reasoning would be necessary ? If a man resolutely shuts his eyes so as not to see the sun, shall he tell us, after we have induced him by great labor and effort to open them, that the sun is not the sun, nay, that there is and can be no sun, for if there was, so much labor could not be required to enable him to see it ? Poor man ! we did not labor to enable him to see the sun, or to make the sun more obvious, but to remove the obstacles to his seeing it, which his own folly and obstinacy had interposed. But whence do Protestants obtain the right to urge charges against the Church which refute one another ? They accuse us of ignorance,

and then object to our Church, that she is the result of the most consummate human wisdom, and all but miraculous knowledge of human nature. They tell us, that we are utterly unable to reason, and as soon as we expose the falseness of their accusation, and show that we can and do reason, they turn upon us and say, they are sure our Church cannot be the true Church, because we support her by argument, and argument cannot give certainty, or because we reason, and reason altogether too well, in her defence ! A wonderful deal of consistency is to be found in Protestants, most assuredly ! They have a double set of objections, one the contrary of the other, so that, as the one set is refuted, they can bring up the other set. Very convenient !

The Examiner thinks it is not likely that our salvation is made to depend on the logical faculty and the understanding of such a piece of pure reasoning as our argument.

"Now, according to Mr. Brownson, our *salvation* depends on our belonging to the true Church ; therefore, our *salvation* depends on our being able to investigate and understand the whole of the great question at issue between the Roman Church and its opponents. He thinks that he has reduced this question to its simplest form in the argument before us ; and he thinks that this argument is perfectly simple and intelligible. Nevertheless, it occupies some sixty pages of pure argument, making a chain of propositions and deductions, *any one of which failing, the whole must go to the ground*. Now we say, that it is not very likely, at the outset, that God has made the salvation of his creatures to depend on the logical faculty and clearness of insight necessary in order to do justice to such a piece of pure reasoning as this." — p. 235.

There is a mistake here as to the number of pages the argument occupies. The whole essay is less than sixty pages long. One eighth of it is exhausted with other matters, before the argument begins, and at least six eighths are taken up with explanations rendered necessary by the errors of Unitarians and others, and in refuting the false theories of heretics. The argument proper occupies less than half a dozen pages, and *The Examiner* professes to have reproduced it in less than one. Then the argument is the farthest removed possible from subtlety. It consists solely in drawing from the premises known and professed by every man who calls himself a Christian their obvious and necessary consequences. To call such an argument subtle is an abuse of terms. Moreover, the argument is not presented as the only, nor as the briefest and sim-

plest argument possible, but professedly in reply to an essay on *The Church*, in *The Christian Examiner* for January, 1845, as the argument best adapted to the apprehensions of Unitarians, and to the removal of their peculiar prejudices.

The writer says the argument consists "of a chain of propositions, any one of which failing, the whole must go to the ground." Be it so. But the same may be said of any extended chain of reasoning, even of mathematical reasoning. It is no objection, that if one link fails the chain is broken, so long as no link can fail. That it is not likely that the understanding of this chain of reasoning is universally necessary to salvation is possible, but we do not recollect of ever having maintained that it is, and the argument itself is designed to prove, that, to be saved, it is necessary to believe, not it, but what God reveals and the Church proposes. It assumes, that, in order to be saved, it is necessary to be a Christian. Does *THE CHRISTIAN EXAMINER* deny this assumption? If it does, let it say so, and avow itself an infidel periodical. If it does not, we beg it to have the kindness to prove in fewer words, and in a less subtle manner than we have employed in our argument for the Church, any doctrine or precept it chooses to name was really taught or enjoined by our Lord; or, in a briefer, plainer, or simpler argument, in opposition to the mythic theory of Strauss, that there actually was such a person as Jesus of Nazareth. Leslie's *Short Method with the Deists*, which falls far short of refuting them, is longer than our essay; Paley's *Evidences of Christianity* make up a respectable octavo volume; Lardner requires nine or ten large octavo volumes to prove the credibility of the Gospel history; Norton requires three to establish the genuineness of the four Gospels; and the writer in *The Examiner* would, we doubt not, require at least forty huge folio volumes to prove that Unitarianism is identical with Christianity, or that the Church of the Disciples is identical with the Church of Christ. Suppose it does require a labored argument of sixty pages to prove the Church against the no-churchism of Protestants. What then? No one distinctively Christian fact can be proved with a shorter or less labored argument, and, what is more to the purpose, when we have once proved the Church, we have proved all, and our labor is done; but the Protestant, when he has proved one fact, even if one fact he can prove, has proved only that fact, and has the same labor to perform in the case of every single fact, doctrine, or precept of the Christian religion, a labor to which no

man's life is adequate, and which the experiments of the Protestant world for three hundred years fully prove can never be brought to a successful termination; for there is not at this moment a single fact, doctrine, or precept which all Protestants agree in regarding as Christian. Even the writer in *The Examiner* confesses that Protestants generally, and some even of his own brotherhood, do not accept the view of faith essential to his theory, and consoles himself with believing that they are tending to it, and may some centuries hence reach it. Then, after all, it is ridiculous to object to our argument that it is subtle, for if it really does establish the claims of the Church, you must believe and obey her, or lie under the sin of rebellion against God. If the argument is really inconclusive, that fact should be shown; but if really conclusive, it is conclusive, however subtle or elaborate it may be, and convicts, if it does not convince, you of warring in your no-churchism against the truth.

But the writer in *The Examiner*, for obvious reasons, objects to all arguments addressed to the understanding. He does not appear to object to our argument, that it is inconclusive for the reason, the intellect; he even seems to concede that it is strictly logical, and as conclusive as any logical argument can be; but he has a thorough dislike to all logic, properly so called, and demands arguments addressed, not to the intellect, but to the heart. Arguments to the understanding do not appear to be his *forte*, but he is great on heart arguments.

"It may be said that such a kind of proof is the only kind possible. We admit that it is the only logical proof possible. But the true Church of Christ might commend itself to us by evidence which would produce certainty in any pure mind; by arguments addressed, not to the intellect, but to the heart. If there were in the world a church so pure that not a flaw could be found in it; a church whose only weapons were the power of truth and love; which had never encouraged crusades to root out heretics with fire and sword; which had never struck medals and sung *Te Deums* to commemorate a Bartholomew massacre; which had never established an Inquisition, to produce an outward conformity by tortures and the stake, and so to make men hypocrites when it could not make converts; a church which never had a murderer for its head, and licentious priests for its ministers; a church like this, filled throughout with truth, love, and holiness, might do what the first disciples did, cause men 'to take knowledge of it, that it had been with Jesus.'" — p. 236.

Our Saviour when on earth exhibited, besides other evi-

dence, the precise kind of evidence here contended for, and yet, if we have not been misinformed, he was despised and rejected, called a "seditious fellow," a "glutton and a wine-bibber," a "devil" and "the prince of devils," — was reviled, mocked, buffeted, spit upon, scourged, and finally crucified between two thieves. The Church has always exhibited the evidence, and all the evidence, here demanded, and yet the very man who says such evidence is sufficient to "produce certainty in any pure mind," rejects her with scorn and contumely, calumniates her, and insinuates charges against her, which, if he had a tithe of the intelligence he claims, he would know are as false as the pit. It is idle, also, to talk about what would produce certainty in "pure minds"; for, unhappily, the men who need to be convinced have not pure minds, and are not fitted to judge by their hearts instead of their heads. Their heads are wrong only because their hearts are foul, and it is necessary to address their heads to convince their understandings that the Church is God's Church, so that they may come to her and have their hearts cleansed.

The writer reasons on a false assumption, — namely, that men out of the Church have pure minds, are pure in heart, — and supposes that it is because a man is pure and holy that he comes to the Church of God. But they who are out of the Church have not pure minds or hearts, are not and cannot be pure and holy, and those who come to the Church come because they are sinners, because they know they are sinners, and must be sinners as long as they remain outside of her communion, and they come to her that they may be cleansed from sin, purified, and made holy. By the very act of seeking admission into the Church, we confess before heaven, earth, and hell that we are sinners, and deserve eternal damnation. Men who come to the Church, feeling that they are pure and holy, that they do not need her as God's medium for saving them from sin, may indeed enter her communion, but will not be *of* it. Christ came to call sinners, not the just; and it was for the ungodly, while they were yet enemies, that he died on the cross. We cannot address those out of the Church as pure and holy, as already living the Christian life; for if we could we should never address them at all, — never call upon them to become Catholics. We do and can look upon them only as sinners, all foul with sin, and festering in their iniquity; and what we must address to them are, not arguments which can be appreciated only by the pure-minded, but such as can be appreciated

by those who are not pure-minded, that is, such as convict them of sin, and instruct them as to the means of salvation.

The Examiner continues : —

“ If it were essential to our salvation to be in outward connection with the true Church, and if the true Church could not be known by its fruits, by its evident holiness, its manifest superior usefulness, — if it were so that our salvation depended on our getting into the Church which stood in the right line of descent, and not that which regenerates our soul, — if this proposition, incredible as it seems, be true, *we shall at least be told of it* by Jesus and his apostles. Jesus will, at any rate, say, ‘ It is necessary to your salvation to belong to the true Church ; and the true Church is the one which will stand in the right line of succession, and have an infallible priesthood.’ Jesus came to teach the way of salvation ; he clearly taught with his own lips what was necessary to salvation. *But he has not taught this.* How are we to explain the omission ? ” — pp. 236, 237.

It will be time enough to explain the alleged omission when it is proved to be a fact. *The Examiner* is not yet recognized as the depository of the words of our Lord, nor has it established the fact of its Divine commission to define what our Lord did or did not say. It must produce its credentials as a Divinely commissioned teacher, before we can entertain any of its assertions as to what are or are not the contents of the Christian revelation. We will simply remind it, however, that the Church does not “ regenerate the soul ” ; — the Holy Ghost is the efficient, and she is only the instrumental, cause of regeneration. We hope *The Examiner* will find this distinction intelligible. But does the Church of the Disciples regenerate the soul ? We thought the doctrine of its founder to be, that the Church is a voluntary association of believers, formed by the regenerated, and therefore subsequent in the order of its birth to their regeneration. That is, we are regenerated without the Church, and then come together and form the Church. If this be so, what right has he to object to the Church, that it does not regenerate the soul ?

But let this pass. *The Examiner* proceeds : —

“ If an infallible Church be necessary in order to teach us certainly what are the truths of Christianity, it is even more necessary that we have an infallible guide to show us which is the infallible Church. For whether is it easier to understand the words of Christ, or to understand the merits of the argument in support of the claims of the Church of Rome ? ” — p. 237.

dence, the precise kind of evidence here contended for, and yet, if we have not been misinformed, he was despised and rejected, called a "seditious fellow," a "glutton and a wine-bibber," a "devil" and "the prince of devils," — was reviled, mocked, buffeted, spit upon, scourged, and finally crucified between two thieves. The Church has always exhibited the evidence, and all the evidence, here demanded, and yet the very man who says such evidence is sufficient to "produce certainty in any pure mind," rejects her with scorn and contumely, calumniates her, and insinuates charges against her, which, if he had a tithe of the intelligence he claims, he would know are as false as the pit. It is idle, also, to talk about what would produce certainty in "pure minds"; for, unhappily, the men who need to be convinced have not pure minds, and are not fitted to judge by their hearts instead of their heads. Their heads are wrong only because their hearts are foul, and it is necessary to address their heads to convince their understandings that the Church is God's Church, so that they may come to her and have their hearts cleansed.

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by those who are not pure-minded, that is, such as convict them of sin, and instruct them as to the means of salvation.

The Examiner continues : —

“ If it were essential to our salvation to be in outward connection with the true Church, and if the true Church could not be known by its fruits, by its evident holiness, its manifest superior usefulness, — if it were so that our salvation depended on our getting into the Church which stood in the right line of descent, and not that which regenerates our soul, — if this proposition, incredible as it seems, be true, *we shall at least be told of it* by Jesus and his apostles. Jesus will, at any rate, say, ‘ It is necessary to your salvation to belong to the true Church ; and the true Church is the one which will stand in the right line of succession, and have an infallible priesthood.’ Jesus came to teach the way of salvation ; he clearly taught with his own lips what was necessary to salvation. *But he has not taught this.* How are we to explain the omission ? ” — pp. 236, 237.

It will be time enough to explain the alleged omission when it is proved to be a fact. *The Examiner* is not yet recognized as the depository of the words of our Lord, nor has it established the fact of its Divine commission to define what our Lord did or did not say. It must produce its credentials as a Divinely commissioned teacher, before we can entertain any of its assertions as to what are or are not the contents of the Christian revelation. We will simply remind it, however, that the Church does not “ regenerate the soul ” ; — the Holy Ghost is the efficient, and she is only the instrumental, cause of regeneration. We hope *The Examiner* will find this distinction intelligible. But does the Church of the Disciples regenerate the soul ? We thought the doctrine of its founder to be, that the Church is a voluntary association of believers, formed by the regenerated, and therefore subsequent in the order of its birth to their regeneration. That is, we are regenerated without the Church, and then come together and form the Church. If this be so, what right has he to object to the Church, that it does not regenerate the soul ?

But let this pass. *The Examiner* proceeds : —

“ If an infallible Church be necessary in order to teach us certainly what are the truths of Christianity, it is even more necessary that we have an infallible guide to show us which is the infallible Church. For whether is it easier to understand the words of Christ, or to understand the merits of the argument in support of the claims of the Church of Rome ? ” — p. 237.

This objection we raised, in substance, against ourselves, in the article to which *The Examiner* professes to reply (April, 1845, pp. 174–179, and 187–191), and the writer had our answer to it under his eyes when he urged it. It was brought by *The Episcopal Observer*, and replied to by us, in our Review for July, 1845, pp. 372–377, and it was repeated in a private letter to us by a clever young Unitarian minister, and answered at full length in an article entitled *Liberalism and Catholicity*, July, 1846. These three several answers are ignored by *The Christian Examiner*, doubtless because it feels confident that its readers have not read and will not be likely to read them, and because it finds it easier to ignore than to refute them. It knows very well that its readers, as a general rule, examine only one side of a question, and that it can with perfect impunity omit all notice of our replies to the objections it copies from our pages. This is only a common Protestant trick, as we pointed out in our Review for April, 1847, pp. 137–145. There is no occasion for us to reply to this objection again, for we have in these replies, as the writer must be presumed to know, amply refuted it. If he could have shown that the answers we have already given are inconclusive, it is fair to presume that he would not have failed to do so. He cannot plead his ignorance of what we have said, for he professes to have before him our entire Review from January, 1844, to January, 1850.

We have never professed to be able to establish the claims of our Church to one who is destitute of reason; and we do not suppose it is easy for one who is intellectually blind to distinguish the true Church from the false. We always presuppose reason and common sense, and it is only by reason and common sense, and to reason and common sense, that we undertake to prove our Church. We hold to faith with reason, not to faith without reason, nor to reason without faith. If it is conceded that our Lord founded a Church, there is no difficulty in finding out which is the true Church. It is and must be the Roman Catholic, for it obviously can be no other, as Unitarians themselves very generally concede, and as we proved in the essay to which *The Examiner* is replying, pp. 187–192, but in regard to which it maintains a discreet silence.

Grant that it is easier to understand the words of the Sermon on the Mount than the arguments which establish the infallibility of the Church. What then? It is possible that the Sermon is not the whole Gospel, that it does not contain all that God

has revealed and enjoined, that something more is necessary to salvation, and that even what is revealed and enjoined in that Sermon cannot be believed and done in the sense required, without the infallible Church. What is there said is addressed to believers,—presupposes the Church and them to be already members of it; from what is practicable for such we cannot conclude what is practicable in the case of persons out of the Church, without the aid of the instruction which she alone can give, and the sacraments which she alone can lawfully administer. Moreover, the ingenious writer is not at liberty to prescind from Divine revelation all that he is not sure of by his own instincts, and then maintain that no infallible teacher is necessary, because none is necessary to teach what he retains. God is the judge, not man, of what it is or is not necessary to believe and to do in order to be saved, and we must be pardoned if we refuse to surrender his authority in matters of his own revelation for that of the founder of the Church of the Disciples. The writer reasons,—we beg his pardon,—*talks*, as if it was the easiest thing in the world to find out, on Protestant principles, what is or is not Christian truth. How happens it, then, that we find Protestants agreeing in no one thing except hostility to the Church, and, instead of uniting as one body in the profession of a common doctrine, maintaining as many different doctrines as they have doctors? Unitarians regard themselves as Protestants, claim to be Protestants of Protestants, the only genuine Protestants in the world, and we have yet to find two of their ministers holding the same doctrine. They agree in a few denials, but no two of them agree in the same affirmations. The writer himself concedes, in the article before us, as we have seen, that many Protestants, and perhaps some of his own brotherhood, do not accept his notion of faith, although he thinks it is that to which they are generally tending,—that is to say, the Protestant world, after three hundred years, are only tending to the true view of what faith is! Yet no infallible church is necessary, and nothing in the world is easier than to find out, by consulting one's own heart, what is and what is not Christian truth! The present state of the Protestant world, its doubt, uncertainty, divisions, sects, and mutually contradictory doctrines, are an admirable commentary on the assertion that our Church cannot be the true Church, because we have occupied some sixty pages in proving that she is!

“So far we agree with Mr. Brownson, that there is but one way of salvation, and that is through faith. But we differ from him as

to the nature of faith, and as to the nature of the object of faith. We are aware that we differ also in this respect from many Protestants; perhaps from the majority, and probably from some who are included in the same brotherhood. We therefore speak only for ourselves in this part of our argument; though we believe our view of faith to be that to which the Protestant Church is tending, and the only one which can be satisfactorily maintained.

"Faith, according to Mr. Brownson, is equivalent to belief. Its object is a formal proposition. It is, he says, 'eminently, though not exclusively, an act of the understanding.'

"Now we maintain, on the other hand, that the saving faith demanded by Christ in the New Testament *is not belief, but reliance. It is an act of trust. It is trust in the love of God, or, rather, in the God of love.* Its object is not a doctrine or proposition concerning God, but its object is God himself, as seen in Christ as a pardoning and saving God. It is not, therefore, eminently an act of the understanding, but it is eminently a moral act. It includes, no doubt, something intellectual, and something affectionate. It carries within it something of the intellect, and something of the heart; but it is itself an act of the will. It is reliance on God, seen in Christ to be Love." — p. 238.

This confirms what we have just said. As to the view of faith here given, it will be time enough to consider it when the author has succeeded in getting Protestants generally to accept it. We cannot spend time in refuting every idle notion of an individual Protestant, which is rejected by the mass of Protestants, and not received even by his own brotherhood. Moreover, we have discussed the subject *in extenso* in our *Reply to the Mercersburg Review*, in our number for April last, and had also sufficiently discussed it in the article on *Liberalism and Catholicity*, already referred to, July, 1846. We replied expressly to the view the author takes in the very article to which he is professedly answering, and we cite what we then replied, in order to save our readers the trouble of recurring to it.

"Not a few Unitarian clergymen of our acquaintance understand by faith *trust* or *confidence* (*fiducia*), and contend, that, when we are commanded to *believe* in Christ, in God, &c., the meaning is that we should *trust* or *confide* in him. To believe in the Son is to confide in him as the Son of God. But I cannot confide in him as the Son of God, unless I believe that he is the Son of God; I cannot confide in God, unless I believe that he is, and that he is a protector of them that trust him. Where there is no belief, there is and can be no confidence. Confidence always presupposes faith; for where there is no belief that the trust reposed will be responded

to, there is no trust ; and the fact, that the one trusted will preserve and not betray the trust, is necessarily a matter of faith, belief, not of knowledge. Faith begets confidence, but is not it ; confidence is the effect or concomitant of faith, but can never exist without it. So, however these may seem to deny the necessity of belief, they all in reality imply it, presuppose it.

"Moreover, all Unitarians hold, that, to be a Christian, one must be a follower of Christ. Their radical conception of Christ is that of a teacher, of a person specially raised up and commissioned by Almighty God to teach, and to teach the truth. But one cannot be said to be the follower of a teacher, unless he believes what the teacher teaches. Therefore, to be a Christian, one must be a believer.

"This, again, is evident from the Holy Scriptures. 'For without faith,' says the blessed Apostle Paul, 'it is impossible to please God.' Heb. xi. 6. So our blessed Saviour: 'He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved ; but he that believeth not shall be condemned.' St. Mark xvi. 16. 'He that believeth in the Son hath eternal life ; but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life ; but the wrath of God abideth on him.' St. John iii. 36. This is sufficient to establish our first position, namely, that, in order to be a Christian, it is necessary to be a believer, that is, to believe somewhat."—*Quarterly Review*, April, 1845, p. 145.

This is not refuted by being ignored, and we leave *The Examiner* to excuse itself as best it can for not having attempted to answer it before insisting the doctrine it refutes.

The author says he disagrees with us as to the nature of faith. Very possibly he does ; but that may not be to our discredit. We do not recognize him as sent from God with authority to teach, and at the very lowest, the fact that he differs from us is as good evidence that he is not right as it is that we are wrong. He evidently does not know whether he does or does not differ from us in the respect he supposes, for it is clear that, unless he intentionally writes what is false and absurd, he does not understand our doctrine. We have never maintained, as he would have his readers believe, that the object of faith is a formal proposition, abstracted from the truth it proposes. The material object of faith is the Christian revelation, and this revelation consists in intelligible, enuntiable propositions, that is to say, is made in a form which can be proposed to the understanding for its assent. This is what we maintain in the article in question. Perhaps the author would not find it amiss on this matter of the object of faith to read

what we say of Toby's dog in *The Two Brothers*, in our Review for January, 1847, pp. 10-14.

We have no occasion to follow the writer through his proofs of his view of faith, because nobody doubts or denies that the word *faith* is sometimes used in the sense of *fiducia*, trust, or confidence. There are passages of Scripture in which it undoubtedly has this sense, but there are others in which it just as obviously means *belief*, *assent*, and even *trust* itself is only a particular form of *belief*. It is nothing to the author's purpose, then, to cite texts in which the word is taken simply as *trust*. Then, again, it is idle to say that he differs from us in our definition of "saving faith," for we were giving no definition of "saving faith." The faith we defined is necessary to salvation, but, as we stated, not of itself sufficient. We were discussing what the Schoolmen call *fides informis*, not the *fides formata*, that is, faith perfected by charity or love,—the "saving faith" the *Examiner* speaks of. We suppose faith to be distinguishable from charity, and St. Paul seems to suppose the same, for he says (1 Cor. xiii. 13.), "Now abideth faith, hope, charity, these THREE"; and St. James speaks also of a faith distinguishable from charity, for he says, "Faith without works is dead, being alone." Because faith without works, or faith unformed or perfected by charity, is not sufficient for salvation, it does not follow, either that it is not faith, or that it is not indispensable to our salvation.

But *The Examiner* proceeds:—

"Suppose that we have an infallible Church, and are able to know certainly that this is the Church of Rome. We accordingly submit ourselves to her guidance; we put ourselves under her instruction, and she teaches us certain truths, by the belief of which we are to be saved. These truths are expressed in her creeds. They are expressed, of course, in words. But the meaning of words is uncertain. How do we know that we understand them in the sense she intends? We go to our priest, and receive his explanation. How do we know that we do not misunderstand him? What we hear always takes a coloring from our own mind. Our teacher's word always means something different to us from what it means to him. We have, then, our infallible Church, but we have not yet attained to certainty. That eludes us still.

"But let us suppose, (what is impossible,) that we *can* be certain of the meaning of the proposition we are called to believe. Have we the *power* to believe it? Suppose that it seems to us incredible, ridiculous, absurd? Can we believe it while it seems so? To *believe* a thing is to have it seem *true*. Can it seem true, while it

seems false? We may try to believe it; we may think that we ought to believe it; we may think we do believe it; but we *cannot* believe it, until it commends itself to our intellect as true. It is one thing to believe that a proposition is true, and quite another to believe the truth contained in the proposition. As a confiding child of the Church of Rome, I may believe that what she tells me is true. But I do not believe what she tells me, till I can see it to be true.

"For example. The Church of Rome teaches me the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Now, there are two things here to be believed. First, we are to believe that the doctrine of Transubstantiation is true. This we believe on the authority of our teacher. Secondly, we are to believe the doctrine of Transubstantiation itself, and this we cannot believe, until it appears reasonable and credible.

"All this is so evident, that the Church of Rome does not pretend to require its children to believe its doctrines; though, according to Mr. Brownson, we are only saved by the belief of these very doctrines. She merely requires them to believe that the doctrines are true; that is to say, in other words, she requires of them, not belief, but obedience. She requires of them merely to submit to her authority, and not to express any outward dissent from her doctrines. In this she is very reasonable, for she knows that belief is not in our own power. All she demands, therefore, is conformity.

"We were lately conversing with a very intelligent lady, one of the recent converts to the Church of Rome. She said that she had long been interested in its ritual, had enjoyed its services, and earnestly wished to become a member and receive its sacraments. But a serious difficulty lay in her way, which, to her guileless mind, bred up in the honesty of Protestantism, seemed insuperable. The difficulty was merely this; that she did not believe the doctrines of the Romish Church, and could not believe them. But the Romish bishop, in conversation with her, at once removed this difficulty. 'My dear lady,' said he, 'we do not wish you to believe our doctrines. That is not necessary. You are simply to *submit* to the Church. You are not to have any belief about it. You are to be a little child, and receive passively, as true, what the Church teaches.' This, she said, quite satisfied her. It was so very simple, she was ashamed not to have seen it before. She was quite willing to believe, so soon as she found that she might believe with her *will*, instead of believing with her intellect."—pp. 240–242.

The first difficulty suggested here is, that language is an uncertain medium of thought, and therefore, since the infallible Church must make her definitions in words, we can never be certain that we understand them in the sense she intends. This objection we have answered in our replies to *The Episcopal Observer*, July, 1845, pp. 364–368, and January, 1846, pp.

11-15. We had occasion to touch upon it in our review of Mr. Newman's *Essay on Development*, January, 1847, and we treated it at length in our criticism on Dr. Bushnell, October, 1849. What we have said on these several occasions, as our opponent had it under his eyes when he wrote, is sufficient till it is answered. Furthermore, we have in our last number, in examining Mr. Morell's *Philosophy of Religion*, stated the objection in a stronger form than it is here stated, and given the principle of its solution; namely, the intelligibility, therefore the evidence, is in the object, not in the subject. It has no applicability to the definitions of the Church, because they are always made in intelligible language. *The Examiner's* argument, moreover, proves too much. If it proves any thing, it proves that language can in no case, and under no circumstances whatever, be a vehicle of truth from mind to mind, either from God to man, or from one man to another, which denies to us the faculty of speech, and to God the ability to make a revelation of truth to man;—which even *The Examiner* dare not assert, since it holds that it can understand the Sermon on the Mount, and takes upon itself to decide authoritatively what the Scriptures do and do not mean.

The second objection is ridiculous, — we were about to say, even too ridiculous to be put forth by the literary and theological organ of the American Unitarians. The difficulty imagined cannot exist. An infallible Church is infallible, and can teach only infallible truth. It is impossible that infallible truth, proposed by infallible authority, can appear to one who accepts the authority as incredible, ridiculous, or absurd. No proposition can so appear that is seen to be made on an adequate authority, and an infallible authority is an adequate authority for any proposition it can make. The credibility is in the authority, and to suppose that one can regard as incredible what he holds he has infallible authority for believing is a plain contradiction in terms, — sheer nonsense.

The Examiner, notwithstanding it charges us with being too subtle, is itself too subtle for our own understanding. It says, "It is one thing to believe that a proposition is true, and quite another to believe the truth contained in the proposition." This is news to us, and, we must say, it needs confirmation. To believe a proposition is to believe the truth it proposes; for, aside from the truth it proposes, from its contents, the proposition is an empty form, a mere nullity, that is to say, no proposition at all, for it proposes nothing. He who believes what

the Church proposes is true, believes what she proposes. To "believe that the doctrine of Transubstantiation is true," is to "believe the doctrine of Transubstantiation itself."

"All this is so evident, that the Church of Rome does not pretend to require its children to *believe* its doctrines." Indeed! "She merely requires them to believe that the doctrines are true; that is to say, in other words, she requires of them, not belief, but obedience." That is, the Church does not require her children to believe her doctrines, but she requires them to believe her doctrines true; that is to say, she requires not belief at all, but simply obedience! Alas! we have no heart to triumph over mental imbecility. The writer may have fancied he meant something, but he cannot have known what, and he has only talked sheer nonsense and palpable absurdity. To believe doctrines are true is certainly belief, and if the Church requires this, as the writer asserts she does, she must certainly require belief. If she commands, as she undeniably does, her children to believe what she teaches is true, she in exacting obedience also exacts belief, for the obedience cannot be rendered without believing.

The anecdote of the lady, introduced to confirm what the author asserts of our Church, is as untrue as his assertion itself. The Bishop of Boston never said what he is alleged to have said, for he is at least a man of common sense, and it is absolutely impossible that he could utter the absurdity ascribed to him. What the lady may have said, we know not, but she certainly never did say what Mr. James Freeman Clarke asserts. It is infinitely more probable that he should have invented it, than it is that an intelligent convert, instructed in the Catholic faith, should have talked so little like a Catholic, and so completely in accordance with his false and absurd theory. We, however, suppose she did say something, which he, not exactly understanding, interpreted to favor a theory he had previously excogitated. Doubtless we could conjecture what she said, but we are under no obligation to do it, and have no space for correcting every ridiculous blunder of the writer.

Yet the author should not have blamed the doctrine he ascribes to the Bishop of Boston, for it is precisely his own. He labors throughout to make it appear that faith is not belief, belongs not to the understanding at all, but is a pure affection of the heart, that is, of the will. Wherefore, then, find fault with the lady for being quite willing to "believe with her will instead of her intellect"? We protest against his right to urge one set

of objections one moment, and an opposite set the next. If a man attempts to reason at all, he must hold himself bound by the laws of logic.

One extract more, and we close this already too protracted article.

"But the Church which to-day claims most loudly to be apostolic, and whose Head claims to be in the place of Christ,—which professes to be infallible, as the Apostles did not profess,—hides its infallibility in a napkin, and, instead of showing us God's truth, requires of us even to receive its doctrines with closed eyes. Never did such magnificent pretension end in so small a result. An infallible Church is demanded on this ground, that we can be saved only by the belief of certain supernatural truths; and, after all, the infallible Church does not pretend to show us those truths, but merely requires submission to herself.

"Finally, we say to Mr. Brownson, that our Saviour himself has given us the test by which to distinguish his prophets, and to know his Church. 'By their fruits, ye shall know them.' 'Men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles.' We are not to know the fruit by the tree, but the tree by the fruit. We are not to say, 'This church is orthodox, therefore its disciples are Christians'; or, 'This church is in the line of apostolic succession, therefore those who belong to it are in the way of salvation.' This method is the reverse of that of Christ. Christ teaches us to know the tree by the fruit. Mr. Brownson would have us know the fruit by the tree. Mr. Brownson virtually says, 'These dissipated cardinals, these domineering popes, these crusading bishops, belonged to the true Church, and therefore are in the way of salvation.' Christ says, 'These little ones are pure, are humble, are loving, and therefore they belong to my kingdom. This man, though he follows not my Apostles, yet, because he is doing good in my name, belongs to me.' We prefer, we confess, the method of Christ to that of Mr. Brownson. Tried by this test, we see little reason for admitting the claims of the Church of Rome to be the only channel of the Holy Ghost. We find holy men, men of God, in all churches. Wesley and Baxter, Doddridge and Jeremy Taylor, Channing and Ware, and tens of thousands of others, whose lowly piety and large philanthropy have sweetened life, were certainly holy men. And if so, the Church of Rome is not the only true Church of Christ. And if we take a wider range of observation, and compare the condition of Roman Catholic and Protestant countries, we shall find that the tone of morals in Italy, Portugal, Spain, and South America is not so much superior to that in Prussia, England, Scotland, and New England, as to convince us that these Catholic countries alone are blessed with the presence of Christ.

But if the claims of Rome are valid, and she be the only channel of the Holy Ghost, then the difference between the moral condition of Catholic and Protestant nations should be so marked that no one could mistake it. Each Catholic nation and people should be an oasis of purity, truthfulness, honesty, industry, and of every Christian virtue. Family ties should be all sacred, the sacrament of marriage never violated, female chastity touched by no stain. All should be order and peace, undisturbed by intestine dissensions, civil struggles, or domestic strife. All Protestant influences have been rooted out of Portugal, Spain, and Italy by the Inquisition, and kept out by the strong hand of law. Here, then, ought to be found the earthly paradise of purity, peace, and moral virtue. Does any one pretend that it is so?—pp. 243, 244.

The flourish in the first paragraph must go for what it is worth. If a man obstinately shuts his eyes to the light, it is not our fault that he finds himself in darkness. The complaint, as far as it is intelligible, is, that our Church requires her doctrines to be received as matters of faith, and not as matters of science, on the veracity of God, because he has revealed them and commissioned her to propose them, and therefore on her proposition of them, not because they are intrinsically evident. This is, undoubtedly, the fact, and if any one is silly enough to urge this as an objection, he is not able to receive an answer. We do not believe the human mind is adequate to the comprehension of all things, and our Church does not pretend to make her children omniscient. The truths she teaches are mysteries, and will be mysteries to us as long as we are in the flesh.

As to the talk about the fruits, we reply that we are willing to test the Church by her fruits, and should be glad so to test her. But we must have an indorser for *The Examiner's* taste, if it is to be the judge. We are not sure that its taste is not perverted, that it is a judge of fruits, or that it will not call bitter sweet, and sweet bitter. "We are not to believe every spirit, but to try the spirits, for many false prophets have gone out into the world." "We," says the beloved Apostle St. John, "are of God. He that knoweth God heareth us, and he that knoweth not God heareth not us. By this we know the spirit of truth, and the spirit of error." (1 St. John iv. 1, 6.) "This Church is in the line of apostolic succession, therefore those who belong to it are in the way of salvation," is the proper method of judging, we concede; but because a man is in the way of salvation, it does not follow that he will be saved,

or that he is just before God. There are bad Catholics as well as good Catholics, and only those in the Church who obey her, believe what she teaches, and do what she commands, and persevere unto the end, will be saved. "This method is the reverse of that of Christ." How does the author know that? Who gave him authority to speak in the name of Christ? Where is his commission sealed with God's seal? He must excuse us, but we prefer the Pope of Rome as the interpreter of God's law to the pope of the chapel in Freeman Place, Boston. We are not aware that our Lord has given this latter a commission to confirm his brethren, or to feed his sheep or lambs. "Christ teaches us to know the tree by the fruit." Agreed. But the first fruit to be borne by the good tree may be to keep the commandment of our Lord to hear the Church, — may be humble submission to those whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us.

"We find holy men, men of God, in all churches." How know you that? How do you know that "Wesley and Baxter, Doddridge and Jeremy Taylor, Channing and Ware," were "holy men, men of God"? How could they be such, if they separated from God's Church, or refused to believe God's word? Before you pronounce on their holiness, it would be well to be sure, either that they obeyed God, kept his revealed law, as well as the law of nature, or else to prove that one can be a holy man, a man of God, who despises God's Church, and teaches men to do the same, and who lives in habitual disobedience to God. The men you name may have had a fair outside, may have been moral in the ordinary sense of the word, but this is all you can say in their favor; and you name them, in fact, only in consequence of their talents, learning, or eloquence, and if they had been men of only ordinary intellect, you would never have named one of them as a saint, and, intellectually considered, the Devil is far superior to them all. Nay, you claim for them only natural piety and philanthropy, which, though not sinful, are not sanctity, and avail nothing to eternal life. Heresy and schism are deadly sins, and though the man guilty of them should be guiltless in all other respects, he would be damned, and justly damned; and though dissipated cardinals, &c., if such there are, cannot, unless they repent, be saved, yet the worst cardinal that ever lived, while he retains the faith, is superior to the best heretic or schismatic that ever existed. The writer should remember that there are spiritual sins as well as carnal sins, sins of pride as well as of the

flesh, and the former are as fatal to the soul as the latter, and far more dangerous, for they not unfrequently dress themselves in the livery of virtue. They are the chief sins of heretics and schismatics, in the beginning of their career, and therefore it is that these, even when appearing as angels of light unto men, are to be regarded as the most odious sinners before God.

As to what the writer insinuates with regard to Catholic countries, we have heretofore said all that is necessary. It is enough for Protestants to defend their own countries, without attacking Catholic countries. There are, no doubt, bad Catholics in the world, that will have their part in the eternal tortures which await all who die impenitent, but the Church is no more responsible for the fact, than God himself is for the existence of sinners in the world. She, as he, respects the free will of men, and cannot make them good against their will. If men obeyed her, believed what she teaches, and did what she commands, Catholic countries would be far better even than the writer supposes they ought to be.

The remaining portions of the article we pass over in silence. We do not recognize the writer as an authorized expounder of Scripture, and we have seen nothing in his attempts to set aside our arguments drawn from them, but his arrogance and his incapacity. It is no answer to us to assert on his own authority, or to say *he thinks* the contrary. He is not to us one who speaks by authority, although the founder of the Church of the Disciples.

In conclusion, we cannot help saying that it is extremely disagreeable to be obliged to follow a writer through page after page, who has no sense of what is requisite to honorable controversy, who throws out loose statements, and repeats worn-out objections, without betraying the least intimation that he is aware that they have been already answered. We have had no pleasure in following our present opponent. He, we must presume, knows perfectly well that we had anticipated all his objections, and answered them thoroughly; he knows, too, that as an honorable man he had no right to urge them, till he had set aside what we had already replied to them. If he rejoins, he must reply, not only to what we have now said, but to our previous answers, or we shall not hold ourselves bound in conscience or civility to notice him.

Of *The Christian Examiner* we have heretofore spoken favorably, but some of its recent writers have done much to degrade its character to the level of the lowest anti-Catholic

publications in the country. The present writer is far inferior to Thornwell, and is not a whit above the Brownlees, the Dowlings, the Sparrys, and that brotherhood. We hope it is but a temporary aberration, and that hereafter this periodical, with which we have had so many associations, will retrieve its character, and prove itself a fair and candid *Examiner*.

ART. III. — *Four Years' Experience of the Catholic Religion : with Observations on its Effects upon the Character, Intellectual, Moral, and Spiritual*. By J. M. CAPES, Esq. Philadelphia : T. K. & P. G. Collins. 1849. 8vo. pp. 72.

THIS is an American reprint, in a cheap form, of an English work, by Mr. Capes, formerly a minister of the Anglican Establishment, who was received into the Church some five or six years since. It is a sort of *compte rendu*, which the author has judged proper to furnish his former brethren who still remain in heresy, of what during four years he has found Catholicity and Catholics in Great Britain. Its author is the founder and editor of *The Rambler*, one of the best conducted and most valuable periodicals in the United Kingdom, and commends himself to us as an accomplished scholar, of a high order of ability, firm faith, and fervent zeal. His experience is written in a tone of great candor and moderation, and can hardly fail to have a happy influence on many of his "separated brethren."

While we acknowledge the ability of the work before us, and add our own experience as a convert in confirmation of its favorable report of Catholicity and Catholics, we still have some doubts about the strict propriety of such works. They seem to us in their general character to be more in consonance with Protestantism than with Catholicity. With Protestants, religion has only a psychological basis, is purely a matter of private experience, and private experience is the rule by which they are accustomed to judge of its truth or falsehood ; but with us, private experience counts for little, and we are accustomed to judge private experience by our religion, not our religion by private experience. If a man has confessions to write, and can write them like St. Augustine, let him write them by all means ; but as a general rule we think it better not to be too fond

of parading our personal experiences before the public. If such experiences interest and attract some who are without, they also minister to their present false notions as to the grounds of religion, and hinder rather than facilitate their study of the true motives of credibility. Religion has an objective validity, an objective evidence, independent of your experience or mine, and our reliance, under the grace of God, should be on that. If Protestants reject the testimony of the Church herself, how can we expect them to accept ours as individuals, when ours as individuals is worth nothing, save as corroborated by hers? It is but justice, however, to Mr. Capes to say, that his book is not precisely a narrative of his religious experience, in the Protestant sense, and that it is mainly a report of facts with regard to our religion and its followers in England, which he has picked up during four years of his Catholic life, together with his reasonings and reflections on various important topics, intellectual, moral, social, and theological.

The author seems to us to have written in a form altogether more egotistical than was desirable. He apologizes for it, indeed, on the ground that, as he was relating what he had himself seen and remarked in himself and others, he could not well avoid it. He could not avoid speaking in the first person, it is true, but he could have spared us the long account in the beginning of his competency and admirable qualifications as a witness. All he says is, no doubt, true, but what was the need of saying it? Those who knew him were already prepared to admit him as a competent witness, and those who did not know him could not be prepared by his own panegyric on himself. They who would not take his word as to his experience could hardly be expected to take his word for his own competency and credibility as a witness. It would have been amply sufficient to have told in a simple, straightforward manner what he had to say, without prefacing it with an account of his own mental habits, and without interrupting the flow of the narrative to tell us that he "honestly asserts," "honestly believes," "fully believes," &c., what he is asserting. However, this is a matter of taste, and no one suffers from it except the author himself.

As a writer, Mr. Capes may be commended for his pure idiomatic English, but he is diffuse, sometimes wordy, and not always clear, direct, and forcible. He affects to write as a man of the world, as a layman, in a popular style, free from all technical terms or forms of expression usually adopted by professional writers. In this he follows the precepts of the rheto-

ricians, but, perhaps, without considering the peculiar circumstances in which the Catholic writing in English is placed. A Protestant writing in English on Protestantism can avoid technical terms and expressions, and abandon himself to the current language of the people, because his Protestantism is itself vague and loose, and appears to far greater advantage in popular than in scientific language, and because the terms most appropriate to its expression have passed into the language of the market, and ceased to be technical, or, at least, become terms familiar to the general reader. But the Catholic writing in the same language on Catholicity cannot do this with safety, because his doctrines are definite and fixed, and because the terms which express them with clearness, exactness, and precision are not in common use. The English language has for three hundred years been usurped by heretics, and been chiefly used as a medium of one or another form of heresy. In its current use it is inadequate to the expression of orthodoxy, and consequently the Catholic writer is obliged, at the risk of appearing stiff and pedantic, to make a liberal use of technical terms and scientific forms of expression, if he does not choose to leave his meaning vague and uncertain. Our Oxford converts do not in general, as far as we have seen, appear to be sufficiently aware of this; they write on as they were accustomed to write before their conversion, in very good English, it is true, but with a choice of terms which leaves us perpetually in doubt whether their thought is sound or heretical.

There is also among others than converts a mistake as to the obligations of the layman writing on theological subjects to be exact in his language. We take up a book written by a layman, by the illustrious Count de Maistre, for instance, all bristling, perhaps, with errors, and errors which become heresies in the minds of unprofessional readers, and if we complain, we are told in excuse, that the author was a man of the world, that he was not a professional theologian, and therefore was not to be expected to write with exactness. We may need, but we cannot accept, this excuse. If the layman cannot write on theological topics with exactness, both of thought and expression, he has no business to write on them at all. He who assumes the doctor's office must be held to the doctor's responsibility; and it is peculiarly important that this rule be enforced in these days of journalism and of lay-writing, when a very considerable portion of our popular literature is proceeding from the hands of the laity. In judging the *man*, we of course look

to what he probably means ; but in judging the *author*, we must hold him to what he says, — to the plain, obvious, and natural sense of his words, whether he be cleric or laic.

The tone of Mr. Capes's work is subdued, and exceedingly moderate. The author writes as if he was afraid some prim Anglican or fastidious Puseyite should suspect him of extravagance or enthusiasm. His statements are generally under the truth, and appear to the Catholic to be weak and tame. The author's motive has been a good one ; he has believed that a calm, deliberate, and reserved statement will have more weight with Protestants than one in which he suffers his Catholic heart to speak out in its own unrestrained warmth and energy. But in this we believe he is mistaken. Heretics do not in our days doubt our ability, our learning, or our logic. What they doubt is our sincerity, — that we believe our own doctrines. They look upon the intelligent Catholic defending his religion as a lawyer speaking from his brief. In a word, they doubt our honesty. Hence, what we say coolly, deliberately, in measured terms, expressly for them, has little weight with them as a body. They all feel, *all*, with here and there an exception, that they are daily and hourly professing what they know they in reality do not believe, and, judging us by themselves, they conclude it must be the same with us. They not only have no faith, but they have ceased to believe faith possible. What they are most anxious to know is, not whether good reasons can be given for our Church or not, but whether her intelligent members, men of learning, of good sense, of whole minds, do really believe her to be what she professes to be, — do really believe what they profess to believe. Asseverations of our honesty and of the firmness of our faith weigh nothing with them, for they know by their own experience that such asseverations cost nothing, — that a man who can profess what he does not really believe, can easily asseverate that he believes what he professes. They attend not to what we say, but to the unconscious manner, the unconscious look and tone, with which we say it.

Moreover, Mr. Capes, knowing the Protestant world as he does, needs not to be told that Protestants, save individual exceptions, under the influence of grace vouchsafed to lead them back to faith and unity, always put the most unfavorable construction on the words we use or the statements we make that they will bear. Candor and fair-dealing are not to be expected from them ; otherwise we should be obliged to regard them as in good faith, and if they were really in good faith they

would not remain in their Protestant communions, but would be speedily reconciled to the Church. Candor and fair-dealing on religious matters are incompatible with the nature of Protestants, and it is always folly to look for them. What we say will always be taken by them in the worst sense it can be. Our moderation will be termed lukewarmness, our candor will be taken as "damning with faint praise," and our forbearance to state our attachment to Catholicity in terms most consonant to our own feelings will be construed into our disgust, if we are converts, at the change of religion we have made. Moderation towards heretics avails nothing to win them, and is usually a wrong to our Catholic friends. He who knows Protestants well, knows that it is idle to try to speak so as to suit them. We shall always have the most favorable effect on them when we pay little regard to them, but speak out naturally, simply, and truly from our own full Catholic hearts, according to the instincts, so to speak, of our Catholic faith and love.

We see clearly enough from Mr. Capes's book, that his faith is full and firm, that his heart is Catholic to the core, and that his real estimate of Catholic life is hardly less high than ours; but he restrains himself in the utterance of his sentiments too much, and is too much afraid of appearing extravagant or enthusiastic, of speaking from his excited feelings, rather than from his sober judgment. He speaks of Catholicity too coldly, without that glow of feeling with which the child always speaks of his tender mother, the lover of his beloved, and he submits to a dissecting of her influence on his own mind and heart, and to the running of a sort of Plutarch parallel between her and Church-of-Englandism, which are to the warmth of our feelings half profane. What if we do appear extravagant, enthusiastic, to the heretical? The Apostles on the day of Pentecost appeared to the by-standers terribly extravagant and forgetful of proprieties. Some thought them drunk, filled with new wine; but three thousand were that day added to the Church. And it is rare that any, except those who appear extravagant, drunken even, to those without, have the consolation of being the instruments of adding large numbers to the faithful. Always will Catholics, filled with the spirit of their religion, and speaking and acting according to the inspirations of grace, appear to heretics and infidels to be extravagant, enthusiastic, carried away by their feelings, drunk even; for they are drunk, inebriated with the wine of the spirit. But what then? What need we care for Anglican primness, or Puseyite fastidiousness? What to us

are the notions that heretics, the enemies of God, the children of Satan, may entertain of our sayings and doings? Are we not the children of the kingdom, and shall we not run and exult to behold the bridegroom as he cometh forth from his chamber? Command us to hold our peace, and the very stones would cry out. Does not the inspired Psalmist call upon the trees to clap their hands; upon all nature, inanimate, animate, and rational, to rejoice and exult aloud? How then shall we restrain our joy when we speak of the Church, our blessed Mother, and of the graces we receive through her from her celestial Spouse,—of the sweet repose we experience, after years of wandering, in laying our head upon her maternal bosom, or feeling ourselves locked in her affectionate embrace, lest some sneering heretic or infidel shall call us extravagant, and be led to disregard our words? Just as if the joy that gushes from our hearts, the love that beams from our eyes, and speaks in every look, tone, and gesture, were not the very thing which, of all others, must most effectually touch his soul, and disarm his face of its sneer? We mean no censure upon Mr. Capes; we only wish to express, in the most forcible manner we are able, that cool, measured statements are not those the most consonant to our feelings, nor those most likely to persuade heretics that we who are converts have found in the Church all, and far more than all, we expected, or than was promised us. There is not one of us who would not find the language of the queen of Sheba to Solomon quite too cold and weak to express how much more we have found than we looked for, when we sought admission to the Catholic communion. “The word is true which I heard in my country of thy virtues and wisdom. I did not believe them that told it, until I came, and my eyes had seen, and I had proved that scarce one half of thy wisdom had been told me: thou hast exceeded thy fame with thy virtues. Happy are thy men, and happy are thy servants, who stand always before thee, and hear thy wisdom. Blessed be the Lord thy God, who hath been pleased to set thee on his throne.”*

Nevertheless, Mr. Capes sometimes forgets the restraint he imposes upon himself. The following, which is the concluding paragraph of his work, is written with deep feeling, and is very beautiful, as well as very true.

“Truly can I say with the patriarch, ‘The Lord is in this place, and I knew it not. This is no other but the house of God, and the

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gate of heaven.' The Catholic Church *can* be nothing less than the spiritual body of Jesus Christ. Nothing less than that adorable Presence, before which the angels veil their faces, can make her what she is, to those who are within her fold. Argument is needed no longer. The scoffings of the infidel, the objections of the Protestant, the sneers of the man of the world, pass over their heads as clouds over a mountain-peak, and leave them calm and undisturbed, with their feet resting on the Rock of Ages. They *know* in whom they have believed. They have passed from speculation to action, and found that all is real, genuine, life-giving, and enduring. Such, with all my sense of the awful mysteriousness of the world which is still invisible, of the fallaciousness of human knowledge, and of the argumentative points which controversy will ever urge against the claims of the Catholic Church, — such is the result of my experience of her aspect towards those who repose upon her bosom, in order that they may gaze upon the lineaments of her countenance. As a child that rests upon its parent's bosom, pressed to her heart with a tenderness that nothing less than a mother can bestow, and from that place of peace and security looks up into her eyes, and there reads the love which is its sweetest joy, so do I watch the aspect of her who has clasped me in her arms, and sustains me that I should not fall, and know that she is indeed the *mother* of my soul. I know only one fear, the fear that my heart may be faithless to Him who has bestowed on me this unspeakable blessing; I know only one mystery, which the more I think upon it, the more incomprehensible does it appear, — the mystery of that calling which brought *me* into this home of rest, while millions and millions are still driven to and fro in the turbulent ocean of the world, without rudder and without compass, without helmsman and without anchor, to drift before the gale upon the fatal shore." — p. 72.

The thought with which this closes is often in the mind of the convert, and is a mystery which grows upon us the more we meditate on it, because, while we see and acknowledge our guilt in remaining as we did outside of the Church, we know that it was no merit of ours, it was no virtue in us, that brought us into her communion. Not to us the glory, but to the free grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ.

Mr. Capes first considers the influence of Catholicity in regard to intellectual freedom. We extract a paragraph or two.

"It is commonly supposed, indeed, that a man of sense and intellectual courage *cannot* believe the dogmas of Catholicism without violating the first principles of reasoning, and enslaving his judgment at the beck of a designing priesthood. So far from this being

the case, I find myself compelled to act in the very opposite direction. I cannot *help* believing the truth of Catholicism in general, nor can I perceive the slightest violation of the laws of reasoning in any one of its separate doctrines. Granting the truth of Christianity as a Divine revelation, my reason forces me to be convinced that no one form of Protestantism can *possibly* be true. So far as argument is concerned, I can see and feel the difficulties which exist in the way of the reception of the Christian religion as Divine, and even of belief in any religion whatsoever, natural or revealed; but when once the question of the origin of Christianity is settled, though I can see and feel arguments against the Church of Rome, and admit that, so far as they go, they are difficulties which must be solved, yet I can see *nothing* in favor of any doctrinal Protestantism whatsoever; and I can no more avoid believing in the exclusive claims of the Church of Rome, than I can help believing in the deductions of physical astronomy or of electricity. The argument in favor of Rome is precisely similar to the reasonings which establish the great facts of any purely human science, which is based upon probabilities, and not on mathematical certainties. On such morally proved sciences, whether physical, domestic, social, or political, the whole course of our daily existence is conducted. We neither eat, drink, move, talk, read, buy, sell, grieve, rejoice, or, in a word, act for a moment as reasonable creatures, except on the supposition that certain general ideas are true, and must be acted upon, although not one of them can be *proved* with all the strictness of a mathematical proposition. Yet no man in his senses calls this an intellectual bondage, or wonders that people can devote their whole lives to a course of conduct against which *some* difficulties can be alleged, though the balance of probabilities is decidedly in its favor.

"And just such is my experience of the effect of a belief in the infallibility of the Catholic Church on my daily moral and spiritual existence. I grant that there are some difficulties to be urged against Christianity, and that the proof of the infallibility of Rome is not a mathematical proof; but nevertheless, I cannot help perceiving that the balance of proof is undeniably in favor of Christianity and of the Catholic Church, and therefore I cannot help acting myself in accordance with that balance, and no more believe or feel that I am intellectually a slave, than when I believe that I am at this moment awake, though it is impossible to *prove* that I am not asleep and dreaming. Many people imagine that a Catholic lives and moves with a sort of sense of intellectual discomfort, with a half-admitted consciousness that he is the victim of a delusion; that he dreads the light of criticism and argument, and is afraid of having his opinions honestly and rigorously canvassed. For my own part, I can most solemnly assert, that, from the moment I entered the Catholic Church,

I felt like a man who has just shattered the fetters which have impeded his movements from his childhood. I experienced a sensation of intellectual *relief*, to which I believe every conscientious Protestant to be an utter stranger. So far from feeling as if I had renounced the great privileges of humanity, and subjugated myself to a debasing servitude, I was conscious that now, for the first time, my faculties had fair play, that I was no longer in bondage to shams, forms of speech, pious frauds, exploded fables, youthful prejudices, or the impudent fabrications of baseless authority. Reason, like a young eagle for the first time floating forth from its mountain nest, and trusting itself with no faltering wing to the boundless expanse of ether around, above, and below, rejoiced in her new-found powers, and looked abroad upon the mighty universe of material and immaterial being, with that unflinching gaze with which the soul dares to look, when conscious that the God who made her has, at length, set her free. To tell me, at such a time, that I was enslaving my reason by that very act which enabled her to assert her supremacy, or that I was violating truth and common sense, by embracing the most *probable* of two momentous alternatives, I should have counted a folly not worthy to be refuted. And such have I felt it to this day. I am conscious that I have embraced one vast, harmonious system, which alone, of all the religions of mankind, is precisely what it pretends to be, and nothing less and nothing more. I behold before me a mighty body of doctrine and practice, self-consistent in all its parts, cohering by rigid logical deductions, and held together by certain moral laws, which are as universally applied in every conceivable contingency, as is the physical law of gravity throughout the visible universe. Complicated and varied as it is, and diverse in nature as are the many elements which go to make up its far-stretching whole, I can detect no flaw in the structure, no incompatibility of one feature with another, no tendency to decay, no token of failure in accomplishing all that it really professes to accomplish. I find every thing to charm and invigorate my intellect. If I am enthralled, it is in a bondage to truth; if I am fascinated, it is by the spell of faultless beauty."— pp. 6-8.

The Protestant, having himself no faith in his sect, concludes that we have none in the Church, and understanding very well that one is not free who is bound to believe whatever a sect, which neither is nor is believed to be infallible, teaches or commands him to believe, he concludes that we must both be and feel ourselves in mental bondage. But he falls in this into the sophism called by logicians *transitio a genere ad genus*, or concluding from one order to another, forgetting that the conclusion, to be valid, must always be in the same order with the prem-

ises. The Church is not in the sectarian order, is not simply the sect claiming infallibility and supreme authority; and Catholics believing their Church infallible and supreme differ essentially from Protestants disbelieving their sect, and well aware that it is fallible and liable to command what is false and wicked. Supposing the Church to be what she claims to be, there is no mental bondage in being held to believe whatever she teaches, and supposing us really to believe that she is what she claims to be, we cannot feel ourselves in mental bondage in being so held. The difficulty the Protestant imagines for us grows out of his supposition that the Church is for us what his sect is for him, and that at bottom we no more believe her than he does it. But this, luckily, is his mistake. Believing with us does not mean professing to believe, and actually doubting. We believe our Church infallible, Divinely commissioned, speaking in the name of God, and therefore that in believing and obeying her we are believing and obeying God, which is not slavery, but freedom; for God is truth and justice, our Maker, and our rightful Sovereign. Hence, Mr. Capes only asserts what reason itself asserts, when he says that one never enjoys, never knows, mental freedom till he becomes a Catholic. In becoming a Catholic we throw off the despotism of opinion, of passion, of caprice, and submit ourselves to the authority of God, and have his truth, his veracity, his word, as our authority for believing. We are freed from bondage, emancipated, and admitted as citizens into the commonwealth of Christ, and made partakers of the liberty of the children of God. On this point every convert's experience fully confirms all, and more than all, Mr. Capes has said.

But while we accept heartily all Mr. Capes says in favor of the freedom possessed and felt by the Catholic, we cannot help thinking that he has made some concessions to his former brethren which he was not required to make, and which may be turned with considerable force against him. He concedes that there are real difficulties in the way of admitting the truth of Christianity itself, and also in the way of admitting Catholicity as its true and only form. He makes the question, aside from the *donum fidei*, or gift of faith, between Christianity and infidelity, and between Catholicity and Protestantism, to be a balancing of probabilities, and concedes that in becoming a Catholic he was only "embracing the most probable of two momentous alternatives." Here is evidently an admission that unbelief and heresy are probable, although, by far, less probable than Cath-

olicity. We are not prepared to make this admission, for in our judgment, and, we think we may safely say, in the judgment of the Church, heresy and unbelief are both improbable, with not the least shadow of probability in their favor, and that every argument that can be adduced in favor of either implies its falsity ; that is to say, each is self-contradictory, and is refuted by itself. Unbelief is a negative quantity, wholly unintelligible save by a positive quantity; for pure negation, being nothing, can be no object of thought. No man can make a denial but by virtue of some affirmative principle, and every affirmative principle is opposed to unbelief. Every man who denies Christianity must affirm something in its place, and the principles he must affirm in order to affirm any thing in its place will, if he remains faithful to them in examining the motives of credibility, compel him to assent to the truth of Christianity. All heresy is self-refuted. It asserts too much to be infidel, and too little to be Christian. If it follows out its denials, it falls into total unbelief, which is refuted by the necessity of believing something as the condition of disbelieving ; if it follows out its positive affirmations, it must accept Catholicity, for Catholic truth is a unity, is one and indivisible, and, embrace what aspect of it you will, you must, in order to be self-consistent, embrace the whole of it down to the holy-water-pot and the blessing of asses, for either it is all false, or, as St. Paul says, "every creature of God may be blessed by prayer." Moreover, if the author concedes that Catholicity is, to human reason, simply the most probable of two alternatives, an acute opponent may force him to a conclusion he may find it inconvenient to adopt. There are eminent Catholic divines who, uncensured, maintain that the law to bind must be not only probably, but certainly, promulgated, and therefore, where we have not certainty, — objective certainty we mean, — we are free to follow the probable instead of the more probable. Even on principles, then, which the author cannot pronounce uncatholic, he might have innocently embraced the other alternative, refused to have become a Catholic, and have without sin remained, even after he had examined the motives of credibility, in his heresy or infidelity !

The author, no doubt, thinks that he escapes this difficulty by asserting that faith is the gift of God, and that certainty, not arrived at by reason, is attained by virtue of this supernatural gift. But he appears to us to mistake the real question involved in his remarks. Undoubtedly, faith, in the theological sense, subjectively considered, is the gift of God, and it is only by

this gift that we are able to believe with that firm adhesion of the mind which is demanded by the virtue of faith. But this is nothing to the purpose. The *donum fidei* is not an objective revelation of the truth, nor does it add any thing to the objective evidence or certainty of the faith; it is simply an infused habit of faith, giving to the mind a supernatural facility, aptitude, and strength in believing what God reveals and the Church proposes. Yet, in discussing, for those who do not believe, the motives of credibility, we can make no account of this infused habit, because those who do not believe have it not, and because we cannot expect them to believe that they can have it, till we have convinced their reason that our Church is the Church of God. God forbid that we should, in the slightest degree, overlook the fact that faith is a supernatural gift, or the necessity of grace to incline the will and to illumine the understanding to see and appreciate the evidences of the truth of our holy religion. But our question here regards the certainty of our religion *in se*, not its certainty in our intellect; its objective certainty, not as addressed to the supernaturalized intellect, but as addressed to natural reason, and as the object, not of divine, but of human faith. Certainly human faith does not of itself suffice, but human faith is all that we seek to produce by arguments, and all that any body ever pretends is produced by the motives of credibility. The real question here is, Do the motives of credibility, duly considered, establish to right reason the objective certainty of the Catholic religion, or only its probable truth, making out, as Lardner says of the credibility of the Gospel history, not certainty indeed, but very high probability? Proposed in this form, although grace is requisite to subjective certainty, to the firm adhesion of the mind to the truth, no Catholic can hesitate a moment as to the answer to be given. The evidence of our Church, taken at its just weight, presents a case, not merely of very high probability, but of absolute certainty, against which reason can bring no reasonable or logical objection; and the man who has examined that evidence is both logically and morally bound to believe what she teaches and to do what she commands. That is to say, the motives of credibility establish the truth of Catholicity, with all the certainty reason ever has or can require, and leave no room for a reasonable doubt; and where there is no room for reasonable doubt, there is not merely objective probability, but objective certainty. We must say all this, or concede that our religion does not respond to all the demands of

reason, and that the grace by virtue of which we elicit the act of faith is a dispensing with reason, instead of being its supernatural elevation, which is the radical error of modern Evangelicalism. *Gratia præsupponit naturam.* Grace retains reason and elevates it above itself; it does not supersede it, and require us to believe without or in opposition to its dictates. In believing Catholicity natural reason is fully satisfied, finds all her demands complied with, so that she never finds herself disappointed, or in any degree opposed to what through grace is believed. This the author himself shows, and it is on this ground that he asserts that the Catholic not only feels, but actually is, mentally free. But this would not be true, if the reason saw only probability, or could see room for a doubt as to the objective truth of Catholicity.

The author has been misled, most likely, by his Oxford logic, which teaches that mathematical certainty is the only genuine certainty, and that moral certainty, or certainty by virtue of extrinsic evidence, is only probability. Yet he holds that probability is sufficient in the case. So Mr. Newman, in his *Essay on Development*, concedes that the infallibility of the Church can be only probably established, and yet contends that we may be infallibly certain of the doctrines we believe on her authority; that is, we may have infallible certainty by virtue of an authority which is only probably infallible! Hence, when we tell Protestants that they have no infallible certainty in the case of the doctrines which they profess to deduce from the Holy Scriptures, because they have only probable reasons for believing that the Scriptures are inspired, and only probable reasons that they have in their doctrines rightly seized their sense, we are altogether wrong, and must concede to Protestants, after all, that, so far as concerns the truths contained in the written word, they stand on as good grounds as we, and that all the advantage we have over them by means of an infallible Church is that of an authority to preserve and define the unwritten word, and to watch over the developments of Christian doctrine, and from time to time to decide between the true developments and the false, anathematizing the latter as heresy, and taking the former up into the body of doctrine, and commanding them to be received as dogmas of faith! But, although this logic may be very convenient at Oxford, and very necessary indeed to all Protestants not confirmed rationalists, we hardly need it in the Catholic Church. As Catholics we can abide by the old rule, that the conclusion follows the

weaker premise, and maintain that the certainty by an authority can never transcend the certainty of the authority itself. We concede that the evidence which establishes to human reason the Divine authority of the Church is extrinsic, but we do not concede that probability is sufficient for belief in that authority, nor that probability is all that this sort of evidence gives. A thing may be established as certainly by extrinsic as by intrinsic evidence, and moral or historical certainty in its order is every whit as high, as infallible, as mathematical certainty. It is rendered, by the extrinsic evidence in the case, as infallibly certain that our Lord wrought miracles, as it is that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and can be doubted only on the assumption of principles which render problematical the highest form of metaphysical certainty. Mr. Capes admits, or rather contends, that we have for the Church the highest degree of certainty, except mathematical certainty, that the human reason ever has; we must then hold him quite inexcusable for conceding that her truth is only a probability, and that in embracing her one is only choosing the more probable of two alternatives. It may be prudent to choose the more probable of two alternatives, but it is entirely to mistake the evidence in the case to suppose that we have nothing to propose to the unelevated reason but a choice between probabilities. It may seem all very wise to him to make liberal concessions to heresy, but we must look well to it that we do not make them at the expense of orthodoxy, or that, in our generosity to Protestants, we do not forget to be just to Catholics. It is not meet to rob the children of their bread and give it unto dogs. However, we do not suppose the real thought the author had in his mind is necessarily unsound, but he has not taken sufficient care to define and express it with exactness and precision.

The author, having spoken of mental freedom under Catholicity, makes some excellent remarks on the influence of Catholicity in developing and strengthening the intellect. He proceeds to give his experience and his views of its influence on modern civilization, and from this portion of his work we must be allowed to make a brief extract.

"On the other hand, how far the course of modern civilization is impeded by the reception of Catholicism, is a question which is by no means easy of solution. From all that I can judge by experience of its effects on myself and on others, I should be disposed to say that, while it tends to the culture of the intelligence, and to

the development of all the faculties of the mind to the highest possible extent, it would lead its disciples to march with a somewhat hesitating step in what is commonly termed the civilization of the age. How far it would discourage purely intellectual cultivation *apart* from religion, is a question with which I have nothing to do, as I am speaking only of what are the effects of a sincere belief of Catholic doctrines, and an earnest practice of Catholic duties, upon the thoughts and life of man. While, then, I see every token that there is not a faculty in the soul, whether it be the pure reasoning faculty, the imagination, the taste, the love of extensive and accurate knowledge, or that which we term common sense, which Catholicism does not tend directly to stimulate in the healthiest and most effective possible manner; — while I see that its sons may be impelled by a burning enthusiasm to triumph throughout the whole domain of human studies, and to bend every acquisition of mental power to the service of God and the salvation of souls; — while the Catholic will labor with unwearying energies, and with the highest abilities, in the fields of mathematics, history, philosophy, science, poetry, or fiction, just as in former days the whole course of European civilization was directed and impelled by the devoted sons of the Church; — at the same time it is impossible to overlook the fact, that so far as our civilization depends on the pursuit of gain, and the restless strivings of ambition, so far it would suffer in the hands of devout Catholics. There exists in the Catholic faith a power to detach the affections from *every thing* on this side of the grave, which necessarily makes men take matters somewhat too easily to be in harmony with the notions of the present epoch. A pious Catholic, to a certain extent, sees no future, except that which commences after death. He lives for the present hour and for eternity. He has a greater tendency to take the affairs of life as they come, and to enjoy what he actually has in possession, without putting himself very much out of the way to add to his store, than is usually found among ardent and business-like Protestants. Taken *on the whole*, I do not believe that Catholic merchants, Catholic tradesmen, Catholic travellers, or Catholic bankers, will ever so successfully compete with men of the world of similar occupations as to make as large fortunes as their Protestant competitors, or to exercise as powerful an influence upon the economic progress of the age. We never shall, taken as a body, be the first in the nation as men of business; and I question whether we could ever be *first* (though we might be *second*) in the study of those physical sciences with whose cultivation the characteristic movement of our time is so intimately bound up. It is undeniable, that Catholics do not *care* so much as others for those objects which furrow the sober and laborious Englishman's brow, and bend him down with premature old age. Not only the general influence of

their religion, as a spiritual system, but the nature of their belief in the excellence of poverty, and of the monastic and celibate life, and in the pernicious nature of excessive carefulness, and of a melancholy, anxious spirit, tends to make them sit down contented amidst reverses, and comparatively careless about worldly success, where other men would strain every nerve to struggle against the assaults of fortune, and to provide against every possible future contingency." — pp. 11, 12.

Here, again, with what the author means we fully and heartily agree, but we can hardly accept what he says. How is it possible to regard Catholicity as likely to impede modern civilization, since modern civilization is undeniably the product of the Catholic religion? Indeed, Catholicity is the only thing that can save civilization, and prevent the modern world from lapsing into barbarism and savagism. The author himself holds and proves this, as is clear from the remarks which follow the passage extracted. Why, then, does he intimate that it will impede rather than advance our civilization? Simply because he takes the pains neither to think nor to express himself with accuracy. What he means by modern civilization is not modern civilization, but practices and tendencies in modern nations, especially Protestant nations, directly opposed to it, namely, the neglect of the higher intellectual culture, worldly-mindedness, selfishness, exclusive cultivation of the physical sciences, and excessive devotion to wealth and mere material prosperity. Mr. Capes is quite right in supposing the Catholic religion favors unworldliness, cherishes the intellectual rather than the mere physical sciences, checks the inordinate pursuit of wealth, and reconciles men to poverty; he is quite right, too, in regarding this as one of its recommendations; but by what hallucination he should have been led to regard it for this reason as less friendly than Protestantism to modern civilization, is more than we are able to divine. Certainly, he is too clear a thinker to confound with our civilization the causes in operation amongst us which tend incessantly, as he himself admits, to destroy it.

We regret that he has not expressed himself with more accuracy, for he cannot be ignorant that the question between Catholicity and Protestantism is no longer a theological or religious question. It is now in reality a purely social question. As a religion, as a medium of worshipping God and saving the soul, Protestants, throughout the world, have virtually yielded the ground to Catholicity, and no longer dispute her claims. They feel that, for men who would give their souls to

God, and live only for heaven, the Catholic is the best religion ; indeed, the only religion adapted to their purpose. They shift the question, and now oppose our religion, though excellent in regard to heaven, as abominable in regard to earth. Admirable as a religion, it is execrable as a civilization. They pretend that it enslaves the mind, crushes the spirit, and fits men only to be mere tools and drudges ; that it robs man of the nobility of his nature, forbids him to assert his manhood, and unfits him to bear a manly part in the progress of society. They institute comparisons between Protestant nations and Catholic, and tell us that in the former all is life and activity, energy and improvement ; industry and commerce flourish, wealth accumulates, social and material well-being are cared for and incessantly advanced ; while in the latter indolence prevails, a general want of thrift is manifest, enterprise sleeps, and every one is contented to remain where and what he was born. All this is false, no doubt, but nothing is more certain than that the notion is entertained by Protestants, and even by some Catholics, that Protestant nations surpass in civilization and temporal prosperity Catholic nations, and that the cause of it is to be sought in the difference between Protestantism and Catholicity. It is on the ground that their pretended religion is more favorable than the Catholic religion to civilization and temporal prosperity, that Protestants now seek to place the controversy with us. It will not do, then, in these times, for us to begin with the apparent concession that our religion is unfavorable to modern civilization. No matter how correct may be our meaning, we must not, even in words, have the least appearance of conceding it, for a candid interpretation of our language is the last thing we are to expect from Protestants. As little value as we set on the earth and things of time, we must not concede even this world to Protestants, although they may be willing to concede us heaven in exchange. They must have nothing, in this world or the next, at our hands, but what they are honestly entitled to, which is just nothing at all ; and we must be ready to maintain against them that ours is the only religion favorable to man's true interests, whether for time or for eternity.

If Protestants retained, as a body, any real reverence for spiritual things, if they were not generally ready "to jump the world to come" if they can make sure of this world, we would waive the question they raise, for a religion is not to be tested by its relations to material prosperity, but by its adapta-

tion to the end of all religion, namely, the glory of God in the redemption and sanctification of souls ; but as they can be made to feel only on the material side of their being, as much as we despise the things of the world, we hold it important for them, not for us, to meet them on their own chosen ground, — the last that remains to them, — and prove to them that, setting aside all considerations of its advantages in regard to another world, the belief and practice of our religion are the only sure means of advancing civilization, and securing and promoting man's social and material well-being. Mr. Capes has himself proved this unanswerably, and we need but refer the reader to his luminous pages on this subject. That our religion detaches its followers from the world, and tends to make them indifferent to material goods, is, no doubt, true, and it is because this is true that it is favorable to civilization and material prosperity. It checks selfishness and increases charity, and charity makes us solicitous for the welfare of others just in proportion as it renders us indifferent to our own. Hence it is that selfishness always retards, while charity advances, civilization. It checks eagerness in the pursuit of wealth, and therefore extravagance in expenditures. All the selfish passions tend to overshoot themselves, and too great eagerness in the pursuit always misses its aim. Riches are not to be estimated by the amount produced, but by the amount produced beyond consumption. No matter how many fold you increase the productions of a people; if you increase their expenditures in the same proportion, you add nothing to their riches. Protestantism, by destroying men's faith in a future life, by depriving the people of the relish for simple spiritual pleasures, always to be had at a trifling expense, confines them to sensual pleasures, which are always expensive. Its very worldly-mindedness and craving for sensual gratification induce an expenditure for pomp and show, for feeding pampered appetites, for sustaining rivalries in houses and furniture, places and honors, which brings consumption in Protestant countries closer on the heels of production than it is ever brought in any Catholic country. Even admitting, what is doubtful, that more is actually produced by a Protestant than by a Catholic people, the latter, placing their felicity, not in sensual, but in spiritual pleasures, caring little for worldly show, and contented with a cheaper and more simple style of living, are sure to have always on hand a larger surplus beyond their wants for consumption, and therefore to be always actually richer. This is evinced by the fact, that one can live in the same grade of

society in a Catholic country at less than one half the expense that is required in England or the United States, the two most favorable Protestant instances to be selected.

If from the accumulation of wealth, which is greater under Catholicity than under Protestantism, — of course we are not speaking of a Catholic people, like the Irish, ruled and oppressed by a Protestant people, — we pass to social and political well-being, we shall find the advantage is all on the side of Catholicity. The tendency of all Protestant legislation is to make the rich richer, and the poor poorer, if we may judge from the example of England, and from our own, and the worst form of aristocracy, a moneyed aristocracy, the aristocracy of money-bags, stocks, and spindles, is its favorite. The poor are ground into the dust, the rich escape. The subordinate in villany is punished, the principal usually escapes. In Catholic countries, — really Catholic countries we mean, — the constitution of the state and society are respected; but legislation and administration, filled with an unworldly and charitable spirit, tend to protect the poor and helpless, and punishment falls with its greatest severity on the proud and lordly oppressor, on the greatest villain. Austria punishes the chiefs of the Hungarian rebellion, but spares the subordinates. Liberty does not consist in fanciful theories, in passionate declamations against monarchy or aristocracy, and the loud vociferation of the words Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, nor in well-planned and successful Jacobinical revolutions, which overturn the throne and altar, and set up the despotism of unbelief and the tyranny of the mob, but in the supremacy of law, in the maintenance of wise and just government, however constituted, and in orderly submission to its authority. That which tends to repress turbulent passions, to wean the affections from this world, to make men unambitious, indifferent to their political or social position, self-denying, disinterested, charitable, contented with spiritual occupations and pleasures, must, then, be that which will most effectually serve the cause of liberty, by drying up the source of the dangers to which it is exposed, weakening the selfishness from which the disposition to tyrannize or to rebel against legitimate authority arises, and taking from tyranny and rebellion their motive and excuse. As a matter of fact, in liberty and real temporal prosperity the Catholic nations of Europe, notwithstanding the obstacles thrown in their way for three hundred years by heretical neighbours, infidel governments, and infidel mobs, are far in advance of the Protestant nations, and have

in them a vitality, a recuperative energy, that we should in vain look for in any country where Protestantism predominates. This should be so, for it is an irreversible law that the goods of this world always fly those who pursue them for themselves, and overtake those who despise and fly them for God's sake.

Mr. Capes has some profound and excellent remarks on the social crisis that has approached or is approaching in England, and shows clearly that the great social problem of the age, pressing every day more and more urgently for a solution, can be solved only by Catholicity. The great question, which Socialists misconceive and are impotent to answer, and which they conceal under their demand of "the right to labor," is, say what we will, the great social question of our day. It is a fearful question, and cannot much longer be blinked, or left to the management of Socialists and Communists. The Protestant system of industry and economy has predominated in the modern world since the peace of Utrecht, in 1713, and it has brought the greater portion of the civilized world to the very brink of ruin. It has reduced the price of labor to the very minimum of human subsistence, and given us an immense operative class,—millions of men and women, able and willing to work for their bread, who are starving because there is no work to be had. Such is the terrible fact that stares us in the face, and affords us so sad a comment on the boasted progress of industry and material prosperity under Protestantism. This fact has to be met and disposed of, or it will dispose of the modern world. Till some practical solution is found, some effectual remedy is applied, we must expect socialist and communist movements to continue, and society to be constantly menaced with total disruption. Nothing renders men more desperate, more ready to make a revolution, than the gnawings of hunger. If you wish to be free from revolutions, take care that the people find employment, and experience no lack of provender. Mr. Capes has not gone into this question at so great a length as we wish he had, but in what he has said he shows that he understands it, has deeply pondered it, and sees whence the remedy is to come. That the Church has in her institutions, if she be cordially accepted, a sure and even a speedy remedy for the evil, he shows conclusively. We feel it necessary to add, to guard against misapprehension, that, though the institutions on which he appears to rely as the institutions of the Church are as highly esteemed by us as by him, yet it is necessary to bear in mind that the Church does not do her work

by virtue of them, but they accomplish their ends by virtue of her. In other words, the Catholic doctrine in regard to poverty, monastic establishments, and vows of celibacy on the part of the clergy and religious, if they could obtain out of the Church, would not, as parts of Protestantism, accomplish any thing good, and it is not they that give to Catholicity its power to remedy social evils, but it is it that gives to them their power and efficiency to that end. The Church is one, a unity, not a union, and its power and efficiency proceed from its centre, from the Holy Ghost who dwells in her, not from an aggregate of parts. When we say monastic establishments, vows of celibacy, &c., have this or that tendency, we must always bear in mind that it is not they that contribute so much power to the Church, but she that contributes their power for good to them.

There are several other points in Mr. Capes's work on which we should like to comment, and some few more inaccuracies of expression we should like to point out; but perhaps we have found fault enough, and have already said enough to incline many of our readers to think us far more ready to censure than to laud. Mr. Capes is an able man, a zealous Catholic, who cheerfully devotes his time, his talents, and his fortune to the cause of Catholicity. His errors arise from his retaining his Oxford philosophy, from his partiality for Mr. Newman's theory of development, his wish to write in a popular style, and from the low state of Catholic theology in Great Britain. From the latter proceeds his twaddle about conscientious Protestants, and wishy-washiness on the subject of exclusive salvation; both are uncalled for, and, if they do no harm, they do no good. We cannot understand why a Catholic writer should be exceedingly anxious to prove the worthlessness of his own religion, and give to those without assurances that they can be saved without embracing it. There is no reason in the world, that we can understand, why every popular scribbler on Catholic theology should be putting his gloss on the solemn definitions of the Church in her general councils. She has defined, that out of the Church no one can ever be saved, and why can we not be content to stop where she stops? Mr. Capes does not hesitate to call Anglicanism an absurdity, to deny it all religious character, or to assert, if he means what he says, the impossibility of faith out of the Church; how, then, can he concede the possibility of salvation out of the Church, since "without faith it is impossible to please God"? Suppose the gloss he

and others put upon the definition of the Church be allowable, it can be allowable in the case of no one who can know that it is allowable, for such a one has an opportunity to hear the Church, and cannot be in invincible ignorance. No man can be invincibly ignorant of what is necessary, *necessitate medii*, to salvation, for salvation is possible to all men. A man must have this, — and faith is always *in re*, never *in voto*, — before the plea of invincible ignorance can excuse him. But we will do Mr. Capes the justice to say, that he is on this point less latitudinarian than English Catholic writers generally, and shows evidently that he does not believe much in the alleged good faith and sanctity of Protestants. He seems to wish to drop the qualification so earnestly insisted upon by those kind souls, who are afraid that they may wound the feelings or alarm the consciences of "their separated brethren."

We are glad to find that Mr. Capes insists earnestly on the great fact, that faith is the gift of God, but we are not quite sure that he is right in calling this gift, received in baptism, a special *faculty*. It is not a faculty, but an infused habit, and imparts no new faculty to the soul, but simply elevates or supernaturalizes an existing faculty.

But enough of this. Notwithstanding the faults we have found, we place a high value on this work, and have read it with great interest and satisfaction. It will be widely read, and will have a good influence on the courage and tone of English and American Catholics. It is not as bold and energetic as we could wish it, but is far more so than the productions of English Catholics during the last century and the beginning of the present. We have, unhappily, been forced to find fault with nearly all the works that have reached us from the Oxford converts. Mr. Faber is the only one of the converts whose writings we are aware of having seen, whom we have had no occasion to criticize. What we have seen from him is written in a true Catholic spirit, is Catholic to the core. Nevertheless, we have found some noble tendencies in all these converts. They nearly all seem to be free from the common English distrust of the Papacy, and if they have any errors, they are not those of the school of Charles Butler. They do not appear to think Catholicity would be improved by being remodelled after the Anglican Establishment, nor are they afraid to say their beads, or ashamed to invoke the saints, and venerate sacred images and relics. They do not appear to think that Catholicity should be one thing for Englishmen and

another for Italians, and they appear to feel that their religion is really *Catholic*.

We have heretofore spoken of the freer and bolder tone that is beginning to be assumed by English Catholics ; there is decidedly less namby-pambyism among them, less of that truckling and servile spirit, so incompatible with the freedom and dignity of our faith, and less of that striving to conciliate and to avoid displeasing heretics, lest our goods should be confiscated or our throats cut, hardly to be expected in the members of a Church that teaches men that in dying they may conquer the world ; and we attribute this, under God, in some degree, to the accession of converts from Anglicanism, but mainly to the influx of Irish Catholics. The Church in England, as in this country, increases by emigration from Ireland, and it is from this source that English Catholicity has derived chiefly its courage to speak in bolder tones and stronger language. And this not only because a large portion of the Catholic population are Irish, but *poor* Irish. Your Catholic aristocracy, save individual exceptions, have too many worldly relations, and too many connections with the dominant heretical society, to permit the missionary to rely upon them with much confidence, and they will always, in consideration of their rank and large possessions, be disposed to temporize, and to give up all of their religion that can possibly be given up without giving up the whole. We regard it as a very great blessing to our own country, that at the present moment the great majority of our Catholic population are poor, and poor Irish. Our Catholicity will thus have a healthier tone, and rest on a far more solid basis, humanly speaking, than if it prevailed only among the native-born population, and the wealthier and more distinguished families. What might at first view seem against us is really in our favor, and we really feel more joy, other things being equal, in the conversion of a poor man or a poor woman, than in that of a rich man or a fine lady. The poor, they who have but few ties that bind them to the world, are more devoted to the truth, love their religion more for its own sake, care less for appearances, and are less afraid of having the plain truth told to their heretical neighbours. The Irish have their faults,—no man pretends to deny it,—and who has not faults ? But Almighty God seems to have reserved to them the special mission of restoring to the faith the nations that speak the English language, and they seem to us to be peculiarly fitted for its performance. If, then, we mark a decided improvement in

the tone and feelings of Catholics in England and in this country during the last half-century, let us, who are of the old English stock, not forget to give the honor where, under God, it is due,—to the piety, the zeal, and the steadfastness of the poor Irish emigrants. And let it console them in some measure for the sufferings of poor, oppressed Ireland, that they are, by Divine Providence, made the instrument of building up the Church in England and the United States, and of the salvation of millions of souls.

ART. IV.—*The Mercersburg Review.* Mercersburg, Pa.
May, 1850.

In his number for May, the Mercersburg Reviewer attempts to defend his doctrine from the charges we preferred against it in our Review for April last. He asserts that the pantheistic consequences we drew from his premises are not warranted, and repeats his main objection to what he improperly, and in very bad taste, terms *Romanism*, that is, Catholicity.

We expected as much; for we did not flatter ourselves that he would at once submit to the Church, and we did not doubt his sincere intention to be a Christian, which, of course, he could not be, if his doctrine involved the consequences we alleged. But the simple denial of those consequences is not enough; he must show that he can so interpret his doctrine as to escape them, and that, when he so interprets it, he is able to distinguish it from, and oppose it to, Catholic faith and theology. He himself, in his January number, reduced the whole controversy between the Church and all classes of her opponents to the question between her and his specific form of Protestantism, and virtually conceded, that, if his specific form of Protestantism is untenable, her claims as the infallible Church of God, out of which there is no salvation, must be admitted. Since the presumption is always in favor of the Church, as prior occupant, his business was to prove his doctrine, and to prove it, not only in so far as coincident with hers, but in so far as distinguished from and opposed to hers. If he has not done this, he has done nothing to his purpose, and we are free, by his own concession, to conclude the Church against him.

In our reply to the Reviewer, as our readers will remember,

It is, in intelligence and will, certainly ; for that is a truism *in*, but not *ad rem*. Are human intelligence and will needed to make room for the existence of truth, as reality, as something existing *in re*? "Truth exists, as truth, only by being known. Blot out all knowledge, all consciousness, all thought, and you blot out all truth at the same time. Intelligence is the light in which it reveals itself, the very form in which it becomes real." (Ibid.) Real as a fact of intelligence? Agreed, *in*; but that is not to the purpose, and is also a mere truism, for it is only saying that what is not known is not known. What does truth as an objective reality exist only by being known, or has it no existence *a parte rei*, till it is a fact of human intelligence? Your meaning, if meaning you have, or if you are saying any thing to the purpose, is, that it does not so exist. Then you concede that you hold the principle, that the object is in the subject, not out of it ; therefore is subject, not object, as we have alleged. Pray, tell us, then, if truth is unreal, a pure abstraction, while unknown, how it can be an object of knowledge at all, or how there can be an act of knowledge where there is no cognizable or intelligible object ; that is, how there can be any truth at all.

"God is at once object and subject, in the most universal sense. He is the absolute union of both." (p. 318.) You must mean by this either that God is at once the *human* subject — the only subject in question — and its object ; or that he is, in regard to himself, at once subject and object, that is, the adequate object of his own intellect. If you mean the former, you are a pantheist ; if the latter, it is true, but not to the purpose. By subject in this controversy, the Reviewer very well knows, unless he is wholly ignorant of modern philosophy, is meant the human soul, the thinking and willing subject we ourselves are, and by object, that which is distinguished from it. Subject and object in God are identical, for he is *actus purissimus*, most pure act. But because they are identical in him, do you say therefore they are identical in us? Whence does this follow? Are we God, and like him the adequate object of our own intellect? "And so, then, in the constitution of the universe under God, object and subject can never fall absolutely asunder, but are required always to go together as joint factors in the determination of all proper *reality* in the world." (Ibid.) If this is at all to the purpose, it asserts that, in like manner as subject and object are one in God, so are they in us. This confirms our assertion that the Reviewer

we analyzed his doctrine, and found that it teaches, among other things, — 1. The supernatural object of faith is in the subject, not out of it ; 2. The supernatural does not *wholly* transcend the natural ; and, 3. Faith is the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed. If he holds these principles, we contended, — 1. He necessarily denies the object of faith, for whatever is in the subject, not out of it, is subject, not object, and therefore he denies faith itself ; for where there is no object to be believed, there can be no act of believing. 2. He denies the proper supernatural, and therefore Christianity as a supernatural revelation, and then Christianity itself ; for it is a contradiction in terms to call that supernatural which does not wholly transcend the sphere of the natural. And 3. He denies faith itself, again, by confounding faith with science ; for the immediate apprehension of the truth of the object or intrinsic truth of a proposition is knowledge, not faith. The three principles, or rather the first two, for he is silent as to the last, the Reviewer reaffirms in his answer ; but he denies the consequences we drew from them. He might, as it seems to us, just as well deny that two and two are four.

The reasoning by which the Reviewer attempts to escape these fatal consequences is to us not very clear, or easy to comprehend. The author has apparently a great aversion to clear, distinct, and definite statements, and follows a species of logic which is more convenient than conclusive, and which allows him to conclude any proposition he chooses, if he only contrives to assert somewhere, on some subject, something which is not false. But we shall do our best to understand him, and to reply fairly and pertinently to his real thought.

The first charge against the Reviewer is, that, by placing the object in the subject, and denying it to be real, save as concentered "in the thinking and willing of single minds," as he expresses himself, he denies the object itself, because if in the subject, it is not object at all. To this he replies, "We still say, however, that there is no truth or law *in the world of mind* under a purely objective form." (p. 317.) *In the world of mind*, that is, in private thought and will, as existing in them, agreed ; but that is a mere truism, and not the question. The question is, Do you, or do you not, admit any purely objective reality, any object really existing, *a parte rei*, independent of our thinking and willing ? "Intelligence and will are needed to make room for such existence, and to bring it actually to pass." (Ibid.) Room for its existence "in the world of mind,"

that is, in intelligence and will, certainly ; for that is a truism again, but not *ad rem*. Are human intelligence and will needed to make room for the existence of truth, as reality, as something existing *in re* ? " Truth exists, as truth, only by being known. Blot out all knowledge, all consciousness, all thought, and you blot out all truth at the same time. Intelligence is the light in which it reveals itself, the very form in which it becomes *real*." (Ibid.) Real as a fact of intelligence ? Agreed, again ; but that is not to the purpose, and is also a mere truism, for it is only saying that what is not known is not known. But does truth as an objective reality exist only by being known, or has it no existence *a parte rei*, till it is a fact of human intelligence ? Your meaning, if meaning you have, or if you are saying any thing to the purpose, is, that it does not so exist. Then you concede that you hold the principle, that the object is in the subject, not out of it ; therefore is subject, not object, as we have alleged. Pray, tell us, then, if truth is unreal, a pure abstraction, while unknown, how it can be an object of knowledge at all, or how there can be an act of knowledge where there is no cognizable or intelligible object ; that is, how there can be any truth at all.

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places the object in the subject, or identifies them. But if so, then we are God, and the Reviewer unwittingly reasserts the very autotheism he disclaims,—evident also from the further fact that he makes all the “proper reality in the world” the result of the joint operations of subject and object. But here is another difficulty. Reality is the result of their action as joint factors. Then they, regarded in themselves, are not real; then they are mere abstractions, mere possibilities; then they are incapable of action, and nothing can result from them; then there can be no reality, and nullism, which we before charged upon the Reviewer’s doctrine, follows as a necessary consequence. Will the Reviewer explain to us how his reasoning obviates the consequences we have before drawn from his premises?

But the Reviewer adds, that he does not mean to understand his doctrine in such sense as to subordinate truth and law to the power of individual thought and will, as though truth and law might be considered the product of men themselves. Pray, then, what is the meaning of all you have been saying, and of your objection to us, that we place the object out of the subject, and hold it to be independent of us? “Men make neither truth nor law.” Indeed! And yet you accuse us of heresy, because we hold truth exists *a parte rei*, and is proposed objectively to our apprehension, and because we do not recognize man’s autonomy in constituting the law which he is morally bound to obey! Have you not said that “truth exists, as truth,” that is, as a reality, “only by being known”? Have you not said that “the law is brought to pass, comes to its actualization in the world, only in the form of being apprehended and willed by its subjects,”—that “mind thus by its very constitution is required to be *autonomic, self-legislative, a true fountain and source of the law itself*,”—and that “only as the law is willed, freely embraced, affirmed, constituted, by the created intelligence it is ordained to rule, *so as to be at the same time the product of this, its own act* virtually and deed, can there be any . . . morality or religion”? (p. 316.) Here is what you say, and nothing you say inconsistent with this can be entertained. If you choose to contradict yourself, that is not our business.

“Men,” says the Reviewer, “make neither truth nor law. These have an absolute *necessity* beyond their will, and *underlie* the very order from which they spring. But still truth and law *actualize* themselves in the world, become concrete, and thus *real* for men, only as they are incorporated with their life

and pass over in this way from a purely objective character to a character which is at the same time subjective and individual." (Ibid.) Concede all this, which is no more than every autotheist or pantheist says, it amounts to nothing. The Reviewer supposes it is possible to assert an objective world independent of our thinking and willing, and yet to maintain that this objective world, considered apart from our thinking and willing, is only a pure abstraction, and is real only as we think and will it, or, what is the same thing, as it is concentered "in the thinking and willing of single minds." But such an objective world is no real world at all,—has no existence *a parte rei*, and is at best only a mode or affection of the subject; for we never cease to repeat to him,—and we wish we could induce him to take notice of what we say,—that a pure abstraction is a sheer nullity. The Reviewer is misled by his German metaphysics, which teach him that the form of the object in both the intellectual world and the moral is supplied by the subject. He understands well enough, what we were not aware any body denied, that, in order to a fact of human life, subject and object must in some way come together,—that there must be a real mediation between them; but he supposes—and here is his primal error—that the mediation must come from the side of the subject, and not from the side of the object, and hence he concludes, that, if the object be conceived as out of the subject and independent of it, existing really, or *a parte rei*, there can be no real mediation between them,—that they can never come really together; for the subject obviously can never go out of itself. But to assume either that the form of the object is supplied by the subject, or that it is the subject that mediates between the subject and object, is the denial of all reality out of the subject, or distinguishable from it, and the assertion of pure autotheism, pantheism, or nullism, whichever term you choose. The true solution of the difficulty is not to be found in Cartesianism or Kantianism, either as modified, on the one hand, by Fichte, or, on the other, by Schelling and Hegel. The form of the object is itself objective, and the principle that mediates between subject and object is not the intelligence of the subject, but the intelligibility of the object. We see intellectually the object, because it is *a parte rei*, and because it is intelligible, not *by us*, but *to us*. Let the Reviewer understand this, and he will be surprised at the doctrine he has been contending for.

But we have not done with this part of the subject yet.

From the Reviewer's doctrine with regard to subject and object we drew the inference that his general doctrine is pantheistic. We never supposed for a moment that he regarded himself as a pantheist, but we felt certain that his whole scheme was pantheistic at bottom, as is all modern German thought, no matter of what philosophical or Protestant school. The Reviewer says he is no pantheist, and formally disavows the pantheistic consequences we charged upon him. This is all very well, but pantheism seems to us to lurk in the very phraseology in which he disavows it. Thus, in a passage we have just quoted:—"Men make neither truth nor law. These have an absolute *necessity* beyond their will, and *underlie* the whole order of existence from which they spring." Here the assertion is not that these have a real existence beyond the human will, but simply a *necessity*. This *necessity* of truth and law is perhaps extra-human, but the truth and law themselves are not; for we are told immediately that "they actualize themselves in the world, become concrete, and thus real for men," only as they become "subjective and individual." They actualize themselves, and become real. This can only mean that the necessity develops or pushes itself out in individual thinking and willing as truth and law, which is a purely pantheistic conception, or, if you please, atheistic, resolving God into necessity, and making him operate, not as free will, but as necessary law or force.

We are aware that the Reviewer denies this, and asserts that God is distinct from the world, and its free cause; but every pantheist says as much, and the Reviewer's conception of freedom is the Calvinistic conception,—what he calls "free necessity,"—that is to say, no proper freedom at all. The freedom with which God causes creation is only the freedom with which he causes his own being. "God," he says (p. 314), "is the free cause of his own being; and much more then of all his works." The *a fortiori* is inadmissible, unless there is a parity between the sense in which God is the free cause of his own being, and that in which he is the free cause of his works. He is the free cause, or the cause at all, of his own being, only in the sense that he depends for his being on nothing beyond himself, exterior to, or distinguishable from himself, and therefore is the free cause of the universe only in the sense that nothing distinguishable from himself impels, compels, or moves him to produce it. But as in reality he is not the cause of his own being, since he is necessary being, and therefore uncaused, so the

universe is uncaused, and springs forth necessarily from the inherent necessity of the Divine nature, which we need not tell the Reviewer is pure Spinozism.

The Reviewer tells us he is no pantheist, but to prove that his doctrine is pantheistic, or worse, we need only examine "the dualism or abstract deism" which he condemns as the error immediately opposed to the error of pantheism. The essence of pantheism is in the denial of the contingency of the universe, or its proper creation, and in the assertion of the substantial identity of God and the world. The error opposed to the error of pantheism, says the Reviewer, is abstract deism. Well, what, according to him, is this abstract deism?

"Abstract deism," he says, "as distinguished from the true *theism* of Christianity, it is hardly necessary to say, is not in and of itself an exclusion absolutely of God from the world. It prides itself rather in being an acknowledgment of God, under the character of the great first cause and end of all things. In this view, however, he is taken to be always out of the world, beyond it, over and above it, and in no sense truly immanent in its constitution and life. His relation to the world is that of a mechanician to a machine. It is the product of his mind and hand; it works according to his will; it goes forward under the superintendence of his eye; while he remains himself, whether near at hand or afar off, wholly on the outside of it, abstract and independent altogether as another order of being." — p. 311.

Now let us examine this, and see what he must maintain who denies it. It takes God "to be always out of the world, beyond it, over and above it, and in no sense truly immanent in its constitution and life." But do you deny that God is out of the world, beyond, over, and above it? Then you deny the extra-mundane Divinity, which is itself pantheism, if not atheism; and how, if not out, beyond, over, and above the world, do you distinguish him, as to his substance, from the world? "In no sense truly immanent in its constitution and life." You cannot say this, because you have begun by conceding that abstract deism does not assert the absolute exclusion of God from the world; then it can hold, and does hold, him to be in some sense immanent in it. "It is the product of his mind and hand." Do you deny this? Then you deny creation. "It works according to his will." Deny this, and you deny that God is the Supreme Governor of the universe. "It goes forward under the superintendence of his eye." Do you maintain that it is not so? Then you reject Divine Prov-

idence. "While he remains himself wholly on the outside of it." This is ambiguous, and may mean *outside* under the relation of space, or *outside* in the sense of *distinction from*. In the former sense, the assertion is gratuitous; no theologian holds God to be outside of the world in that sense, for every one holds that he dwells, not in space, but in immensity. Do you deny that he is outside of the world in the second sense, *outside* inasmuch as he is distinguished from it? Then you identify him with it. "Abstract and independent altogether." *Abstract* we will pass over, for none but men of the author's school hold God, as distinguished from the world, as a pure abstraction. Do you deny, then, that God is "independent altogether" of the world? If you do, you make him dependent on it, and deny his independent existence, and therefore deny him to be God. "As another order of being." God is increate, and the world is created; he is necessary, and it is contingent. Do not necessary and contingent, increate and created, constitute two orders? Do they not belong to two distinct categories? Deny it, assert that God and the world belong to the same category, to the same order, and you identify them, and make a formal confession of pantheism. Now, supposing the Reviewer to write with any definite notions of what he writes, he does make all of the denials we here enumerate, and then, unless we assume that of contraries both may be true, he undeniably maintains atheistic, pantheistic, and nullistic doctrines, whether he knows it or not.

We accused the Reviewer of giving a pantheistic interpretation to the mystery of the Holy Incarnation. In reference to this he says, — "Christ, we are told, is the author of the new creation, but no part of it in his own person; just as he is the old creation, only *mediante actu creativo*, by the act of creating it, [we said, *in* that he creates it,] and in no more intimate way. To make him the real fountain of Christianity itself, is gravely represented as a full identification of his life with that of his people, and runs, we are told, into palpable pantheism." (p. 309.) The Reviewer disdains minute accuracy, and takes the liberty to reproduce our statements, not as we made them, but as best suits his own convenience. We admit that, in one sense, Christ is identically Christianity; but not when Christianity is taken as the new *creation*, or *created* supernatural order. Christ is then it only *mediante* his creative act. What we objected to was the assertion, that Christ not merely begets or creates the Christian life in his people, but is identically the substance of

that life itself. It was the assumption of this identity of substance that we pronounced pantheistic, and that assumption the Reviewer continues to make. He considers it ridiculous to assert that Christ is in his own *person* no part of the new *creation*, and its fountain in no more intimate sense than that of being its creator. His intimate and immanent presence in — not *by* — his creative act is not enough to satisfy our Mercersburg doctor. But, from the very nature of things, Christ cannot be the fountain of the new life of his people in a more intimate sense, without being identically it, and in his substance identified with their substance. In the first place, how can Christ in his own *person*, which is wholly Divine, be any part of the new *creation*? Is the *person* of Christ created? Is the Reviewer not only a Eutychian, as we before proved him, but also a Nestorian? In the second place, how can the Christian life be called a new *creation*, if it is the very substance of the life of Christ's *person*, which is God? And if it is the very substance of that life, how can the author deny that in the supernatural order he maintains pantheism? or, if he maintains pantheism in the supernatural, how can he deny that he also maintains it in the natural?

The Reviewer replies, "We carefully distinguish Christ from his Church." Very true, as the fountain from the stream, not as the cause from the effect. "Yet we hold them to be in a deep sense one, even as the head and members are indissolubly joined together in the living constitution of one body." (p. 310.) But you hold this oneness to be, not mystical, as we ourselves hold it, but substantial, physical, — a oneness in substance, as the substance of the stream is one with the substance of the fountain from which it emanates, or "flows forth." "The position of Christ is absolute and central, while that of his people is relative and peripheral." (Ibid.) This does not relieve the Reviewer. *Absolute* and *relative* mean, in modern philosophy, being and phenomenon, substance and accident, and are the very terms used by pantheists to express their conception of the relation between the external world and its internal origin. The very fact, that he uses these terms in the connection he does, is presumptive proof that his thought is pantheistic. "The position of Christ is central; that of his people peripheral." This does not help the matter. The periphery is simply the external termini of the rays which emanate from the centre, which implies that the Christian life is not a creation by our Lord, but an emanation from him, in the Oriental sense of

emanation. Then, again, in the circle, centre and circumference are mutually dependent, and the one is inconceivable without the other; and to suppose God in any order to be dependent on creation, or in any sense to come within the category of relation, is, if not atheism, at least pantheism. It is, of course, not easy to determine the Reviewer's exact meaning, for he gives us figures of speech instead of scientific statements, and descriptions instead of definitions; but, as far as we can determine his doctrine, it is virtually the old Oriental doctrine of emanation from, and of final absorption into, God. If so, our first charge against his doctrine, that it converts the object into subject, and denies all faith by denying all object of faith, is, of course, well founded.

The second principle we found the Reviewer to hold, namely, the supernatural does not wholly transcend the natural, he concedes and defends. The simplest way of doing him justice is to cite what he says, and we are happy to acknowledge that what he says on this point is for the most part intelligible and *ad rem*.

"We have never meant to deny the supernatural; nor yet to make it the same thing simply with the supersensible, the world of pure thought as distinguished from the world of sense. Our objection to Mr. Brownson is, not that he sets the supernatural out of nature, over it, and above it, but that this *transcendence*, in his hands, is carried to the point of such an absolute disruption of the one world from the other as amounts at last to downright dualism, and leaves no room for the accomplishment of any real conjunction between them in the life of man; which, however, at the same time is the necessary conception of all religion, and the very form especially in which the idea of Christianity becomes complete. We see not how such a real conjunction should imply any thing like a full sufficiency on the side of nature, left to itself for the actualization of the supernatural as its own product; but it does seem to us certainly to require a constitutional fitness and capability on the part of the first, for apprehending with some inward connatural grasp, the presence of this last when brought within its reach. We question not the full objectivity of the supernatural, as an order of life above nature; only we ask that a corresponding subjectivity be allowed also on the part of man, whereby he may be able to receive the object which is thus higher than himself into true union with his life, so as to be lifted by the power of it, not magically but rationally, into its own superior sphere. Such directly receptive capacity we take to be inherently at hand in the gift or faculty of faith. Faith carries in it a real, inward, living, and rational correspondence with the truth it is called to embrace; and in this view

it belongs to the proper, original nature of man, though a Divine influence is needed certainly to bring it into exercise. Such drawing out of the subjective capacity of our nature, however, by no means implies that the truth itself is drawn out in this way ; just as little as the awakening of sight in a previously blind eye would imply, that the surrounding world was brought to pass by its becoming thus an object of vision. What else does our Saviour mean when he says, No man can come to me, except the Father *draw* him ; He that is of God, heareth God's words ; If any man will do my will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God ? For the reception of Christ, all depends on a certain inward sympathy and correspondence with the truth revealed in his person, a real receptivity for the supernatural on the side of the human soul itself, such as all men ought to have, but only some men have in fact." — pp. 322, 323.

We say this is for the most part *ad rem* ; we speak relatively, and only mean that it is so in comparison with the Reviewer's statements in general. He evidently does not comprehend the precise point of the objection we urged. It is, however, clear that he holds that the supernatural does not wholly transcend the natural, and therefore, that, though it is doubtless contrary to his intention, he really denies the supernatural ; for whatever lies within the sphere or reach of the natural, no matter on what side or under what relation, is natural, not supernatural. The conjunction of subject and object, or correspondence between them, contended for, must, of course, take place, or the creditive subject and credible object must remain always apart, and no act of faith be ever elicited. The Reviewer is right in asserting the necessity of the conjunction, or correspondence ; his error lies in supposing that the conjunction is that of the natural subject and the supernatural object. No such conjunction or correspondence of the natural and supernatural is conceivable. The Reviewer is right, too, in assuming that this conjunction or correspondence is by virtue of the gift or faculty of faith ; his error is in maintaining that this gift or faculty is natural, belonging "to the proper, original nature of man," and needing only a Divine influence to call it into exercise, simply drawing out "an original capacity of our nature." For the conjunction or correspondence to take place, subject and object must be in the same order, and therefore the subject on its side must be *supernaturalized*, elevated to the plane of the supernatural. What thus elevates the subject is the *donum fidei*, or gift of faith, which is not an

original capacity, or faculty, of our nature, but a supernatural gift, a supernaturally infused habit, as all Catholic theology teaches, and as we thought we had sufficiently explained in our previous answer to the Reviewer. The Reviewer has fallen into his fatal error, an error which involves the denial of the supernatural altogether, in consequence of the Protestant denial of supernaturally infused habits. All heresy is illogical, and inconsistent with itself. In consequence of rejecting, or not recognizing, the infused habit of faith, which is the supernatural elevation of the creditive subject to the level of the supernatural credible object, he is obliged to restrict the supernatural to the credible object and the Divine influence which simply excites the natural subject to activity, without elevating that activity above the order of nature ; and so restricting the supernatural, he is obliged either to bring it within the sphere of the natural, which is to deny it to be supernatural, or else to keep it always beyond the reach of the subject, and thus incur the very objection he strangely enough imagines must lie against us. The Reviewer should learn from this how dangerous it is to reject or misconceive any Catholic doctrine. Catholic doctrine is a unity, and you must either accept the whole or reject the whole.

The Reviewer passes over in profound silence the third principle we represented him as holding, and the objection we drew from it, namely, faith is the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed ; therefore, faith is science, and mysteries are incredible. Consequently he leaves us free to conclude that he concedes both, since he says nothing in his answer which in any respect indicates or implies the contrary. We, then, rightly apprehended the Reviewer's doctrine on these three points, and he has failed to set aside the consequences we drew from them. Then his doctrine is Antichristian and false, and by his own concession our Church is true,—the Church of God.

Here we might stop, but there are two or three other points on which we wish to offer a few remarks, more for the Reviewer's sake than our own. The Reviewer is an able and learned man, an earnest, vigorous, and eloquent writer. He has caught some glimpses of certain important Catholic truths, not much regarded by Protestants generally, and which he wields with murderous effect against vulgar Protestantism. But he only partially apprehends these great truths, and he combines them

in his own mind with principles utterly repugnant to them, and which, taken by themselves, involve all the fatal consequences we have pointed out. But, unless we have entirely mistaken the character of his mind and heart, his real intellectual and moral wants would be much better satisfied by the Catholic doctrine on the points covered by the uncatholic principles, than by these uncatholic principles themselves. It seems to us that he values those principles for the sake of the Catholic truths in his view connected with them, and not by any means for their own sake. He clasps the errors to his bosom, because he does not see how, without them, he can hold the Catholic truths which he sees in connection with them, and which really enrapture his heart. What he wants is to see the Catholic truths discriminated from the erroneous principles, and its gaps, as existing in his mind, really filled up, as they are in Catholic minds, with Catholic doctrines.

The Reviewer's first and principal objection to Catholicity is, that it sunders subject and object in both the natural order and the supernatural. After what we have said, he must see that this objection is unfounded, and indeed it can appear only ridiculous to those who are acquainted with Catholic theology. The object is independent of the subject, but the subject is never independent of the object. God is independent of his creatures, but they are absolutely dependent on him, and exist, as we have constantly maintained, only by virtue of his intimate presence, and the immanence of his act creating them from nothing. More than this no man can say, without falling into pantheism. In the supernatural order there is no sundering of object and the subject. The supernatural object exists *a parte rei*, independent of the subject, and is as real *in se* when not apprehended or believed as when it is. But no body supposes, at least no Catholic supposes, it can be believed by a subject that has no inward correspondence with it, — only that correspondence is not natural, but must be supernatural. Grace is twofold, exterior and interior, or objective and subjective. As exterior, or objective, it constitutes and presents the supernatural object; as interior, or subjective, it raises or elevates the subject to the plane of the object, and establishes a proportion, a correspondence, between them.

The second objection of the Reviewer is, that Catholicity denies individual freedom, or, in other words, individual freedom and authority are irreconcilable on Catholic principles. The boast of the Reviewer is, that his doctrine reconciles the

two, and his objection is, that ours sacrifices liberty to authority, and, as a consequence of sacrificing liberty to authority, loses authority itself. Both the boast and the objection proceed, as it strikes us, from a total misconception of liberty and authority, as well as of Catholic theology. We are not very positive as to what is the Reviewer's precise doctrine on the subject; for what he says, in the article before us, to elucidate it, only renders it to our apprehension more obscure and indefinite; but he appears to us to resolve both authority and liberty into necessity. His conception of law seems to be that of simple force, acting, in regard to the subject, either from abroad or from within. If from abroad, the subject is not free, and belongs to the physical world as distinguished from the moral; if from within the subject, if through the subject's own intelligence and will, it is the law of freedom, and the subject is free. Slavery would seem, then, to consist, not in being held to obey an unjust law, but in being held to obey a law that comes from abroad, from a source foreign to or distinguishable from the subject; and liberty would seem to stand, not in being held to obey only just law, but in not being held to obey any law not self-imposed, or which does not proceed from the subject himself. This is what we gather from the following passage.

"It may now appear in what sense, and in what sense only, we have ever dreamed of allowing man a will or voice in the constitution of the law by which he is required to be governed. 'To assert man's authority, or right to be governed only by his own will,' according to Mr. Brownson, 'is to deny that he is under law, or bound at all to seek God as the Sovereign Good. Does the Reviewer maintain that we are not morally bound to seek God as our ultimate end? Does he deny all morality, and assert that man is free to live as he lists?' Nothing of this sort, we reply; nothing of this sort whatever. All we mean to say is, that mind is not matter; that morality is not nature; that the law of freedom, to be different from the law of blind necessity, must come to its actualization in the world, not in the way of merely outward force under any view, but through the self-moving spontaneity of its own subjects, the thinking and willing of the created minds in which it works and reigns. The planets obey a law which they have no power to accept or not accept; it is in them, but not from them or of them in any way; and for this very reason their action is blind and unfree. So throughout *Nature*, as such. Its very character is to be without autonomy in its own order of existence. The Moral, on the contrary, as distinguished from the Natural, is self-conscious, self-active, in a certain sense we may say even self-

productive, and in such form truly free. It is not made, except as it at the same time makes itself. It is not moved, save as it originates its own motion. It stands, like all created existence, in the power of law; but the law here is not from abroad simply, as in the case of mere nature, not objective and outward only, but inward also and subjective; it is brought to pass, comes to its actualization in the world, only in the form of being apprehended and willed by its subjects. On the outside of such self-conscious life, it can have no being in the world whatever. Turn it in any way into mere blind force, simple outward compulsion, and all proper morality is at an end. The necessary medium of its revelation, the very element in which it exists and makes itself felt, is the self-moving activity of the life it is formed to bind; which at the same time has full power to be untrue to itself by refusing the authority of its proper law, and which can be rightly bound by this in the end only as it receives the law freely into its own constitution, and so enacts it into force for its own use. Mind thus, by its very constitution, is required to be autonomic, self-legislative, a true fountain and source of law for itself; while the law, notwithstanding, has its ultimate ground only in God, and can be of no force whatever as the product merely of any lower intelligence. Objective and subjective here must fall absolutely together. The will without the law is false; denies its own proper nature; falls over to the sphere of bondage and sin. But the law, on the other hand, without the will, has no power either to accomplish its proper work. Only as the law, previously necessary by Divine constitution, is *willed*, freely embraced, affirmed and constituted, by the created intelligence it is ordained to rule, so as to be at the same time the product of this, its own act virtually and deed, can there be any true escape from the idea of slavery, any true entrance into the sphere of freedom, any morality or religion in the full and right sense of these terms. It is this union of law and will, necessity and liberty, not outwardly, but inwardly, which brings the life of man emphatically to its proper form. This is what we mean by the autonomy of the human subject, the right of man to be governed by his own will, and not simply by a heteronomic force acting upon him from beyond his will, the voice that belongs to him properly in the constitution of the law which he is called to obey." — pp. 315, 316.

This, we think, sustains the view we take, especially as we are bound to interpret it in an anti-Catholic sense. What the Reviewer says about the moral subject being "self-conscious," "self-active," &c., makes nothing against our interpretation; for it is all reconcilable with the assumption that the law is an inherent principle, operating from within the subject, and the further assumption that the subject, as his intelligence is devel-

oped, apprehends and wills it. We are inclined to believe this is the Reviewer's doctrine, for it is genuine Calvinism, and corresponds to the general pantheistic character of his speculations. Moreover, we nowhere find him recognizing, unequivocally, any freedom but that which he calls "free necessity," and his very boast is, that his doctrine reconciles *necessity* and *liberty*! The freedom with which man acts he likens to the freedom with which God creates or causes his own being, which, as we have seen, is no freedom at all, for God is *ens necessarium*, and uncaused. We therefore conclude that the Reviewer really means to teach that the law is necessity, and operates necessarily; but as it operates from within, and is apprehended and willed by the subject, it, at the same time that it is the law of necessity, is also the law of freedom. We need not tell our readers that this does not reconcile liberty and authority, for it resolves both into necessity. There is no freedom in my simply apprehending and willing the necessity to which I am subjected.

Perhaps, however, the meaning of the Reviewer is simply that the law, in order to bind, to have the obligatory force of law, must be accepted or assented to by those it is intended to govern. Much he says may be interpreted in accordance with this view. Hence he would maintain, that to require man to obey a law which he has not voluntarily assented to is tyranny, and he who is required to obey such a law is a slave, and no freeman. This view makes the legality, or binding force, of the law depend on the assent of the subject. This doctrine has been held; we find traces of it in some of our so-called Gallican authors; it lies at the bottom of all the Jacobinical and anarchical theories of the day; it is the fundamental principle of all Protestantism, that is, private reason judging public authority; and it is appealed to in justification of all rebellion in Church or state, and as sanctioning the wild and destructive revolutionary movements which have recently come so near overthrowing all European governments, abolishing all law, and dissolving society itself. Law is law only in that it binds, and therefore, according to this principle, law derives its legality, its character, its very existence as law, not from the authority which wills and promulgates it, but from the voluntary assent of the subjects it is intended to govern. It is law only by virtue of that assent or acceptance. But this makes the subject the real legislator, and the sole source and ground of the law as law. Men are then in every sense their own law-

makers. But this the Reviewer denies. He says expressly, "Men make neither truth nor law"; that the law "has its ultimate ground only in God, and can be of no force as the product merely of any lower intelligence." It would seem, then, that the Reviewer does not, after all, mean this, and we must return to the view already given.

But pass over this; suppose the Reviewer really does mean that the law, to be actually law, must be apprehended and voluntarily assented to by the subject. This, undeniably, makes the subject the real sovereign, which is a contradiction in terms. The law regarded *in se* exists prior to the assent of the subject, as the author must concede; for if not, there would be nothing to assent to. Now has the subject a right to withhold his assent? The self-moving activity of man, the Reviewer says, "has full power to be *untrue* to itself by refusing the authority of its proper law." To refuse his assent to the law which is made "previously necessary by Divine constitution," would then be for man to be "*untrue*," that is, disobedient to his proper law. Has man, we say not the *power*, but the *right*, to be thus untrue or disobedient? If you say, yes, you utter a palpable contradiction, and deny all morality; if you say, no, you assert that the law binds prior to the voluntary assent of the subject, and then deny your thesis, for you say man "can be *rightly* bound by this [the law], only as" he "receives the law freely into" his "own constitution, and so enacts it into force for" his "own use."

The law, in the sense we are to consider it in this controversy, is not a power or force, but a simple rule or measure of action, prescribing what is to be done and what is to be avoided, or commanding good and prohibiting evil. Voluntary obedience to it is virtue, right conduct, righteousness, or justice; voluntary disobedience to it is evil conduct, vice, unrighteousness, or injustice. Now we ask the Reviewer, whether he does or does not admit the reality of a law prescribing the good and prohibiting the evil, and thus constituting a distinction between right and wrong, independent of man's assent. Is it man who prescribes the good and prohibits the evil? Is it his will that makes the distinction between right and wrong? and could man, if he chose, alter the relations between good and evil, right and wrong, by giving or withholding his assent to the law? If you say, yes, you deny the eternal law, and make the whole moral order dependent, not on the eternal and immutable will and nature of God, but on the will of man; if you say,

no, you admit a law above man, independent of his will, demanding no assent of his to be obligatory, and which convicts him of sin, of rebellion, if he does not both assent to and obey it. In the former case, you deny the whole moral order, all immutable morality, and make virtue and vice whatever man wills them to be, — nay, destroy the very conception of both, and leave man, as we before said, free to live as he lists. If the latter, you cannot make the binding force of the law depend on the assent of the subject. Law is not law unless it prescribes what the subject *ought* to will, and what he *ought* not to will, and therefore must be a law *to* the will, not a law deriving from it, and consequently must, by its very nature, derive all its force from an authority above it, from an authority which has the eternal and indefeasible right to command the will. We here repeat only the A B C of ethical science, which the Reviewer must concede, or deny ethical science altogether. To make the law derive its binding force, that is, its character as law, from the assent of those whom it is to govern, is to deny its essential character as law, — is to deny that men are under law, and therefore to deny all morality, for there is morality only where there is law, and if no law binds the assent, there is no law for man.

What the Reviewer really wants to maintain, if he did but see it distinctly, is, however, a very obvious and a very certain truth; namely, none but a rational being, capable of apprehending and voluntarily obeying the law, can be the subject of a moral law; for the simple reason that none other is by the constitution of his nature a moral being. Man must have a moral constitution, or he cannot be the subject of the moral law. No doubt of this. But we must never confound that which constitutes man a moral being with the moral law itself, or the law to which he is morally bound to conform all his thoughts, words, and deeds. Here is where the Reviewer seems to us to err. He does not keep the two distinct, but runs them one into the other, as is evident from his saying that “objective and subjective must here fall absolutely together.” The law is not constituted, or actualized, or made binding, by our moral constitution; but God, in giving us a moral constitution, has made us capable of being governed, not by a physical law, as is external nature, but by the moral law, which addresses itself to reason. We are moral not because we are not bound to obey the law till we voluntarily assent to it, but because we are morally free in obeying it, that is, are not forced against our will

to obey it, but can refuse to obey it, if we choose,—because to obey or not to obey rests always in our own free will ; we are, however, always *bound* to obey it, and the law is just as obligatory when we reject it as when we actually assent to it, and we disobey it only at our peril ; we never have the *right* to refuse our obedience.

The reconciliation of authority and liberty is never a difficult question. The authority of God is absolute over all his creatures, and as his authority is will inseparable from infinite justice, and therefore always inherently just will, it is legitimate, for law is power conjoined with justice, or will regulated by reason. Subjection to God, or to any authority immediately or mediately deriving from him, is never any encroachment upon liberty, for liberty is destroyed, not in being held to obey legitimate authority, but in being subjected to an authority which is illegitimate. Liberty is intact so long as man is left in the full possession of all his rights, and no one of his rights is taken away or abridged by holding him to obedience to God ; for he never had and never can have any right to disobey God. If, then, as the Catholic maintains, the Church be really commissioned by God, authorized by him to speak in his name and by his authority, there is and can be no violation of liberty in requiring all men to believe what she teaches, and to do what she commands. If she is what she professes to be, her authority and our liberty are perfectly compatible, one with the other ; for in submitting to her authority we submit simply to the law, which we never had and never can have the *right* to disobey.

“Our objection,” says the Reviewer, “to the Roman doctrine, as we understand it to be exhibited by Mr. Brownson, is that the law objectively taken is *so far sundered* from the activity of the obeying subject, as to be in fact set over against this in the character of another nature altogether, and under a wholly outward form. Objective and subjective are made to fall apart dualistically into two distinct worlds. We do not wish to confound them, [then you must acknowledge them to be distinct,] to mix them together, or to make one absorb or destroy the other ; *we recognize their difference* ; but still we object just as strenuously also to this abstract separation.” (p. 317.) This may all be very clear and distinct in the Reviewer’s mind, but is a little obscure and confused in ours. His objection is, that we sunder *too far* the law objectively considered from the activity of the obeying subject. But before bringing this objection he should point out *how far* the two may

notion which has given rise to the unmeasured obloquy which has been showered upon the Church; but I know also that I am free to use the language I have just used, and that in doing so I only prove myself a dutiful and prudent son of the Church.

B. Rather of the synagogue of Satan, you mean, young man. The spirit with which you speak is Satanic; but what you say is partly true and partly false, though even the true becomes false in the connection and for the purpose you say it.

O. We thought so, and were sure you would get a rebuke from the Catholic side.

F. I have great regard for our venerable friend; but he is young as a Catholic, and has not yet lost the zeal and intolerance of the recent convert. I do not, he will permit me to say, recognize him as an authorized expounder of Catholic faith and theology. I was born and bred a Catholic.

B. I thought you, like the rest of us, were born an infidel and child of Satan.

F. I am not, and never was, an infidel. I have always been a Catholic, and my father and mother were Catholics before me, and so were all my ancestors, as far back as the time of St. Austin and his forty monks, sent by St. Gregory the Great to convert the Anglo-Saxons. There has never been an infidel or heretic in the family, that I have ever heard of.

B. There may, however, have been some not very good Catholics, and it is possible that the stock has degenerated. Yet you are mistaken in saying you were always a Catholic. You were born — as is every one, excepting always the Blessed Virgin, and those sanctified in the mother's womb, as was the prophet Jeremiah and St. John the Baptist — an infidel and child of Satan, and you became a Catholic only in holy baptism. We who grew up in heresy, and spent the vigor of our lives in the service of Satan, are not meet, I grant, to be called Catholics, to be treated as children; but it is hardly meet in you who have been orthodox from your infancy to tell us so; you should rather rejoice over our conversion, for you know that there is joy in heaven with the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety-and-nine just persons that need no repentance. I claim not to be an authorized teacher; I am but a simple layman, and know very little of Catholic theology. I only know what I am taught, and all that is not censurable in me is that I do not take it upon me to teach my teachers, nor to boast over those who may chance to be less instructed than myself. It is for youth to be proud and

arrogant, to fancy it knows all things, and possesses all virtues ; it is for old age, looking back upon a painful experience, to be modest and humble, — to deplore its ignorance and bewail its short-comings.

F. Forgive me. I did not mean to be assuming or disrespectful.

B. Of course not. You but spoke as it is the fashion for young men now-a-days to speak, — out from the fulness of your own self-confidence, and in utter unconsciousness of the attitude you assume, or the bearing of your speech.

F. You are severe.

B. Kindly so, if I am, as you will yourself feel, long before you are as old as I am ; for I do not think you are one of those who are incapable of profiting by experience. But enough of this. I am a convert, I grant, and you are not. You have to thank God that you had Catholic parents, who brought you up in the Church, and early instructed you in what you should believe and in what you should do ; and I have to thank him no less, nay, still more, that he has had the ineffable goodness to call me from error and sin, and make me in my old age a member of his Church. In your case and mine, all the glory is due to him, and to him alone. Neither of us has wherein to glory but his grace, and neither has wherewithal to boast over the other. The point to be considered is, not which of us is greatest, but what is the truth on the question raised which we both, as Catholics, must hold.

My young friend, if as well instructed in Catholic doctrine as he would persuade us, knows that one may utter some things which are censurable as heresy, others as simply erroneous, others as rash, others as scandalous, others as ill-sounding, and others as offensive to pious ears. Now, supposing he can say all he has said without absolutely falling into heresy, he may still be obnoxious to some of the other notes of censure. What he says is disrespectful to the Church, to the Holy Father, and the clergy, and, to say the least, sounds bad and is offensive to pious ears, and, as it may well lead some to sin, it is scandalous. Aside, then, from the correctness or incorrectness of the particular propositions he utters, he has no right to say what he says ; for a man may be guilty at common law of a libel, though he utters only the truth, by uttering it in a malicious spirit for a malicious purpose, and in this sense, it is sometimes said, the greater the truth the greater the libel. So much must be said as to the *animus* of his remarks.

be legitimately sundered, and where is the line beyond which it is not lawful to go. Then he should show that we do transgress, and in what respect we transgress, that line. We have to regret that he has done neither. We set the object over against the subject, it seems. But the very definition of object, taken simply as object, is that which is over against the subject, or that which stands facing the subject. The very word itself says as much. "In the character of another nature altogether." Subject and object are of the same nature, or they are of different natures. By *nature* here we must understand that which constitutes the thing what it is, and distinguishes it from every other. In this sense, it is incommunicable, and its presence always asserts identity, and excludes diversity. You cannot then assume that subject and object are, as subject and object, partly of the same nature, and partly of diverse natures. You must either assert them as one and identical, as does the pantheist, or you must assert them as differing by nature altogether. The same is the same, and things different are different, then not the same. Are then object and subject the same, one and identical? The Reviewer says, "We recognize their difference." Very good, what more do we ourselves do? We assert their difference, and maintain that they are really as well as apparently distinct. "Under a wholly *outward* form." We do not know what this means. The Reviewer is perpetually talking about "inward" and "outward." We wish he would explain himself, and tell us in what sense he uses these words; for, as the case now stands, he seems to us to be frightened by apparitions raised by his own fancy. In the sense of *distinct from one another*, we oppose subject and object to each other under an *outward* form, if you please, and so does the Reviewer; for he recognizes their difference; but we are not aware that we distinguish them in any other respect in an *outward* form. We recognize an intelligible world distinct from the sensible, and hold that the intelligible exists *a parte rei*, and is as truly objective as the sensible. The law pertains to the intelligible world, as the object of the intellect, not of the senses. But it is not for that reason any more one with the intellect that apprehends it, than a tree is one with the sense of sight by which we behold it. As the tree does not become subject by our beholding it, so the law does not become subjective, or cease to be purely objective, by our apprehending or understanding it. Here is all the "outward

form" we assert, and we are very much mistaken if our *outward* is more outward than the Reviewer's *inward*.*

"But still we object just as strenuously to this abstract separation." What *abstract* separation? The abstract separation which he understands us to make? What is that? We are sure

* The Reviewer seems to us to reason throughout as if he held that the activity of the subject transforms the object into subject, that the fact of knowledge identifies the intellectual subject and the intelligible object, and that the act of willing identifies the voluntary subject with the object willed; hence he never objects that we distinguish the subject and object, but that we assert them to be *wholly* distinct, and he never denies the objectivity of the object altogether, but simply that it is *merely* objective. So, again, he does not deny that the distinction between subject and object is outward, or that they exist as distinct under an outward form, but denies that the form is *wholly* outward. The two may be sundered, but must not be sundered *too far*. It is remarkable that throughout he never dares affirm or deny any thing absolutely. At the tail of his affirmations or denials there always comes in a qualification, which takes off at least one half of the assertion or the negation. He never makes a strictly categorical statement, and hence there is not a single definition, properly so called, in either of his articles against us. Whence comes this? It certainly comes not from his ignorance of the categories, or from his want of logical capacity or discipline; but it comes, in our judgment, from a vicious ontology, which he has been led to adopt, partly by modern philosophers, but still more from his having plunged deeply into the study of mystical theology before having devoted sufficient time to the study of speculative or dogmatic theology. He seems to mistake everywhere mystical union for substantial unity, or identity of substance; or if he does not do this, he assumes that the denial of this unity or identity, or the assertion of the distinction of substances, is a denial of the mystical union itself. The soul in the Christian life is certainly mystically united to God, and its life consists in an ineffable union with him; but there is no identification of substance. The creature remains in the category of created things, and the Christian's highest life, here or in the beatified state, is never the identical life of God, for the promise is, not that when he shall appear we shall be God, but that "we shall be *like* him, for we shall see him as he is"; and likeness always implies difference, as the Reviewer must have learned from the old controversy between the homoiousians and the homoiousians. Love makes us one with God, we concede, but mystically, not physically, for we remain always creature, and he always Creator. So in the fact of knowledge the subject and object are united, but not unified, or made identical. They remain — Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, and Schelling and Hegel, to the contrary notwithstanding — as distinctly two things in the fact of knowledge, as they are out of that fact. This the Reviewer seems to us to overlook, and hence the pantheistic character of his own statements, and his apprehension that we, in asserting the two to be distinct *a parte rei*, and also *in conceptu*, are denying, not only their union in the fact of our life, but the very possibility of such union. This apprehension is idle, for union is inconceivable without distinction and difference.

“ahead on its own hook,” — the sense common to most of our modern geologists, naturalists, or cultivators of the physical sciences, and advocates of the Baconian philosophy; or in the sense in which, as in Plato’s *Timæus*, it asserts God on one side, and the eternity of matter on the other; or, in fine, in the Oriental sense, in which it asserts the dual origin of the universe, and of two original, eternal, self-existent, and mutually independent principles, or beings, one good, the other bad,—the old Manichæan doctrine, held by the Albigenses in the Middle Ages, and perhaps, in modern times, by the great body of Protestants, who boast of being their descendants and continuators. But the Reviewer will not pretend that we assert dualism in any one of these three senses; and the only sense in which he can pretend that we assert it is in the sense in which it asserts that creation is contingent, not necessary, and that God and the world are distinguished as creator and creature, cause and effect. That the truth in opposition to pantheism does not stand in an opposite error, we of course concede; but that it does not stand on the other side, or side opposed to pantheism, we cannot concede, for if it does not, it is not the truth *in opposition* to it. There may be opposite errors, but the truth always stands between them, opposed to both, opposing one face to the one, and another face to the other.

The Reviewer is not satisfied with this. He holds that a great truth underlies pantheism, and another underlies dualism, and that our duty is to accept and harmonize the two. Neither is to be denied absolutely, but we must deny a little and affirm a little of both. This is all very well for a Protestant, who can have truth only as mixed with falsehood, and who can never make an affirmation or a denial without falling into error, but the Reviewer must excuse us for not consenting to place ourselves in his unpleasant position. Pantheism is either true or it is false, and if false it is to be denied absolutely, and no truth does or can underlie it; for if a great truth did underlie it, it would be founded in truth, and a doctrine founded in truth is true doctrine, not false. So of dualism; it is either true or it is false, or true in one sense and false in another. If true in one sense and false in another, your business is to distinguish, and define in what sense it is true and in what it is false, and then to affirm it in the former sense, and deny it in the latter. In the sense it is false, or as a false doctrine, no great truth underlies it, for it is a perversion or denial of the truth. Let us have no eclectic or syncretic twaddle on the subject.

The Reviewer says of us, "The facility with which he throws us continually into the wrong serves only to illustrate, as we take it, the fault and wrong of his own position." That is, we must have fallen into the *error* opposed to the pantheistic error, or we could not have so easily thrown the Reviewer into the wrong! This is not so clear to us. We should draw an opposite conclusion from the same premises, and say that the facility with which we threw him into the wrong serves to illustrate the truth of our position and the falsity of his; for we are quite sure that, without the truth on our side, we should never have been able to throw such a man as the Reviewer into the wrong. "It shows itself to be a dialectical extreme." And "no such extreme can ever live by simply killing its opposite; but only by coming to a true inward reconciliation with it in the power of a higher idea, whose province it is, in such case, not to destroy absolutely on either side, but rather as regards both to complete and fulfil." Here is the mere vulgar cant of our modern eclectics, by which they seek to rehabilitate falsehood, and consecrate every error and heresy, past, present, and to come. It rests on the assumption that error is merely a partial or incomplete truth, as Cousin and his school expressly teach. The assumption is itself a monstrous error. Error is not an incomplete truth, a partial or one-sided view of truth, but a false view, that is, a denial of truth. Every false doctrine is, in that it is false, a contradiction of the truth, and must be killed, or the truth cannot live. Pantheism, the Reviewer concedes, is an error. Its essence consists in the denial of the contingency of the universe, and the assertion that in their substance God and the world are identical. This is not an incomplete truth, a partial or one-sided view of truth, to be completed by an error from the opposite quarter; but it is a sheer, unmitigated falsehood, and is got rid of only by asserting its direct contradictory, namely, the universe is contingent, not necessary, and God and the world are of different substances, or distinct and different as to substance. It and this truth which we oppose to it are in the very nature of things irreconcilable, and one can be asserted only by the absolute, unqualified denial of the other. And what we say of pantheism, we say of every false doctrine. The Reviewer is all wrong in his eclectic twaddle, for we can in conscience call it by no name more respectable. There is no logic by which opposites, that is, contraries, can be reconciled. Truth is never opposed to truth, and of opposites one must always be false. In the power of

“ahead on its own hook,”—the sense common to most of our modern geologists, naturalists, or cultivators of the physical sciences, and advocates of the Baconian philosophy; or in the sense in which, as in Plato's *Timæus*, it asserts God on one side, and the eternity of matter on the other; or, in fine, in the Oriental sense, in which it asserts the dual origin of the universe, and of two original, eternal, self-existent, and mutually independent principles, or beings, one good, the other bad,—the old Manichæan doctrine, held by the Albigenses in the Middle Ages, and perhaps, in modern times, by the great body of Protestants, who boast of being their descendants and continuators. But the Reviewer will not pretend that we assert dualism in any one of these three senses; and the only sense in which he can pretend that we assert it is in the sense in which it asserts that creation is contingent, not necessary, and that God and the world are distinguished as creator and creature, cause and effect. That the truth in opposition to pantheism does not stand in an opposite error, we of course concede; but that it does not stand on the other side, or side opposed to pantheism, we cannot concede, for if it does not, it is not the truth *in opposition* to it. There may be opposite errors, but the truth always stands between them, opposed to both, opposing one face to the one, and another face to the other.

The Reviewer is not satisfied with this. He holds that a great truth underlies pantheism, and another underlies dualism, and that our duty is to accept and harmonize the two. Neither is to be denied absolutely, but we must deny a little and affirm a little of both. This is all very well for a Protestant, who can have truth only as mixed with falsehood, and who can never make an affirmation or a denial without falling into error, but the Reviewer must excuse us for not consenting to place ourselves in his unpleasant position. Pantheism is either true or it is false, and if false it is to be denied absolutely, and no truth does or can underlie it; for if a great truth did underlie it, it would be founded in truth, and a doctrine founded in truth is true doctrine, not false. So of dualism; it is either true or it is false, or true in one sense and false in another. If true in one sense and false in another, your business is to distinguish, and define in what sense it is true and in what it is false, and then to affirm it in the former sense, and deny it in the latter. In the sense it is false, or as a false doctrine, no great truth underlies it, for it is a perversion or denial of the truth. Let us have no eclectic or syncretic twaddle on the subject.

The Reviewer says of us, "The facility with which he throws us continually into the wrong serves only to illustrate, as we take it, the fault and wrong of his own position." That is, we must have fallen into the *error* opposed to the pantheistic error, or we could not have so easily thrown the Reviewer into the wrong! This is not so clear to us. We should draw an opposite conclusion from the same premises, and say that the facility with which we threw him into the wrong serves to illustrate the truth of our position and the falsity of his; for we are quite sure that, without the truth on our side, we should never have been able to throw such a man as the Reviewer into the wrong. "It shows itself to be a dialectical extreme." And "no such extreme can ever live by simply killing its opposite; but only by coming to a true inward reconciliation with it in the power of a higher idea, whose province it is, in such case, not to destroy absolutely on either side, but rather as regards both to complete and fulfil." Here is the mere vulgar cant of our modern eclectics, by which they seek to rehabilitate falsehood, and consecrate every error and heresy, past, present, and to come. It rests on the assumption that error is merely a partial or incomplete truth, as Cousin and his school expressly teach. The assumption is itself a monstrous error. Error is not an incomplete truth, a partial or one-sided view of truth, but a false view, that is, a denial of truth. Every false doctrine is, in that it is false, a contradiction of the truth, and must be killed, or the truth cannot live. Pantheism, the Reviewer concedes, is an error. Its essence consists in the denial of the contingency of the universe, and the assertion that in their substance God and the world are identical. This is not an incomplete truth, a partial or one-sided view of truth, to be completed by an error from the opposite quarter; but it is a sheer, unmitigated falsehood, and is got rid of only by asserting its direct contradictory, namely, the universe is contingent, not necessary, and God and the world are of different substances, or distinct and different as to substance. It and this truth which we oppose to it are in the very nature of things irreconcilable, and one can be asserted only by the absolute, unqualified denial of the other. And what we say of pantheism, we say of every false doctrine. The Reviewer is all wrong in his eclectic twaddle, for we can in conscience call it by no name more respectable. There is no logic by which opposites, that is, contraries, can be reconciled. Truth is never opposed to truth, and of opposites one must always be false. In the power of

what higher idea than either truth or falsehood can truth and falsehood come to a true inward reconciliation with each other?

The Reviewer wishes to be able to assert the immanence of God in his works, and he thinks this immanence is the truth that underlies pantheism. With his leave, this is a great mistake, for pantheism, by his own concession, is false. Then the immanence of God cannot be asserted in a pantheistic sense; then, in the only sense in which it is permitted us to assert it, it is not pantheistic, is no part of pantheism, is not related to pantheism, neither underlies it nor overlies it, and is not denied in denying pantheism, but in fact is denied in *asserting* pantheism. In denying pantheism, the Reviewer may be in danger of denying this immanence; but no one who has an infallible guide is in danger of doing it, or has any occasion to fear that, in the plain, plump denial of error on one side, he may fall into an error on the other. Let the Reviewer define the true immanence of God, as distinguished from the pantheistic immanence, and perhaps he will find that we have not denied it, and that he, in order to maintain it, must take his stand with us.

We have now replied to the Reviewer's article, as far as we have judged it necessary. We are not conscious of having overlooked a single important point, and we have done our best to seize and reply to the real thought of the author. If we have failed, it has been unintentionally, and perhaps the Reviewer's fault more than our own; for we must tell him that, if he writes with vigor, he by no means writes with clearness and definiteness. He seems rarely to express his meaning with distinctness and precision. If he replies to us, we hope he will be more explicit, and try and accommodate himself somewhat to our dulness of apprehension. We wish to be just to him, and have no disposition to charge upon his principles consequences which they do not logically involve. We think, also, that he would find his own advantage in attempting to give his doctrines a more rigidly scientific and logical method and statement. He will find it no useless discipline, and one of the speediest ways of arriving at truth. In conclusion, we must beg him to excuse us if we have seemed now and then a little severe in our remarks. Our severity is intended for his doctrine, not for him personally, for personally we have a high esteem for him.

ART. V. — *Conversations of an Old Man and his Young Friends.* — No. III.

F. You have not satisfied me. I love and honor the Church in her place, and I yield neither to you nor to any other man in my reverence for the clergy, or my obedience to them, so long as they keep within their proper sphere. But when the Church encroaches on the civil authority, and seeks to establish a theocracy, I cease to respect her; and when the clergy leave the spiritual order, and undertake to dictate to me the political conduct I am to follow, I hold myself free to disobey them, and, if need be, to resist them with all my might. I am a man and a citizen, as well as a Christian, and no power on earth, if I can hinder it, shall wrest from me my rights as a man, or interfere with my convictions of duty as a citizen. If the Pope himself should undertake to control my conduct as an American citizen, I would laugh him to scorn, and even, if necessary, make war on him as soon as I would upon any foreign potentate.

B. Bravo! my young friend; you are not lacking in brave words and high spirit, such as it is.

O. *F.* talks very well, and if he could as a good Catholic talk as he does, it would amount to something. They who are not Catholics would then have some assurance that your Church is not incompatible with civil liberty and social progress.

G. Very true. But *F.*'s talk is all gammon, and can deceive no one. He is a poor Catholic, and he will never persuade me that he is talking in the spirit of the religion he professes. He either does not know his religion or he does not believe it, and holds on to it only because he is too proud to forsake the religion of his fathers.

F. You all seem to know my religion better than I know it myself; but I have never known one, brought up a Protestant or an unbeliever, that did not entirely mistake her character; and in no respect is she more misapprehended than in her teachings on the mutual relations of the two orders, temporal and spiritual. I know that the extravagant pretensions of bigots and Ultramontanists have led many to think that I cannot as a good Catholic say what I have just said, and I own that the conduct of such Popes as Gregory the Seventh, Alexander the Third, Innocent the Third, and Boniface the Eighth, which I dare be known not to approve, may seem to confirm the false

notion which has given rise to the unmeasured obloquy which has been showered upon the Church; but I know also that I am free to use the language I have just used, and that in doing so I only prove myself a dutiful and prudent son of the Church.

B. Rather of the synagogue of Satan, you mean, young man. The spirit with which you speak is Satanic; but what you say is partly true and partly false, though even the true becomes false in the connection and for the purpose you say it.

O. We thought so, and were sure you would get a rebuke from the Catholic side.

F. I have great regard for our venerable friend; but he is young as a Catholic, and has not yet lost the zeal and intolerance of the recent convert. I do not, he will permit me to say, recognize him as an authorized expounder of Catholic faith and theology. I was born and bred a Catholic.

B. I thought you, like the rest of us, were born an infidel and child of Satan.

F. I am not, and never was, an infidel. I have always been a Catholic, and my father and mother were Catholics before me, and so were all my ancestors, as far back as the time of St. Austin and his forty monks, sent by St. Gregory the Great to convert the Anglo-Saxons. There has never been an infidel or heretic in the family, that I have ever heard of.

B. There may, however, have been some not very good Catholics, and it is possible that the stock has degenerated. Yet you are mistaken in saying you were always a Catholic. You were born — as is every one, excepting always the Blessed Virgin, and those sanctified in the mother's womb, as was the prophet Jeremiah and St. John the Baptist — an infidel and child of Satan, and you became a Catholic only in holy baptism. We who grew up in heresy, and spent the vigor of our lives in the service of Satan, are not meet, I grant, to be called Catholics, to be treated as children; but it is hardly meet in you who have been orthodox from your infancy to tell us so; you should rather rejoice over our conversion, for you know that there is joy in heaven with the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety-and-nine just persons that need no repentance. I claim not to be an authorized teacher; I am but a simple layman, and know very little of Catholic theology. I only know what I am taught, and all that is not censurable in me is that I do not take it upon me to teach my teachers, nor to boast over those who may chance to be less instructed than myself. It is for youth to be proud and

arrogant, to fancy it knows all things, and possesses all virtues ; it is for old age, looking back upon a painful experience, to be modest and humble, — to deplore its ignorance and bewail its short-comings.

F. Forgive me. I did not mean to be assuming or disrespectful.

B. Of course not. You but spoke as it is the fashion for young men now-a-days to speak, — out from the fulness of your own self-confidence, and in utter unconsciousness of the attitude you assume, or the bearing of your speech.

F. You are severe.

B. Kindly so, if I am, as you will yourself feel, long before you are as old as I am ; for I do not think you are one of those who are incapable of profiting by experience. But enough of this. I am a convert, I grant, and you are not. You have to thank God that you had Catholic parents, who brought you up in the Church, and early instructed you in what you should believe and in what you should do ; and I have to thank him no less, nay, still more, that he has had the ineffable goodness to call me from error and sin, and make me in my old age a member of his Church. In your case and mine, all the glory is due to him, and to him alone. Neither of us has wherein to glory but his grace, and neither has wherewithal to boast over the other. The point to be considered is, not which of us is greatest, but what is the truth on the question raised which we both, as Catholics, must hold.

My young friend, if as well instructed in Catholic doctrine as he would persuade us, knows that one may utter some things which are censurable as heresy, others as simply erroneous, others as rash, others as scandalous, others as ill-sounding, and others as offensive to pious ears. Now, supposing he can say all he has said without absolutely falling into heresy, he may still be obnoxious to some of the other notes of censure. What he says is disrespectful to the Church, to the Holy Father, and the clergy, and, to say the least, sounds bad and is offensive to pious ears, and, as it may well lead some to sin, it is scandalous. Aside, then, from the correctness or incorrectness of the particular propositions he utters, he has no right to say what he says ; for a man may be guilty at common law of a libel, though he utters only the truth, by uttering it in a malicious spirit for a malicious purpose, and in this sense, it is sometimes said, the greater the truth the greater the libel. So much must be said as to the *animus* of his remarks.

As to the matter itself, I agree that the Church is to be honored and obeyed only in her place ; but who, according to Catholicity, is the judge of what is her place ? And how can a Catholic, who, if a Catholic, believes without doubting that she is infallible, commissioned by Almighty God to teach us what we are to believe, and to command us what we are to do, ever make the supposition that she does or can get out of her place ? I have been taught that our Lord is himself supernaturally present with the Church all days unto the consummation of the world, and that he assumes to himself the responsibility of keeping her in her place, and preventing her from going astray or encroaching upon the rights of any individual, community, or interest. As my young friend claims to be well versed in Catholic doctrines, he will set me right if I have been wrongly taught.

F. I do not pretend that you are wrong in this. I hold the Church is infallible and holy ; but I do not therefore hold that popes, cardinals, ambitious prelates, and priests are infallible and impeccable.

B. Fair and easy, young man. Mind the categories, or you may get into a category yourself, as Captain Truck would say. That popes, cardinals, prelates, priests, are personally impeccable, nobody pretends ; so that matter we can pass over. That cardinals, prelates, and priests, teaching out of their own hearts, are not infallible, are as fallible as other men, I concede ; but that they are fallible when teaching what the Church has taught them, or commands them to teach, I deny, and so must my young friend himself, if a good Catholic. Personally they are fallible, but when teaching in the communion of the Church their teaching is infallible. As to the Holy Father, when speaking as a private doctor, he is in the condition of any other private doctor ; but when he teaches as Pope, officially, as the visible Head of the Church, and defines faith or morals for the whole Church, you cannot say he errs, for you are bound, under pain of excommunication, to believe, *ex animo*, that his definition is true, and you are no more at liberty to impugn a doctrinal definition, formally, judicially, given by a pope, than you are to impugn a doctrinal definition given by an œcumenical council. The mere speculative denial of the infallibility of the Pope is not *formal* heresy, and he who makes it may be absolved ; but the practical application of this speculative denial to any particular doctrinal definition made by the Pope, or the denial of the truth of any doctrine

the Pope defines to be Catholic doctrine, is heresy, and, if persisted in, excludes from the Catholic communion. This being so, you are not held to be a heretic because you say the Pope may err, not, indeed, because what you say is not false, but because, being obliged to believe he never does err, it is a harmless absurdity, which the Church has never considered it necessary to condemn, and which she overlooks in compassion for the logical weakness of those who make it. I do not, then, by any means concede to you that a definition of faith or morals for the whole Church by the Sovereign Pontiff can be erroneous, and the moment you select any one and pronounce it erroneous, I shall pronounce you a heretic.

F. That you may indeed do, if the definition has been accepted by all the pastors of the Church.

B. I shall make no inquiry whether it has been so accepted or not; because the definition binds me in conscience the moment that I know the Pope has made it, as is evident from the fact, that, if I should refuse to believe it *ex animo*, or dare to reclaim against it, I should incur, *ipso facto*, excommunication. You are not by any means at liberty to withhold your obedience till you have consulted all the pastors of the Church, and ascertained whether they agree that it is due or not.

F. Well, be that as it may; if the Pope should command me to make war on my country, or bid me encroach on the rights of the temporal power, I will say, what I have heard even from Catholic pulpits, — I would scorn his command; I would refuse him obedience, and resist him to the utmost of my ability.

B. Very likely you would. But there is very little Catholic piety in abusing the Pope hypothetically, and if he has been so abused from Catholic pulpits, so much the more shame. But it is for us to leave the incumbents of those pulpits to answer to those who have received authority to call them to account for their conduct. We will say nothing of them, only, if they have done what their religion does not warrant, we will take care not to imitate them. Indiscreet men, no doubt, sometimes occupy pulpits; men who, in endeavouring to throw off one charge brought against the Church by her enemies, incur another not less dangerous. When one treats disrespectfully the Vicar of our Lord, and makes use of expressions that diminish our reverence for those the Holy Ghost has placed over us, we know he has forgotten himself, and is not acting in accordance with the instructions he has received. Thus

far I own I am not bound to follow him. The supposition you make is absurd and impossible, and it is idle to say what we would or would not do in case it should happen. Wait till the supposition becomes possible, before you make up your mind what you will do.

O. But is not a man's first duty to his country ?

B. No, Sir.

C. As I thought. I always believed the Catholic religion incompatible with patriotism and the rights of the civil power; and this is the reason why, as an American and a republican, I, who am no bigot, and respect the rights of conscience in every one, deprecate its spread amongst us.

R. The Catholic owes allegiance to a foreign potentate, and therefore can never be a good citizen or a real patriot.

F. It is to prove that you are wrong that I have taken the ground I have, and which our venerable friend here, with his Ultramontanism and old world notions, attempts to controvert. Verily, I am half inclined to think he has just been disentombed from the Dark Ages, and supposes the world is now what it was then, and that he can safely revive old, obsolete ideas. Don't believe a word he says. He has, saving his presence and begging pardon of his years, no discretion, and neglects entirely the cardinal virtue of prudence.

M. I am, nevertheless, inclined to believe that you are wrong, and that he is a better expounder of Catholicity than you are. I should despise your Church, indeed, if she were what you would make her.

F. You say that because you despise her already, and delight to have her presented in the most odious light possible. I am not willing to hang a millstone round the neck of my religion; and he who represents her in the light to which I object I must regard as her enemy.

B. Keep cool, my young friend, and do not let your zeal for your religion, which I perceive is very ardent just now, hurry you into rash judgments. Zeal, to be commendable, must be according to knowledge. I have said, and I repeat it, that my first duty is *not* to my country, and I will add that I do not find patriotism ever mentioned as a virtue at all. Nay, as far as I have studied the history of the Church, I have found an overweening patriotism, or nationality, among the very worst enemies religion has had to struggle against. It has been the fruitful cause of all, or nearly all, the schisms which have rent the seamless robe of our Lord, and among the most active causes

of the rise and continuance of all the great heresies of ancient and modern times. Protestantism would have been stillborn, if there had been no narrow and contemptible national feeling and prejudice in Germany, Holland, and England to come to serve as its nurse. What to me are the arbitrary lines and boundaries which separate nations, and as a consequence make them enemies. I know only two classes of mankind,—those who belong to the Church of God, and those who oppose her. The Church is my country, and Catholics are my compatriots, my kinsmen, my brothers, and my sisters, wherever born, wherever they live, of whatever nation, race, or color,—white, red, yellow, or black. Those who are not Catholics, whether pagans, Mahometans, Jews, or heretics, are all of one general class, the enemies of God and children of Satan; for whose conversion and eternal salvation I am always to pray and labor, but with whom the less strict my connection the better. I am to do them good for God's sake, to the full extent of my power; but beyond, I have no part or lot with them. Christianity introduces a higher bond of union than that of nationality, and bids me seek a higher glory than national heroism, and a sublimer virtue than patriotism. The Church is Catholic, and would mould all nations into one vast republic, melt all into one grand brotherhood, by uniting all in the same faith, the same hope, the same charity, the same worship, under the supreme law of God. In presence of this law, which is the same for all men, of whatsoever age or nation, talk not to me of your narrow and contracted patriotism; and before the Church of God, commissioned to teach all nations till the end of time, dare never speak of your petty nationalities, or your diversities of race, sept, clan, or family.

No: my first duty is *not* to my country; my first and my whole duty is to God, and to God alone. I owe no other duty than my duty to him, my only Sovereign, my only Lord and Master. Whatever duty I am bound to render to my country, my parents, my children, my friends, or my neighbours, is included integrally in my duty to him, and I am bound to render it to them only because I owe it to him, and he commands me to pay it to them. I am accountable to God alone; I am rightfully no creature's subject; no man, in his own right, is my master, and I deny the legitimacy of all authority that derives from man, or has simply a human origin. No man, no body of men, has the inherent, underived right to command me, or to bind me, either in soul or body, in thought, will, or

deed. That portion of my duty to God which he commands me to render to my country, to the civil government, to parents, children, friends, or neighbours, I am bound for his sake to render them, and I shall fail in my obedience to him if I do not, — shall be guilty of a sin against him, and deserve his eternal wrath and condemnation.

You young radicals, in your wild enthusiasm and misdirected zeal for liberty, madly deny the very principle of liberty, and under pretence of asserting liberty assert the fundamental principle of slavery. You are poor statesmen, and poorer philosophers ; for you have not yet learned that the principle of all slavery, as of all tyranny, is in the assertion of man's native, inherent right to govern man, or what is the same thing, to institute and enforce government. Government of some sort you must have ; and therefore you must assert somewhere the right to govern, and consequently the duty of obedience. As you wish to be able to resist the governing authority when you choose, you declare it to be of human origin, well knowing that what is of human origin is never in itself sacred and inviolable, and that, being human, you, as also human, must have as much right to resist it as it can have to command you. Believing yourselves cleverer than the average of the people, and therefore concluding that you have above the average chance of being leaders and governors, if you can have a democratic constitution of the state, and confounding liberty with your own liberty to govern, you suppose that you have secured freedom when you have succeeded, not only in making government derive its powers from a purely human source, but from the multitude at large. Thus far all very well. But you do not look on the other side, and you see not that your assertion of the human origin of government, in order to be able to resist it when it does not suit you, is the denial of all right on the part of government to govern, and that therefore you are reduced to the alternative, either no government, as maintain Garrison, Foster, Abby Folsom, &c., or a government that has no right to govern, that is, an illegitimate government. The former is practicable only in theory ; practically, there will always be some government, for without government there is and can be no society, and without society man cannot live, since he is essentially social in his nature. Then you must adopt the latter, and then have only illegitimate government, that is to say, only usurpation and tyranny, under which there is and can be, in principle, only slavery.

Foolish boys, you fancy that you can have freedom without legitimate authority, and legitimate authority without God. But you can no more have a state without God than you can a universe. Political atheism implies universal atheism, and that in turn implies universal negation. An atheist may be a minister of state, but if there were no God there could be no state to administer; for the moment you ask what is the foundation of the state, you must have recourse to a law anterior to the state, by virtue of which it is organized or constituted; and the moment you ask the origin of that law, you must go back of the people to a law giving them the right to organize the state, and therefore back of creation itself, up to the creator, God, who alone, in the last analysis, is sovereign, the fountain of all authority, and of all law that is law.

Deriving the law from God, who has the inherent right to govern us as he will, because he has made us, and is both our Supreme Good and the Supreme Good in itself, we get a solid foundation for freedom. We then deny the principle of tyranny and slavery, the right of man to lord it over man; we declare all men equal before the law, therefore, as to their rights and duties, equal one to another; therefore, that one has no right of his own over another, and therefore, again, one owes nothing to another. Here is freedom, full and absolute, because there is nothing due except to God, the Supreme Good, and nothing demanded except what is due to him; because there is no arbitrary will or authority, and nothing is exactable from any one but what God himself has made so, and what he has made so can be exacted only by virtue of his authority, and according to the law he prescribes.

Since God is the Sovereign Good, the Supreme Good both in itself and of all his creatures, he has taken care to command us to pay as much of what we owe him to our country, to our civil rulers, to our parents, to our children, to our neighbours, as is necessary or proper for their and our good. Ascertain, then, what portion of my duty to God he has made payable to my country and the civil authorities, and that I will acknowledge myself bound in conscience, for his sake, to pay them; but I am bound to pay them nothing more, and even this only for the reason that he bids me do so.

F. That is all I ask. But when the clergy forget that, and either refuse themselves, or forbid others, to render it——

B. They will fail in their duty to God, and incur his condemnation. No doubt of it. When the sky falls, we shall catch larks.

F. You seem to speak as if that could never happen.

B. Remember, I speak not of heretical ministers, or the so-called sectarian clergy, for I do not count them as clergymen. I speak of the Catholic clergy, to a professed Catholic, and I ask him if he is not bound to believe that these are commissioned by Almighty God to teach him his duty.

F. Of course I am.

B. Then it would seem to be the ordination of God, not that you should sit in judgment on the clergy, and see whether they do or do not properly discharge their duty, but that you should go to them to learn yours. The clergy are ordained to teach you, not you to teach them, and you receive the will of God through the Church at their hands, not they at yours. They are your pastors, not you theirs; and the Holy Ghost has placed them over you, not you over them. The shepherd leads the flock, not the flock the shepherd.

F. I admit that the clergy are my guides in all spiritual matters, and that I am bound to obey the representatives of the Church in every thing spiritual. The Church is a spiritual, not a temporal kingdom, and in the spiritual order, under God, she has plenary sovereignty. Here my obedience is due to her, and if I do not yield it I am a bad Catholic. But in the temporal order she has no right to command me, and if her ministers attempt to do it, I have the right to resist them, and by the blessing of God I will resist them. I will perform my duty, but I will also preserve my rights.

B. So you have said, and nobody doubts your readiness to resist the pastors of your Church, and to display your prowess against the clergy. But you claim to be a Catholic, and I hold you bound to be true to Catholic teaching. Who then for us, as Catholics, has received authority from God to expound and declare unto us our duty to him, and to say what part is payable to him immediately, and what part is payable to our neighbour, to our country, or to the temporal order?

F. The Church is commissioned to teach us our duty in the spiritual order, and the state is supreme in the temporal order. Church and state are two separate and coördinate powers, each supreme and independent in its own order. The state is a usurper when it interferes in spirituals; and the Church, when it interferes in temporals. The state has no spiritual jurisdiction; the Church has no temporal jurisdiction.

B. Your reply is not precisely to the point; but let that pass. To whom belongs the right to tell us where is the line

that separates the two orders, and to define the powers of each, or to say when one does or does not encroach on the jurisdiction of the other?

F. Why, — why, — it belongs to each to decide in its own case.

B. And suppose there should be disagreement, and the two orders should set up conflicting claims, who or where is the umpire to decide between them?

F. As to that, no umpire is needed; the line between the two orders is so broad and plain, that there can be no mistake as to where it is.

B. So you may think; but you must be aware that there has been, if not mistake, at least disagreement, and Protestants with one voice tell you, that the Church during the Middle Ages attempted perpetually to encroach upon the temporal jurisdiction of princes, while all Catholics worthy of the name maintain the contrary, that the princes were constantly usurping the rights and prerogatives of the Church, and that all she attempted was to resist their usurpation, and maintain the independence and freedom of the spiritual order. If you have not forgotten the controversies about Investitures and kindred matters between the Popes and the German Emperors, the Clarendon Constitutions, and struggles between the Archbishops of Canterbury and the kings of England. You must know that there have been grave and earnest disputes between the two orders. The Church, too, has temporal possessions, churches, convents, abbeys, lands, endowments, bestowed upon her by the piety and zeal of her children for spiritual purposes. Do these pertain to the temporal order or to the spiritual order? Has the Church jurisdiction in regard to her own temporalities, or does the jurisdiction pertain by right and inherently to the state? You are very ignorant of history if you know not that the Church has on this question decided one way, and the temporal order, for the most part, the other. Practically, then, the line is not so broad and obvious that no mistakes or disagreements can arise between the two powers. Where do you lodge the power to decide? You say, virtually, nowhere. So Almighty God has left his work incomplete, and in certain cases that may and do arise, we simple believers have no means of knowing what is our duty, whether we are to obey the Church or join with the temporal order against her; whether we are to fight for her, or against her. Suppose the two powers are in conflict; the Church, by virtue of the obedi-

ence I owe her, calls upon me to rally to her side, and to resist what she denounces as the tyranny and sacrilege of the civil power ; and the civil power, by virtue of my allegiance to it, calls upon me to rally to its standard, and aid it in maintaining what it calls its rights against ecclesiastical usurpation. Here is a case of conscience. Which am I in conscience bound to obey? Now, when a Catholic has a case of conscience, to whom does he go, to whom is he bound to go, for its solution? To the minister of state, or to the priest of the Church? Are questions of conscience spiritual or temporal? Do they pertain to the temporal jurisdiction or to the spiritual?

F. To the spiritual, of course.

B. Very well. I go, then, with my case of conscience to my parish priest. He either cannot or will not solve it, or does not solve it to suit me ; appeal may then be made to the bishop ; and from the Bishop to the chair of St. Peter, to the Sovereign Pontiff, the ultimate appeal in all questions of the sort. The Pope will decide, because, by the very terms of the supposition, he, as the supreme Head and Ruler of the Church, under God, has already decided, that my duty is to obey the Church, and support her against the encroaching temporal authority. He had decided the case in the outset by commanding me to resist the temporal authority. In the case, as it goes up to him by appeal, you as a Catholic cannot deny his right to decide, and therefore his decision here binds me in conscience. But his right to decide on the appeal is only the right to declare what is the law in the case, the very right he exercised when he issued his command, and if I have no right in the one case to appeal from his decision, I have none in the other. As I have no right, as must be conceded, to appeal from the decision on appeal, I had none to appeal from his command in the outset.

F. So it would seem, I grant.

B. Then the Church is herself the judge for all the faithful in the case, and it is hers to define her own powers, the extent of her jurisdiction, and, in thus defining her own jurisdiction, the extent of the spiritual order, to define the powers and extent of the temporal order. You began, my young friend, by putting the cart before the horse. You said you honored the Church in her place, and the clergy in their own sphere. You would have spoken more like a Christian, if you had said, I honor and obey the state in its own place, and I respect and obey the ministers of state so long as they keep within their own sphere;

but when they come out of it, and intermeddle with spiritual matters, I will neither honor nor obey them ; for I must obey God rather than man.

M. I am no Catholic, but I have always maintained that a consistent Catholic must assert the independence and supremacy of the spiritual order, and, begging F's pardon, I must regard him either as insincere in his professions of temporal independence, and making them merely for Buncombe, or as wholly ignorant of the first principles of his religion, nay, of all religion, if religion. One may see what his principles lead to in the history of the German Protestant Churches, and of the Anglican Church, the handiwork of Henry the Eighth and his saintly daughter Elizabeth. One or the other order must be supreme ; and if we shrink from claiming supremacy for the spiritual order, we must concede it to the temporal, and thus subject conscience to the civil magistrate, and convert the Church into a mere police establishment, and ministers of religion into a part of the constabulary force of the state. If religion is any thing at all but mere state craft, it is the supreme law, to which men in the temporal order, as well as in the spiritual, must conform.

R. But, if we allow religion to be supreme, and identify it with the Catholic faith and worship, what security have we that the Catholic Church will not abuse her power, and bring us into a hopeless spiritual bondage ?

F. That is precisely the difficulty I foresaw, and I consequently claimed for myself and all men the right when it abused its powers to resist it ?

G. All very well ; but you as a Catholic can have no right to decide for yourself when she does or does not abuse her powers ; for that would be private judgment, which your Church does not allow. You cannot allow the state to decide, for that would be the monstrous absurdity of raising the temporal order above the spiritual, against which our Puritan fathers so earnestly protested, and which gave rise to their dissent from the Anglican Establishment. I see no way of solving the difficulty but by rejecting all distinction between the two orders, or rather, by restricting the powers of the state to a very few matters, and recognizing no Church authority at all. I am a democrat in my politics, and a liberalist in my religion.

B. Of which you have more reason to be ashamed than to boast. You gain nothing, except the exchange of faith for unbelief or indifference, and order for anarchy. And then, what

you choose to allow or disallow alters nothing of what God has established. You can deny Christianity if you choose, but that does not make it false, or you wise in denying it; you can say there shall be no Church authority, but if God has established the Catholic Church with the authority she claims, what you say will not alter the fact, and though that authority may crush you, you will not be able to crush it. It is idle for men to talk as you do, as if they had the sovereign disposal of all things. Remember the world is not of your making, and that its government is not committed to your hands. God reigns and will reign, whether it suits you or not.

As to the difficulty you raise, it only demonstrates the folly of my very clever young friends. Never make impossible suppositions, or suppositions which are intrinsically absurd. The Church, if a human institution, may abuse her powers, and you can have no guaranty against her doing so; but no Catholic concedes that she is a human institution, or attempts to defend her as such, unless he is a fool. The very supposition of the Church is the supposition that she is an institution specially created and protected by Almighty God to teach us what he commands us to believe and do, and his whole Divine nature is pledged that she shall do this infallibly. This pledge is guaranty enough, and there is no room to reserve to ourselves the right to resist her in case she should abuse her trust or get out of her place. She cannot abuse her trust, because God will not suffer her to do it. You deny the Catholicity you profess, if you maintain the contrary, or allow it to be supposable.

F. But this is no answer to those not Catholics.

B. I have, at present, nothing to do with them, and I have no disposition to go out of my way to attempt to satisfy those who are incapable of being satisfied. I have no means of satisfying those who believe my Church a mere human institution, except by convincing them that she is not a human institution, but the very Church of God. I cannot expect, and I shall not try, to make her acceptable to those who it is assumed are to continue to be her enemies. I cannot make the same thing be and not be at the same time.

Your whole difficulty, however, grows out of the fact, that you mistake the division line between the spiritual order and the temporal. You include in the temporal order the whole moral law, or law of God, in so far as it is the measure of our secular life. Here is your fundamental error. No man, no body of men, no community, no state, no nation, has the right

to do wrong, and every one is bound to do right. The measure of right in all orders, and the sole measure of right, is the law of God, and to teach and judge of that law is a purely spiritual function, not a function of the temporal order, and therefore it belongs universally to the spiritual authority, and not at all to the temporal. I do not claim temporal jurisdiction for the Church, and she leaves the temporal order free in all that is purely temporal ; but she does not recognize in it any spiritual competency, and therefore does not acknowledge its right to teach and judge of the law of God, that is, the moral law, in any sphere. Within the limits of that law the temporal order may do what it pleases, and the faithful are bound by their duty to God to obey it ; but the acts of the temporal order which transgress those limits trench upon the spiritual order, and are therefore illegal ; and if they require us to act in violation of the moral law, — that is, the law of God, — we are not only not bound, but even forbidden, to obey them ; for we must obey God rather than men. The Church, as the keeper and expounder of that law, does not administer temporal affairs, but she does claim and possess the right to define the moral law which must govern them and the authorities administering them. She is, under God, and by his special appointment, the teacher and supreme judge of all morality, and therefore of the morality of seculars, and of their morality in secular affairs as well as in any others. Whatever pertains to morals comes, by its nature, within the jurisdiction of the spiritual order.

What you are to remember is, that you are to be moral, that is, to obey the law of God in all your acts, to whatever department they belong, and that the state, the civil or temporal order, has no competency as a moral teacher, has no authority at all to decide what the law of God does or does not command, even in regard to secular matters. It has no spiritual function whatever, and is bound to receive the law of God from the spiritual authority, and to take care and transgress no one of its precepts. Your error is in supposing that the temporal order is itself the teacher and judge of the law of God, in so far as that law extends to secular life. This is a monstrous error ; for it completely sunders religion and morality, confines religion to the service of the temple, and subjects the whole moral order to the temporal authority, — the very thing the enemies of religion are always attempting to do, and which I am sorry to find one who calls himself a Catholic ready to aid them to do.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *Speech of Hon. Daniel Webster on Mr. Clay's Resolutions in the Senate of the United States, March 7, 1850.* Washington: Gideon & Co. 1850. 8vo. pp. 64.
2. — *Slavery and the Union. A Lecture delivered in the Tabernacle, New York.* By the Rev. J. W. CUMMINGS, D. D. New York Freeman's Journal, May 25, 1850.
3. — *Review of Mr. Webster's Speech on Slavery.* By WENDELL PHILLIPS. Boston: American A. S. Society. 1850.
4. — *Letter of Hon. Horace Mann, M. C., to his Constituents.* Boston Atlas, May 6, 1850.

MR. WENDELL PHILLIPS's Review of Mr. Webster's Speech we have not done ourselves the honor to read. Mr. Phillips is himself a man of very respectable talents and attainments, — a man abundantly able to distinguish himself without resorting to eccentricity of movement, or wild and savage fanaticism of conduct, — and is therefore utterly inexcusable for taking the course he does. We have introduced his pamphlet, published by the American Antislavery Society, solely as an occasion to assure that Society and its friends, that we make it a point of conscience never to read any of its publications, and to request it and them to spare themselves the trouble of sending us any Abolition publication whatever. We know already all we wish to know of the Abolitionists, and we should be sorry to be compelled to think more unfavorably of them than we now do. They are a class of persons who do not improve upon acquaintance, and we learned enough of them in former years to be certain that the less we know of them, the higher shall we esteem them.

Of the Hon. Horace Mann's Letter to his Constituents we have little to say. Mr. Mann is a member of Congress from the Eighth Congressional District of this Commonwealth; he bears at home the character of a philanthropist, and is said to have won some withered laurels in a controversy with the Boston schoolmasters a few years since, when he was Secretary of our Board of Education. He has some skill in the construction of sentences, is able to give passable lessons in orthography, and perhaps in the rudiments of English Grammar; but we have never understood that he was remarkable as a logician, a lawyer, or a statesman. He had some reputation as a Lyceum-lecturer, but we do not find that he has added to it by his speeches in Congress. He is a man we would not treat unkindly, nay, whom we would treat with great tenderness, and therefore we shall offer no comments on his Letter to his Constituents.

Dr. Cummings's Lecture is a bold, frank, manly production, marked by practical good sense, ready wit, good-natured ridicule, Christian feeling, and true wisdom and prudence. It is upon the whole, from the point of view of religion and morals, the best word we have heard spoken on the subject of slavery and the Union. The lecturer had no novelties to advance, no speculations of his own to bring out; he had nothing to do but to apply the great principles of his holy religion to a pressing moral, social, and political question, and he has done it with a success that leaves little to be desired. He is no advocate of slavery; he is no apologist of the slaveholder; he holds that slavery is an evil, and that we should labor to get rid of it; but in such way only as will not lead to a greater evil. Yet he does not concede that it is *malum in se*, or contend that a man by owning slaves necessarily forfeits his Christian character. The Church does not sanction slavery, nor does she command its abolition as an act of justice. She commands the slave to be obedient for God's sake, and the master to treat his slave with kindness and humanity, and then remits the whole matter to the operation of Christian charity on the hearts of both the slave and his master. Great as the evil of slavery may be, the evil of disunion, or the disruption of the Union of the States, would be incalculably greater, and consequently, however much we may be opposed to slavery, and however desirous we may be to remove it, we are forbidden to attempt its abolition by any measures incompatible with our constitutional duties, or with the peace and prosperity of the Union.

This is the true ground, and the only ground which we can take either as Christians or as American citizens. It is the ground we ourselves took in an essay on the subject in *The Boston Quarterly Review* for April, 1838, and which we have uniformly maintained ever since. Even in the days of our wildest radicalism, we never suffered ourselves to maintain that it is lawful to do evil that good may come; that it is ever permitted to break up a social or political order for the sake of getting rid of an evil which is found to exist under it. Our doctrine was even then, as it is now, that evils existing under a social or political order are to be removed by and in consonance with that order, never by its destruction, and, when not so removable, are to be patiently submitted to as the less evil of the two. We doubtless uttered in those days a great many false, a great many foolish, a great many dangerous opinions, but we were never of the no-government sect; we were never, strictly speaking, a revolutionist; we never held that it can be lawful to resist legitimate authority, or that we are permitted, for the sake of social or political amelioration, to break up an established order of things. We never dreamed of the possibility of effecting reforms in contravention of law, or held the false notion that liberty and

order are antagonistic. We were never so blinded as not to see that order is the only possible condition of freedom, or that order is impossible without government. No doubt we emitted from time to time opinions that imply the contrary, but never any which, when putting them forth, we saw or believed to imply the contrary.

We have always conceded slavery to be an evil, and an evil of which it is highly desirable to get rid; but we have always maintained that it is one of those social evils that it is lawful to remove only in accordance with fidelity to the Constitution and the Federal Union, and that in so far as it cannot be so removed we are not in any respect to meddle with it. The law which binds us to support the Union, to preserve our political order inviolate, is paramount to any law that can bind us to labor for the emancipation of the slave. This is the view we have always taken, and when we had far more influence in political matters than we now have, or are likely ever to have again, we so fully developed it that we have no occasion to add any thing in support of it now. If there are any who wish to see it developed and supported in a triumphant manner, we refer them to the Lecture of Dr. Cummings.

Mr. Webster, in his masterly Speech on Mr. Clay's Resolutions, takes up the subject as a senator, and considers it from the point of view of his constitutional duty. His speech itself, in our judgment, does the distinguished senator more credit as a man and as a statesman than any other he has ever made. It was worthy of his station and of the occasion, and, in the circumstances in which it was delivered, rises above mere intellectual greatness, and approaches the morally sublime. The orator rises to the full dignity of the American senator, above all sectional prejudices, and all party interests and personal ambition, to those high moral and constitutional principles which so many lose sight of, but which should ever animate and guide the American statesman. We have never been associated with the political party with which Mr. Webster usually acts, but we have read his speech with joy to find that public virtue has yet one champion in our country, and that the principles on which the stability of our republic rests have still one eloquent voice that fears not to proclaim them.

Mr. Webster is far more strongly opposed to domestic slavery than we are, and he has never, during his whole public life, failed to do all in his power to prevent its further extension. We know no man in the country more strongly opposed to slavery, or who would go farther, within the limits of the Constitution, to repress and even abolish it. But he is no fanatic, no revolutionist, no mad philanthropist, who, in pursuit of a particular good, is ready to trample down by the way a thousandfold more good than he can possibly gain in gaining the particular end he seeks. He is a

statesman, a moralist, and holds that he has no right to trample on the Constitution he has sworn to support, or to prove faithless to the solemn engagements formed under it. As a senator, he holds it his paramount duty to be loyal to the Union, and faithful to the Constitution. He is not the man to hold office under a constitution, to swear to support it, and, like the radical Senator from New York, to deny its binding force, and claim the right to violate it as often as it may fail to correspond to his private opinion, private caprice, or personal ambition. He is far enough behind the age, far enough behind the Hon. William H. Seward, to hold that law is sacred, and the Constitution inviolable. This may be unfavorable to his popularity with mere radical politicians, and may bring down upon him the censures of *The New York Tribune*, the organ of the American Socialists, and of *The Boston Atlas*, the organ of the men, as John Randolph termed them, of "seven principles,—five loaves and two fishes"; but we dare maintain that it is honorable to him as a statesman, and we doubt not will secure him the warm approbation of the majority of the American people, certainly of all whose approbation it would not be discreditable to have.

Every body has read Mr. Webster's speech, and we have no need of attempting its analysis. The objections we have heard to it are two, that Mr. Webster has contradicted in it the views he has heretofore maintained on the subject of slavery, and yielded too much to the slave interest. In regard to the first, it is well known that Mr. Webster early declared himself opposed to all extension of slave territory. His ground has always been that, where slavery already exists by local laws, there it must be left, and the federal government and non-slaveholding States have no right to interfere with it, and are bound to fulfil in regard to it all the stipulations of the Constitution; but the accession of new slave territory, or the extension of slavery into new territories, where it has no legal existence, is to be steadily resisted as far as it can be by constitutional and legal means. This is what we have always understood to be his doctrine on the subject. Accordingly, we find him resisting with all his might the annexation of Texas, and the acquisition of New Mexico and California. The measures which annexed Texas and the territory acquired from Mexico, he opposed to the last moment that opposition could be legal or constitutional,—but, as is well known, without success. The measures were consummated. They were no longer open questions, and consequently the question for the statesman was itself changed. Texas being annexed, California and New Mexico acquired, what is now the duty of the American senator? Evidently to carry out in good faith the obligations contracted with the new territory, by the action of the government, whether favorable or unfavorable to slavery. This is all Mr. Webster has done, or proposed to do, and this implies no change of

his views of slavery, and no action inconsistent with the principles by which he had always professed to regulate his public conduct on the subject.

The men who accuse him of having changed his views or conduct cannot be sincere in their accusation. They are disappointed and vexed that he has not taken sides with them, and given the sanction of his name and authority to their mad schemes of agitation, or to the illegal and destructive policy which they wish to pursue, and which they are aware is essential to their own distinction, or attainment to power or place. In calm, peaceful times, when none but legal and orderly measures are tolerated, there is, as they well know, no chance for them to emerge from their native insignificance, no opportunity for them to exert the slightest influence in public affairs. It is only in times of violent agitation, of revolution, of confusion, when reason has lost her empire, and passion is enthroned in her place, that little men can usurp the places of great men, and miserable demagogues the places of wise and accomplished statesmen. Settle the question on constitutional grounds, and remove all pretext for agitation, and what would become of your Greeleys, your Schoulers, your Garrisons, your Burleighs, your Fosters, and your Abby Folsoms? Who would ever hear of them again? Where would be the hopes of your Toombses, your Yulees, your Chases, your Sowards, your Manns, and your Palfreys? These men can gain notoriety only by eccentricity, and rise to importance only when the community is distracted by lawless and unprincipled agitation. The moment they fall into the ranks of the friends of order, and of straightforward legal and constitutional action, they are entirely overlooked. What they most fear is the settlement of the question. They vent their spite on Mr. Webster, because he throws the whole weight of his name, his character, his authority, and his eminent abilities into the scale of legal and constitutional policy, and because in doing so the storm is likely to be allayed, and the vexed questions quietly and peaceably disposed of. They also charge him with inconsistency, because they think it something in their favor to dare attack a great man, and something pretty sure to call forth the approbation of their followers, as the poodles all are always filled with admiration when the hound attacks the lion, although sure not to overcome him. Only think, a lion attacked! What a brave dog, not to fear to attack a lion, and contend with him!

As to the second objection, it is undoubtedly well founded, if Abolitionist fanatics are to be listened to; but if we hold to the inviolability of the Constitution, and to the faith of contracts formed under it, it is ridiculous. Mr. Webster yields to slavery just what he is bound to yield to it by the Constitution and the conditions on which Texas was admitted into the Union. Less than this he could not do, with-

out violating his oath to the Constitution, and his obligations as a senator, and more he does not propose to do. The great merit of Mr. Webster's speech is in showing in a clear, calm, and dignified manner, that all the excitement in Congress and out of Congress on the slavery question is "much ado about nothing." Really there is no question to settle. Texas is admitted into the Union as a slave State with the Missouri Compromise. This is settled, and there is no undoing it now. The contract admitting Texas authorizes the formation with her consent of four additional States out of her territory, and south of a given parallel of latitude, with or without slavery, according to the will of the new States themselves. No statesman is at liberty to violate that contract, and we are bound, whatever our views of slavery, to carry out its stipulations in good faith. Here, then, the question is also settled, and nothing remains to be done. As to California and New Mexico, slavery can never go there, for the reason that it does not come to Massachusetts. The climate, soil, and productions are such as to prevent it from being profitable. A law paramount to all laws of man excludes it, as it has excluded it from all New England, and there is no need of introducing provisos to keep it out. There is then really no question to be settled; for so long as the territory of the Union remains as it is, the whole question is already settled, and slavery has its bounds fixed, beyond which it cannot pass, any more than if hemmed in by a wall of adamant. How, then, can you say that Mr. Webster has yielded too much to slavery?

Fault is found with Mr. Webster for his support of an effective law for the recovery of fugitive slaves. But the non-slaveholding States are clearly bound by the Constitution to give up such fugitives, and Congress has the unquestionable right to pass a law for their recovery. Nobody dare deny either of these positions. But it is said the law does not provide for a jury trial. In the first place, we do not place as much confidence in jury trials as some of our countrymen do, and as a general principle we are opposed to extending it beyond its present limits. In the second place, a jury in the case would be an unheard of anomaly in our system of jurisprudence. In no instance is it demanded or provided in the case of fugitives from justice. All appear satisfied that a man accused of crime should be surrendered for trial to the authorities of the State in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, and nobody has as yet demanded that he should not be surrendered but upon the verdict of a jury. We can see no reason why a jury should not be demanded in the case of fugitives from justice, as well as in the case of fugitive slaves, especially since the former are far more numerous than the latter. A white man's liberty is worth as much in our eyes as a black man's, and we are by no means disposed to make the negroes a privileged class. But a jury trial in the case

of fugitives from justice would be an absurdity, because the question to be decided before giving them up is, not whether they are guilty or not, for that question can be decided only where the offence is said to have been committed, but simply whether they shall be given up to be tried. The fugitive from justice is not given up as guilty, but simply as accused by a legal authority, and no jury is needed to try the fact whether he is so accused or not. So the person claimed as a fugitive slave is not surrendered as a slave, and the question to be decided is not whether he is really a slave or not, but simply whether he is claimed as such by a legal authority or not. The legality of the claim is another question, and must be settled in the courts of the State in which it is alleged the person claimed is held to service. A jury in his case would be as great an absurdity as in the case of the fugitive from justice. Undoubtedly no one, under the Constitution, can be deprived of his liberty without a trial by jury, but not therefore may no one be detained in prison for trial, for the law does not regard one as deprived of his liberty till after trial and the judgment of the court. Then the demand for the jury is not made in the interests of justice, not for the purpose of preventing persons from being given up as fugitive slaves who are not such, but for the purpose of screening those who are, and preventing those from being given up whom the Constitution declares shall be. We have in the Constitution pledged ourselves to surrender fugitive slaves; we are bound to do it in the way provided by a law of Congress, and it is not at all to our credit to try to get a law which will practically defeat the end for which it is enacted.

The whole difficulty on the subject of slavery grows out of the fact that the antislavery party really denies the obligation of all constitutions and laws. It professes to appeal from the state to the law of humanity, or the law of God, for God and humanity are for it identical. Mr. Seward appeals to the Bible, and professes to find there a law of God which forbids him to do what he is required to do by the Constitution. The law of God is paramount to the Constitution; we must obey God rather than man. And therefore he concludes that he is justifiable in refusing to perform that duty. If this be so, he is bound to resign his seat in the Senate; for, according to him, the Constitution conflicts with the law of God. No man can lawfully hold office under, and swear to support, a constitution that is repugnant to the law of God. Mr. Seward, while he holds his seat, denies to himself the right to make the appeal from the Constitution; for if he can lawfully hold his seat, the Constitution does not conflict with the law of God; and if he continues to hold his seat, believing that it does so conflict, he practically declares that the fact of its so conflicting does not in the least derogate from its authority. In either case he only declares that

the appeal does not lie, and proves, probably, what few who know him are disposed to doubt, that he is as little to be esteemed as a lawyer as he is as a theologian.

Certainly we are not among those who deny that the law of God is in all cases supreme, and we certainly hold that no act of human legislation that conflicts with it is or can be binding; but we do not hold that Mr. Seward or any one else has a right to assume that the law of God is whatever he chooses to have it, and to plead it as he makes it as his justification for refusing to perform his constitutional duty. Every one is bound to regard the Constitution as conformable to the law of God, till he is able, on an authority paramount to that of the state, to declare the contrary. Those who wish to see the question settled, whether the Federal Constitution is incompatible with the law of God, will do well to read Dr. Cummings's Lecture. That it is not contrary to the law of God to restore a fugitive slave to his master, is pretty evident from the fact that St. Paul restored, after having converted him, the fugitive slave Onesimus to his master Philemon. St. Paul is for us a better authority for what is or is not the law of God, than the Hon. Wm. H. Seward, William L. Garrison, or Abby Folsom. If every one is free to interpret the law of God as he pleases, there is an end of all law and of all government; for every one will interpret the Divine law in a sense that will annul every human law he does not choose to obey.

We confess we do not regard the slave question as of any great intrinsic importance. Slavery is an evil in relation to the master and the state, but, aside from its abuses, it is not necessarily an evil to the slave. The negroes are far better off on our Southern plantations than they are in their native Africa, and they would, as a body, lose rather than gain by emancipation. It is all very fine to declaim in favor of liberty and against slavery; but the negroes, if emancipated, would not, with individual exceptions, be free; they would be a degraded and dependent class, with all the responsibilities of freedom and none of its advantages. We have, in order to be sure of this, only to look at the free negroes in our own Northern cities. They cannot take rank with the whites as free and independent citizens. If they were not separated from the dominant class by color, if they could become merged in the general population of the country, the case would be different; but as it now is, for the masters to emancipate them would be little less cruel than for a father to turn his sons and daughters under age out of his house, and bid them go and take care of themselves.

But be this as it may, slavery has in this country very nearly reached its limits, for the very sufficient reason that a much further extension of it would be ruinous to the slave-owners. Slave labor can sustain itself only in the production of certain staples for com-

merce, and in our country only in the production of rice, cotton, sugar, and tobacco, and these four great staples are pushed about as far as the markets of the world will admit. The demand for cotton is destined to diminish rather than increase, not only because foreign nations will be unable to take the quantities they now take, in consequence of the continually decreasing demand in our own country for their productions and manufactures, but because linen, silk, and wool will soon to a great extent take its place, as they are already beginning to do. The present commercial and industrial system, which builds up large cities, trading-houses, and corporations, while it reduces the mass of the people to abject poverty, cannot last for ever, and either the world will soon come to an end, or nations will be obliged to return to the system of really domestic, really home industry, — a system which will render *families* as well as nations comparatively independent of one another. Commerce and manufactures have nearly, if not quite, reached their maximum, and a change in the industry of all civilized nations must before long take place, and in this change slavery will be abolished, because it will be utterly unable to sustain itself in competition with free labor. It must gradually die out, and it seems to us that all we are called upon to do in regard to it is, to correct, as far as we can legally and morally, its abuses. In a Christian community slavery is no great evil, and in a community not Christian, if you have not domestic slavery, you will have other evils still worse.

The greatest evil in any country just now, after the frightful infidelity so prevalent, is fanaticism, which goes by the name of philanthropy, and our grand error has been in indulging it till it has become nearly unmanageable. In no State in the Union, we are sorry to say, is this moral pestilence more rife than in this ancient Commonwealth. It infects our whole society, and turns a large portion of our citizens into madmen. It destroys our judgments, our moral life, and is fast bringing us into a bondage to which Southern slavery is freedom. It rages in the legislature and in the halls of justice, and spits its venom from sectarian pulpit and press. The well-disposed are overawed, the sober-minded are browbeaten into silence, and even the brave wellnigh quail before it. Something must be done to stay it, or all that is dear and sacred to Christians and freemen is gone. Not a few of those who see and deplore the evil are guilty of a shameful cowardice in regard to it. Let the honest, sober, and sensible portion of the community resist it boldly, denounce it, and give it no quarter, not even a hearing, and it would soon cease to exist. But we have not dared to do this. We have tampered with it, we have courted it, hoping to turn it to the advantage of our sect or our party. It is high time to put an end to this worse than folly, and to speak and act like high-minded and moral men. Most happy are we that Mr. Webster, from his

place in the Senate of the United States, has set us an example worthy of imitation, and we hope that his timely word will rouse our courage, and inspire us with resolution to shake off the tyranny of fanaticism.

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- 5.—*Religion in Society: or the Solution of Great Problems placed within the Reach of every Mind.* From the French of the ABBÉ MARTINET. With an Introduction by the Right Reverend JOHN HUGHES, D. D., Bishop of New York. New York: D. & J. Sadlier, 58 Gold Street. Boston, 72 Federal Street. Montreal, C. E., 179 Notre-Dame Street. 1850. 2 vols. 12mo. pp. 191 and 270.

WE have already expressed our opinion of this work under its French title, *Solution des Grands Problèmes*, and it was at our suggestion and earnest request that its translation was undertaken. We need not, therefore, say that we welcome its publication in an English dress. Without pretending that it is in all respects perfect, that its language is in every instance exact, or that it always adopts the best line of argument, we regard it as one of the most brilliant, and, upon the whole, most satisfactory, popular works on the several topics it takes up that we are acquainted with. The entire work consists of four volumes, and is intended to answer three great questions;—1. "What is it to be a man?" 2. "What is it to be a Christian?" and 3. "Can society be saved without returning to Catholicity?" These are great problems, and the volumes before us contain the answer to the first two; the remaining two volumes, which we trust the public will soon call for, are devoted to the solution of the last. Of the wit and sprightliness, as well as real depth and earnestness of the author, our readers who recollect the *Salve for the Bite of the Black Serpent*, noticed in our Review for April, 1845, may form a tolerably fair opinion, for the excellent Dr. Evariste de Gypendole is no other, we are assured, than the learned, philosophical, and pious Abbé Martinet, the author of *Platon-Polichinelle*. The Abbé turns the laugh upon the other side, and without departing ever from the dignity of his subject or his profession, covers the enemies of religion and society with a ridicule as just as it is irresistible. We have room only for one slight specimen. The author thinks the learned men of the last century gave an undue importance to atheism by treating it as a serious malady. "All the blows inflicted by the Herculean club of the Sorbonne," he says, "are not so effectual as the box on the ear of a celebrated unbeliever, given by the hand of beauty. After having in vain preached to a circle of ladies, he attempted to revenge himself, by saying, 'Pardon my error, ladies,—I did not

imagine that, in a house where wit vies with grace, I alone should have the honor of not believing in God.' 'You are not alone, Sir,' answered the mistress of the mansion; 'my horses, my dog, my cat, share that honor with you; only these poor brutes have the good sense not to boast of it.'"

The translation has been executed with taste, spirit, and fidelity, and has the freedom, freshness, and glow of original composition. The work has suffered nothing by being translated, and we read it with more pleasure in the translation than in the original. As far as we have compared, we have found the sense of the original faithfully, and in general felicitously, rendered, and throughout expressed in pure, idiomatic English. We commend it as a model to those of our friends who are engaged in translating Catholic works from the French.

In glancing through these volumes we have found a few typographical errors, which we trust will be corrected in the second edition. We have space now to point out only one, Vol. I. p. 99, where the author is made to say of our Lord, "He assembled its awful legislation in the Sermon on the Mount, in which, exalting all that man *prizes*, overthrowing all that he adores," &c. It should be, "exalting all that man *despises*,"—*l'homme méprise*. The others we have noticed are of less moment. We return our thanks to the accomplished translator for giving to our public, Protestant as well as Catholic, a work of no ordinary interest and value, and which all who ever ask themselves, "What is it to be a man?" and "What is it to be a Christian?" will do well to read and study long and thoroughly. We cannot better close this brief notice than in the words of the distinguished prelate who has honored the work with a brief but admirable introduction. "These volumes will come to the American reader with freshness and novelty. They will take their place amongst our standard works of literature, and both the gifted and accomplished translator and the spirited publishers will have merited, and I trust will receive, the thanks of the Catholic and the literary public."

6.—*Études Critiques sur le Rationalisme Contemporain*. Par l'ABBÉ H. DE VALROGER, Chanoine Honoraire de Bayeux, et Professeur au Séminaire de Sommervieu. Paris. 1846. 8vo. pp. 612.

THIS volume is devoted to a critical examination of "Eclectisme Rationaliste et du Syncrétisme; de l'Histoire de la Philosophie et de la Philosophie de l'Histoire," as set forth by Cousin, Jouffroy, Damiron, Lerminier, Pierre Leroux, and others, and is the best work on the subject that we have seen from a French author. The Abbé de Valroger, as a critic on the philosophical systems of the

day, whether French or German, is inferior only to Gioberti,—who in this respect is unrivalled, let him be what he may in others,—and we commend his *Etudes Critiques* to all who are engaged in the study of philosophy, and especially to professors of moral and intellectual philosophy in our colleges, whether Catholic or Protestant.

7.—*Lettres et Discours de M. Donoso Cortès, traduit l'Espagnol.* Paris. 1850.

THIS is a *brochure* published by the Electoral Committee of Religious Liberty at Paris. Its author is the Marquis de Valdegamas, a distinguished Spanish nobleman, and Minister of Spain at the Court of Berlin. He is the Count Montalembert of Spain, and one of the most eminent *Catholic* laymen in Europe. We shall endeavour to seize an early opportunity to give our readers some account of his very remarkable and most deeply interesting Letters and Discourses.

8.—*La Vérité sur la Loi de l'Enseignement.* Par MGR. PARISIS, Evêque de Langres, Membre de l'Assemblée Législative. Paris. 1850.

WE know not where one, anxious to obtain the materials for forming a correct judgment of the law on Instruction recently adopted by the French government, can better obtain them than in this pamphlet by the distinguished Bishop of Langres. We have read it with great care, and we confess, that, while the law strikes us as unnecessarily complicated, and far from perfect, we cannot but regard it upon the whole as a great gain for religion, and likely to have a salutary effect in its practical workings. Its restrictive clauses will, practically, operate only against Socialists and enemies of social order. The French bishops and clergy have been divided as to their opinions of its merits, but it appears to have been approved at Rome, and, in view of the peculiar circumstances of France at the present moment, the bishops are permitted to coöperate with the government in carrying it into effect. The Holy Father, however, exhorts them, where the result of the law would be mixed schools, to establish separate schools for Catholics. He also admonishes them “to call often to the recollection of the faithful the fundamental dogma,—Out of the Catholic Church there is no salvation.” We hope that those who have abused us for insisting on this dogma, and protesting with all our might against latitudinarianism and indifferentism, will hereafter be silent, or cease to

call themselves Catholics. It perhaps would not be amiss for the publishers of *St. Vincent's Manual* to take the hint, and leave out of their future editions the impertinent note appended to the Profession of Faith, or, as it is called, the Creed of Pope Pius the Fourth. Such notes are not called for, and if they do not make heretics, they tend at least to make namby-pamby Catholics. If the qualification called for is necessary, why did not Pius the Fourth add it? Why did he leave our profession of faith to be completed by an anonymous editor? The Holy Father is continually admonishing the bishops and clergy of the importance of impressing upon the faithful themselves the absolute necessity of the Catholic faith to salvation, and yet we can hardly take up a single prayer-book or manual of devotion which does not even go out of the way to assure the faithful, virtually, that the Catholic faith is not necessary except for Catholics, and we have in our possession a book in which the author, professedly a Catholic, teaches that a Catholic having become a Methodist may yet be saved, through invincible ignorance, without returning to the Church! The effect of these latitudinarian doctrines is seen in our own country, and in all Europe, and on four different occasions the present Holy Father has expressly warned the faithful against them, and we must believe it is time for us to pay some heed to his admonitions, even though by doing so we may have to confess past carelessness. It is only when we sleep that the enemy sows tares in our fields.

9. — *Loretto, or the Choice : a Story written for the Old and the Young.* In four Parts. Baltimore: Heidan. 1850. 32mo. pp. 274.

THIS story must have been written by a man of real genius, a layman, and a man who is or has been in some sense a man of the world,— a poet, and a musician; but also by a well-instructed Catholic, who loves as well as knows his religion, and does not disdain to practise it. The author is still young, and lacks a little that serenity and repose which belong to more advanced years, but he shows all the qualities in this little work necessary to place him in the front rank of contributors to the Catholic literature of this country. We have read *Loretto* with great care and with intense interest. It is happily conceived, and well executed. It indicates on the part of the author dramatic power of a high order. The characters are original, distinct, and sustained, if we except Melville. Mr. Almy is a real character, a living man, and one with whom we do not every day meet. Gabriel is a half-allegorical character, sometimes apparently symbolizing conscience, at others our guardian angel. Clarence is a sweet boy, and we wish to hear more

of him. The Colonel must have been drawn from the life. He is the most natural and best sustained character in the book. Lel is the author's favorite, on whom he has bestowed the most pains and affection, but we prefer Agnes, "Sister Agnes," who, in defiance of the author, we maintain, is a character of a far higher order than Lel, and equally as lovely. But we have space for no further details. The story is Catholic in its tone, its morals, and in its tendency, but is not a "Catholic novel." It has no theological controversy with heretics, does not attempt to teach theology, but aims to guard youth against immorality, and to incite both old and young, without set exhortations, to the practice of their religious duties. It is a good specimen of the class of works we have repeatedly called for, and we have presented it as a birthday present to our only daughter. We trust it is but the harbinger of a series of popular works needed at the present time, and especially in this country, to counteract the evil influences on our youth of the profane literature of the day. It is not the best thing the author will do, but it is a noble beginning, and is the best popular Catholic story that has as yet been written and published in this country. As such we cordially commend it to the public, Protestant even, as well as Catholic. The author's descriptive powers are very superior, and his style is admirable, but we must caution against a too free indulgence of the former, and we notice in the latter some few verbal inaccuracies. We should know that the author was educated south of Mason and Dixon's line by his frequent use of *would* for *should*. *I would*, or *we would*, expresses a wish or desire, and *should* is the preterite of *shall*, as simply an auxiliary, as well as of *shall* in the sense of the German *sollen*.

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- 10.—*Mohammed, the Arabian Prophet. A Tragedy, in Five Acts.*
By GEORGE H. MILES. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co.
1850. 12mo. pp. 167.

MR. EDWIN FORREST offered a prize of one thousand dollars for the best original tragedy in five acts. About one hundred competitors sent in their manuscripts, and the volume before us is the one to which the prize was awarded. Mr. Forrest regarded it as decidedly the best that was offered, although he does not seem to have regarded it as so well fitted to be acted as to be read,—probably because the character of Mahomet is not at all adapted to his peculiar style of acting. We have read the poem, and have no hesitation in pronouncing it the best poem of the kind ever written and published in this country. It is happily conceived and felicitously executed throughout. It is a work of rare beauty, and of great

power, of deep feeling, and of deep truth. The view it takes of the character of the Arabian prophet is philosophical and just, and the reader will get from this poem a far truer and more complete conception of his real character than from all the lives of him hitherto published in our language. We cordially commend the work to all the lovers of good poetry, and are not a little gratified that so excellent a poem should be written by an esteemed contributor to our own journal.

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11. — *The Life and Religion of Mohammed, as contained in the Sheeâh Traditions of the HYÂT-UL-KULOOB.* From the Persian. By Rev. JAMES L. MERRICK. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1850. 8vo. pp. 483.

MR. MERRICK is or was an American Protestant missionary in Persia, and has given us a work on the life and religion of Mahomet, — *Mohammed*, as he writes, — from the Persian, which will, no doubt, be read with interest by many. It can hardly be called a translation, or faithful reproduction of the Persian work, which serves as its basis. Mr. Merrick tells us that he has taken some liberties with his author, omitting, condensing, paraphrasing according to his own judgment, and considering that judgment is the judgment of a Protestant missionary, it can command no great respect. Nevertheless, the work possesses great interest, and as embodying some portion of the traditions of the sect of Ali, the Mahometan Protestants, it is an important accession to our literature.

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12. — *The Angel World, and other Poems.* By PHILIP JAMES BAILEY, Author of "*Festus*." Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 16mo. pp. 114.

WE could n't, or would n't, read *Festus*, and we have not succeeded in reading this new volume by the same author. One of our friends, who occasionally reads for us the poetical works sent us, tells us that she found it exceedingly hard reading, and that the several poems are far below *Festus*.

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- ART. I.—1. *Del Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani.*** Per VINCENZO GIOBERTI. 2 Edizione di Losanna. Losanna. 1846. 3 tomi. 8vo.
2. *Introduzione allo Studio della Filosofia.* Per VINCENZO GIOBERTI. 2 Edizione riveduta e corretta dall' Autore. Brusselle. 1844. 4 tomi. 8vo.
3. *Del Bello e del Buono. Due Trattati.* Per VINCENZO GIOBERTI. 1 Edizione di Losanna. Losanna. 1846. 8vo.

WE have, on several occasions within the last two or three years, introduced the name of Gioberti, sometimes with praise, sometimes with blame, and some attempt to appreciate his influence as an author, or to determine the practical tendency of his writings, can be neither misplaced nor mistimed; for he is, unquestionably, a man of rare genius, of acute and profound thought, a highly polished intellect, and various and extensive erudition. He appears to have mastered the whole circle of the sciences, and to have made himself thoroughly acquainted with the past and the present. He has studied profoundly the spirit of our age, and we have met with no one who better understands its dangerous tendencies. He possesses a genuine philosophical aptitude, and is unrivalled in his exposition and criticism of modern philosophy, especially as represented by the later German, French, and Italian schools; and as far as concerns the refutation of false systems, and the statement of the first principles and the method of philosophical science, he is eminently successful. The best refutation of sensism, pantheism, radicalism, and socialism, and the clearest and most satisfactory statement and vindication of the several truths op-

posed to them, with which we are acquainted, are to be found in his writings. He never fears to make a bold and manly profession of the Catholic faith, and it is from the point of view of Catholicity, and by the aid of Catholic doctrine, that he refutes the modern errors and heresies he attacks. He seems, also, save in the ascetic region, whenever he has occasion to present Catholic theology, to present it in its highest and most rigidly orthodox forms. According to him, the true human race does not and cannot subsist out of the Catholic or elect society; and he energetically maintains, that out of the Catholic Church man is in an abnormal condition, and incapable, under any aspect of his nature, of attaining to his normal development. He attacks Gallicanism, and asserts in their plenitude the spiritual and civil prerogatives of the Papacy, which French, German, and English theologians, especially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, have so generally denied, or but ambiguously admitted. He maintains that civil society is of sacerdotal origin, derives all power, civil as well as ecclesiastical, from God through the sacerdotal order, and makes the Pope, who embodies in himself the whole priesthood, the representative on earth of the full and universal sovereignty of God.

But we cannot read Gioberti's works without feeling that, along with this, and by ordinary readers not easily separable from it, the author introduces remarks and opinions, and exhibits practical aims and tendencies, which, in our times at least, go far to neutralize his orthodox influence, nay, to throw his influence into the scale of modern liberalism and socialism. We do not judge a book by the personal conduct of the author; but as far as Gioberti's conduct, whether in power or out of power, is known to us, it does not appear to have harmonized with the high-toned Catholic principles he has, at least, the air of professing. His present position with regard to the Holy See, unless we are wholly misinformed, is not that of a dutiful and affectionate son, and contrasts unfavorably with that of Rosmini, or even with that of Padre Ventura. Professedly opposed to all violent revolutions, claiming to be a man of great moderation, and occasionally using language which would lead one to suspect him of being a delegate to the Peace Congress, he nevertheless undeniably had a large share in preparing and precipitating the recent shameful Italian revolutions, and plunging his own sovereign, the late Charles Albert, into his disastrous and unprovoked campaigns against Austria. Professing to disdain modern liberals, to hold democratic politicians in contempt,

and to address himself only to the wisdom and solid judgment of the enlightened and virtuous few, he aided, indirectly, to say the least, in stirring up that infuriated mob which drove the Jesuits out of Italy, assassinated Count Rossi, exiled the Holy Father from Rome, persecuted the religious, massacred the clergy, and enabled Mazzini and his fellow-miscreants to establish the infamous Roman Republic. Asserting in the most unqualified terms the infallibility of the Holy See in the definition of doctrines and the condemnation of books, he has, we believe, never submitted a single one of his own publications to its judgment, and up to the present time has refused to submit to its condemnation of his *Gesuita Moderno*. It is true, and we take pleasure in saying so, that, when at the head of the Sardinian government, he refused to acknowledge the infidel and sacrilegious Roman Republic ; but he also refused to co-operate with the Catholic powers of Europe in restoring the Holy Father to his temporal sovereignty, and sanctioned encroachments of the civil on the spiritual power, which but too clearly preluded the sacrilegious Sicardi laws, the imprisonment of the illustrious Franson, and the persecution of the clergy in the Subalpine kingdom, which so deeply wound the heart, not only of our Holy Father, but of every sincere Catholic. These things, which we are unable to deny, or satisfactorily to explain away, coupled with the fact that he is usually surrounded, not by men venerable for their doctrine and their piety, but by a knot of young Italian atheists and misbelievers, compel us to pause in our admiration, and ask if there be not, after all, some grave fault in the author as well as in the man. With our high estimation of his genius, his talent, his clear and profound thought, his erudition, and his polish and eloquence as a writer, as well as of the soundness of his doctrines on many of the most vital points of philosophy and theology, we must naturally be disposed to place the most favorable construction possible on both his speculations and his acts ; but, considering what has undeniably been the practical influence of his views and tendencies, as a political writer and statesman, on the disastrous and shameful revolutionary movements of his countrymen, we cannot but believe that there is something rotten in his writings, and that, with all his high-toned orthodoxy on so many important points, there is yet something in his thought, as well as in his heart, not compatible with Catholic doctrine and Catholic piety, and which we are bound to reprobate.

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But we cannot read Gioberti's works without feeling that, along with this, and by ordinary readers not easily separable from it, the author introduces remarks and opinions, and exhibits practical aims and tendencies, which, in our times at least, go far to neutralize his orthodox influence, nay, to throw his influence into the scale of modern liberalism and socialism. We do not judge a book by the personal conduct of the author; but as far as Gioberti's conduct, whether in power or out of power, is known to us, it does not appear to have harmonized with the high-toned Catholic principles he has, at least, the air of professing. His present position with regard to the Holy See, unless we are wholly misinformed, is not that of a dutiful and affectionate son, and contrasts unfavorably with that of Rosmini, or even with that of Padre Ventura. Professedly opposed to all violent revolutions, claiming to be a man of great moderation, and occasionally using language which would lead one to suspect him of being a delegate to the Peace Congress, he nevertheless undeniably had a large share in preparing and precipitating the recent shameful Italian revolutions, and plunging his own sovereign, the late Charles Albert, into his disastrous and unprovoked campaigns against Austria. Professing to disdain modern liberals, to hold democratic politicians in contempt,

and to address himself only to the wisdom and solid judgment of the enlightened and virtuous few, he aided, indirectly, to say the least, in stirring up that infuriated mob which drove the Jesuits out of Italy, assassinated Count Rossi, exiled the Holy Father from Rome, persecuted the religious, massacred the clergy, and enabled Mazzini and his fellow-miscreants to establish the infamous Roman Republic. Asserting in the most unqualified terms the infallibility of the Holy See in the definition of doctrines and the condemnation of books, he has, we believe, never submitted a single one of his own publications to its judgment, and up to the present time has refused to submit to its condemnation of his *Gesuita Moderno*. It is true, and we take pleasure in saying so, that, when at the head of the Sardinian government, he refused to acknowledge the infidel and sacrilegious Roman Republic; but he also refused to co-operate with the Catholic powers of Europe in restoring the Holy Father to his temporal sovereignty, and sanctioned encroachments of the civil on the spiritual power, which but too clearly preluded the sacrilegious Sicardi laws, the imprisonment of the illustrious Frasoni, and the persecution of the clergy in the Subalpine kingdom, which so deeply wound the heart, not only of our Holy Father, but of every sincere Catholic. These things, which we are unable to deny, or satisfactorily to explain away, coupled with the fact that he is usually surrounded, not by men venerable for their doctrine and their piety, but by a knot of young Italian atheists and misbelievers, compel us to pause in our admiration, and ask if there be not, after all, some grave fault in the author as well as in the man. With our high estimation of his genius, his talent, his clear and profound thought, his erudition, and his polish and eloquence as a writer, as well as of the soundness of his doctrines on many of the most vital points of philosophy and theology, we must naturally be disposed to place the most favorable construction possible on both his speculations and his acts; but, considering what has undeniably been the practical influence of his views and tendencies, as a political writer and statesman, on the disastrous and shameful revolutionary movements of his countrymen, we cannot but believe that there is something rotten in his writings, and that, with all his high-toned orthodoxy on so many important points, there is yet something in his thought, as well as in his heart, not compatible with Catholic doctrine and Catholic piety, and which we are bound to reprobate.

We took up and read Gioberti's works at first from curiosity, and to find out the truth they might contain, and we were charmed and carried away by his learning and eloquence, to an extent we are ashamed to acknowledge, although we had all the time a secret feeling that he was not altogether healthy in his practical influence ; we have since re-read his writings, to discover, if possible, the error concealed in them, or the source of that unhealthy influence. We think we have discovered it, and our chief purpose in noticing the volumes we have introduced is to point it out to our readers, and, if our review should chance to fall under his eyes, to the distinguished author himself. Several books of greater or less magnitude have been written against the author, but we are unacquainted with their contents. We have read nothing against him, except some high commendations of him in *The North British Review*, a Scotch Presbyterian journal, intended to perpetuate the spirit of John Knox, and some two or three articles, feebly and unsuccessfully attacking his philosophy, in a respectable French periodical, conducted by a layman whose learning and good intentions we hold in high esteem. Our judgment, whether sound or unsound, has been formed by the simple study of the volumes before us, and the school to which their author obviously belongs, and of which he is the most distinguished member.

Our purpose in our present article is not to review Gioberti so much under a philosophical as an ascetic, a speculative as a practical, point of view ; and perhaps we cannot better introduce the criticisms we propose to offer, than by reverting to a fact which we have often insisted on, namely, that there is in modern society a fatal schism between the ecclesiastical order and the temporal, and between spiritual culture and secular. There is not, under Christianity, that harmony between the two orders that there appears to have been under gentilism in Greek and Roman antiquity. In classic antiquity there seems to have been, for the most part, a perfect harmony between religious and secular life, spiritual and secular culture ; and in the great men of Livy and Plutarch, regarding them simply as men, we find a balance, a proportion, a completeness, and, so to speak, roundness of character, in its order, that we do not find in the men of modern times. In modern society the two orders are not only distinct, but mutually repugnant, and we are able to devote ourselves to the one only by rejecting or opposing the other. Civil government opposes,

and, as far as possible, subjects the Church ; philosophy rejects theology ; the sciences are irreligious in their tendency ; and secular literature and art foster unbelief and impiety. The individual and society are alike torn by two internal hostile and irreconcilable forces, and we have no peace, — hardly, at rare intervals, a brief truce. This schism, taken in its principle, may be regarded as the source of all the evils which afflict modern society, whether temporal or spiritual.

It is from the fact we here state, more especially as it exists in Italy, the author's own country, that Gioberti appears to start. He assumes that this schism is practically remediable, that it ought to be healed ; and hence his chief inquiry is as to its causes and the means of healing it. The principal cause, if we understand him aright, is, that the sacerdotal society has lost its control of the lay society, by having lost its former moral and intellectual superiority over it, and yet insists on retaining the dominion it rightfully exercised when it possessed that superiority ; and the remedy is to be sought in the voluntary cession, as far as civilized Europe is concerned, on the part of the sacerdotal society, of that former dominion, become incompatible with modern civilization, the new conditions and relations of peoples and nations, the emancipation of the civil order from the sacerdotal tutelage, and a union, alliance, or interfusion of sacerdotal and lay culture, of the sacerdotal and lay genius, of the Christian spirit and the spirit of ancient Italo-Greek gentilism. He denies, indeed, the right of the lay society to assert its emancipation by violence, and thus far condemns modern liberalists, but contends that the clerical order should voluntarily concede the emancipation, and invest the lay order with an independence that was denied it, and very properly denied it, in the earlier mediæval times. We shall amply prove, before we close, that this is the author's view of the matter ; and, indeed, it is evident from almost every page of his writings, and especially from his long discussion in the *Del Primato* on the difference between the civil dictatorship exercised by the Popes immediately after the dissolution of the Western Empire by the Northern barbarians, and the arbitratorship which he contends is now for civilized Europe all that can or should be exercised by the sovereign pontiffs, except in the Ecclesiastical States.

That, in pointing out the causes of this schism, and proposing the remedy, Gioberti refutes much false philosophy, demolishes many false systems of politics, ethics, and society, and brings

to his aid truths in philosophy, theology, morals, and politics of the highest order and of the last importance, there is no question; but he has nowhere the appearance of doing this for the sake of a genuinely Catholic end. The end for which he brings forward Catholicity, he says expressly,* is not the salvation of the soul, or the advancement of faith and piety for the sake of heaven, eternal beatitude, but the advancement of civilization for the sake of the "earthly felicity of men," and "the temporal well-being of nations." And hence he presents himself as a political and social reformer, in reality as a socialist in relation to his ends, differing from the vulgar herd of socialists only in the respect, that his instruments of reform, of reconstructing society, and of advancing civilization and social well-being, include, instead of rejecting, the ideal philosophy and the Church. In doctrine, in formal teaching, he is the antipodes of our modern socialists and liberalists, but in heart and soul, in spirit, in aim, and practical tendency, he is, after all, with them, and hardly distinguishable from them. Speaking in general terms, his error lies here, and is practical rather than theoretical,—in what he is laboring to effect rather than in the doctrines he formally and expressly teaches or attempts to apply to his socialistic purposes; and hence you feel, in reading him, that he is carrying you away in an anti-Catholic direction, although you cannot easily lay your finger on a direct and positive statement that you can assert to be in itself absolutely heterodox, or that directly and unequivocally expresses the error you are sure he is insinuating into your mind and heart.

Nevertheless, in his practical doctrine, as we have just stated it, there are clearly errors both of fact and of principle. He says expressly, — "*La declinazione delle influenze civili del clero in alcuni paesi cattolici nasce appunto dall'aver lasciato che i laici di sperienza, di senno, di dottrina, e di gentilezza lo avanzassero.*"† And it is clear that he means to lay this down as a general principle, and to maintain that the decline of the influence of the clergy in the civil order is owing to their having suffered "the laity to surpass them in experience, wisdom, knowledge, and cultivation," or, in other words, to the fact, that the sacerdotal society has lost its moral and intellectual superiority over the lay society. But he knows little of human affairs, and of the world at large, who can seriously hold that the

* *Del Primato*, Tom. I. p. 95.

† *Del Primato*, Tom. II. p. 255.

influence of a class, clerical or laical, is always in proportion to its moral and intellectual worth, or to its knowledge and cultivation. Wisdom and virtue do not, naturally, attain to dominion in the affairs of the world, and ignorance and vice always govern, except when God, supernaturally, intervenes to secure the victory to the good over the bad. Every man knows that this is true in the sphere of his own experience ; for every one knows that, if he follows nature, he goes to destruction, and that it is only by grace that he is able to conquer evil, and secure the dominion to wisdom and virtue. What is true thus of men individually is true of them collectively ; and this, being true of the individual, must be equally true of society, which can, therefore, be saved from destruction only by supernatural protection, only by grace, of which the sacerdotal order is the minister. If influence was always exerted in proportion to moral and intellectual worth, the wisest and best, the *optimates*, would always be at the head of affairs, and have the management of the republic, which, we need not say, is by no means the fact. Moreover, if it were so, Gioberti would have nothing to complain of ; for to place the *optimates* at the head of affairs is precisely what he contends for as that which will perfect the political and social constitution.

There is, again, in the principle here assumed, a suspicious approximation to the pretensions and aims of Saint-Simonism. It is lawful, no doubt, to learn from an enemy, but we are not prepared to admit that Catholicity is insufficient for itself, or that it is under the necessity of making any important loans from those who are studying to supplant it. The essential principle of the Saint-Simonian constitution is the organization of society, hierarchically, under its natural chiefs, the natural aristocracy, that is to say, the *optimates*. These, from the fall of the Roman Empire to the age of Leo the Tenth, the Saint-Simonians assert, were the Catholic clergy, under their supreme chief, the Pope ; but at the latter period they ceased to be the natural chiefs of society, because they ceased to advance in the same proportion that advanced the lay society, and suffered themselves to be surpassed in civil wisdom, knowledge, and cultivation by the laity. No one familiar with the writings of the Saint-Simonian school can read Gioberti without being pained to find him too often speaking as one of its honored disciples.

Finally, we deny the fact assumed. The clergy have never,

in relation to the lay society, lost their former moral and intellectual, or scientific and civil superiority ; and if they sometimes seem to have done so, it is only because the lay society has opposed to them false morality, false society, and false science, in place of the genuine. The clergy have never ceased, even in the most polished nations of Europe, to surpass the laity ; never have the laity been able to be their teachers ; and in every instance where they have claimed to be, they have been able to do so only on the ground of their having departed in religion, morals, politics, or philosophy from sound doctrine. Abelard was a layman, — reputed a learned man, a great philosopher, an able dialectician ; but his influence served only to promote nominalism, poorly disguised under the name of conceptualism, and to ruin philosophical science. Bacon and Descartes were laymen, and Gioberti holds them in no higher estimation than we do. Except, perhaps, in mathematics and some of the physical sciences, which are only secondary matters, and whose predominance marks an infidel age, the superiority of science and doctrine has always been on the side of the clergy, and we are aware of no contributions of any real value ever made by the laity. The fact is not as Gioberti assumes. The laity, having acquired a smattering of science and learning, have become filled with pride and conceit, and refused for that reason to recognize the just influence of the clergy. The decline of the influence of the clergy in some Catholic countries is not owing to their having suffered the laity, in wisdom, doctrine, and cultivation, to surpass them, but to the overweening pride and conceit of the laity, which have taken the place of humility and docility. The most truly learned, scientific, and cultivated among the laity are, even in our own age, the most docile to the clergy, and the most ready to assert and vindicate their general moral and intellectual superiority ; for we do not reckon your Mazzinis, Caninos, Mamianis, and Leopardis among the distinguished laymen of our times. They and their associates are not to be named in the same day with an O'Connell, a Montalembert, a De Falloux, a Donoso Cortès. Moreover, where are the laymen who in our days rank above Balmez in Spain, Wiseman or Newman in England, Moehler in Germany, and VINCENZO GIOBERTI in Italy, not to mention hundreds of others of the clerical order in no sense their inferiors, but who happen to be less known to our American public ?

The author assumes, virtually, that, when the clergy find

their influence decline, it is owing to their own fault and the growing virtue of the laity. It is only on this assumption that he can justify his demand of concessions to the revolting laity, and the union or fusion of sacerdotal with lay culture. The contrary of this is the truth. The clergy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when their influence had much declined, were, in relation to contemporary society, not one whit below what they were in the previous ages, when their influence was the greatest; and in no age have the laity shown themselves more superficial, more ignorant, more indisposed to severe thought and solid studies, or less virtuous, or more immoral, than in the eighteenth century, and in France, where the influence of the clergy was nearly null, but where their faith and virtue were by no means null, as was amply proved in the hour of trial. The clergy never obtain, and never maintain, in any country, their influence by mere personal qualifications, or personal superiority to the rest of the community, although this superiority may be a fact; but by the superiority of their doctrine and the sacredness of their office, — by the fact of their being priests and doctors, — the depositaries of the Christian mysteries, and the dispensers to the people of the bread of life; and their influence declines just in proportion as the people lose their faith in these mysteries, and their relish for this bread, or become wedded to the flesh and the world.

With all deference, then, to the distinguished author, we must dissent from his representation of the first element of the cause of the evil which we, as well as he, deplore. We cannot revive our youth, and join again with those who ascribe, in whole or in part, the acknowledged evils of society to the clergy, or the decline of their influence, in most countries, to the loss of their former moral and intellectual superiority; and just as little can we ascribe their loss of influence to the growing intelligence and virtue of the lay society, for this growing intelligence and virtue is not a fact, and if it were a fact, it would only render the lay society so much the more docile and submissive to the sacerdotal society. Individual clergymen, no doubt, there are, who do not by any means adorn their profession, or walk worthily in their high vocation, of which our author is, perhaps, a notable example; but, taken as a body, throughout the world, it is not the clergy that need reforming, but the laity, — not those of the laity, again, who are docile and submissive to their pastors, but those who are indocile,

rebellious, and require the clergy to come to them, instead of recognizing the fact that it is for them to go to the clergy.

We find it equally difficult to agree with Gioberti, that the fatal schism is continued by any censurable disposition of the sacerdotal society to hold on to the shadow of a dominion which, as to its substance, has long since escaped them. He contends that the civil dictatorship belongs, *in radice*, to the priesthood in all times and in all countries, but that its exercise is practicable or desirable only during the infancy or minority of nations, and that when a nation attains its majority, as we say of children, it is entitled to its freedom, and should and must be emancipated. The priesthood should then resign its dictatorship, and be contented to fill, in regard to civil society, the simple office of arbitrator, or referee. He says, — “When the priesthood delay beyond the proper time the civil emancipation of the people, as well as when these presume to hasten it, and attempt its possession prematurely, grave dissensions spring up and disturb both the Church and the state, until sound reason triumphs, and the true order of things is restored; for the sacerdotal tutelage of *infant* nations and the civil independence of *adult* nations are equally two laws of nature, which may be resisted for a time, but which no human power can wholly annul, or permanently suspend.”*

In accordance with this view, the author appears to charge the clergy with having failed to recognize the fact that modern nations have attained their majority, and of being in some measure the cause of the present schism between the two orders, by attempting to retain them under their tutelage beyond the proper time. They are behind their age; they have not taken sufficient account of the changes which have been going on, and the progress of civilization, or civil and social culture, which has been effected. They are not aware that the Middle Ages have passed away, and that a new order has sprung up, and is henceforth, for civilized Europe, the only legitimate order. Hence, they are found in opposition to the secular movements of the day, which is disastrous for them, and still more disastrous for society. They cannot hinder these movements, and by opposing them they lose all control over them, and all influence for good on their age. In consequence of their opposition, — in plain language, of their opposition to the demands of the age for liberal governments, free institutions, and a generous and par-

* *Del Primato*, Tom. II. p. 253.

tially independent secular culture, — they lose the lay society, and the lay society loses the guidance and salutary control of the sacerdotal society. This thought runs through all of Gioberti's writings that we have read. It is clear to the intelligent reader that he is dissatisfied with the political order he finds existing, especially in Austria and Italy, and that he finds the clergy in the way of such changes as he wishes to introduce. Perhaps the Pope, certainly the College of Cardinals, the regular clergy, especially the Jesuits, and no small portion even of the secular clergy of Italy and Austria, are opposed to all organic changes in the existing constitutions. He is not, or was not when he wrote, prepared to attempt the changes in spite of them, and therefore he writes to win them over to his side, and attempts to set forth a theory which shall make it appear to them that they not only can favor the revolution he demands, consistently with the highest-toned Catholicity, but that they are required to do so by the most rigid forms of orthodoxy, and the soundest philosophy, as well as by the interests of secular society and civilization.

But after all, he only sings us the song sung by Lamennais, and the whole swarm of the so-called Neo-catholics, and simply proves that he is a slave of the age against which he is everywhere so sarcastic, not, as he no doubt honestly believes, one of its masters. It is remarkable, too, that with him, as with Lamennais, Ultramontanism and high-toned orthodoxy are far more apparent than real. Even we ourselves are, in reading his *Del Primato*, occasionally startled by some of his strong assertions of the civil power of the Pope; but as we read on, we find that we had no reason to be startled, and that the power of the Pope dwindles down into a very commonplace affair, as he somewhere says, only the power infidels readily accord to a respectable parish priest, — and is, after all, merely a power that grows out of the accidental condition of nations in space and time, rather than a power held and exercised by virtue of the positive and express institution of Almighty God. So Lamennais made a furious onslaught upon Gallicanism, and yet ended by making the authority of the Church herself depend on the *consensus hominum*, and resolving the Christian religion into pure socialism. Gioberti attacks Gallicanism with great strength of language, and great force of argument, and yet winds up the controversy by telling us, — “The principal error of the famous Gallican Declaration of 1682 consisted in asserting as universal what is and must be only particular. It is beyond

doubt that, in nations that have attained to civil maturity, the government, in temporal things, is wholly independent of the Pope and the clergy, and that the clergy, *participating in the general culture*, possesses by good right certain canonical and disciplinary liberties which should be respected by all ; for it is a general rule, applicable to all ecclesiastical as well as to all civil government, that absolute and arbitrary authority is good and legitimate only in barbarous ages, and even then only because *no other order is then possible.*" * That is to say, Gallicanism is, in the main, true, when asserted of a given time and place, or of nations that have attained a certain grade of civilization, though false when asserted as true of all times and places, and of nations through all the stages of their civil development. This implies that the *actual* powers of the Papacy derive, not from the positive and immediate grant of our Lord to Peter, but from those political and social accidents which demand them ; that is, they grow out of the wants or necessities of society, and inhere in the Papacy solely because it is in the best condition to assume and exercise them for social organization and progress, which, in principle, is the assertion simply of the government of the *optimates*, — of the Pope, not because he is the Divinely appointed sovereign, but because, in reference to time, place, and circumstances, he is the wisest, and best able to govern, — the doctrine which Thomas Carlyle, the inveterate pantheist, has been for these fifteen or twenty years harping upon *ad nauseam*. The right to govern, whether in Church or state, depends on the Divine appointment, not on the personal qualifications of the governors, and the *optimates* are always those who are legitimately invested with authority, and are such solely because so invested. The right gives the capacity to govern, not the capacity the right.

It is undoubtedly true, that the Sovereign Pontiffs do not, and cannot in the existing state of the secular order in Europe, exercise all the powers they did in the earlier ages of the modern world, and therefore we readily grant that those powers are now to some extent in abeyance. But it is one thing to recognize this as a fact, and another to recognize it as a law. We are aware that Gioberti holds to what he calls "moderate optimism," as was to be expected from an ardent admirer of Leibnitz ; but we are not aware that in this respect Catholic faith requires us to agree with him, and we confess that we have

* *Del Primato*, Tom. I. p. 219, note.

never been able to agree with the pupil of Lord Bollingbroke, that "Whatever is, is right."

Because such political and social changes have taken place in the world, as render the exercise of certain powers on the part of the sovereign pontiffs impracticable or inexpedient, it does not follow that the Papacy does not still actually possess them, or that the well-being of society does not as imperiously demand their exercise now, as before the changes occurred. The fact that they cannot be exercised may be a social calamity, instead of a social progress; and it is very conceivable, that, if society had continued to follow the Christian law, their exercise would not have become impracticable. We agree that regard must be had to time and place, and that certain powers must be exercised by the clergy in certain circumstances which in other circumstances they are not required to exercise in the same form. We concede that to attempt the practical assertion of what Gioberti calls the dictatorship would in our times most likely be productive of evil rather than good; but we do not concede that this is so because modern nations have attained to civil majority, and therefore do not need it. The reason is, simply, that modern nations have, to a great extent, lost their faith, and will not heed the commands of their father. It is as necessary for them to receive and obey the paternal commands as ever it was, but they have grown so rebellious and stubborn that they will not.

Gioberti's theory about the minority and majority of nations is no doubt plausible; and if it were true in fact, that a nation ever does attain to civil majority, we should not seriously object to his doctrine, nay, we could not, without contradicting doctrines heretofore advanced in our own pages. But the truth is, save in regard to the department of mere industry, no nation ever attains to majority, and every one is as much a minor when in the most as when in the least advanced stage of its civilization. We hold, with Gioberti, that civil society is the creature of the priesthood, and that it is in all times and places through the priesthood, not, as modern demagogues pretend, through the people, that Almighty God invests civil society with its authority to govern; therefore we also hold with him, that the civil no less than the spiritual sovereignty under God vests immediately in the Divinely instituted priesthood, and in civil society only *mediante* the sacerdotal society. With what he says on this point we cordially agree, and we had maintained sub-

stantially the same doctrine in *The Democratic Review*, while still a Protestant. But that there ever comes a time when the priesthood is required to abandon its civil sovereignty and recognize the independence of the civil order, we are not prepared to concede; for, among other reasons, there never comes a time when the independence of the civil order does not conduct the nation to barbarism. All civilization is of sacerdotal origin, and must be lost just in proportion as society escapes from subjection to the priesthood. The reason of this is, that the elements of civilization are from the supernatural order, and the elements of barbarism are inherent in human nature, reproduced in every new-born individual, and retained in the bosom of every human being as long as he remains in the flesh. Barbarism has its seat in the carnal mind, the inferior soul, the natural passions, propensities, appetites, and instincts, which are always, when left to themselves, even in the saint while in this world, opposed to the law of God, and never cease to lust against the spirit, in order to bring us into captivity to the law of sin and death. The essence of barbarism is in the freedom and independence of this lower nature, in the predominance of inclination, passion, concupiscence, over reason and will. Civilization is precisely in the subjection of the inferior soul in the community to the superior, and in the assertion and maintenance of the sovereignty of right reason, that is, THE SUPREMACY OF LAW.

But this supremacy is secured by no possible secular culture; for it is the work in the individual, and therefore in society, not of natural reason and will, but of supernatural grace, of which the priesthood is the minister. It is of faith, we believe, that man, in his lapsed state, cannot without grace fulfil even the law of nature, and this grace is as necessary in the case of the learned, the cultivated, the refined, as it is in the case of the rude and simple. No natural training, no merely secular culture, is sufficient to subdue the barbarous elements in our nature, and the Christian maintains his virtue, and the constant predominance in his own bosom of the essential elements of civilization, only by constant vigilance, and continual recourse to the means of grace. If he relaxes his vigilance, if he neglects the sacraments, if he foregoes prayer and meditation, if he trusts to the training he has already received, to the habits already formed, or which have been infused into him by the Holy Ghost, he loses his spiritual freedom, fails to maintain the supremacy of reason, suffers the animal nature, the beast that is in him, to

become independent, predominant, and lapses into the barbarian and the savage.

This, which is undeniably true of the individual, is equally true of communities and nations. No nation remains civilized without the constant presence and activity of the powers that originally civilized it, any more than creatures continue to exist without the immanence of the creative act which produces them from nothing. In consequence of retaining always and everywhere in its bosom the germs of barbarism, which no culture can eradicate, and which are ever ready to spring up, blossom, and bear fruit, the moment the sacerdotal vigilance and authority are withdrawn, or even relaxed, the nation in regard to civilization remains always in the state of a minor, and never does and never can attain to majority, — to a state in which it need be no longer under the parental dictation, and can safely be trusted to set up for itself. This has been amply proved by the modern revolutions in France and Italy, the two most civilized nations in the world; and both, especially France, if especially France, the moment the temporal order set up for itself, and asserted its independence, have exhibited a barbarism that it would be difficult to match in the annals of the old Vandals, Goths, and Huns. We have never seen grosser barbarism than Paris exhibited under the Convention, or Rome under the recent Triumvirate, and the nations of Europe, as did those of Asia and Africa, approach barbarism just in proportion as they break from the parental authority of the Sovereign Pontiff. This proves that these nations have not attained to civil majority, and that whatever sacerdotal authority is demanded by nations in their infancy is demanded equally by them through all the stages of their existence. We cannot, therefore, agree with the learned and philosophic author, that the principal error of Gallicanism was in asserting as universal what is true only in particular cases. Gallicanism is either universally true, or it is universally false, and it was no more applicable to the France of Louis Quatorze than to the France of Pepin or Clovis.

It is not true, again, that the clergy, as Gioberti insinuates, rather than expressly asserts, show themselves reluctant to concede the civil emancipation of nations, and determined to continue their tutelage beyond its proper time. The clergy have never shown any thing of the sort, and, if any fault is to be charged against them, it is the fault of having been too yielding to the temporal power, of not having always asserted with suffi-

cient firmness, constancy, and energy their own rights and prerogatives against its grasping ambition and sacrilegious encroachments. If the clergy have sinned at all, it has not been against the civil order, as distinguished from the ecclesiastical, it has not been in too strenuously asserting the sacerdotal dictatorship, but in not asserting it, in siding, for the sake of peace, or now and then for the sake of their revenues, with the temporal prince, as mere laics, instead of rallying to the support of their spiritual chief; that is, in doing the very thing in principle that Gioberti counsels them to do, and in not doing the very thing he accuses them of having done. The grasping of power over the civil order, or tenacity in clinging to it, has never been a vice or failing of the Christian priesthood, and they have always shown themselves ready and willing to yield to the temporal authorities all that could be yielded without giving up the faith, or sacrificing the freedom of religion, as the early rise and wide prevalence of what is called Gallicanism abundantly prove.

The schism is not caused or exaggerated by the efforts of the clergy to retain an undue control over the secular order, and those who have followed Gioberti's advice, and yielded to the modern spirit, have effected nothing towards healing it. The countenance some of them showed, from 1845 to 1849, to the revolutionary movements in Italy, served only to weaken their legitimate influence, to diminish reverence for the Church in her spiritual character, and to please, embolden, and strengthen the enemies of religion and society, — to give up Rome to the savage Mazzinis and Garibaldis, and to subject their own order to a bitter persecution, which we fear is yet far from being ended. They were applauded for the moment by heretics and infidels, Freemasons and Carbonari, Red Republicans and Socialists, and some persons were simple enough to regard these applauses as indicating a growing respect for the Church, and a return to Catholicity, whereas they really indicated only the demoniacal joy of the enemies of truth and sanctity, that the clergy themselves were destroying the Church by bringing her to them, instead of insisting, as formerly, on their coming to her. When the modern liberalists applauded Pius the Ninth, it was not because their feelings towards the Church had changed, but because they believed, or hoped to make the Catholic population believe, that the Pope was himself a liberalist in the chair of St. Peter; and when he was obliged, in order to undeceive them, or to prevent them from deceiving the faithful, to protest against their interpretation of

his acts, they cried out, "Death to Pius the Ninth!" and compelled him to flee from Rome, and seek a refuge in exile.

This leads us to consider the remedy proposed. Gioberti would retain the supremacy of the Church, — in words, certainly, — and preserve for the Pope the civil arbitratorship. Yet his means of healing the schism are not the absolute subjection of the temporal order to the spiritual, as demanded by his own dialectics, but, as we have said, the union, alliance, or interfusion of the two orders, that is, of the sacerdotal and lay culture. As the case now stands, sacerdotal culture is mystical, excessively ascetic, and does not make sufficient account of earthly felicity and the advance of civilization, or temporal prosperity of nations; and secular culture is weak, mean, contemptible, disgraceful, because it lacks the order of truth, of which the priesthood is the sole depositary. A true culture and a true and noble civilization are possible only by the union or coalition of the two orders of culture, rendering the one less unworldly, and the other more ideal, or philosophical. To do this is the business of the priesthood, because the priesthood is the creator, in the order of second causes, of civilization.

Religion, throughout Gioberti's works, as far as we have read them, is considered only as the grand civilizing agency of mankind, and civilization is held to be in itself, not indeed the supreme good, but a real good, which we are to seek for its own sake. The advancement of civilization for its own sake, and the earthly felicity it secures, is set forth as a noble and laudable aim, and as an end to which the Church should exert, directly and intentionally, her various powers and influences. After having established his first principles, and attempted to show that, according to them, all life and all dialectics are in harmonizing extremes, conciliating opposites, or contraries, he proceeds to say, —

"The application of these principles to our subject is not difficult. The religious and universal society which is called the Church and Catholicity is a complex of forces, which, in so far as finite and having a temporal aim, are subjected to the general laws of every dynamic process. The action of this grand community is in the preservation and development of the ideal principles, in the twofold order of things and cognitions, and therefore works and manifests itself as doctrine and as art. As doctrine, it is the guardian of the ideal principles in their primitive purity and integrity, and the deduction of all the secondary truths included in them; as art, it is

the application of the doctrine to active life in order to the production of the earthly felicity of mankind ; for I am considering here religion only in so far as it is the supreme dialectics conciliating human forces on the earth, and the system of civilization directed to the temporal well-being of nations, not as the direct instrument of celestial salvation, or of eternal beatitude." — *Del Primato, Avvertenza*, Tom. I. pp. 94, 95.

That the author holds that this mode of considering religion is proper, and that religion, as a civilizer and promoter of earthly well-being, may be distinguished from religion as the medium of salvation, and considered apart, is clear, not only from the passage just cited, but from the whole tenor of his teachings. His primary charge against the Jesuits is, that they do not seek to advance civilization, do not allow free and independent thinking, and that they discourage the developments of genius and the attainment of mental excellence, — a charge itself full of meaning. He adds : —

" Understanding (*l'ingegno*), informed and strengthened by virtue, produces the precious fruits of civilization and science, which are two inseparable things, since the former is only the practical use and application of the latter. To oppose civil progress, and the cognitions which effect it, is an attempt injurious to God, repugnant to the order and design of the world, fatal to mankind, and contrary to the spirit, the precepts, and the purpose of Christianity. It offends God, because civilization is divine, like religion, to which it is inferior only inasmuch as it aims directly at time instead of eternity. But as eternity, in respect to creatures, presupposes temporal duration, and is, so to speak, its consummation, he who disrelishes and discountenances worldly interests prejudices the heavenly, as every one opposes the end who weakens or obstructs the aids by which it is to be gained. Civilization and religion alike import the superiority and victory of the soul over the body, of reason over sense, of will over instinct, of law over brute force, of the spirit over nature, of man over the other terrestrial beings, and of finite intelligences over the corporeal universe. So that it may be said that religion is absolute and perfect civilization, as secular culture is an initial religion, which bears to the other the relation of a part to the whole, or of the beginning to its completion. Both are alike universal, dialectic, conciliative ; both combat the same enemy, that is, blind and fatal forces, and tend to repress without destroying them, by subjecting them to the directing authority of intellect and reason : and hence, as their powers are gradually developed, they are transformed one into the other, and their effects prove them to be identical." — *Ibid.*, p. 140.

This is intelligible, and very much to the purpose. But here is something more.

"The maxims of a falsely understood mysticism, and its abusive effects, to which science and civilization give occasion, lead many persons of good faith, but of narrow minds, if not wholly to repudiate, at least to distrust and discountenance, these two noblest parts of understanding. It appears to the abettors of an exaggerated asceticism as a sort of sacrilege to regard temporal things as of some account, and to occupy ourselves with them, since our ultimate end, our abiding country, is not on the earth, but in heaven. Moreover, finding that we are in a fallen state, and that our present life is intended to be an expiation, a penalty, it seems to the exaggerated mystics, that to improve our earthly condition would be to favor the corruption to which it is subjected, and to lessen or destroy the expiatory penalty, which is the only possible profit to be drawn from it. But this doctrine is not Christian, since, according to the teachings of the Gospel, nature, although greatly impaired, is not substantially changed, and the germs of good nestle in its bosom by the side of the contrary powers. It is, therefore, our duty to regenerate it, and ameliorate it as much as possible, but not to neglect what it retains that is good, far less to exterminate it. Manichæism, and the pantheistic systems connected with it, admit, indeed, the essential malignity of the corporeal world; and not far removed from this heresy are they who, exaggerating the dogma of the Fall, presuppose that it has changed and perverted the essence of nature. Now, if the natural orders have not essentially changed, it follows, that, notwithstanding the introduction of evil, the primitive condition of the earth has not varied, and that it is always, as in the beginning, a place of probation, of progress, and of melioration to its inhabitants. The only difference there is between the primitive state and the present is, that in the beginning man had only to develop and cultivate the seeds of good, whereas now he is obliged, in addition, to extirpate those of evil which are sown among them. Hence life, which in no case could have been idle, is now not simply business, but also toil, or rather a fatiguing business, in which the duty of expiation does not essentially alter the reasons of earthly existence, or change in regard to it the universal properties of every dialectic work. This, consisting in evolving and harmonizing diversities and contrarieties, and not in annulling the sound and the positive that is found in them, is at all times the office of man on the earth; and in this respect our globe does not differ from other stations of the universe subjected to the course of ages, and to the great law of development. Now, what else is civilization, in so far as it depends on us, but the continuous development of terrestrial forces? The conclusions of Christianity, then, accord with those of a severe and profound philosophy,

which, unable to deny the coexistence of good and its opposite, must impose upon us a double correlative duty, the fulfilment of which is civilization or religion, as referred to this life or to that which is to come." — *Ibid.*, pp. 142, 143.

It is evident from these extracts, that the author holds civilization and religion to be alike divine, and that to live and labor for earthly happiness and the temporal prosperity of nations is, as far as it goes, as much to serve God, and to keep his commandments, as to live and labor for eternal beatitude. No doubt the temporal end is to be held inferior and subordinate to the eternal, but it is nevertheless equally sacred, and is not to be sacrificed to it. The two ends are both substantive, so to speak, and are to be harmonized without the destruction of either. The harmonizing of these two ends authorizes the union or alliance of the two orders, the two cultures, sacerdotal and secular, or rather is itself that very union or alliance of which we have spoken. Hence the author's condemnation of the mystics, the exaggerated (?) ascetics, and especially the old Oriental monks and the modern Jesuits, whose teaching is, that man should immolate himself to God, and earth to heaven. This teaching he cannot endure.

"Another exaggeration," he says, "is the disregard, the contempt, and hatred of profane literature, and that rich, intellectual patrimony of eloquence, taste, imagination, invention, memory, institutions, which the ancients have transmitted to us, as if the Christian religion could be the enemy of that which embellishes, consoles, strengthens, and even meliorates, humanly speaking, our mortal life, and as if the spirit of the Gospel consisted, not in the subordination and wise direction, but in the immolation, of the body to the soul, time to eternity, earth to heaven, — a supposition most foreign to that faith which is invoked to justify it, injurious to Providence, and contrary to his designs in the ideal history of the world; for civilization, although of inferior excellence, is no less divine in its principle, in its essence, and in its terminus, than religion." — *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Even Bossuet, according to our Italian Abbate, runs into intemperate ascetism, especially in his indiscriminate censure of the modern theatre, and never made sufficient account of this world. He adds in a note to his *Del Primato*, —

"A worthy French writer belonging to the clerical order, and a great admirer of Bossuet, confesses that Bossuet had a very imperfect conception of Providence, and he excuses him by casting the blame on his age. 'In the age of Bossuet,' he says, 'the opinion

of the Middle Ages which requires man to live exclusively for eternity (*qui jette l'homme entier dans l'éternité*), which treats things of time with a disdainful indifference, and holds them to be unworthy to draw down the judgments of heaven upon them, still survived.' He elsewhere asserts that Bossuet was ignorant of the true genius of modern civilization." — Tom. II. p. 403.

It is not difficult to understand what the learned, philosophical, and we wish we could add, pious author means by "intemperate," "excessive," "exaggerated," asceticism; and the doctrine he opposes to it seems to us to be plain enough. We certainly are not among those, if such there are in the Church, who regard religion as inimical to civilization, or to any thing which is really useful to men in this life. That religion promotes or creates civilization, that, so far as received and obeyed, it provides for and secures the temporal prosperity of nations, cultivates the human mind and heart, favors science and the fine arts, fosters industry, and diffuses earthly happiness, we hold to be unquestionable, and we cannot understand how any right-minded man, with ordinary information, can pretend to the contrary. Thus far we certainly have no quarrel with our author, but agree with him most fully and most heartily. But it does not do this by teaching us to set our hearts upon these things, to value them for their own sake, or to make them direct objects of pursuit. This world is not our home, and we are never permitted by religion to regard it as such. We are, *in hac providentia*, beings with one destiny, not with a twofold destiny, the one earthly, the other heavenly; and therefore earthly felicity, the temporal prosperity of nations, and the melioration of the globe and of our condition on it, are not and never can be our lawful end, or lawfully consulted, save as a means and condition, if such they are or can be, of attaining our heavenly destiny, — eternal beatitude. We are not permitted to consult them as ultimate, even in their own order, or to regard ourselves as keeping the commandments of God, because we accept and use religious authority, dogmas, and institutions for securing them. Religion knows no earthly end; it knows no end but God himself, and no good for us but in returning to him as our final cause, and beholding him in the beatific vision. It does not and cannot, therefore, allow us to distinguish an earthly destiny from the heavenly, and to make it a direct object of our affections or of our pursuit. Here, it seems to us, is the primal error of our author. He professedly considers religion only in so far as it is an in-

strument of civilization, of earthly individual and social well-being, and avowedly waives its consideration as the instrument of salvation, of eternal beatitude. This, he must permit us to say, he has no right to do, *because religion thus considered is not true religion*, and because, so considered, *it is and can be no instrument of civilization, no medium even of earthly felicity*.

Religion promotes, or, if the author chooses, creates, civilization, secures the temporal prosperity of nations, and provides for earthly felicity, only inasmuch as it draws our minds and hearts off from these things, and fixes them on God and eternal beatitude. No well-instructed Christian pretends that we secure heavenly beatitude by simply laboring for earthly happiness, eternity by devoting ourselves to time ; but just as little do we, or can we, secure earthly happiness by making it an object of pursuit, or time by devoting ourselves to time. The earthly, in so far as good, has its root in the heavenly, and time is simply the extrinsication of eternity. The author's own dialectics establish this, and all experience proves it. We lose the world by seeking it. Wealth sought for a worldly end does not enrich, pleasure does not please, knowledge does not enlighten. The fact holds true, whether you speak of the individual or of the nation. No nation, even in regard to this world, is more to be pitied, than that which places its affections on things of the earth, and its religion wholly or partially even in seeking temporal power, greatness, prosperity, and felicity. It never attains really what it seeks. Its prosperity, however dazzling it may be to the superficial beholder, is rotten within, — its apparent felicity a gilded misery ; and its highest glory is that of the ghastly and grinning skeleton dressed in festive robes and crowned with flowers, for the Egyptian banquet. Hence our Lord says, — “ If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it.”* The reason of this is obvious enough. Man can find good, temporal or eternal, only in living his normal life, and he lives his normal life only when he lives to the end for which he was intended by his Maker, that is to say, his ultimate end, which is God as the Supreme Good, the end of all things. Whenever, then, he loses sight of God as the Supreme Good in itself, or as his supreme good, he abandons the source of all good, and falls into a condition in which there is no good for him.

* St. Matt. xvi. 24, 25.

The author tells us, indeed, that he is not writing a book of devotion, and we are not so unreasonable as to ask, in a work on philosophy or on politics, an ascetic treatise ; but we must be permitted to say, that when he leaves out the consideration of religion as the instrument of celestial salvation and eternal beatitude, or the duty of seeking these, and the means, agencies, and influences by which they are gained, he leaves out all that renders religion efficient in the work of civilization, of securing earthly felicity, and the temporal prosperity of nations ; because it is only by instructing us in the principles of eternal life, by directing our minds and hearts to the gaining of our true end as the one sole business of our lives, and infusing into us the graces, and furnishing us with the helps, necessary to gain it, that religion affords us any aid in subduing barbarism, in advancing civilization, or securing the blessings of time. Considered merely as civilization, or as an agent in promoting civilization, religion is not religion, becomes merely human, and passes wholly into the secular order, and therefore necessarily loses all power or influence over it. The author, although not writing a work expressly on devotion, was, inasmuch as he presented religion as a civilizer and promoter of well-being on earth, bound to present her under that point of view in which she is able to do, and does do, what he claims, and therefore was bound to present her as the instrument of celestial salvation and eternal beatitude, since it is only because she is that instrument that she is an instrument of civilization and earthly happiness.

The author errs, as it seems to us, not as to the fact of the civilizing influence of religion, but as to the *rationale* of that fact. Christianity secures us all the goods of this life, and enhances them a hundredfold ; but she does it, not by stimulating and directing the pursuit of them, but by commanding and enabling us to immolate them, morally, to the goods of eternity. Hence our Lord says, " Be not solicitous for your life, what ye shall eat, nor for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than the food, and the body more than the raiment ? Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns, yet your Heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not ye of much more value than they ? And which of you by thinking can add to his stature one cubit ? And for raiment, why are ye solicitous ? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow ; they labor not, neither do they spin. And yet I say unto you that not even Solomon in all his glory was arrayed as one of these. Now, if God so clothe the

grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, how much more you, O ye of little faith ! Be not solicitous, therefore, saying, What shall we eat, or What shall we drink, or Wherewith shall we be clothed ? *For after all these things do the heathen seek.* For your Heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. Seek ye, therefore, first the kingdom of God and his justice, *and all these things shall be added unto you.*"* The doctrine here is too plain to be easily misapprehended. It is not, that you must seek the kingdom of God and his justice more than you seek the world, but that you are to seek them as the principle, and the world only in them and for them, as is evident from the 24th verse of the same chapter : — "No man can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will hold to the one and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." If this be so, the teaching of our Lord is plainly the immolation — the moral immolation, of course, not the physical — of ourselves to God, of the body to the soul, time to eternity, earth to heaven, — the very contradictory of Gioberti's doctrine, as we understand it, — and that when we so immolate ourselves and all secular interests to God, making a complete moral abnegation of the whole, all these things, that is, all temporal goods, in so far as goods, and of which our Heavenly Father knoweth we have need, are added to us, as our Lord here says, and as he teaches us when he tells us that "whosoever will save his life shall lose it ; and he that will lose his life for my sake shall find it." The principle we here insist upon, that earthly goods are attainable only in so far as we abnegate them, turn our backs upon them, and seek only heavenly goods, not by laboring to lay up treasures on the earth, but by laboring exclusively to lay up treasures in heaven, Gioberti seems to us to have overlooked, and hence his condemnation of the ascetics, his war against the Jesuits, his great admiration of gentile culture, of heathen civilization, and the worldly tendency and influence of his writings.

The author does not appear to us to be just to the mystics, or ascetics, for he evidently means to include among them many whom the Church has beatified, and proposes to the veneration of the faithful, — the anchorites of the Thebais, St. Anthony, St. Pachomius, St. Simon Stylites, and the Oriental monks generally, as well as some modern religious who happened

* St. Matt. vi. 25 – 33.

not to be Italians. That some pantheistic and dualistic systems have led in the pagan world to extraordinary austerities on the one hand, and a censurable quietism on the other, may or may not be true, for with them we have at present no concern; but that the asceticism found in the Church, practised by Catholics, and especially by Catholic saints, has ever been affected by any obvious or secret taint of the doctrine of the inherent malignity of matter is not true. The mortifications and self-denials practised have always had another and a truly Christian reason,—the reason, on the one hand, of discipline, and on the other, of expiation. It is a great mistake, also, to suppose that none but the active orders are useful to others than themselves. The contemplative orders are, to say the least, no less useful. Our Lord did not place Martha above Mary, and we have entirely misapprehended our holy religion, if even a St. Simon Stylites was lost to mankind by giving himself entirely to God. It will not do to forget that our temporal as well as our spiritual blessings come from God, and that he is moved to grant both by the prayers and intercessions of his saints. Moses holding up his hands in prayer contributed not less to the victory of the children of Israel over the Amalekites, than Josue, who led them forth to the battle. They who set at Jesus's feet and listen to his words choose the good part, and he loves them, and who can tell us how much he has done and daily does for us poor worldly sinners, in answer to their prayers? Perhaps, if our deserts were filled with holy hermits and devout anchorites, whose life is one unremitting prayer, the world would not be overrun with infidelity and irreligion; and we have no doubt that the prayer and mortification of a single pious contemplative, however obscure or remote from the busy haunts of men, is worth more for the conversion of the unbeliever than all that Gioberti or any other philosopher has ever written or ever will write. Doubtless, all are not called to be contemplatives; doubtless the saints have done things which are not to be proposed for the imitation of every one; but what men like our author would term extravagance, exaggeration, or sublime folly, perhaps is no extravagance, exaggeration, or folly in them, and always in proportion as we approach that which is wise in the sight of God do we approach that which is foolish in the sight of the world.

The author in his condemnation of asceticism, and in his attempt to unite the world and God, earth and heaven, time and eternity, philosophy and theology, heathenism and Christianity,

lay culture and sacerdotal, or, in a word, if he will permit us to say so, to combine the service of mammon with the service of God, seems to us to depart from his own ideal formula, no less than from the Gospel. His formula, as we understand it, asserts not the harmony of the two orders, but the absolute supremacy of the one, and the absolute subjection of the other. This formula is, *L' Ente crea l' esistenza ; Ens creat existantias* ; or, Being — that is, God — creates existences ; as we are taught in the first verse of Genesis, in the first question of the Catechism, and the first article of the Creed. It is intuitively evident to us, but is and can be presented to the mind as an object of reflection, or of distinct thought, only in language, which is in its origin a Divine revelation. We accept this formula as axiomatic, as the *primum philosophicum*, and regard the author, in having restored it to modern philosophy, vindicated its truth, and shown its secundity, as deserving the gratitude of all who wish to be able to refute scientifically sensism, pantheism, and nullism.

This formula is a synthetic judgment, *a priori*, and, like every judgment, contains three terms, the subject, the predicate, and the copula. The subject is *God*, the predicate is *existences*, and the copula is *creation*, or the creative act. The predicate *existences* is affirmable only by means of creation, for it is only *mediante* the creative act of God that existences exist, or that there are existences, as distinguishable from *Ens*, or God himself. The creative act produces them from nothing, causes them to be, and therefore their relation to God cannot be the relation of co-subsistences, or independent entities, harmonized or conciliated by a middle term, but must be that of the creature to the creator, and therefore that of absolute dependence, and hence of absolute subjection.

This ideal formula, according to the author, and in this we agree with him, is the ontological basis of all dialectics,—for the order of cognition must in all respects correspond to the order of being ; and since it is the basis of the whole created order, it must reappear in every fact of the universe, and therefore in every fact of human life. God as creator enters universally, and therefore must be represented universally as the subject, in the order of second causes. Consequently there must also always enter or be represented in the same order the other two terms, that is, predicate and copula, answering in their degree to creature and creation in the order of the first cause. Now, in relation to the question before us, the subject is the priest-

hood, the predicate is civilization, and the copula the creative act, in the order of second causes, whence the formula becomes, *The priesthood creates civilization*. Consequently, the relation of society or civilization to the sacerdotal order is that of creature to creator, and therefore that of absolute dependence, which is the assertion of the absolute subjection of the secular order, under God, to the spiritual. The two orders are not, therefore, two independent, coexisting orders, to be reconciled or harmonized one with the other by a middle term. No union, alliance, or marriage between them is supposable ; for these terms imply a certain degree of independence or autonomy on the part of the secular order in relation to the sacerdotal, which is denied by the ideal formula, and is as inadmissible as the assertion of an autonomic power on the part of existences in relation to God creating them, authorizing them to say to him, in some measure, what and with what qualities he shall or shall not make them. In demanding, therefore, as he does, the emancipation of what he calls adult nations from sacerdotal tutelage, or their civil independence, and the union of sacred and profane literature, of sacerdotal and secular culture, that is to say, in order to speak without disguise, of Christianity and gentilism, the author obviously departs from his own ideal formula, and misapplies his own dialectics.

The author very properly recognizes two cosmic cycles, the one the procession of existences, by way of creation, not emanation, from God as first cause, and the other, the return of existences, without being absorbed in him, to God as final cause. God is the final cause, as he is the first cause, of all existences, for he has created all things for himself. Now, all practical life, all manifestation of created activity, belongs to this second cycle, the return of existences to God. The end, or final cause, is the legislator,—imposes the law ; and God, as our sole end, or final cause, is therefore our sole and absolute legislator. The law he imposes is absolute, universal. God alone hath true and complete autonomy, and in the order of second causes that only is in a secondary sense autonomic which represents the subject in the ideal formula. Man before God as final cause has no more autonomy than he has before God as first cause, that is to say, none at all. He has before God, then, no rights, no independence, but is bound to absolute submission to his law. The law is the copula, the ligament that binds man to his final end, or supreme good, and is in the second cosmic cycle what the creative act is in the first ; that

is, the law in the order of *palingenesis* is what the creative act is in the order of *genesis*. As there is no physical cosmos save *mediante* the creative act of God, so is there no moral cosmos save *mediante* the law of God. As all physical existence is from God as first cause, *mediante* creation, so all moral existence is from God as final cause, *mediante* obedience to his law. Without seeking God as final cause, as his law commands, there is no proper morality, any more than there is or can be holy living, or supernatural sanctity.

The priesthood, as Catholicity teaches, is the sole depositary, guardian, and interpreter of the law of God, and therefore represents for us the sole and absolute legislator, not, of course, by virtue of the humanity of its members, but by Divine constitution, appointment, and assistance. The authority of the priesthood, then, extends to the whole of practical life, and that practical life is moral, therefore good, only inasmuch as it is submissive or obedient to the law as they promulgate and declare it. There is, then, and can be, no order of life, individual or social, that has or can have any autonomy in the face of the Church, or that is or can be pronounced morally good, save in so far as subjected to her and informed by obedience to her as representative of the authority of God as universal, absolute legislator. This, if we understand the author, is what his own dialectics require us to assert. Secular culture, then, in order to be moral, in order to have any right to be, must be the product of sacerdotal culture, receive its law and its informing spirit from the Divinely authorized priesthood, and be in all things dependent on it, and subject to it. Hence, the schism we spoke of in the beginning is not to be healed by a union of secular culture with the sacerdotal, but by the absolute subjection of the former to the latter, because the former, in so far as it does not proceed from the latter and depend on it, proceeds from human activity, not subjected to the law of God, and therefore is not moral.

We do not suppose that Gioberti really means to deny this conclusion, although much he says is not easily reconcilable with it. He earnestly contends that all civilization is of sacerdotal origin, but he seems to us to suppose that in a truly civilized state the proper office of the priesthood is restricted to the dispensation of the mysteries of religion, or the revelation of God as the superintelligible, and that the revelation of God as the intelligible is free to the lay genius, which has the right to cultivate it without any dependence on the sacerdotal order, so

long as it does not run athwart any supernatural dogma. He very properly asserts two orders of ideal truth, one the natural, or revelation of God as Idea, or the Intelligible, and the other supernatural, or the revelation of God as the Superintelligible. The former revelation is philosophy, the latter faith, objectively considered. Both are given originally in language, supernaturally infused into the human mind with language, which is itself a Divine revelation. So all science is originally a Divine revelation, not a human invention, creation, or discovery. But one part, the revelation of the Intelligible, though not naturally discoverable, is yet, when presented in language, naturally evident, that is, intuitive, or evident *per se*. Thus language is the medium through which the mind apprehends it, but not the authority on which it receives it, or assents to its truth. The other part, the revelation of the Superintelligible, being mystery, is not only apprehended through the medium of language, but is received on the authority of language alone, that is, on the authority of the hieratic language, preserved from corruption, and in its purity and integrity, by the infallible hieratic society, or priesthood.

The primitive science of both orders was transmitted without division till the epoch of the dispersion of mankind, but since that epoch, or the time of Phaleg, it has been transmitted through two different channels, the one orthodox, running through the patriarchs, the synagogue, and the Catholic Church, down to us; the other heterodox, running through the Egyptian, Hindoo, Italian, Greek, and Roman, or, in a word, pagan priest-hoods. There is a double tradition, the tradition of the supernatural revelation and of the scientific, and a double channel of tradition, the orthodox and the heterodox, or the Catholic and the pagan. In the orthodox, the Church, or the elect society, the tradition of the revelation of the *Superintelligible* has come down to us in its purity and integrity, in the infallible language or speech of the orthodox priesthood. In the pagan, it has been more or less corrupted, and wholly lost, or so travestied that it is hardly possible to detect some traces of it in the various heathen myths and fables. Yet the author seems to us to hold that the revelation of the *Intelligible*, that is, philosophy, the scientific tradition, has been transmitted in greater purity, and with fuller and grander developments, by the old heterodox or pagan priest-hoods, than by the orthodox priesthood, and that in this respect the ancient gentile world was superior, if not to the ancient, at least to the modern, orthodox world. In

other words, that the gentile culture, including philosophy and all that pertains to strictly secular life, — what we call *lay* culture, for we recognize no *priestly* character in the heathen priest-hoods, — was superior to that which attains under Christianity, and that we should now, instead of denouncing it as of the Devil, accept it, and endeavour to effect a union between it and Christianity ; and this he appears to think we may do without departing from the ideal formula, because the basis of this culture was the primitive revelation of the intelligible in language, and because it was the work of the pagan priesthoods, heterodox, indeed, and therefore without authority in the order of the supernatural truth, yet, as descending from the primitive priest-hoods, legitimate in the secular order, since the loss of religion, as the Council of Constance has defined in the case of the Wicliffites, does not forfeit secular rights.* Pagan culture, therefore, may be regarded as in some sort a sacerdotal culture, and therefore as created by the ideal, and in its turn in a degree autonomic.

“The speculative spirit,” says the author, “is feebler in the moderns than in the ancients. If we compare modern philosophy with that of Greece and India in their flourishing periods, we shall find on our side greater truth of doctrine (which, however, cannot be said of the larger number of modern thinkers), and greater rigor of analysis, but not, indeed, greater, or even equal, synthetic force and contemplative aptitude, in which philosophical genius principally consists. . . . We certainly cannot pretend that we surpass, or equal, the cultivated nations of antiquity, even in respect to moral qualities, such as nobleness of soul, fervor of sentiment, constancy of opinion and action, magnanimity of thought and deed, in a word, the several virtues which appertain to civil life. We must distinguish here, as in ideal cognition, the works of men from the effects of institutions, and in institutions themselves human inventions from the suggestions of religion. Under its religious aspects, our civilization is immeasurably superior to that of the most cultivated pagan nations, and surpasses it as much as the

* The learned author misapplies the decision of the Council. The Wicliffites contended that the prince who falls into mortal sin forfeits his civil rights, because, as they pretended, these rights depend on personal sanctity. This the Council condemned. But the cases are not parallel. The secular rights of the priesthood are the consequence of their spiritual rights, and spiritual rights are of course forfeited by heresy or apostasy. The pagan sacerdocies had, as sacerdocies, no legitimate secular rights or powers, because they were no legitimate priest-hoods at all. The members were really nothing but laymen, and had, as have Protestant ministers, only the rights and powers of laymen.

Gospel surpasses gentilism; and as religion, the supreme dominatrix, exercises her salutary influence on every department of individual and social life, there is no branch of our culture in which Christianity has not effected important meliorations. But however large the space occupied by religion, and however operative and efficacious it may be, it is not alone; by its side is found the nature of man, yielding to or resisting its action, enhancing or diminishing its beneficial effects. Civilization, being the mixt result of these principles, may give place in the same time to diverse qualities, and be at once good and bad, strong and weak, flourishing and declining, in the way of perfection and of degeneracy, as the matters on which it turns are referred to one or the other of these two causes. This distinction is of the greatest importance, and he who does not distinguish accurately between the natural elements and the Christian is in danger either of adulating the age or of calumniating religion; — and, in truth, some philosophers, like Machiavelli and Rousseau, do impute many defects of modern civilization to religion itself, mistaking excellences for defects, or confounding religion with superstition, — a monstrous paradox, which it is now no longer necessary to combat.

“The special characteristic of the modern man by the side of the ancient, if we speak merely of natural dispositions, is frivolity. This extends to manners, the sciences, literature, politics, opinions, and beliefs, and embraces and pollutes every branch of human thought and action. The ancients in their bloom, as, for instance, when the Italo-Greek civilization was at its height, have, in respect to us moderns, the same proportion that the full-grown man generally has to the boy. The men of Livy and Plutarch, in comparison with us, are more than mortals, or we are less than men; that is, in regard to force of mind, vigor, firmness, constancy, perseverance, courage, and all those qualities which are alike applicable to virtue or vice; for the ancients carried even into vice and crime a greatness unknown in modern times. Some would persuade us that this is a mere poetical illusion, and that this alleged superiority of the ancients proceeds from the *prestige* which imagination lends to distant objects, and the rhetorical art of the ancient authors. But this is not true. The facts speak for themselves, and there is here no question of style, eloquence, or rhetoric, but history; for Greek and Roman facts, narrated as rudely and as nakedly as you please, are still wonderful. Salamis, Thermopylæ, Sparta, Leuctra, Homer, Pythagoras, Socrates, Epaminondas, Timoleon, Camillus, Scipio, Fabricius, Cato, the Roman Senate, law, and jurisconsults, the games and theatres, the literature and arts, of those times, — alone perfect, because they join simplicity and polish to force, — stand as unique portents in the world; and they are so attractive, that, were it not for Christianity, and the incomparable benefits with which it has en-

riched even this life, whoever has the heart of a man, and a single generous feeling in his soul, would be disposed to murmur at Providence for having given us our birth amid the meanness and filth of the modern world. Other parts of antiquity, and even mediæval facts, are also remote in place and time, and have a certain poetic charm when embellished by the art of the historian; but nevertheless they do not approach Greek and Roman excellence. The Middle Ages are, no doubt, admirable for their Christian genius, and the people then, so far as animated by the Catholic idea, certainly surpassed the most cultivated gentile world; but I know not what there is in their annals to admire, except what they directly or indirectly derived from religion; and the modern eulogists of Feudalism, Chivalry, Gothic Architecture, and the Crusades, strike me as being little reasonable and very dull. The knightly heroes, and all those fearless or lion-hearted warriors, with their mad adventures and silly love-making, appear to me very much like those one finds in Boiardo and Ariosto, and Cervantes, who hits them off in his inimitable way, I am inclined to believe, partakes often of the philosophical historian not less than of the satirical poet. There may be something laudable in their strong muscles and reckless generosity, but assuredly they lack simplicity and common sense, and therefore true greatness. Their courage is rendered ridiculous by the lack of worthy aim, and by effort, pomp, and ostentation. We do not find in them the prudence, the naturalness, the true valor, and the sane and tranquil fury of Themistocles, Epaminondas, and Scipio, and they amongst us who revive the chivalric practices, and fancy themselves advancing the civilization of the age, only succeed in getting themselves laughed at. If you really wish to advance the age, and have really at heart to change its manners and customs, — which, by the way, is no joke, — leave the old romances and chronicles, and turn to history; add the superhuman excellences of the Gospel to the ancient spirit of Athens, Sparta, Samnium, and Rome; assemble and melt into each other Plato and Dante, Brutus and Michael Angelo, Cato and Hildebrand, Lycurgus and Charles Borromeo; fuse together these elements, which we marvel to find separated in history, so necessary are they each to the others' perfection, and cause to come forth from their fusion a new civilization, higher and more exquisite than the world has hitherto known. This should be the great endeavour of the age, and especially of us Italians." — *Introduzione*, Tom. I. cap. 2, pp. 164 – 168.

We might easily extract much more to the same purport, but this is sufficient for our present purpose, and, unless we wholly mistake the author's meaning, or unless he attaches a ridiculous importance to mere external polish, fully bears us

out in our assertion, that he holds that in civilization and strictly secular culture the heterodox and pagan world surpassed, at least the modern orthodox world, and that what is now demanded for the advancement of mankind is the union of polished gentilism and Christianity; which, since polished gentilism, in so far as it has any thing not truly of Christian origin, or not created or inspired by the orthodox priesthood, is the product of the lay genius, is the union of the lay society and the sacerdotal, of secular culture and sacerdotal culture. We are not disposed to deny that the Græco-Roman civilization retained some valuable portions of the primitive revelation in the order of the intelligible, and that these gave it a certain worth, in some respects even a certain grandeur; but we do deny that the heathen world, even in its least corrupt nations, and in its most blooming periods, retained any portions of that revelation not retained by the chosen society, or the orthodox priesthood; and it seems to us not a little strange, that a writer who makes a boast of high-toned Catholicity, and holds the Catholic priesthood to be infallibly assisted and protected by the Holy Ghost, should send us from it to an acknowledged heretical and corrupt society to find portions of truth and manifestations of virtue not to be found in that priesthood itself, assumed to have always preserved the revelation in its purity and integrity. It is not an ordinary genius that would think of sending one in search of pure water from a pure to a corrupt fountain to obtain it. Gioberti tells us, over and over again, that philosophy cannot be preserved, or successfully cultivated, outside of orthodoxy and the Catholic society, yet he sends us to the old Pythagoreans and Platonists, and among the moderns principally to Leibnitz and Reid, that is, to heathens and heretics, to study it. The men he most praises are almost without exception heretics, infidels, or at least men of very questionable orthodoxy and piety. He praises Vico, indeed, but even Vico, as we have read him in a French translation, was hardly less pantheistic as to the foundation of his thought than M. Victor Cousin, whom the author wars against. He appears to hold Malebranche in high esteem, it is true, but whether this is well or not we are unable to say, for we know Malebranche only at second hand. But Leibnitz was an eclectic, as Cousin justly asserts, and the father of German rationalism, which Gioberti condemns and refutes. Dr. Reid was a Scotch Presbyterian minister, a mere psychologist, a sort of feeble prelude to the German Kant. The Pythagoreans, as Gioberti

himself confesses, held to the heresy of the eternity of matter, and Plato he owns was a moderate pantheist. Yet it is to these impure and corrupt sources he sends us to draw the living waters which are to refresh and revivify our drooping scientific world!

We confess we are not edified by finding the Abbate proposing, as the condition of producing a higher and more perfect civilization than the world has yet known, the tempering together, or fusing into one, of "Plato and Dante, Brutus and Michael Angelo, Cato and Hildebrand, Lycurgus and Charles Borromeo." Dante would have been improved by more frequent prayer and meditation, by a more strict conformity to the teachings, the spirit, and the requirements of his religion, which would have softened the asperities of his temper, sweetened his affections, and relieved the darkness of his passions, and made him more amiable as a man, without detracting from his strength, or his sublimity as a poet; but we know not what Plato had which would have made him a more elevated or perfect character. An infusion of St. Francis of Sales, or of Fénelon, would, no doubt, have been an improvement, but not an infusion of Plato. Michael Angelo was far enough from being perfect, but we had always supposed that his defect consisted in his being too much, not in his being not enough, of a heathen, as was the case with but too many of his Italian contemporaries. What the weak-minded Brutus — if Marcus Brutus be the Brutus meant, — the ingrate, the conspirator, the assassin, the self-murderer, who conspired against his best friend, plunged his dagger into the only man worthy to govern Rome, and when defeated fell pitifully on the sword of his companion, exclaiming, "O Virtue, I have worshipped thee as a god, but I find thee an empty name!" — had which it would have been to his advantage to possess, we are quite unable to conjecture. We know nothing in Brutus to admire, unless we are prepared to instaurate the worship of the dagger, and to proclaim the right of every man to assassinate whomsoever he takes it into his head does not understand liberty as he does, or who is not favorable to what he chooses to call patriotism.

Then, what had the stoical pedant, Cato Uticensis, — the Cato we presume the author means, — stuffed with a double quantity of the superlative pride of his sect, shrinking as a poltroon from defeat, reading Plato on immortality, and cutting his own throat, — to add to the elevation, or completeness, or finish of the character of the sainted Hildebrand, the illustrious Gregory the Seventh, who, not from pride, but from humility, never

bowed but to his God, and never lost an opportunity of asserting truth and sanctity, of withstanding the lordly, royal, or imperial oppressor, or of befriending the friendless, protecting the weak and innocent, and helping the helpless, — who, when sacrilegiously driven from Rome to Salerno, bore his exile with true Christian fortitude, in resignation, and without a murmur, and exclaimed, in yielding up his pure and heroic spirit, “I have loved justice, and hated iniquity, — therefore I die in exile” ? Or what could the great Cardinal St. Charles Borromeo — the learned, polished, enlightened, wise, energetic, tender, vigilant, brave, faithful, and eminently meek and affectionate Archbishop of Milan, who conferred by his heroic virtues blessings on Italy and the world, not yet exhausted — borrow to perfect his character as a man, a prince, a priest, or a saint from the stern old Spartan lawgiver, who legalized theft, adultery, and murder, forbade whatever could charm or embellish life, and rejected every virtue not a virtue of the camp ? Really the learned and philosophic Abbate must be joking, or else he must suppose that we have forgotten to study history.

We ourselves, like most men, at some period of their lives, who have studied Greek and Roman antiquity, and read the classics, especially Livy and Plutarch, have at times been disposed to rank the Græco-Roman civilization above its merits, and, indeed, we have not long since expressed our views of it in terms not fitly chosen, and which require qualification ; but we have never dreamed of commending it in the sense in which we now understand Gioberti to approve it. The heathen standard of greatness and the Christian are different, and in all important respects diametrically opposed one to the other. Tried by the heathen standard, the great men of Livy and Plutarch had qualities which the moderns have not in an equal degree ; but tried by the Christian standard, in respect to either of the qualities demanded or tolerated by our religion, they shrink, even as men, into insignificance, before the great men of the Bollandists. The principle of heathen greatness is pride, and if pride is the principle of true greatness, we certainly ought, with Gioberti, to sympathize with and admire the Græco-Roman civilization, and to hold that in the human order it far surpassed the modern. That kind of culture which takes man instead of God for its principle, and substitutes the glory of man for the glory of God, pride for humility, and earthly pleasures for heavenly, we believe was really carried, by the

ancient Greek and Roman people, to a degree of perfection to which no modern Catholic nation has as yet succeeded in carrying it. Thus far Gioberti's doctrine is unquestionably sound and undeniable.

But when it is proposed to combine this gentile culture with the superhuman excellences of the Gospel, the question changes. The spirit of ancient Athens, Sparta, Samnium, and Rome was the spirit of the world, and proposed as the end the glory of man, individual or social, and the embellishment and enjoyment of this mundane life. Now is this spirit compatible with the spirit of the Gospel? Here is the question, and we know on Divine authority that it is not; for our Lord expressly opposes his maxims to the maxims of the gentiles, and tells us that the spirit of the gentile, the heathen, — and, let Gioberti say what he will, his favorite Italo-Greek or Pelasgic nations were heathen, — was what we have just described it to be. "For after all these things do the heathen seek," that is, what shall we eat, what shall we drink, and wherewith shall we be clothed, or, in other words, the goods and pleasures of this life. He bids us not be like them, but "seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto" us. There can be no union between the two, no alliance between pride and humility, Christ and the world. Our Lord says, Blessed are the poor in spirit, that is, the humble; the heathen adored pride. The Lord says, Blessed are they who weep; the heathen said, Blessed are they who rejoice. The Lord says, Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice's sake, and blessed are ye when men shall revile you and persecute you, and say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake; the heathen thought this a calamity, and more than flesh could endure. The Lord says, Lay not up treasures on earth, but lay up treasures in heaven; the heathen said, Lay up treasures on the earth. The Lord directed us not to look for our reward here, but to wait for it in heaven; the heathen said, Seek your reward in this world, and study to enjoy yourselves here, eat, drink, and be merry, while life lasts, for we know not what comes after it. Now, though Gioberti talks much about conciliating contraries, and harmonizing opposites, we have found in his dialectics no way by which these two opposite, contradictory spirits can be reconciled, and brought to operate in unison. The one can live only by the destruction of the other. Hence the perpetual warfare which rages in the bosom of Christian individuals and Christian nations, — a warfare

unknown for the most part in heathendom, because the heathen religion chimed in with the worldly spirit of the people. As they had broken away from the orthodox instruction, rejected the worship of God, and "liked not to have God in their knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient. Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness, wickedness, — full of envy, murder, contention, deceit, malignity, — whisperers, detractors, hateful to God, contumelious, proud, haughty, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, foolish, dissolute, without affection, without fidelity, without mercy. Who, having known the justice of God, did not understand that they who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they who do them, but they also who consent to them that do them."* This is the description which an inspired Apostle gives us of the heathen, and therefore of Gioberti's noble Italo-Greeks, and we can easily understand from it that there should have been in their case a completeness and roundness of character, reference had to the order of character to which it belonged, a proportion between their religion and the daily life of the people, which we cannot find or expect to find among Christians, on the one hand striving after the supernatural virtues of the Gospel, and on the other drawn away by their corrupt nature in the opposite direction, towards the vices, the crimes, and the abominations of the heathen.

The author tells us, that in civilization there is, besides the religious element, the human element, and his pretence is, no doubt, that the human element of civilization was more perfect among the cultivated Gentiles than it is among the moderns. This view we ourselves took when we wrote the essay in our number for July, 1849, on *The Church in the Dark Ages*; but the study of Gioberti's own dialectics which we have since made has of itself served to convince us that it is not true, and that the Christian cannot consistently entertain it. Civilization he makes the creation of the priesthood, and, as we have seen, he identifies it with religion; then in civilization proper there is and can be no human element distinguishable from the religious; for it is only as instructed and informed by the sacerdotal culture that man is, or can be, *civilized* man. The sum total of the life of a so-called civilized country is, no doubt, a mixed result, composed of a religious and a human element, but

* Rom. i. 28 – 32.

this life, in so far as distinguishably human, is defective, and not yet civilized. Thus far religion has not been able to subdue the human element, and transform its acts into religious acts, therefore into civilized acts. If the priesthood creates civilization, then civilization cannot be a mixed result of the human and Divine, in any other sense than is religion itself as exhibited by men a mixed result, but must be a pure result of the religious element acting on and subduing the human. Then, again, if man is in his normal state only in the Catholic society, how can it be possible for the human element to attain a more perfect and exquisite development out of that society, and therefore, as Gioberti contends, as well as we, disjoined from the true human race, — the human race living in the unity of the ideal, therefore in communion with God, — than it can or does in that society itself? If this were so, we should be obliged to assume that the abnormal is more perfect and exquisite than the normal, — a monstrous paradox.

We are pained to be obliged to remark, that Gioberti nowhere, so far as we can discover, recognizes the influence in promoting civilization of the sacramental principle of our religion. As far as we have been able to ascertain, he holds that religion operates as dogma and government, as doctrine and authority, but we do not find that he recognizes in it any other mode of civilizing action. Now he places the seat of barbarism in the flesh, as well as we, and he attempts to identify civilization with religion, for the reason, among others, that it gives man a dominion over instinct, passion, the body. But religion can, in this view of the case, promote civilization only by the means she adopts to give us a victory over the flesh, in which are the seeds of barbarism. These means are not simply dogma and precept, for the devils know these, and believe and tremble, but joined to these mortification, prayer, meditation, and the sacraments, as set forth in an excellent tract entitled *Influence of Catholic Prayer on Civilization*, by Father Tapparelli, translated from the Italian, and published in this journal for July, 1848. The surest way to destroy barbarism is to destroy its cause, or to dry up its fountain. This is done, as far as it can be done, by the practice of asceticism, and the purity and strength obtained from the sacraments, especially, after Baptism, from Penance and the holy Eucharist. After all, then, the devout mystics, and the pious ascetics, who, in the view of Gioberti, are rather the enemies than the friends of civilization, take necessarily as such the most, and, we may

add, the only, effectual way of advancing or securing it. No doubt there are evangelical counsels distinguishable from evangelical precepts, and we are far from pretending that, in strict law, we are all obliged to lead the life of the religious. The life of seculars is lawful, but that of the religious is higher and more perfect, and the nearer we approach its elevation and perfection, the better for us, and the better our influence on the world, both for time and eternity.

We intended to offer something more, and we may resume the discussion hereafter, but for the present we must content ourselves with what we have already said. We frankly acknowledge that on many points we have been enlightened by reading Gioberti's writings, and had we not read them, we could hardly have given the statement we have of the truth opposed to his errors; we also acknowledge, nay, contend, that his errors do not necessarily grow out of his fundamental philosophy, but are distinguishable from it, and in fact opposed to it. They have another origin, and ought not to lead us to reject the philosophy itself, because he has bound them up with it. Nevertheless, as these errors chime in with the grand heresy of our age, — that is, the secularization of Christianity, the rehabilitation of the flesh, the revival of paganism, and the conceptions of the carnal Jews, who expected a temporal prince and temporal prosperity, instead of a spiritual ruler and the salvation of the soul, — they are precisely that in his writings which will give them their popularity with the mass of readers, and determine their practical influence, and therefore are exceedingly dangerous. They seem also to indicate the practical results the author has had in view in writing his philosophy. Hence, however sound may be the philosophy itself, the author's writings cannot be safe, and we have felt it our duty to admonish our readers to be on their guard against them.

As to Gioberti himself, while we have not spared him where we have thought him wrong, we have aimed to treat him with candor and respect. It is possible that he began writing with good intentions, with the sincere and earnest desire to promote the cause of truth and piety; but the tone and style of his works are not such as to win our confidence in him as a sincere, humble, and devout Catholic priest. They are laical; and his spirit is proud, his bearing haughty and disdainful. He strikes us as a politician, or as a man of the world, rather than as a spiritual father. We miss in his writings that unction which so charms us in Fénelon, and especially in St. Francis

of Sales, and we cannot help feeling that he has spent an undue proportion of his time in studying philosophy and profane literature, and has reserved himself too little to spend at the foot of the crucifix in prayer and meditation. We are sorry to think so, for we see in him a man whom God has endowed with extraordinary gifts, and who might be an honor to his country, and a useful servant of the Church ; but so we must think, till he breaks his present silence, submits to the Holy Father, responds to the affectionate entreaty of Pius the Ninth, and sets himself earnestly at work to purge his writings of their mischievous errors.

ART. II. — 1. *Sermons on the Obedience of Faith.* By the Right Rev. SILLIMAN IVES, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of North Carolina.

2. *Pastoral Letter on the Priestly Office.* By the same.

3. *Pastoral Letter on the Salisbury Convention.* By the same.

4. *A Voice from Connecticut.* By SAMUEL FARMER JARVIS, D. D., Historiographer of the Protestant Episcopal Church.

5. *Auricular Confession in the Protestant Episcopal Church.* By a Protestant Episcopalian.

6. *The History of the Confessional.* By JOHN HENRY HOPKINS, D. D., Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont.

OUR readers must not imagine that we have undertaken to furnish them with a bookseller's catalogue ; we have only placed on our list a few out of many publications which have been recently issued on the great controversy concerning Confession. This has been chiefly an internal dispute in the Protestant Episcopal Church, occasioned, we imagine, by the efforts made on the other side of the Atlantic to restore the practice in the Established Church of England, of which a distinguished advocate (Mr. Maskell) has recently passed to our communion. The Protestant Episcopal Bishop of North Carolina, a few years since, became an ardent supporter of the same views, which he urged on the consideration of his hearers throughout his diocese. The publication of his sermons gave form and consistency to the reports which were spread abroad of his Roman tendencies, and notwithstanding the caution with which he expressed himself, and the protection which he sought

under the bulwarks of the English Establishment, he was denounced at home and abroad, by presbyter and layman, as a dangerous innovator. A North Carolina Senator of the United States rebuked his assumption; a presbyter of the diocese and a New York presbyter, a native of North Carolina, undertook to refute him; the aged historiographer of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States sent forth his warning voice, with oracular solemnity, from Connecticut; the late editor of *The Churchman* resumed his pen to trace the precise limits of the midway course to be pursued between orthodoxy and Protestantism; and last, not least, the chivalrous Bishop of Vermont appeared on the battle-ground, encased in the ponderous armour of antiquity, to make a diversion by attacking the Roman camp, instead of leading back his too adventurous fellow-knight, who was incautiously advancing in that direction.

We regret that decision and firmness have been wanting, on the part of Bishop Ives, throughout this whole controversy. Although he exposed himself to considerable censure by recommending confession as a salutary practice, in some instances necessary, he shrank from the odium of inculcating its absolute necessity, in virtue of the Divine ordinance, and sheltered himself beneath the English rubrics, and the authority of Anglican divines. Now and then he ventured to refer to the power of forgiveness granted by Christ, and condemned "that presumption which leads neglecters and violators to trust for pardon to a vague and general repentance, a repentance not accepted by the representatives of Christ, who alone have charge of the discipline of his Church, or the power to remit or retain sins." * He asked with earnestness, "How can the merits of Christ be applied now except through that priestly judgment, intercession, and absolution, authorized and made binding by his express commission, 'Whosoever sins ye remit,' &c.?" † He insisted that confession is "a remedy for sin, which the experience of the one Catholic and Apostolic Church has ever sanctioned." ‡ He ventured to affirm that it was, in some cases at least, indispensable. § But he had not courage clearly and unequivocally to avow that it was Divinely commanded. On the contrary, not content with the qualifying terms

* *Pastoral Letter on the Priestly Office*, p. 24.

† *Sermon on Self-examination*, p. 113.

‡ *Sermon, Obedience the Way to Knowledge*, p. 151.

§ *Sermon, The Case of the Baptized without Self-discipline*.

of Sales, and we cannot help feeling that he has spent an undue proportion of his time in studying philosophy and profane literature, and has reserved himself too little to spend at the foot of the crucifix in prayer and meditation. We are sorry to think so, for we see in him a man whom God has endowed with extraordinary gifts, and who might be an honor to his country, and a useful servant of the Church; but so we must think, till he breaks his present silence, submits to the Holy Father, responds to the affectionate entreaty of Pius the Ninth, and sets himself earnestly at work to purge his writings of their mischievous errors.

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5. *Auricular Confession in the Protestant Episcopal Church.* By a Protestant Episcopalian.
6. *The History of the Confessional.* By JOHN HENRY HOPKINS, D. D., Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont.

OUR readers must not imagine that we have undertaken to furnish them with a bookseller's catalogue; we have only placed on our list a few out of many publications which have been recently issued on the great controversy concerning Confession. This has been chiefly an internal dispute in the Protestant Episcopal Church, occasioned, we imagine, by the efforts made on the other side of the Atlantic to restore the practice in the Established Church of England, of which a distinguished advocate (Mr. Maskell) has recently passed to our communion. The Protestant Episcopal Bishop of North Carolina, a few years since, became an ardent supporter of the same views, which he urged on the consideration of his diocese throughout his diocese. The publication of his form and consistency to the of his Roman tendency which he expressed

which were interwoven with his strongest phrases, he openly declared that "private confession is not regarded by his branch of the one Catholic Church as generally necessary to salvation."* This weakness and hesitancy can scarcely merit sympathy. The imperfection of his mental vision is the only excuse which charity can suggest for a course of conduct utterly inconsistent with the general character of the effort to re-establish the practice. If he were convinced that confession is a necessary condition for the exercise of the power of forgiveness, he should have stated it broadly and openly; if he judged it to be a mere disciplinary observance, — a medicinal appliance to diseased souls, — he might have recommended it; but he should scarcely have disturbed the tranquillity of his diocesans by insisting on its adoption.

It is an undeniable fact that the English *Book of Common Prayer* contains an exhortation to the communicants to confess any weighty matter which may disturb the tranquillity of their conscience, with a view to obtain absolution as well as comfort. Dr. Hopkins is of opinion that this rubric was inserted "to favor the feelings and habits of a large proportion of the nation, in whose judgment the principles of the Reformation had not yet become fully established"; or rather, "to agree as far as possible with the system of the German Reformers, Luther and Melancthon, who called absolution a sacrament, and required auricular confession and priestly absolution of every one, as a regular preparative for the Eucharist." Whichever motive influenced the compilers of the *Book of Common Prayer*, their work is, in this respect, true to its general character, — equivocal and vague, — so that it may be employed by the advocates of confession, which it insinuates and recommends, and by its opponents, since by implication it denies its necessity. Dr. Hopkins bitterly laments that the rubric was inserted, and rejoices in the expurgated American ritual, which Dr. Jarvis shows to have been the result of compromise. To every unbiased mind it must be manifest that no argument can be derived from the English rubric in support of the practice, save as a relief for weak minds, and as the last vestige of a rite which the spirit of innovation sought to abolish. It may serve to recall those who glory in the recollections of the Anglo-Saxon Church to earlier and better times, when the clergy and faithful people sought relief for their distressed souls in the tri-

* *Pastoral Letter on the Salisbury Convention.*

bunal of penance, and with contrite hearts confessed their sins before they approached the Holy Table. The absolution, in a deprecatory form, which is still pronounced after the people have acknowledged that "they have done what they ought not to have done, and have left undone what they ought to have done," corresponds with the prayer which the Catholic priest pronounces before he administers communion ; but it is not an exercise of the absolving power, so that with Protestant Episcopalians there remains not even the shadow of that power, which Bishop Pearson regarded as distinguishing the Church of Christ from the followers of the Novatian heresy. It is not easy to understand how it is that the revised prayer-book varies, notwithstanding, in no essential matter from the formularies of the mother Church of England.

Although Dr. Hopkins professes to have undertaken his work, because "no author in the English language had hitherto treated the subject as extensively as its importance deserves," we notice some omissions of authorities, even of some quoted by his predecessors in the controversy. St. Irenæus, whose testimony is recited by the anonymous writer, speaks of women who for a time had followed the heretic Marcus :—"These, often converted to the Church of God, confessed that, having their bodies exterminated, as it were, by him, and influenced by lust, they loved him to excess." Of another he says :—"Penetrated with grief, she spent her whole time in confessing and bewailing her sins, (*in exomologesi*,) and lamenting the crime which she had been led by this magician to commit." The answer given to these testimonies is far from being satisfactory. *Exomologesis*, it is said, on the authority of Tertullian, is a public act, and the confession was a general one, imposed by ancient discipline ; but Dr. Hopkins informs us that the system of canonical penance, of which public confession formed a part, was not regulated by any formal code until the fourth century. True, he maintains that it existed in substance in the days of Tertullian ; but if this be admitted, it necessarily follows that, before any special legislation on this head, penance, as it was afterwards formally prescribed, was practised in virtue of the great principles of Christian doctrine. The prominent place which confession occupied is manifest from its being chosen as characteristic of the whole process. It can scarcely be contended—and certainly it cannot be proved—that public confession was generally required, at that early period, if indeed at any time, in regard to secret sins ; so that, as

confession of some kind was necessary, the inference is in favor of private or auricular confession. This may have often been followed by public demonstrations of sorrow on the part of those who, like the deluded followers of Marcus, had given scandal by their adherence to an heretical teacher. They may have been induced to make a public avowal, in order to unmask the teacher of error, when urged to it as a duty by a confidential adviser, such as a confessor ; but if private confession was not practised, it is difficult to suppose that any would have followed their own sense of duty so far as to make so humiliating an acknowledgment. Origen, in effect, warns the sinner to use great care in selecting his spiritual physician, that, in case he should judge proper that his disorder should be stated and healed in the presence of the assembled church, it might be done with profit and edification. The observation of Dr. Hopkins, that any prudent Christian, having experience, may be meant by this physician, is refuted by another passage, in which Origen describes the penitent as "not blushing to confess his sin to the priest of the Lord." From a comparison of these various testimonies, it is evident that private confession regarded all sins without distinction, and that public confession was confined to such as might be declared before all without scandal, or danger to one's self or others. When, in the fifth century, some endeavoured to enforce the open confession of secret sins, St. Leo rebuked the rash attempt, and declared that it was sufficient to confess them to the priests of the Lord in private.*

We are willing, however, to meet Dr. Hopkins on his own ground, and we leave him to choose whether public or private confession be meant by the early fathers ; it is enough for us that confession — the acknowledgment of special sins — was demanded. We ask him how he can dispense with public and private confession, when, long before any ecclesiastical enactment was passed to this effect, confession of some kind was urged under the most awful penalty. Exomologesis, according to Tertullian, implied "the falling down before the priests, the kneeling to the beloved of God," "a manifestation of one's self, which many through a false shame delayed from day to day, consulting more for their feelings than for their salvation, like those who conceal from the physician their secret maladies." Its necessity was such, that the stern moralist address-

* *Ep. ad Universos Episcopos*, Tom. I. p. 356.

es the reluctant sinner, — “If you hesitate to confess, think on hell, whose flames are quenched by confession.” This evidently implies its absolute necessity, which, as none assert it concerning public confession, — at that time not prescribed by any canon, — must be understood of that which is auricular. It is impossible to restrict what Tertullian and the other fathers have written on this subject to confession made to God in secret. He, indeed, calls it “confession to the Lord,” because it is made in the Divine presence, and with a view to obtain pardon from God. “This act,” he says, “is *exomologesis*, whereby we confess our sin to the Lord, not indeed as if he knew it not, but inasmuch as satisfaction is prepared for by confessions. Penance proceeds from confession, and God is appeased by penance.”* This implies self-manifestation, “*publicationem sui*,” which — since, as we have shown, it does not extend to a public confession — must mean the disclosure of our sins to our spiritual physician. This passage may throw light on many others which we meet with from time to time in various fathers, who speak of confession of sin to God, plainly meaning that which is made to his ministers, in compliance with his command. It is of this St. Cyprian speaks, when he explains the practice of confession in regard to ordinary sins, and insists strongly on the criminality of admitting to communion those who had abjured the faith, and had not atoned by penance. “Since sinners guilty of lesser sins do penance during a suitable time, and come to confession according to the order of discipline, and receive the right to communicate by the imposition of hands of the bishop and clergy; now in a time of peril, whilst the persecution still continues, peace not being yet restored to the Church, these men are admitted to communion, and their name is recited; and before they have done penance, before they have made a confession, before the hand of the bishop and clergy has been laid on them, the Eucharist is given them, although it be written, ‘Whosoever shall eat of the bread or drink of the chalice of the Lord unworthily shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord.’”† This abuse called for strong condemnation from Cyprian, who exhorted the faithful to confess their sins whilst confession made to the priests of the Lord is acceptable.

The term *exomologesis*, used by all these ancient writers, is borrowed from the Acts, in which the verb from which it is

* *De Pœnit.*, Sect. IX.

† *Ep. ad Clerum.*

formed is used in regard to the believers who, on witnessing the visitation of God on the sons of Sceva, came forward to the Apostles, "confessing their deeds," * and evincing the sincerity of their compunction by consigning to the flames a vast amount of superstitious books which they had in their possession. Bloomfield and other Protestants admit that they made a special acknowledgment, not only of the sin of magic, but of other sins, and the perfect participle, which is employed, denotes that they were persons who had long since come to the faith; yet Dr. Hopkins, with this fact under his eye, boldly asserts that "there is no example in the Acts of persons confessing their sins, after baptism, either to the Apostles or to any one else." St. Basil thought otherwise, since he alleges this example in support of the principle, that "we must confess our sins to those who are intrusted with the dispensation of the mysteries of God." † But Dr. Hopkins does not hesitate to say, "he was plainly mistaken"; and yet he has ventured to designate the illustrious doctor as his tenth witness!

In the selection of his witnesses he has not been fortunate; but the confidence with which he calls them his own may deceive some readers. His first witness is Tertullian, who insists on confession under threats of hell-fire. The second is Cyprian, who states that persons guilty of sins far less heinous than apostasy must confess them, and extols those who reveal their sinful thoughts. The third is Lactantius, who makes our hope of pardon depend on our satisfying God by confessing our sins, and gives confession and penance as the characteristics distinguishing the true Church from pseudo-Catholic conventicles.

If a father of the Church speak of the forgiveness of sin by God, Dr. Hopkins hastily concludes against the delegated power of the priesthood, and wrests most unscrupulously to an unnatural meaning other passages which clearly affirm it. Thus has he distorted its emphatic vindication by St. Ambrose, and referred to the public reconciliation of penitents what is said, without restriction, of sacerdotal absolution. He might have learned the necessity of confession from this admirable passage: — "If thou wilt be justified, confess thy sin: for the modest confession of sins looses the bonds of crime." ‡ Of this saint his contemporary biographer relates that he wept in receiving confessions, so as to move the penitent to tears, and that he communicated only with God on the sins declared to him. Most

* Acts xix. 18.

† Inter. 288.

‡ L. 11, *de Penit.*, c. VI.

truly he avowed that in loosing the sinner he was guilty of no usurpation, but on the contrary obeyed a Divine command.*

St. Jerome has employed the well-known similitude of the physician, used by Origen and Tertullian, to enforce the acknowledgment of sin to our brother and master, since medicine cannot be applied to an unknown disease; and has ascribed to the priesthood the right of prejudging the cases of sinners, that they may escape the final judgment. Dr. Hopkins twists and turns his expressions, and still calls him his witness, as if he hoped by the boldness of his assertions to obscure the splendor of his testimony in favor of confession. With St. Augustine he deals less reservedly. Although he also is claimed, his principles in regard to penitential inflictions cannot pass without positive reprobation. "Now here Augustine advances a principle, which, I am bound to say, is equally unscriptural and dangerous. From this false principle thus advocated by Augustine sprang all the corruptions of satisfaction to God as a part of penitence. . . . Here is the root of a dangerous delusion." Yet the very principle here referred to is expressly laid down by Tertullian, in a passage which Dr. Hopkins has recited; and both, nevertheless, are witnesses in his behalf! Let our readers imagine to themselves a lawyer offering to prove his case by evidence. "Gentlemen of the jury," he cries, "I shall prove you my client's case by a number of most respectable witnesses." Yet on hearing their testimony he qualifies his commendation by observing that one is plainly mistaken, another utters a gross absurdity, a third is a fool or knave.

The Divine obligation of confession is not a mere inference from the power of binding or loosing, forgiving or retaining sins; it is directly proved from the perpetual practice of the Church. The usage was prior to the writing of the Gospels, being the exercise of the ministry of reconciliation which Christ intrusted to his Apostles. The fact is fairly deducible from the avowal of Calvin that "the usage is most ancient," † and the manifest impossibility of establishing it without a Divine sanction. If the Apostles had not required it, could their successors have made it a condition of forgiveness? The difficulty of inducing men to disclose their prevarications shows that the general recognition of the obligation must have been the result of the im-

* This is the meaning of "*servimus imperio*," which Dr. Hopkins has rendered, not felicitously, "*serve his government*."

† *Inst.*, Lib. III. c. IV. n. 7.

memorial teaching of the prelates of the Church uninterruptedly from the Apostles. Individuals may choose to reveal their griefs to a confidential friend ; some may venture to make known their worst disorders ; but these rare occurrences cannot account for a usage so general as that of confession, connected with the universal persuasion of its necessity. The commission given to the Apostles is the only satisfactory explanation of its origin ; and the argument thence derived serves to support the usage, which is by no means the result of constructive interpretation. Confession is of Divine obligation, because it has always been recognized as a necessary condition for the exercise of the discretionary power of forgiveness granted to the Apostles. It is in vain for Dr. Hopkins to cavil at the analogies employed by St. Thomas Aquinas in illustration of this duty, which to others may not appear quite so absurd. "Boetius," he remarks, "in his book on Consolation, says, if you desire the aid of the physician, you must manifest to him your disease : now it is necessary for salvation that man receive the remedy of his sins ; therefore it is necessary for salvation to disclose his disease in confession. Moreover, in civil tribunals the judge is different from the culprit : now the spiritual tribunal is the prelate ; therefore the sinner, who is the culprit, should not be his own judge, but should be judged by another ; and so should confess to him."* It is easier to sneer at these analogies than to point out their unfitness. But in what language shall we express our disgust at the boldness of the critic who ventures unblushingly to assert that the Angelic Doctor, in his endeavours to support the doctrine of the Church by analogies, "exhibits an example of the most flagitious private judgment, not to be surpassed in the whole history of heresy" !

It must always puzzle those who deny that confession was practised in the Apostolic age to account for its introduction at any subsequent period, and for its general prevalence prior to any legislation on this subject. The first general enactment enforcing it was that of the Fourth Council of Lateran, in 1215. No one can seriously pretend that it was then first established or introduced, since even Bishop Hopkins has gathered together decisive passages from the fathers, in which its necessity is positively affirmed. Nearly eight centuries before, St. Leo wrote that it is sufficient to confess secretly to the priests alone,

* III. *Par. Suppl.*, Qu. VI. Art. 1.

which, in far plainer terms, Basil had previously declared to be necessary.

The argument which Dr. Hopkins derives from the statements of Fleury concerning the period at which confession was enjoined is a weapon which turns back on him with destructive power. The enactments do not bear the character of mere positive laws ; they enforce a recognized duty, — they add canonical penalties as sanctions of existing obligations. Since it is proved that confession was inculcated and practised ages before, it must have its foundation in the doctrine of Christ himself, — in the power of forgiveness which he delegated to his Apostles.

When the nature of sacramental confession is considered, we should not expect to find the same striking evidences of the practice as are furnished of solemn acts of public worship. It is a private and confidential communication of the penitent with the priest. The necessity and frequency of the usage depend on the special condition of the conscience of each individual ; and the fact of having confessed becomes known only as far as the penitent chooses to manifest it. In ages of persecution it was not advisable to erect public confessionals, the chair of instruction being easily adapted to the purpose. In the Roman catacombs, however, stone chairs are found in a position which favors the belief that they served as confessionals ; whence arose a foul calumny of the heathens, from the humble posture in which penitents were sometimes discovered kneeling before the sacred ministers.* The works of casuists, and books for the use of penitents, did not then exist, because all was conducted with the utmost simplicity, with reference to the Gospel maxims, which each priest applied according to his best judgment. Since ecclesiastical laws have been multiplied, and theologians have discussed moral principles in great detail, the study of moral theology in connection with the confessional has become extensive and somewhat intricate. These aids and appendages — the results of progressive study and legislation — could not be expected at a time when scarcely any thing was committed to writing but apologies addressed to the persecutors, or instructions regarding the first principles of ecclesiastical organization, or other matters rendered necessary by circumstances. The sacred ministers learned their duties chiefly by oral instruction from more experienced priests, and the faith-

* Minucius Felix.

ful confessed their sins according as their conscience reproached them with delinquency against the Divine law, or the injunctions of their lawful superiors. Nevertheless, their delicate sense of the obligation, even in the early ages, appears from the testimony of St. Cyprian, who extols the piety of those who confessed having entertained the thought of adopting some unlawful stratagem to escape persecution. "How superior in faith, and better in fear, are those who, although defiled by no act of sacrifice, or certificate of conformity, since however they thought of it, confess this very thing with sorrow and simplicity to the priests of God." *

The popular argument against confession, namely, its corrupt tendency, is presented by Dr. Hopkins in a manner wholly inconsistent with his fair professions of basing his arguments on the evidence acknowledged by ourselves. Despite of this declaration, he adopts the Jansenist Pascal's caricatures of Jesuit teaching, and gives them as correct pictures of the general principles of confessors, in order to lead his readers to believe that the practical influence of the confessional is to sanction licentiousness, perjury, and bloodshed. We can pity the blind prejudice of the man who sincerely believes that such is the fact; but we should feel contempt for his hypocrisy, did we suppose that he affected soft tones and honeyed accents only more effectually to mislead the unsuspecting by the aid of satirists and slanderers. The Jesuits whom Pascal traduced were eminent for learning, piety, and zeal, and their lives were a splendid refutation of the relaxed system of morality which they were supposed to patronize. Voltaire himself could not deny that the Society had produced men of extraordinary merit, and that even in his day it numbered many such among its members. Their general reputation was that of exemplary men, whose conduct defied reproach. If any of them erred in theological speculations, it was owing to their solicitude not to multiply the obstacles to salvation, by condemning what admitted of probable justification. The mild system which most of them defended was subsequently advocated by St. Alphonsus de Liguori, whose purity of life and zeal for the salvation of souls are celebrated throughout the whole Church. It would have been more becoming in Dr. Hopkins to have used his works to show the practical operation of the confessional, although even these are misunderstood by the carnal-minded, who confound moderation of sentiment with relaxation and indulgence.

* *Lib. de Lapsis.*

We ask the calm attention of our readers to the fact, that St. Alphonsus de Liguori — although, from the innocence of his life, unacquainted with vice — studied the science of morals in all its most disgusting details, and discussed every most delicate question in a body of moral theology, composed for the use of the missionaries of the congregation which he founded, and of priests generally. All those points which the Jesuit Vasquez treated of in his work on marriage, to the great annoyance of persons of refined sensibilities, are brought under review by the saint, and closely examined. It is beyond a doubt that he himself had the most delicate sense of purity, and shunned with extreme caution whatever might sully his virginal innocence. As a religious superior he was jealous, in the highest degree, of the purity of the members of his institute ; as a bishop, he watched over the morals of his clergy with unceasing solicitude. Can we suppose that he put into their hands a book calculated to tarnish their conscience, and to enable them to tamper with those who might seek their guidance ? Since he has examined with so much minuteness every possible deviation from virtue, — since he has taken the pains to qualify each sinful act, — since his eye has pierced the nuptial veil, and his hand has traced what is lawful and what is forbidden in the matrimonial relations, — we must be convinced that his long experience in the confessional — reaching beyond half a century — taught him that the accurate knowledge of all these details is highly important for the direction of souls, and that it can be acquired and used without detriment to the virtue of the spiritual physician. It may be perilous to the weak and to the self-confident, but the danger is remote for those who, in the fear of God, study the greatness of human disorders with a view to apply suitable remedies. How many weak youths were won to holy purity by the secret exhortations of St. Philip Neri, whose purity of life appeared in the words of admonition which he uttered ! How many lost ones were drawn to the confessional by the preaching of St. Alphonsus, there to experience the power of Divine grace, stopping the issue which no medicine could heal, and imparting strength unattainable by mere human effort !

The questions put by the confessor are referred to by the two writers whom we have before us as an immediate occasion of revolting abuses. Do they suppose that it is the practice of confessors to question penitents generally on all possible deviations from the code of morals ? They should know that confession is a duty of the penitent, to aid whom interrogatories

are occasionally used, only as far as they may be deemed necessary, according to the age, sex, and circumstances of each individual. If a child presents himself, the innocence of his heart is not endangered by any inopportune question; whilst the hoary sinner, whose iniquities are multiplied above the hairs of his head, often desires the aid of his spiritual father to recount over the transgressions of his misspent years. The chaste virgin is not assailed with interrogatories, such as may sometimes be necessary to probe the deep wounds of the child of misfortune. In the Ritual, discretion, reserve, and caution are strongly inculcated to confessors, whilst brevity and modesty are prescribed to penitents. We can safely appeal to the general experience of all who practise confession, who will testify that it is conducted with the utmost delicacy, and that its tendency is to produce a loathing of sin, and a love for virtue.

The horror which some affect for the mention of sins alluded to in tables for self-examination, and more fully discussed in theological works, is truly Pharisaical. They read with eagerness the most morbid descriptions in popular novels; they enter into all the revolting details of unnatural crimes which the newspapers furnish; they witness without remorse the most exciting exhibitions; and yet they shudder at the idea of the possibility of certain sins in the present advanced state of civilization and morals! Alas for poor human nature! What crime is there on record that cannot find its counterpart in our age and country? It is much if the moral sentiment be maintained, and public decorum respected; but it is vain to deny that individual frailty is extreme. We have no wish to depreciate the morals of the community; we will consent to regard the sins referred to in our prayer-books as mere possibilities; but we deny the prudence of keeping them wholly out of view, lest some who may have transgressed blind themselves to the malice of their acts, and go forward in the career of perdition. From what sources, we ask, have these details been derived? Is it not from those very Scriptures which are put into the hands of children, of either sex, from an early age? Do our books designed for popular use represent those excesses as vividly as St. Paul? Do not our theologians themselves follow closely on the track marked out by the Apostle, as well as by Moses? Can any thing be found in the discrimination of what is lawful and what is forbidden, as given in theological works, so exciting as the plain narrative of unnatural crimes presented by the Sacred Historians?

St. Chrysostom justly remarks that St. Paul, writing to the Romans, found it necessary to speak of unnatural crimes with sufficient distinctness to be understood, and yet so as not to shock modesty by its plainness, — two qualities which it is extremely difficult to combine; “for if you speak with delicacy, you can scarcely make your hearer feel his guilt, so that, if you aim at making him deeply sensible of it, you must clearly and distinctly attack vice. This prudent and holy soul succeeded in uniting both qualities, rebuking the sinner in the name of outraged nature, yet using a kind of veil that modesty should appear in the manner of his speech.”* The prudence and delicacy of the Apostle are closely imitated by confessors. They do not ordinarily put questions concerning the heathenish vices against which he inveighs; but they listen to the sad narrative which the sinner makes of his own offences, and they warn him of the punishments which await him who, with the knowledge and grace of the Christian dispensation, degrades himself by excess. The confessional thus presents an opportunity for reproving vice without exposing it to the public gaze, and of inspiring a loathing for sin without naming it, the accusation of the sinner affording the ground for the paternal admonition of the confessor.

Some points of morality are by general consent banished from the pulpit, which, nevertheless, the Holy Ghost has marked in the plainest terms in the Scripture, adding most awful facts to impress them.† For the thousands who cannot read, and others who have not adverted to these special passages, these facts and principles are utterly unavailing, except through the confessional. Conscience, indeed, if free from improper influence, might discover the wickedness of certain practices; but unhappily she is easily blinded, and her still, small voice is unheeded by many who present an exterior marked by the strictest regard for morality. Others struggle with their convictions, half stifle remorse, and for want of counsel live on in partial blindness and interior conflict. Although it is not the duty or practice of confessors to interrogate unnecessarily on matters of this kind, the penitent here finds an opportunity for relieving mental anxiety, and learns that the natural law and the Divine are above all considerations of human respect, personal inconvenience, sickness, and poverty. From the reserve of confessors, it still happens that some who frequent the tribu-

* *In Ep. ad Rom.*, iv.

† Gen. xxxviii.

nal live on in a state which God has marked in the Scriptures as very wicked ; but how much more frequent must this culpable delusion be in those who have no one whom they dare consult on matters of such extreme delicacy ! The holiness of the tribunal and of the place, the sacredness of the office, inspire a confidence which in no other circumstances can be entertained.

We regard it as a counsel of Divine Providence that the confessional has become the chief matter of controversy in this age and country. The foul vituperation of its assailants serves to direct attention to the strictness of our moral code, which regulates the most delicate relations of human life, and with nice discrimination determines right and wrong in thought, word, and action. The turpitude of sin is inherent : it is not the result of theological inquisition, or of the scrutiny of the confessional.

The formularies of confession which Bishop Hopkins has collected from the Middle Ages show that sins of all kinds were considered to be matter of accusation, whenever the conscience of the penitent reproached him with their commission. It cannot, indeed, be supposed that the bishops, to whom several of these formularies are ascribed, were guilty of the enormities which they detail ; but it is likely that they were composed by them, or by their authority, for the direction of penitents, who might appropriate to themselves such portions of them as they found applicable to their own case. It is quite improbable that each one recited the entire formulary, accusing himself in general terms of every kind of sin ; for this would imply falsehood, and would amount to nothing, the formulary being common to all. They served, we imagine, the same purpose as modern tables of sins, and were used with such modifications as the individual found necessary to represent the real state of his conscience. Questions directed to this end are prescribed in the penitential work of John the Faster, who sat in the patriarchal chair of Constantinople at the time when the monk Augustine laid the foundation of the Anglo-Saxon hierarchy. This proves that private confession continued to be practised in the Church of Constantinople, notwithstanding the abolition of the office of public penitentiary by Nectarius, who, in leaving each one at liberty to approach communion conformably to his conscience, did not free him from the Divine law of having recourse to the priest for absolution.

The advantages of the confessional must be obvious on

the slightest reflection. It is a means of securing the practice of the maxims and laws of Christ, since the penitent is charged to compare his conduct with the Gospel standard, and state with candor wherein he has transgressed. Considering human frailty, we cannot hope that Christians will be altogether without sin. It is much to entice them to reformation by the hope of pardon on condition of repentance. Men easily content themselves with a moral exterior regulated by public opinion. Confession obliges them to search into their own hearts, to discover their secret offences, to weigh the motives of their conduct, and to labor to remove every stain from their conscience. The scrutiny is left chiefly to themselves, — the accusation must be spontaneous, and the pardon depends on their fidelity in preparing for its reception by compunction and virtuous resolution. The judge appointed to receive their confession, and pronounce forgiveness, is bound by his office to study the Divine law, and to see that it be understood by the penitent, and applied to his conduct. He is to judge without fear or favor, having God only in view, in whose name he acts, and the salvation of the sinner. At the peril of his own soul he is charged to exercise his ministry in accordance with the unchangeable principles of the Gospel.

The two writers, among those on our list, who have dilated most on the horrors of the confessional, — Dr. Hopkins with affected delicacy, and Dr. Hawks under a visor, — particularly advert to its secrecy, and describe the dangers to female innocence in a private apartment, at the mercy of a confessor whose acts or speeches are concealed even from her own mother under an impenetrable veil of secrecy. This has one, at least, of the characteristics of poetry, — it is pure fiction. The confessional, according to the prescription of the Roman Ritual and the general usage of Catholic countries, is a box with two distinct apartments, the penitent being entirely separated from the priest, with whom she communicates only through a lattice or grate. It is placed in an open and public situation in the church, and is generally surrounded at the time when confessions are heard by a number of persons, so that priest and penitent are alike under observation. Secrecy is incumbent on the penitent only so far as it may be dishonorable and unjust to expose the confessor to censure or injury for any advice conscientiously given ; but in case of any abuse of the ministry, even in the slightest degree, by an improper insinuation, so far from secrecy being enjoined, the denunciation of the prevaricator to

his ecclesiastical superior is absolutely commanded. This must be known to both these writers, since they dwell with satisfaction on the Papal decrees regarding the abuse of the confessional. But how shall we reconcile this knowledge with the effort to persuade their readers that a patent is given for the most unbridled licentiousness by the inviolable secrecy enjoined on the penitent? The privileges of the tribunal are in her favor, and for her protection.

In regard to the alleged frequency of such abuse, the testimony of Llorente — a traitor to his religion as well as his country — is utterly worthless. The extension said to have been granted by the Spanish Inquisitors of the time for denunciations, is likely to have arisen rather from their scarceness than from their number. The allegations of apostates, on which Dr. Hopkins relies, are self-refuted, since they ought long before to have abandoned a ministry which they represent as essentially corrupt. Above all statements and conjectures is the well-known fact, that the use of the confessional is regarded as a means of sanctification by all Catholics of every age, sex, and condition of life, — especially by those who frequent it. If it were, as it is represented, a sink of corruption, it would be shunned by the virtuous; its very name would excite horror, and its approach would be forbidden under the severest penalties by every parent, every husband, every guardian of unprotected innocence.

The triumphant vindication of the confessional is found in the confidence which is universally entertained in its purity, which far outweighs the foul suspicions of carnal-minded men, and the fouler charges of licentious lecturers or unprincipled pamphleteers. The homage rendered to it, on both sides of the Atlantic, by men of high moral character not of our communion, more than compensates for these slanderous assaults. The conversion of several of the most eminent among them, Masskell, Forbes, Huntington, Preston, MacLeod, is an earnest of the great number who by this means will be led back to the ancient paths. Bishop Ives does not hesitate to say, — “On this doctrine of priestly absolution the great battle of Christ’s authority in the Church is to be fought.” We must, however, again express our regret that he does not exhibit the high qualities which should distinguish a leader who combats for the truth. The weakness with which he yielded last year to the Salisbury Convention was not fully redeemed by his prompt disclaimer of the interpretation which they gave to his words; for although

he assumed the tone and swelled to the dignity of a real bishop, he neither acknowledged his error unequivocally, nor avowed the truth in its fulness. For a moment he appeared in a grand attitude, and spoke as one having authority, rebuking with becoming severity the presbyters who had sat in judgment on their prelate : — “ I am a bishop. Who are you who usurp the judgment seat ? I have retracted nothing : I shall never retract any thing.” But the grandeur of that scene soon passed away, the high tone of authority subsided ; and now with faltering accents he qualifies and modifies his assertions, in order to silence the murmurs of his clerical subordinates. Men look in vain for the spirit of an Ambrose and a Basil in the shadowy representatives of the episcopate.

The history of the confessional cannot be written by the pen of man : it is the narrative of the secrets of Divine mercy. The angels who rejoice at the conversion of a sinner constantly hover around this tribunal, blotting out the sins as they are uttered, wiping away the tears that trickle down the cheek of the penitent, knocking off the chains which hold the sinner a bondman of Satan, and whispering peace. Who that has opened his mouth in humble confession, with a contrite and afflicted spirit, has not felt, at the moment when the priest pronounced absolution, an inward and mysterious change, the token, if not evidence, of pardon ? The consolation which confession imparts, the hope which it inspires, the strength which it communicates, show it to be a heaven-born institution, a boon of Divine goodness. Let those calumniate it who are strangers to its healing virtue ; but the wretched whom it has comforted, the lost whom it has reclaimed, the dead whom it has restored to life, will bear witness that it is a work of Divine power unto salvation. We shall close with the simple statement of a fact. An aged Lutheran minister, whose convictions and affections tended strongly to Catholicity, once avowed to us his deep sense of the necessity of such an institution. “ I know,” said he, “ that I have sinned ; and I dread going forth to meet my Judge, without any previous assurance that my repentance has been such as he demands. I would fain hear from the lips of his ministers, ‘ The Lord hath taken away thy sin.’ ” As he was dying, the priest was called in, barely in time to bid him go in peace.

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Some would-be philosophers and moralists, indeed, attempt to steer a middle course between the two extremes we have indicated. They would condemn the purely sensual art as opposed to true beauty, and yet would not require all art to be purely ascetic. They persuade themselves that the artist, the poet, the orator, or the rhetorician may lawfully avail himself up to a certain point of our sensitive emotions, passions, affections, tendencies, if he only recognizes at the same time that he delights and charms us by exciting and employing them, that we must not forget to be orthodox and moral, and takes care to caution us against suffering them to run into excess. They assume that nature is essentially good, and that its tendencies are all proper to be consulted, unless unduly excited, and inordinately strengthened. They see evil only in their excess,—in suffering them to exceed a certain proportion, — and charm us by their indulgence and moderation, by their suavity and condescension to our weakness. But for this very reason they are the most dangerous class of philosophizers and moralizers we have amongst us ; they soothe and lull the conscience while they delight the flesh. Their error is subtle, and not easily detected by the ordinary mind. They deceive many, and would, if it were possible, deceive the very elect.

Physically considered, we grant that our nature is good, and so is the nature of the Devil himself ; as follows from the fact that *summum ens* is *summum bonum*, and every creature of a perfect and good creator must be itself good. Of this there is no doubt ; and hence no ascetic, no master of spiritual life, ever demands of us the physical immolation of ourselves, either in whole or in part. But morally considered, our nature is not good ; on the contrary, it is corrupt. True, physically considered, our nature was not essentially changed by the Fall. We had the same lower nature in the state of innocence that we have in our lapsed state, and the natural ends and tendencies of that nature were then, in themselves considered, precisely what they are now ; but they were then subordinated to reason, and through grace held in strict subjection to understanding and will, which were themselves by the same grace held in strict subjection to the will of God. Their natural objects were not then pursued inordinately, nor for their own sake ; and the action of the man, in so far as he sought those objects,

This is not a fashionable mode of reviewing, we admit, and is generally regarded as narrow, illiberal, and bigoted ; for it is in our days thought to be a mark of wisdom to deny the unity and universality both of the first and of the final cause of the universe, to separate philosophy from theology, truth from revelation, Christianity from the Church, morality from religion, and art, or, as it is improperly called, *æsthetics*, from morality. But this is a fact not precisely to the credit of the age. Catholicity, in the order of ideas or principles, is the truth and the whole truth, whether the truth evident to natural reason, or the truth revealed and affirmed to us by supernatural authority. It therefore necessarily extends to every department of human thought, feeling, and action. Nothing, then, in any order, or under any relation, is really separable from it, exempted from its law, or commendable save as inspired by it and as it conforms to it. Falsehood either as to the principle or as to the end is never commendable, and moral deformity is no less repugnant to the beautiful than physical deformity. The *Wahlverwandschaften*, or *Elective Affinities*, of Goethe is as offensive to good taste as shocking to the moral sense.

We do not say that the beautiful is not, in some sense, distinguishable from truth of doctrine and soundness of morals, but we do maintain that it is never separable from them. All art or *æsthetics* must be addressed to man under one or all of three relations, — 1. The intellect, or understanding ; 2. The will ; 3. The imagination. The proper object of the understanding is truth ; of the will, moral good ; of the imagination, if you please, the beautiful. All literature, or any other species of art, in order to meet the demands of intellect and will, must be true and morally good, therefore must be grounded in Catholic doctrine and morals ; for aside from these, in the intellectual and volitive orders, all is false and immoral, neither true nor good. The imagination is commonly regarded as a mixed faculty, partaking both of the rational nature and of the irrational, and in some sense as a union of the two, so to speak, of the soul and body. But it is primarily and essentially rational, or intellectual, and moves as intellect before moving as sensibility ; or, in other words, it is intellectual apprehension before it is sensitive affection, as the life and activity of the body are from the soul, not the life and activity of the soul from the body. The beautiful, then, as the proper object of the imagination, must be really objective and intelligible, and therefore belong to the order of the true and the good, and be at bottom identical with

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sort is a counterfeit or false art ; because just in proportion as we follow the sensitive nature, we run away from God, " the first good and the first fair," the supreme and absolute truth, the supreme and absolute good, and the supreme and absolute beauty, and tend towards the creature as final cause, or ultimate end, therefore towards supreme and absolute falsehood, and consequently towards supreme and absolute nullity, since the creature separated from God is a nullity, and absolute nullity must needs be as far removed from the beautiful as it is from the true and the good.

The beautiful is not a human creation ; men do not make it ; it is real, and independent of the genius that discovers it or seeks to embody it in works of art, in poetry, eloquence, music, painting, sculpture, or architecture. It then, like all reality, has its origin in God, and even as created beauty must be, though distinguishable, yet inseparable from God, and like every creature in its degree an image of God. God creates all things after the ideas or archetypes in his own Divine mind, or infinite intelligence. These ideas or archetypes in his intellect are indistinguishable from his essence ; for, as St. Thomas, after St. Augustine, teaches, "*idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei.*" It is precisely in this image of God in which all things in their degree and according to their nature are created, that reside the truth, goodness, and beauty of things. Whatever obscures this image, or leads us away from it, or substitutes for it the image of the creature, obscures the beautiful, and leads us away from it, into the deformed and the inane, which is evidently the case with the art that takes for its object the pleasure or satisfaction of the inferior soul, or the corrupt appetites and passions of our nature. Whence it follows that only the art that operates in the second mode we have defined, that is, to allay concupiscence, to tranquillize the passions, and enfeeble their force, can be true and genuine art, or the art that really and truly embodies the beautiful. This it can do only by elevating us into a region above the sphere of the sensitive soul, above the merely sensible world, into the intelligible world, by exciting in us noble thoughts, lofty aspirations, and so charming the rational soul, the intellect and will, with spiritual truth and goodness, that the sensitive soul, so to speak, is for the time being overpowered and rendered unable to disturb us. This is what the Church has always aimed at in her sacred art, whether manifested in her noble hymns, her grand cathedrals, her splendid ritual, or her solemn chants and soul-subduing music ; — not,

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did in no sense terminate in them. He ate, but not to enjoy the pleasures of the palate, nor merely to preserve the life of his body ; but to preserve the life of his body for the sake of God, of employing himself in the service of his Maker. But when he sinned, he lost the grace which held concupiscence, or the inferior powers of the soul, in subjection to the higher or rational powers, and escaping from the dominion of reason, they recovered their natural freedom, and henceforth operated according to their own inherent laws for the various sensual ends to which they all naturally tend, when unrestrained by reason and grace. The common end of all these tendencies is sensual pleasure ; sensual pleasure is derivable only from the possession of sensible objects or sensible goods ; and hence the sensual man, the natural or carnal man, seeks always sensual pleasure as his ultimate end, and the possession of sensible goods as the means of obtaining it. Intellect and will — the nobler part of his nature — are for him only “instrumental faculties,” as the Fourierists expressly denominate them, and he esteems and cultivates them only as means of gaining these sensible goods, and for procuring sensual pleasure. This carnal or natural man, following his natural tendencies, and seeking his own sensual pleasure, is intellectually and morally dead. The end and the objects he seeks are in the created order, and his activity terminates in the creature, and therefore he acts in a direction from God, and adopts as his final cause, or ultimate end, a final cause or ultimate end opposed to God, who is his sole final, as his sole first cause, his last end, as his first beginning. He sins, then, intellectually, by assuming a false final cause, denying his true, and asserting a false, ultimate end ; and he sins morally, by rejecting God as his sovereign, and devoting himself to a false sovereign, and giving what is due to God alone to the creature who has no right to it. We may lawfully seek the creature in God, for the creature is in God as his beginning and end ; but not God in the creature, as our modern socialists and neologists falsely teach, for, morally considered, God is not in the creature. To set our affections on the creature, to propose the creature as our final cause, as the end of our activity, or any portion of our activity, is to turn our backs upon God, is to march from him, to depart from our supreme good, and to rush into falsehood and sin, the death of the rational soul, which lives and can live only by virtue of truth and moral good. This lies in the very nature of things, and God himself cannot alter it, for not even

Omnipotence itself can make the creature the creator, or seeking the creature seeking God himself, as final cause. As all morality, or all truth of conduct, lies precisely in seeking God as our final cause, or ultimate end, every act that rejects him as that end, and terminates in any created object, is immoral, and tends to kill the soul. As this is the case with every act of concupiscence, or every act of ours having for its end, no matter in what degree, sensual delight or satisfaction, there can be no compromise in the case, and the attempt of the artist, in any degree, to avail himself of our natural emotions, passions, or affections in their natural order and relations, within whatever limits he may intend to remain, is of a false and immoral tendency, and therefore unartistic.

All Christian moralists, all masters of spiritual life, teach that humility is the foundation and root of all the virtues, and that pride is the foundation and root of all sin. But pride is simply the assertion, in the moral order, of our own self-sufficiency, that is, the denial of God as our final cause, and the assertion of ourselves as our own ultimate end; that is, again, the blasphemous assertion of ourselves as God, and sovereign lawgiver, according to the words of the serpent to our first parents, "Ye shall be as gods." In its essence, every act of pride is the absolute denial of God in the moral, and therefore in the physical order, and the assertion of the absolute supremacy of man, of me, myself, not vaguely hinted in Dr. Channing's doctrine of the "dignity of human nature," in which, one of his brother ministers was accustomed to say, the eloquent doctor "made man a great god, and God a little man." Humility is the opposite of pride, that is, the absolute denial of man's supremacy, and the assertion of the absolute supremacy of God, in the moral order, — the annihilation of the creature as final cause, and the assertion of God as final cause, and sole final cause, or ultimate end in all things whatsoever. Pride is a stupendous lie, and as gross a violation of dialectics as of ethics; humility is simply the assertion of the truth, and conformity to it, since God, as sole creator of man, must needs be his sole final cause or ultimate end. Humility simply recognizes and practically conforms to this truth; and to recognize and practically conform to this truth in all our actions is the whole of virtue. It follows, then, that just so far as we seek sensual or natural pleasure, and make the creature the termination of our activity, we act contrary to virtue, and are immoral. We know no way to avoid this conclusion, undeniable in the nature of things.

It follows from this that these *via-media* philosophers and moralists are mistaken in assuming that the evil lies in the excess, in the undue lengths to which we suffer ourselves to be borne by our natural tendencies, appetites, passions, and affections. It does not lie in following these too far, but in following them at all. Their natural direction, from their very starting-point, is away from God towards the creature, that is, from the end we are bound, either explicitly or implicitly, actually or habitually, to seek at all times and in all our actions, great or small. Here is the fact. We cannot serve two masters; and we cannot serve God in seeking our own pleasure. The sensitive nature must be subordinated and completely subjected to the rational; and as this has become impossible since the Fall, for the carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be, nothing remains for us but to resist it, — by the grace of God to fight it, and to fight it unceasingly, as long as we live. We can make no compromise, no truce even, with it, and the least relaxation of our vigilance gives it the victory over us, and enables it to bring us again into bondage to sin and death. There must be no dallying with the flesh, any more than with the world and the Devil. They who fancy that there is no necessity of being so *very* strict, who flatter themselves that they can yield somewhat to concupiscence, and give a portion of their time, thoughts, and affections to the world, to its pomps, its shows, its vanities, and dissipations, without danger, labor under a fatal delusion. It requires no violent effort to live for the world; our natural tendencies are to it, and before we are aware of danger, we become so absorbed in it, that we have no longer the courage or the energy to throw it off and return to the duties of religion. Authors who set out with the lax notions we are combating, disposed to stop every now and then to gather the flowers of sense that border the path of life, without wholly losing sight of religion, always delay longer than they intend, and in the ordinary course of things finally stray from the path and lose themselves, either in gross sensuality, or in open, decided heresy. None of our natural passions or affections can be trusted; the trail of the serpent is over them all; they are all branded with the curse of original sin, and the purest and best of them, — conjugal love, love of children, love of parents, love of country, love of mankind, — when indulged for their own sake, place us on the declivity, whence it is difficult only not to slide into the hell burning at the foot.

These views are necessary, not merely to our own justification as reviewers, but also to all who aspire to artistic excellence and literary glory. These should remember that they must know and will, as well as feel, study as well as dream, and labor to rise above the merely sensible world, and fill their minds and invigorate their hearts with the highest order of intellectual and spiritual truth that Almighty God has revealed or made accessible to the human mind. It is not enough to study human nature, and to become able to address successfully, or acceptably, the various natural passions and affections from the point of view of the objects to which they naturally tend. In doing this one only speaks from fallen human nature to fallen human nature, and the truth we attain to is only truth to man in his abnormal state, which, since what is abnormal is false, is after all only falsehood, and alike remote from the good and the beautiful. Our popular authors, we are sorry to add, seem not to have considered this important fact, and hence our popular literature, almost without exception, expresses only the truth and beauty of our corrupt nature. Indeed, among non-professional writers, it is rare in these days to find an author who even aims, whether he speaks in prose or verse, at any thing more than delighting and charming us on the sensitive or irrational side. It is the tendency of the age, and indeed, as to that matter, of the world in every age, to forget that man's glory is in his intellect and will, in his reason, by which he is made but a little lower than the angels, and through grace able to rise to the contemplation of God himself and to the exhibition in his life of sublime and heroic virtue, and to place it simply in that which he possesses in common with the animal world. To divert him from all deep and masculine thought, to divest him of all rational or spiritual truth, to render him dead to all religious affections and aspirations, and to reduce him to a better sort of animal, — to a creature of mere sensation, or weak and silly sentimentality, — is seriously regarded by those who claim to be the great lights of the nineteenth century as vindicating his manhood, asserting the nobility of his nature, and elevating him to his true rank in the scale of being. To this the "movement party" of our times, following the spirit of the world, have come, and to this conspire all our popular philosophy, science, art, and literature.

Yet this brutal result should not surprise us. It lay in the natural course of things, and might have been foreseen by ordinary sagacity as inevitable, except by miracle, when Dante

instaurated the lay genius, and commenced the creation of a lay literature by the side of the sacred literature of the Church. The literature that leaves the intelligible world, and the high order of supernatural truth, which Almighty God has revealed for our instruction, and confines itself to the sensible world, to delight and captivate the natural man, is always that which is the most easily produced, and for which there is the greatest demand. It chimes in with our natural tastes and tendencies, and imposes no self-denial, no restraint, on either author or reader. Its authors may always, where the simple ability to read is general, count on a fit "audience," and not "few"; for to appreciate it exacts no preparatory discipline. In our fallen state falsehood and evil are natural to us, and we need no previous instruction, no previous training, to embrace them, or to be charmed with them. Error and sin, like Dogberry's reading and writing, come by nature, and there is no one who cannot err and sin without being taught, without violent effort, self-denial, or mortification. When we choose to err or sin, wind and tide are in our favor, and we can rest upon our oars. Any fool is competent to err; but it takes a wise man to avoid error, to know the truth and to practise it, or to lead others to know and practise it; and wisdom and virtue do not come by nature, are not natural to us in our lapsed state, and can be acquired only by hard and persevering labor,—by violence to all our natural tendencies, severe discipline, rigid self-denial, and painful mortification,—by a constant struggle against both wind and current, against the whole force of our nature, to which no man is equal, unless excited and assisted by Divine grace. It is not surprising, then, that, in an age when authorship is resorted to as a profession, as a livelihood, and when almost every body reads, popular literature and philosophy should regard only the human animal, the irrational elements of man's nature, and address only our natural tendencies to error and sin; or that the great body of the people, accustomed to no other intellectual food, and incapable, without a discipline they are far from receiving, of relishing any other food, should feel themselves flattered in being allowed to stand at the head of the *mammalia* family, and to look upon themselves as first cousins to the orang-outang and baboon. He who begins by reverencing the animal man will soon see in man nothing but the animal to reverence; and if things go on as they are now going, we must expect to see fetichism reëstablished among the poets, artists, and philosophers of the nineteenth century.

The sensitive soul is indeed integral in man, and the animal man is the same individual or person that we call the rational or spiritual man. Man is composed of body and soul ; by his soul he is related to the spiritual world, and by his body to the material world. Considered on the former side he is the rational man ; on the latter, the animal man. Yet he is the same man, the same individual, the same person, physically, let us consider him on which side we will, and he always acts with the unity which belongs to his nature. He never acts as intellect and will without sensibility, or as sensibility without some affection of reason ; for the soul is essentially rational nature, and also the life of the body ; for when bereft of the soul, the body is a corpse, incapable of performing a single function. What we call the irrational or animal soul must, then, undoubtedly, have its place and office in the physical economy of human life, and, physically, a share in every human act. Undoubtedly, therefore, the artist cannot move intellect and will without affecting it, and in some degree moving it also. He must, then, understand the instinctive and irrational nature, and study and even address the emotions, passions, and affections. This we grant ; but what we maintain is, that he must not do it from the direction of the ends to which they tend, or by presenting them their natural objects ; he must do it from the side of intellect and will, through reason, the teachings of revelation, and the precepts of the Gospel. He cannot, if he would, avoid presenting them more or less of sensible beauty, and with sensible beauty they are always pleased ; but he must not present that beauty in its nakedness, in the form which carries away sensibility in its natural direction ; he must clothe it with a higher beauty, a beauty not sensible, but ideal, spiritual, moral, celestial, and immortal, which is undoubtedly an achievement of great difficulty, and within the reach of none but the very first masters. It is precisely one of the miseries of our fallen state that we cannot indulge our natural taste for sensible beauty without danger ; and hence, to preserve our moral integrity, we are obliged to deny and mortify that taste. The earth has been cursed for our sake, and this curse, in no small part, is in the fact that the very beauties of nature, strewn in such rich profusion around us, the mountain and plain, the streamlet and lake, the river and ocean, the varied and smiling landscape, the many-colored and fragrant flowers, the glorious sunshine, the golden-tinted clouds, the starry vault of heaven, all that poets love to see and describe, and which, had we re-

mained in the state of innocence, would have given so pure a delight to our existence, have become to us in consequence of sin a temptation and a snare. The saints, though keenly alive to all that is beautiful in nature, are accustomed to restrain their eyes, to close them to the beauty which appeals to the senses, and to open them only to the contemplation of the beauty of truth and holiness. Yet if, in contemplating spiritual truth, the goodness, the love, and mercy of God, if, enraptured with the celestial beauty with which all truth and good of the spiritual order are always clothed to the mind and the heart open to them, we overflow with joy, and our whole body thrills with delight, as sometimes happens, we may accept with gratitude to God the sensible sweetness, for it is then a divine pleasure, as it were a slight, a very slight foretaste of heaven ; but we must never seek it, and above all we must beware of confounding it with the voluntary devotion which God demands of us, and of the false notion which some entertain, that we can press the sensitive affections into the service of religion, and make them helps to our growth in knowledge and virtue.

We add here, to prevent misconception, that we do not, in bringing every work to the test of Catholic doctrine and morals, necessarily exclude from trial all works not the works of orthodox and practical Catholics. We find in Plato and Aristotle much sound philosophy ; no little beauty in the ancient Greek and Roman classics ; and some in the masterpieces of poetry, music, and eloquence of modern Protestant and infidel nations. This is because all nations, ancient and modern, even the heretical and corrupt, have had some rays of truth and goodness from the Catholic sun furrowing their darkness. Catholicity, in the order of ideas or principles, we have said, is the truth, the whole truth, whether the truth evident *per se* to natural reason, or the truth pertaining to the supernatural order, and evident only as revealed and affirmed to us by supernatural authority. This is evident from the fact that theology is the queen of the sciences, and the Church is the supreme judge and interpreter, under God, of both the revealed law and the law of nature. The first order of truth, embodied in language and evident of itself to natural reason, is in some measure known to all men ; the second order, that pertaining to the supernatural, was, as to its substance, revealed in the beginning to our first parents, and has been preserved by tradition, and never entirely lost by any people. It is therefore retained, and in some measure known, even by heretical and unbelieving

nations and individuals. It is true, the works of heretics and unbelievers, whether ancient or modern, considered in relation to the merit of the operator, or as entitling one to eternal life, have no value ; for they are, as to the operator, defective both in their principle and end. The heretic or the infidel, the gentile or the Protestant, acts always from nature to nature, which is never enough for everlasting life, for that lies in the supernatural order. The noblest works of heretics and individuals avail nothing for salvation. Only Catholics do, or can, act from human nature elevated by grace, and for God as author of grace and the supernatural end of man ; and therefore none but Catholics can enter into heaven, as we are taught in the dogma, that out of the Church no one can ever be saved. But considered apart from the principle and end of the operator, and regarded only for what they are in themselves, the works of individuals not Catholics may have, under a philosophical and an artistic point of view, no inconsiderable degree of merit. It is thus that in purely metaphysical questions St. Thomas and the fathers cite the gentile philosophers, and good Catholics admire the Apollo and the Laocoön. But what we admire in the philosophy or art of heterodox nations and individuals is precisely that in them which conforms to Catholic doctrine and morals, and which has been inspired by those elements of Catholicity which they have retained after their lapse into heterodoxy and infidelity. So, though our rule obliges us to condemn as opposed to true art whatever cannot abide the Catholic test, we are still free, under it, to judge any work without inquiring whence it came or who has produced it ; yet we expect the masterpiece only from the Catholic who spends no small portion of his time at the foot of the crucifix, and the art of all pagan or heterodox nations will always betray its origin.

From these last remarks it must appear, that, as reviewers, we hold our business to be with the work presented for our judgment, rather than with the workman abstracted from it. We do not belong to the new school of criticism, if new it is, springing up amongst us, and which values a work of art only in so far as it is a revelation of the psychological character of its author, and lets us into the secrets of his interior soul. We cannot, with a bold but flippant critic on Mr. Dana, in a late number of the *Christian Examiner*, leave the consideration of the intrinsic merits or demerits of the works themselves, as revelations of the true, the good, or the beautiful, and proceed by their aid to analyze the author as a man, to dissect his moral

and mental constitution, and to set forth, to the wonderment of our readers at our own sagacity and penetration, what he is or is not in himself. This exceeds, in our judgment, both our province and our ability. The author, in so far as he enters into his work, that is, as strictly the *author* and distinguishable from the man, is, no doubt, the proper subject of criticism, but beyond he is not, for beyond he does not publish himself, and is not amenable to a literary tribunal. Because a man has seen proper to publish a poem or a series of tales and essays, it does not follow in our code of morals that we have the right to treat him as a psychological phenomenon, or to make him a psychological *study*. The man has a right to determine for himself how far he will and how far he will not publish himself, and so far as he does not publish himself he is a private man, just as much as if he had never published any thing at all. The end of art is not to reveal the artist. It is somewhat necessary in these democratic times, when there is a universal tendency to invade every man's privacy, to violate all private rights, and merge the individual in the public, or rather in the mob, to insist on this obvious fact, if we would preserve any degree of personal independence before the many-headed and meddling multitude. It will be a sad day for personal independence, freedom of thought, manly conduct, and strong and masculine literature, when your Edwin P. Whipples unrebuked sit in judgment on the interior character of your Richard H. Danas, and publish to the world their psychological lucubrations. No man of any native modesty, or delicacy of feeling, will then venture to lay before the public the creations of his genius, or the results of his deep thought and patient investigations, his fervent meditations, or private musings.

Moreover, the critic can never give a judgment of an author beyond his works that can be worthy of much reliance, for the workman always surpasses his work, and it is only an infinitesimal part of himself that any tolerable author does or can express in his writings. Only emptiness can tell all that it is. The man of true genius, great abilities, and full mind can compress only the smallest portion of what he is into words intelligible to all the world. He can fully open himself only to minds of a like order and cultivation with his own. Good readers are nearly as rare as good authors, and the best part of a really good author is lost upon the crowd even of his admirers. It is not seldom that he is pained to hear himself complimented for what he would blush to have meant, and what is

at best only the merest commonplace. The evil is already one of serious magnitude, and becomes and must become every day greater and greater as nominal readers multiply, and the proportion of genuine scholars to mere sciolists diminishes. Every body now-a-days fancies himself a fit judge of every thing, and is ready to swear that whatever is true, beautiful, or good to him, is so in itself, and that whatever transcends his puny understanding is a nullity. "The schoolmaster is abroad," we are told, and it is no doubt true; but we think it were quite as well if he stayed at home, and formed scholars who might write as scholars for scholars. The world has not profited by leaving behind the old maxim, *ne sutor ultra crepidam*, and installing the Whipples as literary and psychological critics of the Danas.

We have dwelt so long on the canons of literary and æsthetic criticism, that we have reserved ourselves little time or space to apply them to the works before us. Nor can we proceed with the same confidence in their application that we have felt in stating them. They are founded in the eternal truth and nature of things, and we have been guided by our religion in determining them; their application is an act of human judgment, in all cases fallible, and peculiarly so in ours, especially when the application is to be made to poetical or artistic productions, of which we are very indifferent judges. Art is the expression of the true and the good under the form of the beautiful; the form of the beautiful is not created by the mind of the artist, is not projected from his mind, before having been drawn in from without, or from above; it is real, objective, — the real and eternal form of the true and the good themselves, as they exist independent of our apprehension; but it is not given to every eye to behold it, and it is only privileged minds, minds endowed with some portion of that extraordinary power called genius, and which escapes all definition, that can detect or embody it. We ordinary mortals can apprehend the true and the morally good, can know our duty and perform it; but we are not privileged to see them always and everywhere under the form of the beautiful; far less are we able to seize that form and embody it in our works. In so far as it is identical with the true and the good we can judge of it; but in so far as it is distinguishable from them, — for distinguishable, though not separable, from them we conceive it may be, — we hold ourselves poorly qualified, either by nature or discipline, to determine its presence.

Mr. Dana's writings consist of moral and political essays, literary reviews and criticisms, and tales and poems. The essays are the most to our taste, and are the portion of his writings with which we have the most sympathy. Mr. Dana is no Red Republican, no radical, no revolutionist, but, without being hopelessly wedded to any particular form of political constitution, is a genuine conservative, a believer in the necessity of law, and in the almost forgotten fact that loyalty is a virtue. His essays, entitled *Old Times*, *The Past and the Present*, and *Law as suited to Man*, — the first published in 1817, and the last two, one in 1833, and the other in 1835, written with rare eloquence and grace of style, and clearness and force of expression, — prove very satisfactorily that he is far from holding what is called the "sacred right of insurrection," and from believing that all innovation is improvement, and that the surest way to protect liberty is to obliterate from the mind the notion of law which guaranties it, and to break down all the bulwarks the wisdom of our ancestors erected for its defence. Mr. Dana is one of the few men remaining amongst us that retain somewhat of the views and tastes of the better class of the Loyalist gentry in ante-Revolutionary times, and who have never adopted all the peculiarities of our modern democracy.

The American Revolution and Independence have had an astonishing effect in developing the material resources of our country, and in stimulating industrial activity and enterprise, but they have not had an equally salutary influence on our manners and morals, and our general habits of thought and belief. The tone of good society under the republic is below what it was in colonial times, and thought has lost in depth and soundness what it has gained in expansion. American society has not yet recovered the loss of the old Loyalist or Tory families, for the most part the *élite* of the colonial gentry. Democracy is great and glorious in the order of mere material industry and prosperity, when that industry and prosperity are able to thrive in spite of the government; but it is not remarkably favorable to the growth of reverence, respect, and courtesy. Its fundamental principle is pride, — is, "I am as good as you, and will not bow or take off my hat to you," — and therefore its natural tendency is to lower the standard of morals and manners. It invariably tends to invade every man's privacy, to make war on all individual freedom and mental independence, and to deny to every one the right to think, to act, or to be, save as merged in the crowd, and going to make up the public.

Its natural tendency is to bring every thing down to a common average, to the level of the common mind, and to make public opinion the standard of doctrine and morals. It puts the people, or rather the mob, in the place of God, and makes all men taken individually slaves of all men taken collectively. Of all conceivable governments democracy is the most unfavorable to free and manly thought, to mental independence, to freedom and nobility of soul.*

* Let no one infer from our strictures on democracy that we are disloyal to the republican institutions of this country. In condemning democracy we have no reference to either of the two great political parties which divide our countrymen, for in the sense in which we condemn it, democracy is common to both parties;— we refer not to the particular measures of administration which either party advocates, for in this journal we are neither Whig nor Democrat; nor do we refer to the fundamental principles of the American Constitution, State or national, for we deny that the American Constitution is democratic or was ever intended to be democratic. The democracy we condemn relates neither to parties nor to measures of administration, but to the origin of power and the constitution of the state. We condemn as destructive of freedom *all* government of mere will, whether the will of plebeians or of nobility, of the people or of the monarch. We demand a government of law,— a government legal in its origin, in its principles, and in its administration, and such a government we hold the American government to be when rightly interpreted; and such a government we hold a democracy is not and never can be. Democracy, as the word is now universally understood, and rightly understood, is nothing but *mobocracy*. We are opposed, not to our American institutions, but to the democratic interpretation of them insisted on by the majority of our countrymen, and even by some few of our nominally Catholic fellow-citizens, who are Catholics in the old Anglican fashion, that is, Catholics who are for this world at any rate, and for heaven in so far as it demands no self-renunciation, and they are able to accommodate its livery to the service of the Devil. What we oppose is not the institutions, but the mobocratic principles, doctrines, and practices become so prevalent that no man of tolerable ability can hope to be elevated to any place of honor or trust unless he makes a public profession of them, and sets law and common sense at defiance.

For ourselves, we advocate not monarchy, not timocracy, not oligarchy, not aristocracy, not democracy, not ochlocracy, but simply legitimacy and legality, and precisely such, we hold, is the government which Providence through the wisdom of our ancestors has established in this country. To this form of government, and the laws made in conformity to its constitution, we owe civil allegiance, and are always ready to comply with all the demands of such allegiance. But the democratic doctrines floating in the minds of our countrymen outside of the constitution, we do not hold ourselves bound to obey; and we maintain that no man in this country can follow or encourage them without ceasing to be a loyal citizen, and becoming treasonable in his thought and deed. It is not we in opposing, but our countrymen in encouraging, these doctrines and tendencies, that are disloyal to American institutions.

In consequence of the natural influence of democracy, but an influence against which the framers of the Federal Constitution intended to guard, we of the present generation are far inferior in a moral and intellectual point of view to the generation that won our Independence, and which was formed under the colonial *régime*, as is evident to all among us old enough to have known that generation before it had wholly disappeared. Even the more ultra members of the revolutionary party, not excepting even Mr. Jefferson, entertained views far more profound, just, and conservative than it is common to meet among those who now pass for aristocrats or monarchists, because not absolutely mobocrats. Since even our own memory there was no party in the country that would own the name of democrat, and the term was rarely used, save as a term of reproach. Men would say, "We are republicans, but not democrats"; and the Whig party of to-day is more democratic than was the republican party under Jefferson and Madison. There was, when the War of Independence commenced, and till many years after Independence had been gained, and we had taken our place among sovereign states, something of loyalty in our disposition, and a general conviction in our minds of the necessity and obligation of law. The sound doctrines and moral habits that we had inherited from remote ancestors were not yet worn out, and we retained some precious elements of moral and social life. These are now gone, and our country passes into the hands of the generation formed under the practical operations of democratic convictions and tendencies, — a puny generation, so degenerated in mental and moral stature from its predecessors that one can hardly believe that it has really descended from them. They who with us see and deplore this constant deterioration of American society, will read these essays of Mr. Dana with great pleasure, and with thanksgiving that there is one writer amongst us, of the highest order of American writers, who dares intimate to his countrymen that their march of intellect is downward, not upward, and to labor to recall their attention to the good old things that have passed or are passing away. The chief regret we feel in reading these essays is, that he who wrote them has not followed them up and given us many more like them, a regret we seldom have occasion to feel in the case of contemporary essayists.

The literary reviews and criticisms prove that Mr. Dana has made criticism a study. We have been particularly pleased with the paper on *Edgeworths' Readings on Poetry*, in

which the sound sense and just and acute observations of the author are surpassed only by his wit and humor. The Edgeworth tales, if man had no end but to get on well in the world, to be respectable and prosperous here, without reference to an hereafter, would have been highly meritorious. The father and daughter were very respectable pagans. But the Edgeworth notions of education, and the Edgeworth utilitarianism, cannot be too severely ridiculed, and are as contemptible as the school system and school-books of Peter Parley. We have seen no reason to believe that the modern methods of education surpass those practised by the ancients, and we are strongly inclined to the belief, that the attempt to make a young child understand every thing is the most effectual way of preventing him from ever understanding any thing.

The paper on *The Sketch Book* is a fair and discriminating review of the earlier writings of Washington Irving. We were pleased to observe, that, while the writer is just to the many merits of Mr. Irving, he is not blind to his defects, and with great kindness and delicacy indicates them. We confess that, as much as we admire the inimitable Knickerbocker, we tire of his History before reaching the end, and in fact have never yet succeeded in reading to the last page. Irving has true wit and delicate humor, a lively and fertile fancy, a pure, chaste, and elegant style, but he is a little monotonous, and his uniform sweetness now and then cloy the appetite.

The elaborate paper on *Hazlitt's Lectures on the English Poets* is to our judgment the ablest and most characteristic of any in the collection. Of Hazlitt's Lectures themselves we cannot speak, for we have never read them, nor any thing else from the same author; but Mr. Dana's own criticisms are superior to any thing of the sort written on this side the Atlantic we remember to have read. We know nothing finer, more tasteful, acute, or just in the whole range of literary criticism than the remarks on Alexander Pope, and his poetry. We were delighted exceedingly to find Mr. Dana doing justice to Swift, in spite of the *Edinburgh Review's* attempt to exclude him from good society. Swift had his faults both as a man and as a writer; he is occasionally coarse, and in his *Tale of a Tub* downright profane; but he was taller by the head and shoulders than any of his Protestant literary contemporaries, and among all the celebrated writers of Queen Anne's reign the author for whom we have the most esteem and affection. We have no sympathy with his cynicism, whether it was real or

affected ; we regret his coarseness, and detest his Protestantism ; but we confess his rare genius, his satirical wit, his strong masculine sense, and have a profound respect for his political sagacity and wisdom. The political policy he advocated, and which the Whig Addison opposed, was wise and profound, and England is the sufferer to-day, and will be the greater sufferer hereafter, for having rejected it. His policy was to save the independence of the crown, to guard against parliamentary despotism, and protect and strengthen the country population against the urban population, that is, prevent the government from falling into the hands of fund-holders, stock-jobbers, merchants, and manufacturers, — a population that lacks stability, and fluctuates with the fluctuations of trade and the state of the markets, not only at home, but also abroad. Mr. D'Israeli, if we understand him, is attempting to revive this policy, but we fear it is too late ; the Reform Bill and the late Sir Robert Peel's free-trade measures, together with the changes as to the balance of property produced in Great Britain by the marvelous development of commerce and manufactures during the last sixty years, have given the preponderance hopelessly, we are inclined to believe, to the urban system, so zealously defended by Addison in the time of Swift. England's opportunity of recovering from the sad effects of the rebellion and revolution of the seventeenth century was lost when she called in the present House of Hanover, instead of the legitimate heir of her throne, and she must, we fear, reap the consequences of her wickedness and folly. Sacred rights are never violated with impunity, and the injured in the long run are sure to be avenged.

Mr. Dana rates Wordsworth as a poet higher than we have been in the habit of doing. Our early dislike of Wordsworth may have proceeded from our early admiration of Byron, and perhaps, since we have ceased to admire Byron, we ought to overcome our distaste for Wordsworth. Wordsworth did not lack the poetic temperament, and he has written, for an Anglican, some very good poetry. Many of his sonnets, we acknowledge, are very beautiful, although we dislike sonnets, as we do hexameters, in English, and we cannot deny that they produce the effect of true poetry on the mind and heart of the reader. He wrote, too, with an honest aim, and with such religious thought and feeling as he could have without being a Catholic. But he remains always too near the ground, and never rises above a respectable Greek or Roman gentile, save in words. His philosophy is, perhaps, higher and broader

than that of Locke and Paley, but it is still low and narrow, and now and then even verges upon pantheism. He is too much of an idolater of nature to please us, and we grow weary, half to death, of his interminable descriptions of natural scenery, mountain and lake, hill and dale, park and paddock, woodland and meadow, clouds and sunsets, especially in his *Excursion*. We can endure no poetry that gives us any description of nature, or merely natural objects, any farther than it subserves the action of the piece. All description, introduced for description's sake, however beautiful in itself, is a blemish. In poetry, in eloquence, in painting, in every species of art, the moral must predominate, be the principal, and the merely natural only the accessory, and must never, as Cole's pictures of the *Voyage of Life*, overlay the moral. Wordsworth seems to us to have formed a tolerably just conception of what poetry should be, but to have labored all his long life in the nearly vain attempt to realize it. He made poetry step down from her stilts, and walk on her own natural feet and legs, and so far he did good service, but we are afraid that he will have to answer for not a few of the sins of the more recent schools of the Brownings, the Barretts, the Tennysons, the Lowells, and their fellows, with which our present youthful generation is so grievously afflicted.

Of Mr. Dana's poems and tales, we can offer only a brief criticism. As a poet, he steers clear of the literary faults we have, rightly or wrongly, charged upon Wordsworth. He has a quick eye for external beauty, and he gives us some exquisite pictures of nature, but they never divert our attention from the action of the piece, or mar its unity, but for the most part help it on, and deepen the impression intended. He does not appear to have learned that rhythm is unessential to poetry, or that mere feeling without thought, clear and distinct thought, is the chief element in the composition of a poet. It is pretty evident, therefore, that his poems were written some years ago, and that he did not anticipate our recent discoveries. His rhythm is always good, and his poetical language is natural, easy, and, for aught we can see, is used as properly, as simply, as plainly, and as intelligibly as if he were talking prose. To us this is a great merit, but in these days it may be thought a defect. His diction is choice, and his style, clear, strong, terse, energetic, and free from all exaggeration and diffuseness. In his *Buccaneer* he compresses as much meaning into a single line as our younger poets succeed in getting into a score of stanzas.

In nothing he has written in his poems or in his *Idle Man*, the general title of the collection of tales, is there any thing that transgresses good taste, or ordinary morality, as understood by the better class of our Protestant countrymen. They are both marked by a certain moral aim, a certain religiousness, and, so far as words go, express a reverence for and belief in Christianity. Yet we feel when reading them that the author has never been really elevated above the natural order, and that the sphere in which he lives and moves lies far below the supernatural into which Divine grace elevates us, and in which are the secret springs of the Christian's life. The only sanctity we recognize in his works is forensic and imputed, not infused and intrinsic. Hence they fail to express the higher order of beauty, and to produce the effect we have always the right to demand of all productions claiming to be artistic. The supernatural in *The Buccaneer* is terrible, but neither beautiful nor sublime, — for it is infernal, not celestial; demoniacal, not divine. And bad as Mat Lee was, we should have been better satisfied, since supernatural agency was to be introduced, if it had been introduced to save and not to destroy. As it is, the Spectre-Horse is simply terrible, and affects us as unfavorably as the *diablerie* of Hoffman.

Speaking in general terms of Mr. Dana's poems, and especially of *The Idle Man*, we are obliged to say, that the author, beyond the exquisite beauty of his style and diction, seldom attains to the truly beautiful. His *Edward and Mary* is a very sweet love story, pleasantly and delicately told, but it is only a story of ordinary human love, which in no respect rises above the natural order, and is as much within the reach of the gentile as the Christian. But the rest are, for the most part, dark, gloomy, and morbid. They are terrible, rather than beautiful, and recall too vividly the general effect of the novels of Godwin and Charles Brockden Brown. We do not mean to say Mr. Dana copies or imitates these writers, nor imply any thing against his originality both of style and thought, but he writes with the same morbid spirit that they do, and leaves on his reader a painful and unhealthy impression. His *Paul Felton* is a powerfully written story, but it is fearful. It displays in the most masterly manner the workings of a richly endowed mind, left to its own solitary musings, strong passions, and deep affections without steady principle, and grown morbid; but scarcely any thing in the world would induce us to give it a second reading. The author in it is true to our morbid or fallen nature

placed in the circumstances he imagines, and subjected to Satanic influences ; but he must pardon us if we intimate, that, let the case stand with him now as it may, when he wrote the story of *Paul Felton*, he did not at all understand the philosophy of the case he so powerfully and fearfully sketched. His hero wanted two things, the infused habits of grace, and an enlightened conscience. The errors and defects of Paul did not arise from the solitude in which he was brought up, nor from his mingling so little in general society. Had the boy been baptized, had he been well instructed in Christian doctrine, and been under the direction of a wise master of spiritual life, the circumstances in which he was placed and his manner of life would have favored enjoyment and the growth of virtue. But as it was, he had nothing of the grace by which the Christian lives, and the little knowledge of Christianity he had was just enough to give him a scrupulous conscience in matters not of moment, and a lax one in all else.

Paul Felton is the conception of a Calvinist, and is an admirable illustration of Calvinism in real life. Calvinists have no adequate instruction in Christian duty. A few minor things they are taught, and if in regard to these they keep tolerably clear of sin, they are satisfied with themselves, and have no trouble of conscience, however grossly they may sin in matters of real spiritual magnitude. This is the case with the great majority of them. They satisfy themselves, and maintain their self-complacency on matters of little consequence, and leave the rest to take care of itself. They can without remorse destroy the widow's house, if they do not forget to make long prayers. If they "pay tithe of mint, and anise, and cummin," they can with a self-approving conscience pass over "the weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith." But when one of them fails in small matters, his conscience takes the alarm ; he is filled with scruples ; he becomes morbid, he grows mad, and plunges into the most fearful crimes and hideous sins. The basis of this character is pride and spiritual ignorance, oftenest met with in persons of good natural parts, respectable literary and scientific attainments, but unaccompanied by proper spiritual or ghostly direction. Such was Paul Felton, the jealous and tyrannical husband, the leaguer with the Devil, the murderer of his wife and of himself, yet a man of tender conscience, persuading himself that he is in all acting in accordance with conscience, and under the dictates of a superior power.

Mr. Dana in stories of this sort offends Christian morality, not indeed because he paints great crimes, but because he paints them in unchristian colors, from the point of view of mere nature, without directing the mind to their remedy. The saints relate to us crimes of the deepest die, but they do it with inward sanctity of their own, and so as not only to inspire horror for the deeds, but a love for God and heroic virtue. Mr. Dana gives us, in contrast with his bold sketches or finished details of crime and sin, no glimpses of the justice and mercy of God, no gleams of hope in the Divine charity, no heroic sanctity to which the mind and heart, sickened with the disgusting views of sin and iniquity, can turn and find relief and refreshment. The effect on the reader of all the kind of writing he here gives us is bad, enervating, and tends rather to fit one to be a villain and a desperado, than to recall him from error and sin, and to fix his affections on the true and the holy. In meditating on the passion of our Lord, it is more wholesome to dwell on the ineffable love, the infinite mercy of God manifested in it, than even on our own sins for which our Lord suffered on the cross : for love to God is a nobler affection than simple hatred of sin. The sinner not unfrequently loathes the sin he continues to commit, but not loathing it because opposed to the Divine charity, or to the possession of God as his supreme good, he is rather the worse than the better for the loathing ; because the loathing only drives him deeper and deeper into iniquity, in the vain hope of curing, or at least of concealing itself. Finally, we see now and then a recognition in Mr. Dana's writings of the prevalent and fashionable doctrine of the purifying and ennobling influence of mere human love. This doctrine, however disguised, is nothing but the pander to lust. We know that woman's love, a mere natural sentiment, is half deified, and represented as thaumaturgic ; but we have no more confidence in either woman's or man's love as a principle of virtue than we have in any other natural sentiment, nor half so much. Marriage *may* sometimes reform the rake of his rakishness, as avarice will sometimes cure a man of intemperance and sloth, but it does not elevate him into the sphere of virtue. The fact is, nature is never sufficient, and always does and must disappoint those who rely on it. It must be elevated by grace, and charity must enter, pervade, and rule the domestic circle, or the domestic affections themselves can do nothing for real virtue. The state, and the family, as well as individual virtue, must have a truly religious basis, be based in

Christianity, and sustained by supernatural grace, or they are no better than castles in the air.

But we have extended our remarks to an unreasonable length, and must close. We have given Mr. Dana's works themselves a very inadequate review, and the author may feel that, in common justice, we should have entered more into detail. But our purpose has not been a regular criticism of his writings, but to discuss with some depth and clearness the subject they very naturally suggested, and that not for his sake, but for the sake of our young Catholic aspirants to literary and artistic excellence. As a writer Mr. Dana is morbid, and wants that mental serenity and that buoyancy of spirit which only the Catholic faith and fidelity to the Catholic Church can give. We see in his writings the absence of the operations of Catholicity on the mind and heart, and the presence of much Puritanic pride and scrupulosity. But we see at the same time a writer of great intellectual power, of true genius, and for the most part, so far as the form goes, of cultivated, pure, and delicate taste. His style may be studied as a model, and is among the very best specimens of pure English that has been written by one born and trained on this side of the Atlantic, and is rather that of an Englishman than of an American. His relative rank as a poet we stated in the brief notice of his works in our Review for last January, and though his works are not by any means all we could wish them, few if any American productions of the sort are more creditable to our literature.

ART. IV. — *Cuba and the Cubans, comprising a History of the Island of Cuba, its present Social, Political, and Domestic Condition ; also, its Relation to England and the United States.* By the Author of "Letters from Cuba." With an Appendix, containing important Statistical Information, and a Reply to Señor Saco on Annexation, translated from the Spanish. New York : Hueston. 1850. 12mo. pp. 255.

THIS book, whose author, very much to our satisfaction, is unknown to us, may contain some valuable information on the subject of which it treats ; but it has evidently been written for

the purpose of promoting a democratic revolution in Cuba, and of persuading our citizens to lend their aid in wresting that noble island from the Spanish Crown, and annexing it as a State to the American Union. This is sufficient to condemn it and its author in the minds of all honorable men, and especially in the mind of every American citizen who retains some respect for international rights, and some regard for the honor of his country.

A considerable portion of our countrymen have long coveted the possession of Cuba, and our government, pretending that there was danger of its falling into the hands of Great Britain, went so far a few years since, we believe, as to make overtures to the Court of Madrid for its purchase. But these overtures, of course, were not listened to, and the pretence proved so utterly unfounded, that the government has been obliged to abandon it. Still, the desire for the acquisition of the island has continued, and many persons have thought that it could be effected by inducing and aiding the native Cubans to revolt from Spain, establish themselves as an independent republic, and then apply for admission into the American Union. In accordance with a plan of this sort, a military expedition was set on foot within our territories in 1849, to assist the Cuban patriots, or pretended Cuban patriots, to revolutionize the island. This expedition was prevented for the time being from embarking by the intervention of the Federal government; but it has been renewed during the present year, and this time, successfully eluding the vigilance of the government, it actually effected a landing in small force, and, after a smart engagement, took possession of Cardenas, committed several murders, made the governor of the town a prisoner, burnt his palace, and robbed the public treasury. But meeting a determined resistance, and not finding the native Cubans as ready to flock to its piratical standard as it was expected they would be, it abandoned Cardenas, after holding possession of it for eight hours, and effected its escape, or return, to the territories of the United States, apparently for reinforcements, in order speedily to renew the attempt in stronger force, and with a better prospect of final success.

As to the character of such an expedition against a power with whom we are at peace, or of the attempt to wrest from a friendly power one of its provinces and annex it to the Union, no matter under what pretext, there can be but one opinion among honorable men, and since its failure, the American press

has been tolerably unanimous in condemning it ; but we may well doubt if the press would be thus unanimous in condemning it, if it had succeeded, or if there were a fair prospect of successfully renewing it. Had Lopez, the chief of the expedition, succeeded, we have too much reason to believe that he would have been hailed as a hero, and welcomed to a seat in the United States Senate by the side of the honorable Senators from Texas.

It cannot be denied that a portion, we would fain hope not a large portion, of the people of this country, have very loose notions of right and wrong, and, when blinded by their passions or stimulated by their interests, find little difficulty in converting the pirate into the hero, and piracy and murder into wise and honorable policy. To this portion of our citizens religion and morality, municipal laws, and laws of nations have either no meaning or an odious meaning when opposed to their interests or their passions, their thirst for gold or their lust for the acquisition of territory. Regarding the will of the people as the supreme law, and by a natural and easy process confounding the will of the people with the will of the mob, or the will of the people as the state with the will of the people outside of the constitution and laws, they hold that what any portion of the people wish and are able to do, they have the unquestionable and indefeasible right to do. Mistaking the sound and legal republicanism held by our fathers, and incorporated into our noble institutions, for wild and lawless radicalism, they assert the right of the people, or rather the mob, in every country, to rebel, whenever they please, against their legitimate sovereign, to overthrow with armed force the existing order whenever it ceases to suit their fancy or caprice, and to institute such new order in its place as shall seem to them good. Starting with this revolutionary principle, and assuming that all who avail themselves of it, and rise in arms against their sovereign, are necessarily the party of freedom, struggling for liberty, for the inalienable rights of man, they assume that the cause of such party is always the cause of justice, of humanity, of God, and therefore that we are all free to rush to their aid, to assist them with our sympathy, our counsel, our treasure, our arms, and our blood, irrespective of existing laws, the rights of sovereigns, or the faith of treaties. Hence we find them always sympathizing with rebels, or party at war with their rulers, applauding their prowess, rejoicing in their victories over the friends of order and legitimate authority, and mourning over

their defeat. And hence these see in the attempts of the pirate Lopez and his crew nothing but the practical application of their own deeply cherished principles.

The fact that Lopez, after his return to the United States, was greeted with loud and prolonged applause, when he assured the citizens of Savannah that he had not abandoned his enterprise, but had consecrated his whole life to the liberation of Cuba, indicates only too clearly that these principles are by no means unpopular, at least in certain sections of the country. Indeed, the number of those who, if not ready to join actively in such an expedition as Lopez and his associates fitted out, yet hold that the Cubans have a perfect right, and we a perfect right to assist them, to rebel against their sovereign, to revolutionize the island, and, with the consent of our government, to annex themselves to the Union, is much larger, we fear, than a good citizen who regards the honor of his country is willing to believe, — so little value is placed upon the rights of sovereignty, and so little respect is paid even to the rights of property.

Certainly, we are far from asserting or insinuating that any considerable portion of our citizens are sufficiently depraved to join actively in a piratical attempt like that made by the recent Cuban expedition, but such an attempt is not wholly incompatible with the political creed of perhaps a majority of our countrymen. According to the plan of the conspirators, the citizens of this country were to appear to the world only as the allies or auxiliaries of the people of Cuba. It was assumed that there was, or that there could be created, a Red Republican party among the Creole population of the island, and it was through these that possession of it was to be obtained. The Cubans themselves were to appear before the world as the prime movers of the enterprise and chief actors in it. They were to proclaim themselves a republic, independent of Spain, and we were simply to enlist under their banner, and to aid them in achieving their independence. Annexation would, it was supposed, follow republicanism and independence, as a matter of course. This was the plan, and we can see nothing in it inconsistent with the doctrines advocated by the whole body of American demagogues, and by nearly the whole American newspaper press. Once lay it down, as nearly all our politicians of late have been in the habit of doing, that the people may rebel against the sovereign authority of the state when they judge proper, and that, irrespective of pre-

existing constitutions and laws, they are sovereign and the legitimate source of all political power, and it is impossible for you to point out any thing wrong or censurable in the attempt to get possession of Cuba in the way proposed, that is, by rebellion, murder, and robbery. According to these principles, the Creoles of Cuba, however few in number, or insignificant in position, who were dissatisfied with the Spanish government, or uneasy and merely desirous of a change, had a right to assume to be the *people* of Cuba, in whom vests the national sovereignty, and to organize themselves into a provisional government, and speak and act in the name of the universal Cuban nation. If they had this right, on the same principles our citizens, as many of them as chose, had the right to treat them as the independent and sovereign people of Cuba, and as such to join with them, and assist them in effecting their independence, and consolidating their authority over the whole island; for according to the popular political creed of this country, democracy is the native inherent right of every people, the only legitimate form of government, and therefore the national sovereignty must always vest in the party struggling to maintain or to establish democracy. Either, then, we must say that Lopez and his crew are not censurable, except for their imprudence and ill-success, or abandon our popular political creed. If we hold on, as the mass of our politicians do, and no doubt will for some time to come, to the principles of that creed, it is only by a logical inconsequence that we can condemn the Cuban or any expedition of the sort.

But our politicians would do well to reflect that a people cannot hold and act on principles which would justify such an expedition, without placing themselves out of the pale of civilized nations, and authorizing the civilized world to treat them as a nest of pirates, and to make war on them as the common foe of mankind. Especially must this be so, when they avow and act on such principles against a power with which their government has treaties of peace and amity, as our government has with Spain. With such a people, having a popular form of government, which must in the long run, to a great extent at least, yield to the popular will, however expressed, no nation can live in peace; for they hold themselves bound neither by the laws of nations nor by the faith of treaties. No nation within reach of their influence can ever be safe from their machinations; and every one must be perpetually in danger of having them stir up its subjects to rebellion, and through them

to strip it of its territories, and finally blot out its national existence. Friendly relations with such a people are out of the question, and the common interests of nations and of society must ultimately league the whole civilized world against them to exterminate them, or to be exterminated by them.

We are too sincere a patriot and too loyal a citizen to believe that the majority even of those who adhere to these false and detestable principles are aware of the horrible consequences which legitimately flow from them. It is but common candor to regard them as better than their principles, and to presume that, in general, they do not understand the real nature of the doctrines they profess, and indeed seem to glory in professing. They are no doubt greatly blinded by their passions, and misled by their insane thirst of gold and territorial acquisition, but much of their error originates in misapprehension of the true nature of their own political institutions. These institutions are republican, indeed, and repugnant to both monarchy and political aristocracy, but they are not democratic, either in the ancient or the modern sense of that term. Anciently, as in Athens, where the word originated, democracy meant a government possessed and administered by the common people, in distinction from the Eupatrids, or nobles; in modern times, it means the absolute and underived sovereignty of the people, or the native and inherent right of the multitude to do whatever they please, and is necessarily resolvable into anarchy or the despotism of the mob. Our institutions are democratic in neither of these senses: not in the former, for they recognize no political distinction of common people and Eupatrids, lords and commons; not in the latter, for they recognize no political power in the people save as constitutionally defined and exercised in virtue of and accordance with legal forms, and they make it high treason to rebel against the state, or to levy war against its sovereign authority. Under our political system, the people are the *motive* force, but not the *governing* power, and are, theoretically, neither the government nor the source of its rights. The constitution and laws are above them. Suffrage is not with us a natural right, an incident of one's manhood, but a public trust conferred by law, and capable of being extended or contracted by municipal regulation.

But American politicians generally, not of one party only, for in this respect Whigs and Democrats do not essentially differ, have of late years overlooked this important fact, and, corrupted by French Jacobins, and English and Scotch radi-

cals, have sought to give to our institutions a democratic interpretation in the modern sense of the word. They cease to hold the laws sacred, and the constitution inviolable, and nothing is for them sacred or obligatory, but the arbitrary and irresponsible will of the multitude. According to them, the will of the people overrides constitutions and laws, and is the only authority to be consulted by the statesman, and, they are well-nigh prepared to say, by the moralist and the divine. He must be an obtuse dialectician indeed, who fails to perceive, when his attention is called to the point, that it is a necessary corollary from a democracy of this sort, that the people, or any number of persons calling themselves the people, have the right to rebel against the state when they choose, and change its constitution as they please. This doctrine, of course, strikes at all legality, all legitimacy, abrogates all law, municipal or international, renders loyalty an unmeaning word, and leaves the people, theoretically at least, in a state of pure anarchy and lawlessness. It denies all government by denying to government all sacredness and inviolability, and leaves us free to follow our own instincts, passions, lusts, and supposed interests, without regard to municipal law, the laws of nations, or the obligations of treaties. Our error lies in our adhesion to the fundamental principles of this false democracy, a democracy of foreign, not of native growth, and as anti-American as it is anti-national and anti-social. It is the prevalence of this false democracy amongst us that has in some measure blinded us, and rendered the mass of our people apathetic to the reprehensible character of the recent conduct of a portion of our citizens towards Spain, Mexico, and even Great Britain.

It, of course, will be easy for our demagogues and our radical press to call us hard names for these remarks, to denounce us as the enemy of free institutions and the friend of tyrants and aristocrats, and to drown the voice of truth and justice by senseless shouts of "Popular Sovereignty," "The Rights of Man," "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," or other popular watchwords which have convulsed the nations of the Old World, consecrated rebellion, and instituted the worship of the dagger; but it will nevertheless remain still true, that a large portion of the American people have lost sight of the principles of their own institutions, and embraced principles which they cannot avow and act on without deserving to be placed outside of the pale of civilized nations, and which, if continued to be held and acted on, must in the end sink us to the

level of the Asiatic Malays. There is no use in seeking to deceive ourselves. There is a spirit abroad among us, working in the very heart of our population, that, unless speedily exorcised, must ultimately, if our power continues to increase at its present ratio, make us the deadliest foe of Christian civilization that has arisen since Attila the Hun, and the early Saracenic and Turkish successors of the Arabian impostor.

It cannot be denied, and should not be disguised, that we are fast adopting the principles, and following in the footsteps, of the old French Jacobins. We are preparing to enter, and would that we could say we have not entered, upon a career of Jacobinical propagandism and territorial acquisition. Other nations see this, and therefore see in us the future disturbers of the peace of the world. Hence, while they admire our industrial activity, our enterprise and energy in the material order, they detest our principles, and hold our national character in low esteem. It is idle for us to cherish the delusion, that the estimation in which the nations of the Old World hold us is owing to our republicanism and free institutions. It is no such thing. It is because they see in us, as a nation, no loyalty, no high moral aims, no lofty principles of religion and virtue, but a low, grovelling attachment to the world, the deification of material interests, and the worship of the "almighty dollar." It is because they see us becoming democratic propagandists, and sympathizers with the rebels against legitimate authority, the peace and order of society, wherever we find them, and ready to decree an ovation to every popular miscreant, who, after having lighted the flames of rebellion and civil war in his own country, flies hither to save his neck from the halter it so richly merits. It is because we respect not the rights of sovereignty, the independence of nations, or the faith of treaties, and have proved ourselves capable of stirring up the citizens of a state with which we are at peace to a rebellion against its sovereign authority, for the sake of stripping it, through them, of a portion of its territory, and incorporating it into the Union.

Unhappily for our reputation, the recent military expedition against Cuba is not an isolated fact or an anomaly in our brief national history. It stands connected with our act of robbing Mexico of Texas, and annexing it to the Union. Texas was a Mexican province chiefly settled by American emigrants, who by settling it became Mexican citizens and subjects. These Americo-Mexicans, in concert with our citizens, and, it is said, with persons in high official station under our government, re-

belled against the Mexican authorities, and by means of volunteers, money, arms, and munitions of war from the States, succeeded in achieving independence. As soon as this was achieved, or assumed to be achieved, the Republic of Texas applied to our government for admission into the American confederacy. Her application was indeed rejected by Mr. Van Buren, who was then President of the United States, and whose management of our foreign relations, little as we esteem that gentleman, we are bound to say, were creditable to himself and to his country ; but it was renewed and accepted under his successor, and in 1845 Texas became one of the United States, and sent, as one of her representatives in the American Senate, the very man who is said to have concerted with President Jackson and others the robbery, and who certainly was the chief to whom its execution was intrusted. Here was a great national crime, not yet expiated ; and here was set a precedent not a little hostile to the nations that have territory contiguous to ours.

We acknowledge personally, with shame and regret, that, though opposed to the revolt of Texas from Mexico, and to the aid which she received from this country by the connivance of the government, we were, after her independence was an acknowledged fact, among those who, for certain political reasons, of less weight than we were led to believe, advocated her annexation to the Union. It is true, we repudiated the principles on which she and our countrymen defended her conduct, and we sought to make out a case of legality in her favor ; but, nevertheless, we were wrong, and are heartily sorry for what we did, and our only consolation is that we were too insignificant to have had any influence on the result, one way or the other. But be this as it may, the recent expeditions for revolutionizing and annexing Cuba are historically connected with this great national crime. No sooner had Texas been annexed than the rage for annexation seemed to have become universal. Mr. Yulee, the Jew-Senator from Florida, immediately brought forward in the Senate a proposition for the acquisition of Cuba. Mr. Dallas, Vice-President of the United States, in the same year, 1845, gave, at a public dinner, the annexation of Cuba, as a toast, and in 1847 wrote a letter in favor of the appropriation of that island, as essential to his plans for the aggrandizement of the Union. Early in 1845 the press began to advocate the annexation of California, another province of Mexico, and it should be remembered that Colonel Fremont, an officer

of the United States army, before he had learned that war existed between us and the Mexican republic, actually, by the aid of American residents, got up a revolution in that province, and declared it independent of the Mexican authorities. Here the game of Texas was begun to be played over again, and it is not insignificant that this same Colonel Fremont is sent to represent California in the Federal Senate, now that she is admitted as a State into the Union. There can be no reasonable doubt, that both California and New Mexico would have been annexed to the Union *à la* Texas, if the war with the Mexican republic had not given us an opportunity of acquiring them in a more honorable manner, that is, openly by the sword. It was, as the papers said, "manifest destiny," and it is a prevailing belief among our politicians that the annexation of the whole of Mexico, and even of Central America, is only a question of time. The fever of annexation broke out even on our northern frontier, and if Great Britain had not appeared to us to be a more formidable power than Spain or Mexico, the Canadian Annexationists and Red Republicans would have received all the aid they needed to sever their connection with the British empire, and to become incorporated with the United States. A war with Great Britain was not deemed prudent for the moment, and the annexation of Canada is, for the present, postponed. Pirate does not fight pirate, or even man-of-war, if the encounter can be avoided.

Now, in judging the bearing on our national character of the recent expedition of our citizens against Cuba, which it is well known both our people and our government are extremely anxious to possess, these facts must be taken into the account; and they show that it is not an isolated act, but one of a series of acts of like character, and of acts, too, which have received, at least in the case of Texas, even the sanction of the Federal government. What our citizens had done in the case of Texas and California, what was to prevent them from doing in the case of Cuba? and if the government connived at their conduct, and finally sanctioned it in the instance of fraudulently appropriating a province of Mexico, why should it not do the same in the instance of fraudulently appropriating a province of Spain? Viewed in the light of our previous conduct, the expedition to Cuba ceases to be merely the act of the adventurer Lopez and a few nameless and lawless individuals, the spawn of New York and New Orleans, Washington and Cincinnati, who were induced to engage in it, and becomes in some sort

an act for which the American people themselves are responsible, and other nations at least will, and have the right to, so regard it. The proposed Cuban republic, provisionally organized, had its juntas, clubs, or agents in our principal cities; the forces raised were chiefly our own citizens, under officers who had served under our flag in Mexico; the regiments were numbered and named after individual States, as if they had been United States troops; and the papers, — no bad index to public sentiment, — in announcing the killed and wounded in the attack on Cardenas, used the very terms they would have used if they had in fact been so. It is not unfair, then, to assume that the people of this country did to a great extent actually sympathize with that expedition; that they were so desirous of acquiring Cuba, and so indifferent as to the means, that their moral sense took no alarm at acquiring it in the manner we had acquired Texas; and that, if they regarded the proceedings as somewhat irregular, they yet were extremely apathetic to their moral turpitude. If, as no doubt was the fact, they were for the most part unprepared to take any very active part in furthering the nefarious proceedings, it is clear that they were not unwilling that they should go on and succeed. The expedition, if successful, would give us Cuba, the key to the Gulf of Mexico, open to us the final annexation of all the West Indies, liberate Cuba from the dark despotism of Spain, perhaps from the darker despotism of Rome, and introduce the oppressed Creoles to the advantages of our free institutions, of our Bible societies, and sectarian religion, and enrich us with the spoils of its churches and religious houses, supposed to be immensely rich. So the end would justify the means. If such had not been the public sentiment of our people, especially in our principal cities, and in the South and Southwest, the conspirators could never have carried on their operations within the jurisdiction of the United States in the public manner they did; they would have been denounced to the public authorities, and ample evidence would have been forthcoming for their conviction.

No doubt there was a large body of our citizens, passive in regard to nearly all public matters, that had never heard of Lopez, or the attempt to organize an expedition against Cuba, nay, who have not yet heard any thing of either; no doubt there was a respectable number of enlightened and moral citizens, who were from the first indignant at the very thought of setting on foot such an expedition within our jurisdiction, and

no doubt, again, that a large majority of our people, now the subject is brought distinctly before them, and its enormity pointed out, are prepared to repudiate it; but it is still undeniable that the rumors of the attempt to organize such an expedition did not alarm the public mind, and the news of its embarking was received rather with approbation than horror. The iniquity of the proceeding did not strike the mass of the people till after "the sober second thought" induced by its ridiculous failure. The feelings and wishes, the sympathies, of that whole body of citizens who usually give tone to our community, and determine the action and policy of the American people, were decidedly with Lopez and his piratical associates, not in the least with the friendly power about to be so grievously wronged. This portion of our citizens, whose dominant sentiment ordinarily represents that of the country, for ordinarily the less, not the more, worthy public sentiment predominates, saw nothing morally wrong in the nefarious proceeding, nothing, indeed, but the somewhat bold application of their own principles. It is this undeniable fact that authorizes us to say that the Cuban expedition met the popular sympathy, and that the American people as a body are to no inconsiderable extent implicated in its guilt, if not actively, at least passively. It is this fact, again, which gives to that expedition its chief importance.

Even among those who opposed the proceedings in this case, as in that of Texas, comparatively few opposed them primarily and chiefly on the ground of their injustice to Spain, of their being a violation of the laws of nations, the faith of treaties, the rights of sovereignty, and the rights of property. They opposed the expedition for the same reasons that the South and Southwest favored it, because it was supposed that the acquisition of Cuba would strengthen the cause of negro slavery, and retard or wholly hinder its final emancipation. They reasoned that it must not be encouraged, because it was not an "Abolition" or a "Free Soil" measure. The question, therefore, was discussed, as far as discussed at all, after the manner of the English and American mind, on a collateral issue, not on its intrinsic merits. This of itself shows that the essential principle involved in it as a moral and international question was not regarded, even by not a few of the opponents of the expedition, as grossly immoral, and that even with them the rights of Spain, the laws of nations, and the faith of treaties, in themselves considered, counted for little, and were

worth urging only when favorable to the views and purposes of a certain portion of our own citizens. The controversy, as far it went on, was confined to a purely local and domestic question, and became only a branch of the general controversy which has been for some time raging between the Northern and Southern sections of the Union. It is this fact, again, which has deceived so many otherwise well-disposed citizens. If the independence and annexation of Texas had been discussed on its merits, not in its relation to negro slavery, a matter of great indifference to many of us, there was still moral soundness enough in the American people, we doubt not, to have saved us from the great national and international crime we committed; and if the independence and annexation of Cuba could have been presented to the American people in its true light, free from all connection with the same subject, we owe it to our countrymen to say, that we have no doubt that a majority of them would have repudiated the proposition with indignation. But the fact that it was not so presented and discussed was their own fault, and they must be held responsible for its consequences.

Thus far we have considered the Cuban expedition in its relation to the political principles and popular sentiments of the American people, as distinguished from the American government; but it is necessary to go farther, and consider the dispositions and acts of the government in regard to it. The conduct of the American people outside of the government, or rather of the active minority, by which they are usually represented, if not as bad as appearances indicate, is still gravely reprehensible, and extremely mortifying to all who are alive to the honor of their country. But notwithstanding this, the government itself may have had honorable intentions, and been really in earnest to discharge its obligations towards Spain, with whom it has treaties of peace and friendship. Is such the fact? Has it all along acted in good faith? Has it failed to perform its duty through incapacity, or has it aimed to do no more than necessary to save appearances, and to avoid an open rupture with Spain?

We wish to speak of the government with the loyal respect the citizen always owes to the supreme political authority of his country, and we do not allow ourselves rashly to judge its intentions. It was bound to peace relations with Spain by express treaty, made in 1795, and subsequently confirmed, the first article of which stipulates "that there shall be firm and in-

violable peace and sincere friendship between the two governments and their respective citizens and subjects, without exception of persons or places." Under this and other clauses of the same treaty, the United States were bound to use all necessary force to repress and punish all acts hostile to Spain, or any of her provinces or colonies, committed within their jurisdiction. The treaty, we need not say, is the supreme law of the land, and as binding on the citizen as on the government itself. The citizens of a state cannot be legally at war with a power with which their government is at peace, and their hostile acts are its acts if it neglect to use all its power, if needed, to prevent or chastise them; for the government under the laws of nations, even in the absence of treaty stipulations, is responsible to foreign powers for the acts of all persons within its jurisdiction. Undoubtedly it is excused from all hostile intention, if it does all in its power to prevent hostile acts on the part of its subjects, or persons within its jurisdiction, or if, failing wholly to prevent, it is prompt to put forth its whole power to repress them, and bring the offenders to justice; for no government can at all times and under all circumstances control the entire conduct of every person within its jurisdiction. But with this reserve, under the law of nations, the government is responsible for the conduct of all persons within its jurisdiction, and especially when the law of nations is defined, and, so to speak, intensified, by express treaty obligations. Our government was then bound to exert all its vigilance and power, if needed, to prevent the beginning or setting on foot within its jurisdiction, and much more the embarking, of the military expedition against Cuba. This was clearly its duty, and any thing short of this was short of what Spain had the undoubted right to expect and to require at its hands. It owed it, also, to Spain and to its own majesty to execute the full rigor of its own municipal law against the persons implicated in that expedition.

But our government, owing to the fact of its having connived at the rebellion of Texas, of its having, against the protest of Mexico, incorporated that province into the Union, and of its having gone to war with Mexico, and still further dismembered her, because she would not peaceably submit to be robbed of her territory, had given Spain ample reason to distrust its professions except so far as backed by deeds, and to regard it as capable of repeating its previous dishonorable and criminal connivance at rebellion, murder, and robbery. All the world knew that Texas had been wrested from Mexico by American citi-

zens, or persons within our jurisdiction, without opposition from our government, and it was by no means improbable, *a priori*, that what it had consented to see done in the case of Texas, it might be willing to have done in the case of Cuba. Spain had seen in our relations with Mexico the manner in which we were capable of interpreting our treaties of peace and amity with foreign powers, and might reasonably suspect us of being no further opposed to the Cuban expedition than was necessary to save appearances. This undoubtedly was the view taken by the movers and friends of the expedition; otherwise we can hardly suppose they would have dared, knowing, as they must have known, the stringent nature of our laws, to commit the acts they did within the Federal jurisdiction. Our government, if it acted really in good faith, was therefore bound, at least for its own sake, to more than ordinary vigilance and activity in preventing or suppressing the enterprise, and bringing its participants, aiders, and abettors to justice.

We doubt not the honest intentions of the government, but we must say that, so far from exerting this extraordinary vigilance or activity, it has undeniably failed in the full and prompt discharge of its duty both to Spain and to its own character. We are forced to this conclusion by a series of facts and considerations which seem to us to leave no room for doubt. The government can be said to have done its duty only on the supposition that it could not detect the proceedings of the conspirators, or that it lacked power to arrest them, or was unable to procure the evidence necessary to establish juridically their guilt. No one of these suppositions is admissible, least of all the second; for the government itself would not thank the friends who should undertake to defend it on the ground of its inability to fulfil its treaty obligations, and to execute its own laws. Such a line of defence the government would be prompt to repudiate, as it would place it in the most humiliating light before the nations of the world, and authorize them to refuse to enter into any treaty stipulations with it.

The proposition to acquire Cuba by means of revolutionizing it was before the country, and discussed in the public journals. Every body knew, or might have known, that, as far back at least as 1848, there was a movement concerted with American citizens, to be efficiently supported by us, going on in Cuba and some of our cities, to get up a republican revolution in Cuba, and that this revolution was intended to result in its independence and ultimate annexation to the Union. Of all this the

government could not have been uninformed. It was equally well known that the movement in certain sections of the Union met with great favor, that it accorded with the wishes of the country, and even of the government so far as the simple acquisition of Cuba was concerned, and throughout with the popular democratic creed of the great body of our politicians and of our newspaper press generally. Here was enough to place a loyal and competent government on its guard, and induce it to take active and efficient measures to preserve the peace relations between us and Spain, and to prevent its treaty obligations with that government from being violated by persons within its jurisdiction. Unhappily, it did nothing of the sort. Public men, men high in social, and even official station, were advocating the acquisition of Cuba, the press, especially at the Southwest, was busy manufacturing public opinion for the country, and urging the violation of the rights of property, the law of nations, and the faith of treaties, and the government was silent and inactive; its organs were dumb, and it did and said nothing to give its deluded subjects any reason to believe that it would be more disposed to execute its laws against a Cuban, than it had been against a Texan, military expedition. Had the government been really loyal, really disposed to respect the rights of Spain, and to fulfil its duties towards her, it may be asked why it did not exert itself in the beginning to correct the false opinion that the citizens of this country have a right to engage in a project for revolutionizing a province or colony of a friendly power, and of wresting it from its lawful sovereign, as well as the grave error that they could do all this without implicating the government in their guilt. At any rate, would it not, since its past delinquency had made it necessary, have assured its misguided subjects in the outset, that it would not suffer them to make the attempt with impunity? Yet it took no notice of what was going on, and suffered the false opinion to spread, till it became a power all but impossible to be controlled.

It is true that the military expedition fitted out in 1849 was prevented from embarking by the intervention of the government. But its destination was no secret; and the adventurers were set at liberty, without even the form of a trial, permitted to retain their arms and ammunition, and suffered to disperse themselves over the Union without receiving the punishment, or any portion of the punishment, which our laws annex to the high misdemeanour of which they were unquestionably guilty. Why was not the full rigor of the law executed against them?

Had it been, others would have been deterred from engaging in similar expeditions. The very fact that they were let off without being punished was well calculated to produce the conviction, unfounded we are willing to believe, that the government itself was at heart not ill disposed to their enterprise, and would do no more to prevent its execution than was strictly necessary to avoid an open rupture with Spain. It is idle to pretend that no sufficient proof could be obtained to convict them. Proof enough could have been obtained if the government had really wanted it, and earnestly sought for it ; for the real character and objects of the expedition were well known, were matters of public notoriety, and it is not likely that they were incapable of being juridically established.

As was to be expected, the impunity extended to the military expedition of 1849 served only to encourage another. That had failed in consequence of appointing its rendezvous within the jurisdiction of the United States. The new expedition had only to avoid that error, by assembling at some point without that jurisdiction ; from such point or points it could embark for its piratical attack on Cuba, free from the apprehension of being interrupted by the officers of the Union. It accordingly adopted that precaution, and, as is well known, with complete success. If it failed in its ulterior objects, it was owing, not to the vigilance or the activity of our government, but to the precautions taken by the Spanish authorities, and the unexpected loyalty of the Cuban population. The Cuban democrats appear to have been from home, and the Red Republican demonstration proved a complete failure, to the no small honor of our Creole neighbours.

The government could not have been ignorant of the attempt to set on foot this new expedition within its jurisdiction. No sooner had it dismissed the adventurers from Round Island, than military preparations were recommenced in New York, Boston, and especially New Orleans ; men were enlisted, drilled in the use of arms, and despatched to Chagres, or other points out of the Union, and all in the most public manner. The adventurers hardly attempted to conceal their destination, and ostentatiously displayed the cockade and colors of the proposed Cuban republic. The publishers of the *New York Sun* hoisted on their office the new flag of Cuba, and openly engaged in acts hostile to Spain. The advertisements and proclamations of the revolutionary junta were inserted in the public journals, and bonds made payable on the revenues of the

island of Cuba were issued, to procure money for raising troops and exercising them in the use of arms. The conspirators carried their effrontery so far as to insert in the public journals of Washington, under the very nose of the government, an advertisement announcing the formation of a permanent junta destined to promote the *political interests of Cuba*, that is, to revolutionize the island. These acts, done openly, before all the world, of a nature easily traceable to their perpetrators, could not have been unknown to the government, unless it chose to remain ignorant of them. The Spanish Minister, as early as the 19th of January of this year, called the attention of the government to them. The Secretary, Mr. Clayton, issued, indeed, a feeble and indolent circular, on the 22d of the same month, to the District Attorneys of Washington, New York, and New Orleans, enjoining upon them to *observe* what should be passing in their respective districts ; but with no apparent result. These attorneys excused themselves from prosecuting the offenders, on the pretence that an overt act was necessary to justify the commencement of proceedings against them,—a pretence as creditable to their legal attainments as to their loyalty. The law declares, “ That if any person shall within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States *begin*, or set on foot, or provide or prepare the means for, any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States are at peace, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanour, and shall be fined not exceeding three thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than three years.”* The journals, by publishing the advertisements and proclamations of the conspirators, as well as the conspirators themselves, were guilty under this law, and liable to its penalties ; for the law makes the very *beginning* or *attempt* to get up such expedition or enterprise a high misdemeanour, as these district attorneys, if lawyers, must have known perfectly well. The district attorneys were probably not unfavorable to the expedition, and had no wish to interfere with it any further than they could help, and the Secretary of State, though well disposed himself, probably did not judge it necessary to insist with energy on their performance of their official duties. The crimes had been committed in their districts, and it was

* *Statutes of the United States*, 1818, chap. 88, sec. 6.

their duty to have prosecuted the offenders, and nobody can really be so simple as to believe that they could not have obtained the requisite evidence for their conviction, if they had sought it. But the government ought to be responsible for their neglect, for they were its agents.

The conspirators continued their operations, without the government's taking any efficient measures to arrest them. On the 8th of May, the Spanish Minister, M. Calderon de la Barca, writes to the Secretary again, and from this date continues in frequent communications to furnish him with precise information and detailed proofs of the movements of the conspirators, till the final departure of the expedition from the United States. Yet till its final departure nothing could excite the Secretary to activity ; but then, after the expedition had sailed, and there was no probability of being able to intercept it before it should effect a landing on the island, he despatched a vessel of war to the port of Havana, where there was no danger, and where there could be no expectation of encountering the pirates, with orders to *observe* the motions of vessels approaching that port, in order to *ascertain* if there had been commenced any military expedition or enterprise to be directed from the United States against the territory or the dominions of Spain !

This order strikes us as being little better than a mockery. To despatch a vessel of war on a cruise of observation to ascertain a well-known fact, — a fact already with detailed proofs before the government, — was, to say the least, wholly unnecessary, and calculated only to throw doubts on the good faith of the government. Then the fact that it was despatched only *after* the piratical expedition had embarked, when it was too late to intercept it, and to the port of Havana, the best guarded and least exposed port of the island, and where nobody expected the pirates would attempt to effect their landing, could only indicate either the extreme inefficiency of the government, or its good-will to the pirates, and wish not to interfere with their sport of murder and robbery. The fact of the non-interference of the government till the last moment, and its inefficient interference even then, are well calculated to throw doubts on its good faith, and to create a painful suspicion, which, however, we repudiate, that it was willing to connive at the expedition, — at least so far as to give it a fair chance of succeeding, if it could. At any rate, the facts we have detailed prove a culpable failure of the late administration in the discharge of its duty to Spain, and in the execution of the laws of the Union, and if Mr. Clay-

ton thought to obtain credit with honorable men for his vigilance and promptness, he made a mistake.

We cannot but remark that Mr. Secretary Clayton's language is far more energetic when he has some pretence for asserting that Spain has infringed or is likely to infringe the rights of American citizens. He had remained nearly apathetic while the conspirators were at work in fitting out their expedition against Cuba, and nothing could induce him to take efficient measures to arrest them. Our treaty obligations with Spain and our own laws were violated in open day, and he could at most only be induced to issue some indolent and tardy order to his subordinates to make observations. But when Spain, not exactly within her jurisdiction, but on a desert island close to her shores, takes a portion of the military expedition prisoners, he is incited to an unwonted degree of energy. The boot is on the other leg now, and he writes—we translate from the *Courier des Etats-Unis*, not having the original despatch before us—to Mr. Campbell, our Consul at Havana,—“If the facts relative to their capture are as reported, the President is resolved that the eagle shall protect them from all punishment except such as may be inflicted on them by the tribunals of their own country. Tell the Count of Alcoy to send them back to the United States, where they will find a punishment worse than any that he can inflict on them, if they are honorable men, in the reprobation they will meet from all right-minded persons, for having made an attempt against the good faith of a nation that prefers its reputation for integrity to all the Antilles together.” This is in some respects no less amusing than grandiloquent. The supposition that men enlisted in a piratical expedition are *honorable* men is somewhat comical, and the suggestion that they would meet a heavier punishment for their crimes in the public opinion of their own country than any the Count of Alcoy could inflict on them, when that public opinion was in favor of their enterprise, and so strongly in favor of it that the Secretary himself wellnigh lacked the courage to brave it, is original, and shows that the late Secretary of State has one of the qualities, if not of a statesman, at least of a poet. Then the flourish about the high estimation in which we hold our national reputation for integrity would be worth more if we had, or even deserved, that reputation. We bartered that reputation for Texas, for California and New Mexico, and might easily be supposed capable of bartering it again for Cuba and Porto Rico. The frail one should not challenge admiration for her virtue.

The prisoners taken on the islands of Las Mugerres and Contoy were, and it is well known that they were, a portion of the Lopez expedition, and had left the United States on a piratical enterprise against the dominions of Spain. They were pirates, and, under our treaty with Spain and the laws of nations, they were punishable as pirates. Spain had been invaded, her territory had been violated by our citizens, her subjects murdered, her treasury plundered, her public buildings burned, and the governor of one of her towns made prisoner; she was threatened with still further invasion from the same quarter, and with all the horrors of war. She had, under these circumstances, the right to protect herself by taking and hanging every individual she found engaged in the piratical expedition against her dominions. These Contoy prisoners, as they are called, were the comrades of those who had invaded her soil; they shared in their guilt, and were virtually pirates, and as such could not claim the protection of our government. To any demand of ours to Spain to give them up, it was sufficient for her to allege this fact, and that she had taken them in the right of self-defence, and should treat them according to the law of nations.

Our government could demand the release of these prisoners only on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence to connect them with the piratical expedition against Cuba; but of that fact Spain was a competent judge, and she had the full right to bring them to trial, and if convicted by her own tribunals, under the laws of nations, of being a part of that expedition, she had the undoubted right to sentence and punish them, without our having the least right to remonstrate. There was really nothing in the conduct of Spain with regard to the capture, detention, and trial of these prisoners of which we have the least right to complain. Spain was not obliged to wait till the pirates had actually set foot on her soil, and struck the first blow, before her right to arrest and punish them commenced. It was enough that their intention to invade her soil was manifest, and it was clear that they had embarked for that purpose. These Contoy prisoners were taken under arms near her territories, on desert islands, the usual resort of the adventurers. Undoubtedly they had not yet actually invaded Cuba, but the circumstances under which they were found lurking there sufficiently indicated their purpose, and pointed them out as a part of the expedition which had landed, committed its depredations, and retreated to Key West

within the jurisdiction of the Union. They might be there waiting the return of their comrades with reinforcements to renew their piratical attacks, and no one can be so ignorant of the rights of Spain as to suppose that she was bound to respect their hiding-place till they had acquired sufficient force to commence the actual murder of her subjects, and the sack and destruction of her towns. She had the right to make them prisoners, and, if she had the right to make them prisoners, the right to retain them a reasonable time for investigating their case, and of ascertaining their guilt or innocence. She did only this, and considering the inefficiency our government had displayed in protecting her from the piratical attacks of our own citizens, and that the expedition intended to operate against her from our territory had been defeated by her own exertions, without any efficient aid or act of ours, she had far more right to deem herself aggrieved by our peremptory demand for the delivery of the prisoners, than we to complain of her for detaining and subjecting them, or proposing to subject them, to a trial before her own tribunals.

We are quite sure that, if the case had been reversed, we should have given a brief answer to a like demand from the Spanish government. How, in fact, did we reason, when General Jackson marched with his troops into Florida, then a Spanish province, and took military possession of its capital, because the Spanish governor could not, or would not, restrain the Seminole Indians, as bound by treaty, from making predatory incursions into the territory of the Union? If the tables had been turned, and the military expedition had been intended to operate from Cuba against us, and the Spanish authorities had been as remiss and inefficient in preventing or repressing it as ours has been, the whole force of the Union would have been put in requisition, if needed, to lay all Cuba in ashes; and if we had detected armed adventurers from her ports lurking near our coast, watching a favorable opportunity to make a descent, we should have taken them prisoners, and with the briefest trial possible hung them up, every one of them, as pirates. Of this no man who knows our character, and our summary manner of dealing with those who violate our rights, can reasonably doubt. It would be well to remember that the obligations of the treaty between us and Spain are reciprocal, — that they do not bind her and leave us free, as one is tempted to think is our interpretation of them, but bind us as well as her, and what would be right in our case is equally right in hers.

The journals have been filled with loud complaints of the cruelty with which the Spanish authorities treated the Contoy prisoners while they detained them in custody. There is not a word of truth in these complaints, as the good plight of the prisoners when landed in the United States amply proves. They were well treated, and no unusual or unnecessary severity was exercised against them, — no further severity than that of guarding against their escape, and their intercourse with their sympathizers or accomplices. We are well aware that the mass of the American people, believing all the falsehoods and retaining all the prejudices of their ancestors current in the days of Queen Elizabeth, are prepared to credit any absurd tale of Spanish cruelty that any idle vagabond chooses to invent ; but this much is to be said of our countrymen, that they are probably unrivalled in the facility of believing every thing — except the truth. No people can surpass them in their ability to believe falsehood without evidence, or to reject truth though supported by evidence complete and irrefragable. It is one of their titles to the admiration of the philosophers of the nineteenth century.

We are not the apologists of Spain ; but we may say this much for her, that no nation has been more maligned, and no national character more vilely traduced, than the Spanish. There is no nobler blood in Europe than the brave old Castilian, and a more elevated or virtuous peasantry than the Spanish is not to be found in the whole world. Time was, and not long since, when Spain was the freest country in Europe, worthy even of all admiration for her noble political institutions. She was, at no distant date, the ruling European nation, surpassing in grandeur and power all that Great Britain now claims to be. Domestic dissensions, fomented by foreign influences, foreign and civil wars, French invasion, French philosophism, English protection, radicalism, rebellion, revolution, and the terrible struggle for her very national existence against the colossal power of Napoleon, in the zenith of his pride and his strength, have for the moment reduced her from her former relative position among European nations, and induced many in both hemispheres to forget the gratitude that is due her for her eminent services and eminent sacrifices to the cause of religion and European and American civilization ; but she is still a living and a noble nation, with a recuperative energy in her population to be found in no other population in Europe, and lowly as she lies at this moment to the eye of the super-

ficial spectator, she has in her all the elements of her former greatness, and before her a long and glorious future. She has still a believing heart, a loyal soul, and an inbred reverence for religion and morality. The spoiler's work is wellnigh finished, and the infidel and sacrilegious revolutionary storm has wellnigh spent its fury, and the day draweth nigh for her to put off her garments of sorrow, and to put on her robes of joy and gladness. She has had, no doubt, her faults, and will have them again, but as to her cruelty it is mildness itself in comparison with the tender mercies of the renowned Anglo-Saxon, who, after twelve hundred years of culture, seems still to cherish in his heart the habits and tastes of his piratical ancestors.

But our failure in the discharge of our duty to Spain extends farther than we have stated. Cuba, in consequence of our remissness and inefficiency, is still in danger of piratical attacks from our citizens, or at least of their attempts, in concert with disaffected Cubans, to get up a democratic revolution in the island, and involve it in the horrors of civil war. Spain has been put to great trouble and expense in defending that island from our machinations, which it was our duty to have spared her, and she is obliged to continue her armament and defences on the war footing, and that to defend her province from the hostile invasions of the subjects of a government which professes to be at peace with her. This is not an endurable state of things. Does it comport with our honor as a nation to suffer it to continue? Have we not the will and the power to restrain our lawless citizens, and to compel them to respect the rights and the property of a friendly power? Are we reduced either to the moral or physical necessity of compelling nations with whom we have treaties of peace and amity to arm themselves to the teeth, and everywhere keep watch and ward against the depredations of our American citizens and subjects? We would fain hope not, and we look with confidence to the new administration to take efficient measures to reassure Spain, to indemnify her for the wrongs she has suffered in consequence of our remissness, and to relieve her from the necessity of keeping up any extra garrison in Cuba to protect her possession of that island from the aggressions of persons subject to the government of the United States. We have full confidence that, in the hands of the present Secretary of State, the errors and blunders of his predecessor will be repaired, and that our foreign relations will be managed with wisdom and en-

ergy, with jealous regard to the rights and feelings of other nations, and to the dignity and honor of our own.

We hope, too, that our citizens will participate in the reaction against wild and lawless democracy, or Red Republicanism, which appears to have commenced in the Old World ; and that, remembering that justice exalteth a nation, while sin is a reproach to any people, they will retrace their steps, and return to the wholesome principles embodied in their fundamental institutions. It is time for them to pay less attention to the acquisition of territory, and more to the acquisition and maintenance of national honor. We have, morally considered, fallen to a fearful depth, but we have not fallen so low that we cannot, if we choose, rise again. We have prided ourselves on our institutions, and have claimed to be a model republic. We are not, as a people, wholly insensible to the opinions of the civilized world, and we wish all nations to admire our political institutions, and to model their own after them. This is all laudable enough. But we cannot expect them to do it, unless we retrace our steps, and show that we ourselves adhere to the principles of our institutions, and are governed by them.

Hitherto republicanism in the Old World has been associated in the minds of intelligent and honest people with barbarism, the absence of public and private virtue, contempt of religion, disregard of the most sacred obligations and relations, the loss of personal freedom, war on the Church, on morality, on property, on the family, and on society itself. It should have been ours to have proved by our example that this is only an accidental character of republicanism, and that a people may be republican, may dispense with kings and lords, without lapsing into barbarism or interrupting the progress of Christian civilization, — that such a people may be cultivated and moral, refined and religious, free and loyal, respecting the rights of God as well as the rights of man, preserving the sanctity of marriage, and the integrity of the family, respecting the rights of property, the rights of sovereignty, and the independence of nations, and maintaining peace and order under the reign of law. This should have been our mission, but we have been recreant to it ; we have been latterly identifying republicanism with democracy, and American democracy with the European, and doing our best to prove by our example, that in all lands democracy degenerates into license, becomes immoral, irreligious, and aggressive. We have been furnishing kings and aristocrats with strong arguments against republicanism, and in

favor of their system of government. Instead of aiding the emancipation of the oppressed of other lands, we have given their masters new reasons for withholding from them those franchises we so highly esteem, and have double riveted the chains of the slave. The Christian world may well exclaim, in view of our example for the last twenty years, "God save the king! for if licentious and despotic kings are bad, licentious and aggressive democracies are worse."

We are for ourselves neither monarchists nor aristocrats, but according to the best of our knowledge and ability a loyal American citizen; yet we cannot shut our eyes to the dangerous and utterly immoral and dishonorable career upon which the American people to a fearful extent have entered. It is difficult, it may be too late, to arrest them; but as one of the people, as one who yields to no man in his love of his country, and attachment to her government, we assure them that they will never secure true freedom and prosperity in the way they have thus far sought them. If they value national honor, if they love liberty, they must return to the recognition of law, the obligations of morality, and the duty of religious faith and worship. No nation can recede from law without falling into anarchy, or depart from God without precipitating itself into hell. All is not gold that glitters. All change is not improvement. All motion is not progress, and every novelty is not a conquest from the domain of truth. Let our citizens meditate these commonplaces, and form a more just estimate of themselves. They have territory enough, — quite too much; they have room for all the virtuous expansion of which they are capable; let them learn to be content with what they have, and that it is as base to steal a province from a neighbouring state, as it is to pick a neighbour's pocket, or to steal his sheep.

We have taken no notice of what is said about the tyranny with which Spain governs Cuba, for we have no authority to supervise her internal administration, and are bound to treat her as an independent and a Christian nation. We must annul our treaty with her before we can put her out of the pale of civilized nations, and we must put her out of that pale before we can have any right to supervise or interfere with her treatment of her own subjects. But what is said about Spanish tyranny and oppression in her colonies is all unfounded. Spain does not oppress and never has oppressed her colonial subjects, and Cuba would have far less real freedom as a democracy, than she enjoys as a province of the Spanish monarchy. So it was said

in language, language must be a Divine revelation, not a human invention. Without language, intuition is very possible, but reflection is not possible at all; and understanding by thought a reflective act, or an intellectual act in which the actor apprehends both the object perceived and himself as subject perceiving it, De Bonald is right in saying that man cannot think without language. Every human speech, however cultivated or however rude, contains the elements of all that is knowable, and through its medium is repeated, so to speak, in a tangible form, to the reflective understanding, what is revealed to primitive intuition. And when so presented, it is intuitively evident, because in intuition the intelligible object evidences itself.

Intuitions, then, are practically available only as evidencing and rendering certain the truth presented to reflection through the medium of language. They are not the fountain from which we primarily draw those truths by reflection, but the authority by which we know and assert them to be truths. You cannot, then, follow pure intuition, to the neglect of reflection, if you would, and you cannot reflect without language. But if you use language, you must make use of intellectual forms and logical statements, however great your repugnance to them, and the only question to be settled is, whether you make a good or a bad use of them. I have no more fondness for metaphysical systems than you have. I have and wish to have no metaphysical system of my own. I accept in metaphysics simply logic, or the right use of reason in its application to the various matters that fall under our observation, whether by revelation or intuition. The attempt to build up systems of philosophy, and of natural ethics, independent of theology, I cannot approve, and I hold it to be as foolish as was the attempt of the builders in the plain of Shinar to erect a tower whose top should reach to heaven. It has probably arisen from the apparent success with which speculative science was cultivated among the gentiles, and the use which the fathers made of it in their controversies with the heathen, and the scholastics in reducing Christian doctrine to the form of theological science. But the truth in the natural order, though barely possible to be known by our natural light, can without revelation be known only to a very few. The gentile philosophy was far enough from being perfect, and yet what perfection it had was by no means derived solely from the light of nature. No nation, people, or tribe has ever yet been abandoned to the simple light of nature.

means to obtain it. Instead of murmuring at this, we should be grateful for it, and see in it an additional motive for love and gratitude to him.

Z. But why need this supernatural destiny be attainable only by violence to our nature? I see no reason why we might not have been so made that nature and grace should aspire to the same end, so that we might have followed our nature and grace at the same time.

B. Such, in a certain sense, was the case with us prior to sin. Prior to sin, our nature was turned towards God, was held by grace in subjection to his law, and it required no interior struggle to fulfil it, and attain our supernatural destiny. But by sin that grace was lost, and our nature became turned away from God, and inclined to evil. In consequence of this, our nature, that is, the flesh, is now opposed to God, and we can obey his law and live for our supernatural destiny only by doing violence to it. Hence you see that a religion may be very true, very holy, and indispensable to our salvation, and yet be very distasteful to the natural man, and altogether repugnant to the instincts and aspirations of the natural heart.

Z. But one cannot believe what he finds repugnant to his natural feelings.

B. That were some comfort, if it were true; but in the various vicissitudes of life, I find myself obliged to believe many things exceedingly repugnant to my feelings. There are a great many disagreeable truths even in the order of nature, which all of us are compelled to believe.

Z. I am in the habit of relying on my feelings, and when I find I cannot feel with you in what you say, I say at once I do not and cannot believe with you. I do not like your doctrine, for it sacrifices the pure feelings, the noble emotions, and the gentle affections of the human heart, to the cold propositions and rigid deductions of a dry and inexorable logic.

B. Such may be your habit, but the question for you to determine is, whether it be commendable or the reverse. If the propositions and deductions of logic are true, if they conform to reality, your feelings, emotions, and affections, which are opposed to them, are false, and are neither pure nor noble, and if followed lead into falsehood and sin. They are repugnant to truth, and therefore they, not the propositions and deductions, are in fault.

Z. But I am tired of dry and rigid logic, of the cold forms of the intellect. I want the heart, the warm and loving heart,

and the heart is a better guide to the truth than the understanding.

B. That is to say, you are a bit of a sentimentalist, too indolent to think, and simply disposed to lie at your length under a wide-spreading beech, and indulge the luxury of feeling.

"Lentus in umbra
Formosam resonare doces Amaryllida silvas."

This is no uncommon case with young men, especially when smitten by the sweet face and laughing eyes of Amaryllis. But the state of mind you describe is not one to boast of, or to parade before the world. It is a state in which one is expected to say and do a thousand foolish things, but no one ever thinks of taking them as a proof of his good sense, or piety and orthodoxy. Man is not a block of marble, nor is he required to be a mere logic-grinder. The heart has its place and its office; but, when used in a good sense, it means the will, not mere sentiment, and the will, as a blind faculty, never does or can act, save in reference to objects presented to it by the intellect, or that are intellectually apprehended. The heart, distinguished from the understanding, is no guide to truth, for it cannot apprehend truth, and it can be safely trusted only when it is enlightened or informed by intellectual apprehension.

Z. What I mean is, not that we are to follow blind feeling, but our intuitions, that is, the truth as intuitively beheld, rather than as drawn out into logical statements and formal propositions.

B. So that you can disport yourself in the vague, and never be called to an account for any thing you say, however false or absurd. Intuition, on the part of the subject, is an intellectual act, but in the intelligible order it is never a clear, distinct, conscious apprehension of the object, and one knows not that he knows what he intuitively apprehends, till he makes it an object of reflection, and logic is simply the instrument or form of the reflective understanding as distinguished from the intuitive. The intuitions are never practically available as intuitions. They must be embodied in language, and presented through it to the mind, before we can distinctly know what they are, or make any use of them. And the moment you begin to use language you are in the domain of reflection, and answerable at the bar of logic.

C. That is too metaphysical for my understanding. What is the reason you cannot talk in the plain language of common sense, so that simple men even can understand you?

B. My young friends are too hard with me. They bring out doctrines which can neither be confirmed nor refuted without resort to metaphysical principles and distinctions, and the moment I attempt to subject them to these principles and distinctions, they cry out, 'That is too metaphysical, — give us common sense, and speak so that we can understand you. I am accused of making too much of logic, and overlooking the feelings and affections. You tell me these are trustworthy, and our surest guides to truth. I reply, the value of these is in the fact that they are informed by truth, and conform to it, and that they can be so only as we intellectually apprehend the truth; for truth is apprehended only by the intellect. The feelings can no more apprehend it than the eye can apprehend sounds, or the ear colors. Then you shift your ground, and tell me that they are our intuitions, not properly our feelings and affections, you mean. I acknowledge the fact of intuition, and that all our knowledge in the natural order, in the order of the intelligible as distinguished from the superintelligible, rests mediately or immediately on intuition for its evidence. But intuition of the intelligible, as distinguished from the sensible object, is, though apprehension, an unconscious apprehension, that is, in intuition we apprehend the object indeed, but do not take note of the fact that it is we who apprehend it. We do not consciously connect the apprehending subject with the apprehended object, and therefore the intuition is what Leibnitz calls simple perception, wanting the character of apperception, in which we apprehend both the object and ourselves as apprehending it. How, without adverting to this fact, am I to test the value of what you allege? And how, without understanding this, are you to be disabused of your error?

The truth, and the whole truth, of the intelligible order, is undoubtedly in our primitive intuitions, in which are all the principles or *data* of the speculative reason in the order of nature. But in the state of pure intuition this truth is not available, is never practical knowledge. It must become apperception first, and this it cannot become without reflection. Reflection is a turning back upon or rethinking the objects revealed in the intuitions. But as the intuitions in themselves, save when intuitions of sensible objects, are simple apprehensions, and not apprehensions which we are conscious of having, the reflective intellect cannot seize this object in them and make it the object of its own action. It must be presented in language, and therefore, as it must have been already embodied

world, and yet evil abounds, and therefore it is clear that her system is false. If hers is false, ours must be true.

B. But if evil abounds in spite of all the Church has done to eradicate it, how much more it must have abounded if there had been no Church !

Z. It is clear to every *enlightened* mind, that the cause of the evil suffered by society and individuals is all owing to the false system of the Church. Her system makes man of no account, places no generous confidence in human nature, and allows man to place no reliance on himself. Making him nothing, allowing him no rights before God, no strength, no virtue of his own, it is not surprising that he has done nothing, and does nothing, to meliorate his condition.

B. You probably regard the Church as an evil.

Z. Most assuredly I do, and were it not that I respect your feelings, I should speak of her in terms of the strongest reprobation.

B. That the Church exists is a fact in the world's history. It is either the work of Almighty God, or of man himself. If you say it is the work of Almighty God, you cannot maintain that it is an evil without blasphemy.

Z. I do not say it is the work of God. It is the work of men, — vile, crafty, wicked men.

B. Prior to the Church, then, there were vile, crafty, wicked men, capable of creating a great evil.

Z. Certainly.

B. It would seem, then, that there was evil before the Church, and you cannot say that she has caused all the evil in the world. How did your human nature, of which you predicate innate rectitude and perfectibility, become so corrupt as to produce the vile, crafty, wicked men who created so great an evil as you hold the Church to be ? And if men could without the Church become corrupt enough to create her, how does it follow that, if she were removed, all evil would be removed ?

M. I hold that the Church is of human origin, and now a most mischievous institution, which the good of society and of individuals requires to be abolished ; but I do not think that its originators were wicked men. They were governed by good motives, sought really to promote earthly felicity and to advance mankind, and I have no doubt that the Church in its origin was a good institution, far in advance of Paganism and Judaism, and for a long series of ages, that is, so long as it was in harmony with the intelligence of the times, it exerted a ben-

eficial influence. Its grand defect was in its inflexibility and want of expansive power. If it had only adopted the theory of development, and admitted the principle of progress into its code of doctrine and morals, it might have advanced with the advance of general intelligence, and continued to be a useful institution. The Church now does harm, because it is no longer in harmony with our times, because it has fallen behind the age, and labors to confine our intelligence to the beliefs, and our conduct to the morality, of the age in which it originated. In order to do this, it is obliged to repel all progress of intelligence, and to claim an authority over the minds of men which is tyrannical, and to which no man conscious of the rights and the dignity of his nature will submit.

B. That is your theory of the origin of the Church. I have not leisure to examine it at length; but you cannot hold it and be a very rigid moralist. The men who founded the Church professed to erect her as a Divine institution, on certain facts. These facts, if facts, clearly and unequivocally established her Divine origin. Now, with regard to these facts, these men could not, humanly speaking, be deceived. They either knew them to be facts, or they knew them not to be facts. If facts, the Church is Divine, not human; if not facts, these men lied when they asserted them to be facts, and were liars and impostors, and the Church was a lie and an imposition. Now, how can you say liars and impostors are good men, governed by good motives? And how can you say a stupendous lie and imposition can be and do good even for a time? Does the *enlightened* morality of the nineteenth century allow you to maintain such monstrous propositions?

Z. I maintain no such thing, and believing the Church to be a sink of iniquity, I believe her origin was in wickedness, not in virtue.

B. Yet you see that you cannot easily explain the origin of that wickedness consistently with your doctrine of the innate rectitude and perfectibility of human nature.

M. For that reason I assign the Church a good origin, and believe it the work of good men.

B. Yet agree that it has become wholly evil, and now produces only evil.

M. Certainly.

B. If it was good in its origin, worked good for a time, and has from first to last been only what men have made it, how, if human nature has the innate rectitude and perfectibility you

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M. Certainly.

B. If it was good in its origin, worked good for a time, and has from first to last been only what men have made it, how, if human nature has the innate rectitude and perfectibility you

assert, has it ceased to be good, and become productive only of evil ? The evil it now produces must have had a cause, and as the Church has, according to you, been all the time subject to human control, this evil can have had only a human origin, that is, it must have originated in the wickedness of the men who have managed the Church. How do you, with your views of the impeccability, perfectibility, and self-sufficiency of human nature, account for this wickedness ?

M. I would say the evil originated in ignorance rather than in wickedness.

B. Be it so. But according to you the Church was at first adapted to the wants of man and society, and for a series of ages aided progress. As human nature is perfectible, and inherently progressive according to you, Churchmen themselves, inasmuch as they as well as you share human nature, must have continued for a long series of ages to advance under the Church, and therefore at any point of time subsequent to her origin must have been more competent to mould her to the wants of that subsequent time than they were to fit her to the age in which they created her. Will you explain to me the reason of their failure to do so ?

M. They had lost sight of her real human origin ; had had so much experience of her benefits, that they had come to believe her really a Divine institution, and therefore were deterred by reverence and praiseworthy religious motives from effecting in her the changes and modifications really required.

B. And this coming to regard and to reverence as Divine what was really only a human creation, you take, I suppose, as an evidence of progress, of enlightenment, of the perfectibility of human nature !

M. My theory, I see, is not tenable.

W. The true cause, I apprehend, why the Church was not made to keep pace with the progress of intelligence was, that in the Dark Ages it had acquired great wealth and political power, and they who enjoyed these, who lived in luxury, and lorded it over the people, were selfish, grasping, ambitious, and would not suffer any change or innovation, lest they should lose them.

B. Do you approve their conduct ?

W. By no means.

B. They were wicked men, were they not ?

W. Certainly they were.

B. Yet they followed, I presume, their own natural instincts and tendencies.

W. No doubt of it.

B. Nevertheless, you hold to the innate rectitude, perfectibility, and self-sufficiency of human nature !

C. I take a very different view of the case. I believe Christianity was from God, that its first preachers were inspired and holy men, but through the ignorance and perversity of their immediate followers, who only imperfectly understood their doctrines, it began to be corrupted by an admixture of surrounding heathenism, and has been growing more and more corrupt down to our times, save the partial purification effected by the Reformers in the sixteenth century, and by their successors.

B. Yet human nature is impeccable, perfectible, sufficient of itself to attain its destiny, and there has been continuous progress in knowledge and virtue from the earliest ages down to the full blaze of the nineteenth century, when reformers are as thick as grasshoppers on an August afternoon !

P. I take a different view still. I believe that man has fallen, lies under sin, needs redemption, and can be redeemed and attain to his destiny only by Divine grace. Thus far I agree with the Church, and have no confidence in the sufficiency of human nature for itself. I believe also that redemption is through the atoning blood of the Saviour, and that the Christian Church, one and Catholic, was founded by Almighty God, as the ordinary medium of salvation. But the Bishop of Rome encroached upon the rights of his brethren, and gradually usurped power over the whole Church, and set himself up as the vicegerent of God, and allowed no liberty of instruction, nor right of private judgment. From that time all manner of errors crept into the Church, the simple doctrines of the Gospel were overlaid with a mass of heathenish notions, and the pure worship instituted by the Apostles was corrupted by the introduction of the whole heathen ritual.

B. When did all that take place ?

P. Why, I cannot fix the precise date when it took place, but it began with Constantine, and continued from that time down, till Luther and Calvin sounded the note of Reform.

B. How do you suppose the usurper happened to be the Bishop of Rome rather than any other bishop ? Do you not hold that previously all the bishops were equal ?

P. It was owing to the fact that Rome was the capital city of the empire, and the church of Rome the richest and most influential church of the time.

B. If I recollect aright, when, according to you, this process of usurpation began, Rome had ceased to be the capital city of the empire. Constantine had founded Constantinople, and made it the capital of the empire, and the customary seat of the emperors of the whole empire was never afterwards at Rome. Your first reason, therefore, fails, and may be dismissed. Your second is no better. That the church of Rome was the richest church of the time is not a fact. It had been from the beginning one of the poorest, and was for a long time in splendor and wealth far inferior to many of the Oriental churches, such as those of Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople. Constantinople from the time of Constantine was a Christian city, while Rome remained long after a pagan city, and had pagan Senators as late as the time of St. Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan. The city of Rome was almost the last stronghold of paganism in the Western Empire, and had not been wholly Christianized at the close of the fifth century. None of these external causes you assign can explain why the usurper was the Bishop of Rome, rather than the Bishop of Constantinople, of Antioch, or Alexandria.

Then this usurpation does not strike me as a very feasible thing. Grant, if you will, — what in fact I deny, — that the Roman pontiff had a disposition to encroach, to usurp power, you must bear in mind that his disposition must have been met by the resistance of all the bishops in the world, who, you must presume, were as much disposed to keep their power as he was to usurp it. Now, supposing the eighteen hundred bishops of the Roman empire to have commenced with the fact and the right of equality, ignorant of the Papacy, and acknowledging no primacy of power in the Bishop of Rome, and each as determined to keep his power as the Bishop of Rome was to usurp it, what progress in usurpation do you imagine the Roman pontiff could have made? Suppose, as on your ground you must suppose, that each of these bishops had the disposition of the Roman, the odds against his success and in favor of them would have been far too great for one to be willing to bet on his head, or for any reasonable man to accept your theory.

But suppose the matter to be as you state, what is your remedy? If God has founded a Church, and taken no better care of it than you suppose, who can rely on it? If your theory be correct, God must have founded his Church, and then abandoned it to the care of men, and concerned himself no further with it, which is sheer Epicureanism, only transformed

from the natural order to the supernatural, and involves sheer atheism as its logical consequence, as much as it does when confined to the order of nature. If God abandoned his Church to the care of men, and they through their ignorance and perversity corrupted it, so that for at least eight hundred years the true Church was no longer to be found on the earth, what surety can you give, or have you for yourselves, that, even if you could restore it, as your fruitless efforts for three hundred years show you cannot, men would not soon corrupt it again.

Your grand error, my young friends, is in the denial of Providence. Some of you are out-and-out Epicureans, and hold that God made the world, gave it a kick, set it agoing, and bade it go ahead on its own hook and take care of itself; others among you do not say quite so much of the natural world. You are willing, one division of you, to say that he had so much regard for the world that he founded a Church for its redemption and salvation, and another division of you, that he made a revelation for its benefit; but you both agree that he abandoned the Church or the revelation immediately to its fate, — threw it upon the great concourse of men, and said, Here, take it, and make the most of it. I have no further concern with it. Here you deny the providence of God in the supernatural order. Now I beg you to reflect seriously on this denial. God has created the world from nothing, and it is only by virtue of his immanence in the world through that creative act that the world exists or does not return to nothing. But he remains thus immanent, and all created power is insufficient to annihilate or displace a single monad. By the same free act of his will by which he created the world he preserves it, and suffers no change in its physical constitution to take place but according to his own good will and pleasure. So also by his grace has he created the Christian order, or the "new creation," the Church and all that pertains to it, and it subsists only by virtue of his immanence in it through his act of grace creating it, and were he to cease for a single moment to be so immanent in it, it would sink instantly back into nothing. So long as so immanent, it is and must be preserved, and all the powers of earth and hell strive in vain against it. Men may beat against it, and break their own heads in the shock, but they cannot move or injure it. There is, then, no medium between its entire indefectibility and its total ceasing to be. Your theory, whether you call it the Church or simply revelation, of its gradual, partial, or total corruption, is unten-

able, and you have no middle ground on which to stand between the Roman Catholic Church and the absolute denial of Christianity ; and if you deny Christianity, you have nothing but sheer humanism, the absolute divinity of human nature, putting man in the place of God, setting him in the temple of God to show himself and to be worshipped as if he were God.

ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *The Scarlet Letter*: A Romance. By NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 12mo. pp. 322.

MR. HAWTHORNE is a writer endowed with a large share of genius, and in the species of literature he cultivates has no rival in this country, unless it be Washington Irving. His *Twice-told Tales*, his *Mosses from an Old Manse*, and other contributions to the periodical press, have made him familiarly known, and endeared him to a large circle of readers. The work before us is the largest and most elaborate of the romances he has as yet published, and no one can read half a dozen pages of it without feeling that none but a man of true genius and a highly cultivated mind could have written it. It is a work of rare, we may say of fearful power, and to the great body of our countrymen who have no well defined religious belief, and no fixed principles of virtue, it will be deeply interesting and highly pleasing.

We have neither the space nor the inclination to attempt an analysis of Mr. Hawthorne's genius, after the manner of the fashionable criticism of the day. Mere literature for its own sake we do not prize, and we are more disposed to analyze an author's work than the author himself. Men are not for us mere psychological phenomena, to be studied, classed, and labelled. They are moral and accountable beings, and we look only to the moral and religious effect of their works. Genius perverted, or employed in perverting others, has no charms for us, and we turn away from it with sorrow and disgust. We are not among those who join in the worship of passion, or even of intellect. God gave us our faculties to be employed in his service, and in that of our fellow-creatures for his sake, and our only legitimate office as critics is to inquire, when a book is sent us for review, if its author in producing it has so employed them.

Mr. Hawthorne, according to the popular standard of morals in this age and this community, can hardly be said to pervert God's gifts, or to exert an immoral influence. Yet his work is far from being unobjectionable. The story is told with great naturalness, ease, grace, and delicacy, but it is a story that should not have been told. It is a story of crime, of an adulteress and her accomplice, a meek and gifted and highly popular Puritan minister in our early colonial days,—a purely imaginary story, though not altogether improbable. Crimes like the one imagined were not unknown even in the golden days of Puritanism, and are perhaps more common among the descendants of the Puritans than it is at all pleasant to believe; but they are not fit subjects for popular literature, and moral health is not promoted by leading the imagination to dwell on them. There is an unsound state of public morals when the novelist is permitted, without a scorching rebuke, to select such crimes, and invest them with all the fascinations of genius, and all the charms of a highly polished style. In a moral community such crimes are spoken of as rarely as possible, and when spoken of at all, it is always in terms which render them loathsome, and repel the imagination.

Nor is the conduct of the story better than the story itself. The author makes the guilty parties suffer, and suffer intensely, but he nowhere manages so as to make their sufferings excite the horror of his readers for their crime. The adulteress suffers not from remorse, but from regret, and from the disgrace to which her crime has exposed her, in her being condemned to wear emblazoned on her dress the *Scarlet Letter* which proclaims to all the deed she has committed. The minister, her accomplice, suffers also, horribly, and feels all his life after the same terrible letter branded on his heart, but not from the fact of the crime itself, but from the consciousness of not being what he seems to the world, from his having permitted the partner in his guilt to be disgraced, to be punished, without his having the manliness to avow his share in the guilt, and to bear his share of the punishment. Neither ever really repents of the criminal deed; nay, neither ever regards it as really criminal, and both seem to hold it to have been laudable, because they *loved* one another,—as if the love itself were not illicit, and highly criminal. No man has the right to love another man's wife, and no married woman has the right to love any man but her husband. Mr. Hawthorne in the present case seeks to excuse Hester Prynne, a married woman, for loving the Puritan minister, on the ground that she had no love for her husband, and it is hard that a woman should not have some one to love; but this only aggravated her guilt, because she was not only forbidden to love the minister, but commanded to love her husband, whom she had vowed to love, honor, cherish, and obey. The modern doctrine that represents the

affections as fatal, and wholly withdrawn from voluntary control, and then allows us to plead them in justification of neglect of duty and breach of the most positive precepts of both the natural and the revealed law, cannot be too severely reprobated.

Human nature is frail, and it is necessary for every one who standeth to take heed lest he fall. Compassion for the fallen is a duty which we all owe, in consideration of our own failings, and especially in consideration of the infinite mercy our God has manifested to his erring and sinful children. But however binding may be this duty, we are never to forget that sin is sin, and that it is pardonable only through the great mercy of God, on condition of the sincere repentance of the sinner. But in the present case neither of the guilty parties repents of the sin, neither exclaims with the royal prophet, who had himself fallen into the sin of adultery and murder, *Misere mei Deus, secundum magnam misericordiam ; et secundum multitudinem miserationum tuarum, dele iniquitatem meam. Amplius lava me ab iniquitate mea ; et a peccato munda me. Quoniam iniquitatem meam cognosco, et peccatum meum contra me est semper.* They hug their illicit love ; they cherish their sin ; and after the lapse of seven years are ready, and actually agree, to depart into a foreign country, where they may indulge it without disguise and without restraint. Even to the last, even when the minister, driven by his agony, goes so far as to throw off the mask of hypocrisy, and openly confess his crime, he shows no sign of repentance, or that he regarded his deed as criminal.

The Christian who reads *The Scarlet Letter* cannot fail to perceive that the author is wholly ignorant of Christian asceticism, and that the highest principle of action he recognizes is pride. In both the criminals, the long and intense agony they are represented as suffering springs not from remorse, from the consciousness of having offended God, but mainly from the feeling, especially on the part of the minister, that they have failed to maintain the integrity of their character. They have lowered themselves in their own estimation, and cannot longer hold up their heads in society as honest people. It is not their conscience that is wounded, but their pride. *He* cannot bear to think that he wears a disguise, that he cannot be the open, frank, stainless character he had from his youth aspired to be, and *she*, that she is driven from society, lives a solitary outcast, and has nothing to console her but her fidelity to her paramour. There is nothing Christian, nothing really moral, here. The very pride itself is a sin ; and pride often a greater sin than that which it restrains us from committing. There are thousands of men and women too proud to commit carnal sins, and to the indomitable pride of our Puritan ancestors we may attribute no small share of their external morality and decorum. It may almost be said, that, if they had less of that external morality and decorum, their case would be

less desperate ; and often the violation of them, or failure to maintain them, by which their pride receives a shock, and their self-complacency is shaken, becomes the occasion, under the grace of God, of their conversion to truth and holiness. As long as they maintain their self-complacency, are satisfied with themselves, and feel that they have outraged none of the decencies of life, no argument can reach them, no admonition can startle them, no exhortation can move them. Proud of their supposed virtue, free from all self-reproach, they are as placid as a summer morning, pass through life without a cloud to mar their serenity, and die as gently and as sweetly as the infant falling asleep in its mother's arms. We have met with these people, and after laboring in vain to waken them to a sense of their actual condition, till completely discouraged, we have been tempted to say, Would that you might commit some overt act, that should startle you from your sleep, and make you feel how far pride is from being either a virtue, or the safeguard of virtue, — or convince you of your own insufficiency for yourselves, and your absolute need of Divine grace. Mr. Hawthorne seems never to have learned that pride is not only sin, but the root of all sin, and that humility is not only a virtue, but the root of all virtue. No genuine contrition or repentance ever springs from pride, and the sorrow for sin because it mortifies our pride, or lessens us in our own eyes, is nothing but the effect of pride. All true remorse, all genuine repentance, springs from humility, and is sorrow for having offended God, not sorrow for having offended ourselves.

Mr. Hawthorne also mistakes entirely the effect of Christian pardon upon the interior state of the sinner. He seems entirely ignorant of the religion that can restore peace to the sinner, — true, inward peace, we mean. He would persuade us, that Hester had found pardon, and yet he shows us that she had found no inward peace. Something like this is common among popular Protestant writers, who, in speaking of great sinners among Catholics that have made themselves monks or hermits to expiate their sins by devoting themselves to prayer, and mortification, and the duties of religion, represent them as always devoured by remorse, and suffering in their interior agony almost the pains of the damned. An instance of this is the Hermit of Engeddi in Sir Walter Scott's *Talisman*. These men know nothing either of true remorse, or of the effect of Divine pardon. They draw from their imagination, enlightened, or rather darkened, by their own experience. Their speculations are based on the supposition that the sinner's remorse is the effect of wounded pride, and that during life the wound can never be healed. All this is false. The remorse does not spring from wounded pride, and the greatest sinner who really repents, who really does penance, never fails to find interior peace. The mortifications he practises are not prompted by his interior agony,

nor designed to bring peace to his soul ; they are a discipline to guard against his relapse, and an expiation that his interior peace already found, and his overflowing love to God for his superabounding mercy, lead him to offer to God, in union with that made by his blessed Lord and Master on the cross.

Again, Mr. Hawthorne mistakes the character of confession. He does well to recognize and insist on its necessity ; but he is wrong in supposing that its office is simply to disburden the mind by communicating its secrets to another, to restore the sinner to his self-complacency, and to relieve him from the charge of cowardice and hypocrisy. Confession is a duty we owe to God, and a means, not of restoring us to our self-complacency, but of restoring us to the favor of God, and reëstablishing us in his friendship. The work before us is full of mistakes of this sort, in those portions where the author really means to speak like a Christian, and therefore we are obliged to condemn it, where we acquit him of all unchristian intention.

As a picture of the old Puritans, taken from the position of a moderate transcendentalist and liberal of the modern school, the work has its merits ; but as little as we sympathize with those stern old Popery-haters, we do not regard the picture as at all just. We should commend where the author condemns, and condemn where he commends. Their treatment of the adulteress was far more Christian than his ridicule of it. But enough of fault-finding, and as we have no praise, except what we have given, to offer, we here close this brief notice.

2. — *Nature, Progress, Ideas. A Discourse on Naturalism, in its various Phases, as opposed to the true Scriptural Doctrine of the Divine Imperium.* Delivered at Union College, July 24, 1849, before the New York Alpha of the Phi Beta Kappa Society. By TAYLOR LEWIS, LL. D., Professor of Greek in Union College. Schenectady: Van Deogert. 1850. 8vo. pp. 56.

DR. LEWIS belongs, we believe, to the Presbyterian sect, and is one of the ablest and most learned members of which that sect can boast in this country. We have seen several occasional discourses from him which indicate a high order of talent, thought rather profound than otherwise, and respectable scholarship. He appears to be a man of honest intentions, who really wishes to serve his country, by correcting many of the false notions of his countrymen, but unhappily is compelled by his Protestantism to stop short in following out the principles he adopts to their legitimate consequences.

The Discourse before us is the ablest and least objectionable of any thing we have seen from the Protestant side on the several topics it undertakes to discuss, and it leaves upon our mind the impression, that, had the author not been cramped by his Protestantism, it would have been all that we could wish. The author sees clearly the dangerous tendencies of the popular theories and speculations of the age, that they strike at the foundation of Christianity, — of even natural religion, philosophy, political government, and society itself. He sees also their shallowness, their want of real thought, and the deplorable ignorance and egotism of the men who follow or defend them. To a great extent he perceives and states the great and comprehensive truths opposed to them. His strictures on the modern notions of "the philosophy of history" are profound and just; his vindication of Providence against the rationalistic and pantheistic doctrines of the hour, which resolve Providence into necessity, and all history into the struggle and development of eternal ideas, excluding from all share in it both God and men, is creditable to his good sense, and to his desire to retain some vestiges, at least, of Christian truth; and his refutation of the modern doctrines of progress and socialism leaves little to be desired, considered in itself; but having to provide for his Protestantism, and to be able to maintain that it is from God, and Catholicity from the Devil, he is obliged in turn to assert principles of which the errors he wars against are only the necessary logical, as well as historical, results. This fact vitiates his whole discourse, and renders the many profound and important truths he sets forth in opposition to them of no scientific value.

All the errors he wars against have been refuted over and over again in the pages of this journal, and Professor Lewis successfully refutes them only on the ground and by the same arguments that we do. But we need not tell our readers, nor the advocates of those errors, that none but a Catholic has or can have any right to assume that ground, or to make use of those arguments. The Protestant can no doubt take that ground, and use those arguments, but in doing so he virtually condemns his Protestantism. No man who holds that the Protestant movement was a Divine movement can consistently object to the philosophy of history as held by Michelet and Morell, or with right profess to hold the views of history of "the pious, Scriptural, and unphilosophical," and the author should have added, Catholic, "Rollin." He who holds the right of private judgment, and justifies the Reformers in their rebellion against the authority of the Church of which they were members, cannot, except by a gross logical inconsequence, maintain the Divine origin of power, the sacredness of law, and the inviolability of government. Nor can he who rejects the authority of the Church, in order to assert the right of the individual to deter-

mine or define the law of God for himself, consistently make war on modern humanism and naturalism. Here is the difficulty every Protestant necessarily encounters whenever he undertakes to war against errors of the kind attacked by Professor Lewis. He can oppose to those errors only Catholic doctrines and arguments, and those same doctrines and arguments are equally opposed to his Protestantism, and the advocates of those errors know it as well as we do, and tell him that they in advocating them are the true Protestants, and that he in opposing them is false to his own principles. The great body of Protestants will believe him, no doubt, rather than them, for these errors are opposed to common sense, and what he opposes to them is in accordance with common sense. Every man so long as he speaks as a Catholic speaks in accordance with common sense, and when he avoids setting forth the special dogmas of his Church, the ordinary Protestant accepts at once all he says, without stopping to inquire whether in doing so he is or is not condemning in principle his Protestantism. Nevertheless, the errorists the learned and philosophical Professor attacks, and attacks with rare energy and ability, are, absurd as they unquestionably are, truer Protestants than he is, and far more consequent in their reasoning. He stands in relation to them and us, as Anglicans do in relation to us and Dissenters. Anglicans use the arguments of Dissenters against Catholics, and the arguments of Catholics against Dissenters; he uses the arguments of the humanists, as we call them, against Catholics, and the arguments of Catholics against the humanists. We have no space in this brief notice to justify these assertions by citations from the author's Discourse, but it is nevertheless true, that while he refutes in a masterly manner, by the aid of Catholic doctrine and arguments, the reigning errors of the day, he reaffirms them all in principle in the same Discourse, by his assumption of Protestantism as from God, as we may on another occasion attempt to show.

3. *A Sunday in London.* By J. M. CAPES, M. A. London: Longman, Brown, Greene, & Longmans. 1850. 16mo. pp. 291.

As a literary production this work deserves high commendation. It is written in a style of rare freedom and eloquence. The author has a brilliant fancy, a rich imagination, and a lively sensibility, and in this work proves that he could, if he would, rival the greatest of our popular authors of fiction. His work, under a purely literary point of view, is happily conceived and felicitously executed. We read it with interest, perhaps with too intense interest. It lays open the vices and horrors of London, that great capital of the commercial and industrial world, with the hand of a master, and every

scene presented appears to be actually passing under our eyes. There is through the whole an air of life and reality, and the characters introduced are all real, living men and women, with nothing shadowy or statue-like about them.

But having said thus much, we must, after our manner, find a few faults. Our readers know our general estimate of the author, from our article in review of his *Four Years' Experience*. He is, as they know, one of the Oxford converts. He was formerly an Anglican minister, and he is now a Catholic, devoting his fortune and all his powers to the cause of Catholicity. He is a man we must respect, and with whom we largely sympathize. But we fear that he is not wholly free from crotchets, or incapable of mounting hobbies. We are not sure that he judged wisely in selecting a German rationalist for his chief personage, and in making him comment on the various objectionable features in London society from the point of view of indifferentism. His German rationalist, for the most part, speaks in character, but in consequence he is made to utter sentiments which are by no means edifying to the Catholic. We do not pretend to have much knowledge of English society, but we must be permitted to doubt whether our Catholic friends do not commit a mistake in assuming, as so many of them do, that it is in no danger of becoming rationalistic. We were more amused than edified, some time since, by an article in *The Dublin Review*, praising Thomas Carlyle, and sneering at the suggestion that there was any danger of Englishmen becoming pantheists. We think this sneer ill judged, for to us there are clear indications of a rationalistic and pantheistic tendency even in England, and it will not answer to regard Puseyism as the true type of English Protestantism. The philosophy talked by Coleridge and poetized by Wordsworth is not unpopular in England, and that philosophy is at bottom transcendentalism, and transcendentalism is only another name for pantheism. Carlyle is an inveterate pantheist, and he is exerting a silent, but powerful, influence on English literature. *The Westminster Review* is rationalistic, and the *Edinburgh Review* is in reality infidel, while the *North British Review* has a decided neological leaning, and a socialistic tendency. There is no doubt that the mass of Englishmen, owing to the peculiar character of the Establishment, are indisposed to push their principles to their ultimate conclusions, and have been trained to say, as it suits their purpose, two and two make three, or two and two make five; but after all, the English mind is not wholly divested of logic, and it is becoming every year far more determined to be consequent, as the Puseyite movement on the one hand, and the Chartist movement on the other, clearly indicate. Our friends will find, or we are very much mistaken, that the body of the English people who do not become Catholics will slide into rationalism. We think the English Cath-

olic writers, regarding, as they generally do, the Establishment as their chief enemy in England, are not sufficiently alive to the danger of rationalism, which, in the several forms of eclecticism, transcendentalism, pantheism, and socialism, is the grand heresy of our age. We cannot but think that Mr. Capes would have done better, if he had shown less favor to his rationalist, and had chosen, instead of him, a Catholic to comment on the vices and crimes of London society from the point of view of Catholicity.

Then, again, we think Mr. Capes is riding a hobby when he proposes, as the grand specific for the cure of all the evils of London society, Sunday amusements. He brings his rationalist friend into contact with an excellent Catholic priest, who knows London well, and has devoted much time and thought to the means of curing its vices. He tells us that this priest has come to the conclusion, that these vices originate in the want of Sunday amusements, and can be removed only by furnishing them. A rare Catholic priest that, and worth crossing the Atlantic to see! The reasoning by which he supports this novel doctrine is admirable. The peasantry on the Continent are far more moral than the lower classes in London, but the peasantry on the Continent have Sunday amusements, and the lower classes of London have not, and therefore, if the lower classes had them, they would be as moral as the Continental peasantry. The conclusion does not seem to us to be necessary. A peasantry really religious and light-hearted is no doubt preserved from some vices by innocent amusements moderately enjoyed on holidays, after having attended to their religious duties; but that a dark, heavy, half-savage populace, destitute of religion and capable only of gross sensual pleasure, would be recovered from vice by having Sunday amusements provided for them, is more than we can believe. They would carry their vices with them into these amusements, and perhaps find in them only an occasion of still more degrading vice. Amusement or recreation for the people is certainly desirable, and, combined with other and far more efficient means of moral reform, it may no doubt do something; but taken alone, so far as our observation extends, it would have very little power to reform the vicious, or to prevent the occurrence of such vices as Mr. Capes describes as abounding in London. There is and can be no grand specific for the reformation of individuals or society outside of the Church. You cannot have a moral community without Christianity, and you can have no Christianity out of the Church. The men who cannot be reformed by the doctrines, sacraments, discipline, and worship of the Church, we may give up at once as irreformable. You need not hope to effect by moral-reform societies, temperance societies, Sunday amusements, state education, or any other of the methods the *philanthropy* of the age suggests, what she has been unable to accomplish.

We utter a truth here which we wish we could in some way beat into the head of this age. Not only Protestants, but even many Catholics, are unwilling to trust all to the Church, and to act only for her and under her direction. They, even when believing her God's Church, seem to distrust her efficiency, and are anxious to get up extra ecclesiastical associations, and movements auxiliary to her, to infuse energy into her, and to add something to the efficiency of Almighty God. Padre Ventura thought it would be a grand thing to form an alliance of the Church with the popular or liberal party of the age, and did what he could to persuade the world that such was the view of *Pio Nono*; but he got for his pains only the universal convulsion of Europe, the sacrilegious Roman republic, and the exile of the Sovereign Pontiff. Similar results attend all efforts to operate through or in unison with extra ecclesiastical movements. Even your temperance societies seldom do more than expel one vice by introducing another, and not always a lesser vice. Save so far as you can make a man a good Christian, you cannot eradicate a single vice from his heart, except by planting another in its place. The drunkard leaves off drinking, but takes to chewing opium, or becomes sober only to become avaricious, simply exchanging inebriety for avarice. You do not get rid of the hydra of evil by lopping off one of its many heads, nor does the lopping off of one head prepare the way for lopping off another. You must drug the monster himself, and destroy his inward vitality, which nothing but the grace of God through the sacraments of the Church can do. Almighty God founded his Church for the express purpose of destroying evil, of delivering men from vice, sin, and iniquity, and it is no unreasonable stretch of modesty to doubt our ability to add any thing to its perfection, or to its efficiency. He knew at least as well as we what was needed and what would answer the purpose; he was as well disposed as we to cure the vices of society; and it would seem to be no more than reasonable for us to be contented with his work, and to rely on it as the only efficient means of reform, and of good, whether social or individual. We make these remarks for others than Mr. Capes, and as for him, we are willing he should have Sunday amusements for his Londoners, but he must pardon us for doubting their efficacy.

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4. — *Willy Burke; or the Irish Orphan in America.* By Mrs. J. SADLER. Boston: Donahoe. 1850. 32mo. pp. 298.

THIS work has been written in consequence of a suggestion we made in our journal for last January, in noticing *The Orphan of*
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Moscow. Mr. Donahoe was pleased with the suggestion, and offered a prize for the best tale written in accordance with it, and did us the honor to appoint us as the judge to decide on the merit of the competitors, and award the prize. Several tales were sent in, some of them of great merit, but we awarded the prize to *Willy Burke*, by Mrs. Sadlier of Montreal, as being the most in accordance with the plan we had suggested. It is not often we praise a work written by a lady, for we are not in general partial to feminine literature; but in this case we are obliged to surmount our prejudice, and to pronounce *Willy Burke* an admirable story. It is written with great naturalness and simplicity, with real tenderness, and true pathos. The work is the genuine expression of a genuine Catholic Irish heart, and no one can read it without being forced to love and honor the poor Irish emigrant, and to wish to possess, reverence, and obey the Catholic religion, the source of all his virtues and his sure support and sweet consolation in poverty, in exile, in affliction, and under the injustice he receives from those who are ignorant of his religion and love not his nation. We commend this little book to all our young friends, and bid them take *Willy Burke* for their model, and we recommend all Protestants who are engaged in stealing our children from us in order to train them up heretics, and to do what they can to check the growth of the Catholic population in this country, to procure it, read it, and to ponder it well. They may learn from it that there is something better than is dreamed of in their philosophy. We welcome the appearance of this little book as an indication that the day for the sort of Catholic novels we formerly condemned has gone by, and that a new literature, equally popular, but far more Catholic and healthy, is beginning to make its appearance among us. *Willy Burke*, and *Loretto*, by the author of *Mohammed*, noticed in our last Review, are attempts in the right direction, and we trust are but the first fruits of a rich harvest that is to follow. We see announced as in the press, *John O'Brien, or the Orphan of Boston*. Having been permitted to peruse the manuscript, we can promise our Catholic friends that they will find it a work replete with interest, important hints, and valuable instruction, from one who is destined to rank among the most popular and powerful Catholic writers in the country.

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5. — *History of the Christian Church, from its first Establishment to the present Century.* By the Rev. JOSEPH REEVE. First American Edition. Boston: Donahoe. 1850. 8vo. pp. 626.

WE have not read this History, but it is well known as enjoying the reputation of being the best popular compend of ecclesiastical

history in the English language. Mr. Donahoe has published it in a neat style, and furnishes it at the very low price of one dollar a copy. We are pleased to learn that it is meeting with a rapid and extensive sale. Every Catholic family should possess a copy of it, and it would do Protestants no harm to read it, unless they wish to remain in ignorance of Church history.

6. — *A Miniature Manual of the Sacred Heart*. Boston: Joseph A. Copes. 1850. 32mo. pp. 261.

THIS work is published with the approbation of the Right Reverend Bishop of this diocese, which is a sufficient guaranty of its piety and orthodoxy. It is a truly pious work, and will be found an admirable help in one of the sweetest and most profitable devotions in our Church. But we are sorry that we cannot commend it also under a literary point of view. The style lacks simplicity, clearness, and precision. The sentences are long, lumbering, and confused. Whether this is the fault of the author or of his translator we are unable to say, but we certainly expected from the translator or compiler of this work a greater mastery of English composition, and more ease, simplicity, grace, and delicacy of style and diction. We hope, before he suffers it to pass to a second edition, that he will give it a thorough revision. We know he is a man of fine taste and a cultivated mind, and we know no reason why we should be called upon to say our prayers in barbarous or unintelligible English.

7. — *In Memoriam*. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 12mo. pp. 216.

THIS poem, said to be by Tennyson, is presented us by its publishers in all the luxury of paper and type. We find our contemporaries in England and in this country speak highly of it, and rank its author at the head of living English poets. We suppose we must be destitute of the bump of poetry, for we certainly are unable to admire Tennyson, or to discover any other merit in him than harmonious verse and a little namby-pamby sentiment. We broke down before reading twenty pages of the volume before us. It is doubtless all our own fault, and owing to our inability to detect or appreciate true poetic gems. In brief words, Tennyson is not a poet to our taste. That he has a poetic temperament, we can believe; that he scatters here and there a real poetic gem in his works, we are not disposed to deny; but to us he is feeble, diffuse,

and tiresome. He strikes us as a man of feeble intellect, as wanting altogether in the depth and force of thought indispensable, not to the poetic temperament, but to the genuine poet. He seems to us a poet for puny transcendentalists, beardless boys, and miss in her teens.

8. — *Songs of Labor, and other Poems.* By JOHN G. WHITTIER. Boston : Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 12mo. pp. 127.

MR. WHITTIER has some of the elements of a true poet, but his poems, though often marked by strength and tenderness, are our abomination. He is a Quaker, an infidel, an Abolitionist, a philanthropist, a peace man, a Red Republican, a non-resistant, a revolutionist, all characters we hold in horror and detestation, and his poems are the echo of himself. God gave him noble gifts, every one of which he has used to undermine faith, to eradicate loyalty, to break down authority, and to establish the reign of anarchy, and all under the gentle mask of promoting love and good-will, diffusing the Christian spirit, and defending the sacred cause of liberty. He approaches us in the gentle and winning form of an angel of light, and yet, whether he means it or not, it is only to rob us of all that renders life worth possessing. If he believes himself doing the will of God, he is the most perfect dupe of the Evil One the Devil has ever been able to make. He is silly enough, after having denounced Pius the Ninth in the most savage manner, and canonized the assassins and ruffians who founded the Roman republic, to think that he can pass with Catholics as not being their enemy, because, forsooth, he favored the Irish rebellion ! Whoever denounces our Church or its illustrious chief is our enemy, and we would much sooner hold the man who should seek to deprive us of life to be our friend, than the one who should undertake to deprive us of our religion. With this estimate of Mr. Whittier, how can we praise his poems, or commend them to the public ?

9. — *Elfreide of Guldal, a Scandinavian Legend; and other Poems.* By MARKS OF BARHAMVILLE. New York : Appleton & Co. 1850. 12mo. pp. 186.

Who Marks of Barhamville is we do not know. We have nothing to say of his poems.

10. — *Poems*. By J. G. SAXE. Boston : Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 12mo. pp. 130.

MR. SAXE has skill and facility in versification, plenty of wit, and in satirical poetry possesses more than ordinary merit. He is no transcendentalist, and no philanthropist, two things which speak volumes in his praise. He laughs at our modern notions of progress and world-reform, and we give him our good word.

11. — *Lacon; or Many Things in Few Words: addressed to those who think*. By the Rev. C. C. COLTON, A. M. New York : Gowans. 1849. 16mo. pp. 504.

THIS is a new and revised edition of a book never worth the printing, although, like many other dull or mischievous books, it has found its admirers.

12. — *Researches respecting Americus Vespucius, and his Voyages*. By the VISCOUNT SANTAREM. Translated by E. V. Childe. Boston : Little & Brown. 16mo. pp. 221.

THIS is a work that shows a great deal of research, on a question of some interest to a few. It proves, we think, beyond doubt or cavil, that Americus had no right to give his name to this continent, as we had supposed every body already believed ; but how the matter can be rectified now is more than we can see. This continent bears and will bear his name.

13. — *Oration pronounced before the Philomathean Society of Mount St. Mary's College, Emmitsburg, at the Annual Commencement, June 26, 1850*. By GEORGE H. MILES, Esq. Baltimore : Sherwood & Co. 1850. 8vo. pp. 30.

MR. MILES has genius, talent, and learning enough to place himself at the head of the literary men of this country, and with steady application and persevering labor he will one day do it. We might find a few faults, of a minor order, with this Oration, but upon the whole we are well pleased with it. That the author has taken a philosophical view of reverence, the subject of his Oration, in all respects, may be a question, and in some instances loyalty, rather than reverence, is, we think, the virtue he means. He seems to us also to speak of reverence rather as a sentiment than as a virtue, and to proceed as if the errors he condemns had a sentimental

rather than an intellectual origin. This, we apprehend, is only half true. That men have imbibed the spirit of disorder is certain, but they have also lost the intellectual apprehension of law, and they are to be recovered through the reason still more than through the sensibility. Nevertheless, the Oration is timely, marked by just principles, and full of important suggestions. We thank the author from the bottom of our heart for his denunciation of the paganism of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and, indeed, of the Medicean age, the most sad to a Catholic of any age since the birth of Christ, as might be inferred from the fact that it received the eulogiums of such a heathen as the philanthropist Roscoe. If any class of men ever deserved the curse of all good Christians they were the humanists of that age, among whom the snarling Erasmus and the lustful Henry, to whom Luther and Calvin were pigmies in evil, hold a distinguished rank. Since their time literature has become as really pagan as it was in ancient Greece and Rome, although infinitely inferior in depth of thought, and beauty and finish of form. We are thankful to find even one young American scholar who dares to be a Christian, and send polished gentilism to the Devil, from whom it came.

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14. — *The Red Hand of Ulster : or the Fortunes of Hugh O'Neil.*
By Mrs. J. SADLER. Boston : Donahoe. 1850. 32mo.
pp. 328.

THIS is a well-written story, founded on a most interesting passage in Irish history, but far inferior to *Willy Burke*, by the same gifted lady. It has too much of the air of ordinary romance to suit our taste, and, had the authoress written, not a romance on *the O'Neil*, but a simple history of his unsuccessful attempt to recover the independence of his country, she would have given us a work more interesting as well as more instructive. We wish there were a good history of Ireland, at once readable and reliable. There is not a more remarkable people in Europe, nor one that has been more misunderstood, or that has so great a facility in making itself misunderstood. It never gets the credit it deserves, and somehow contrives to tell its own story so that the world will not believe it. No people in the world more readily place themselves as individuals at the point of sight of those with whom they associate, and the best conceivable companion is a cultivated Irishman ; but the moment an Irishman, if a patriot, begins to write the history of his country, he writes in *Irish*, which few but Irishmen can understand, and which the Irish themselves understand and speak differently in every different locality. We are perplexed the moment we open Irish history, and thus far have found ourselves utterly unable to master it.

One thing, however, is perfectly clear to us, that Ireland for seven hundred years has suffered wrongs at the hands of England that would have extinguished any other people, or a people less tenacious of national existence, or possessing a less remarkable recuperative energy. England, at this moment, we believe, is really desirous of doing something to repair the wrongs she has for so many ages been inflicting upon her ; but, unhappily, she will adopt no measure for the benefit of Ireland that is not openly or secretly hostile to the religion of Ireland. Here arises all the difficulty of removing the political and social grievances of that beautiful island. If England could make up her mind to legislate for Ireland without looking to the extirpation or oppression of the Catholic religion, it would be the easiest thing in the world to remove all the grievances of which the Irish people complain, and to secure to them a degree of prosperity every way equal or superior to her own. There is nothing but England's heresy that is in the way of England's justice to Ireland, and the experience of three hundred years, we should suppose, might have taught her that the only way to effect any good for Ireland is to regard her as a Catholic country, that must be governed as such or not at all. The government colleges would have been a blessing to Ireland, if they had been established, as they should have been, under the supervision and control of the Catholic hierarchy. As they are, they are only a curse, a source of discontent, of complaint, and of dislike to the government on the part of those who would naturally be its warm friends. All good Catholics see in them only an engine designed for the destruction of Catholicity by diffusing indifferentism. Every measure England adopts for Ireland has a sinister design of this sort, and it is this fact that renders the government of Ireland to her a matter of so great difficulty and perplexity. All Catholics are not like the Catholics of England in the days of Queen Elizabeth, preferring allegiance to an illegitimate sovereign to obedience to the legitimate Pontiff and Vicar of Jesus Christ. There are Catholics who prefer the soul to the body, and religion to life, who would rather die of starvation in streets and lanes than turn heretics and damn their souls to all eternity, and it is the glory of Ireland that she has abounded in Catholics of this sort. England ought to know this, and to give up her ungodly and fruitless attempt to extirpate Catholicity from "the Island of Saints."

Nevertheless, England's loss is our gain, and her oppression of the faith in Ireland builds it up in this country, and wherever the English tongue is spoken. Perhaps a Catholic people may yet grow up from the children of Irish emigrants that will call England herself to an account for her cruelty and wrongs to their ancestors. The large infusion of Celtic blood into the American population will greatly modify, in a few years, the American character ; for

the Celtic element has a tenacity of life unknown to the Saxon or Norman, and in the long run is sure to triumph over these and become the predominating element, as we have seen in the case of the Norman and Saxon invaders and settlers in Ireland. America may yet avenge Ireland's wrongs on England; but we hope it will be only the Christian's revenge, that of freeing England from heresy, and restoring her to the Church as an integral part of Christendom.

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15. — *History of the French Revolution of 1848.* By A. DE LAMARTINE. Translated by F. A. Durivage and W. S. Chase. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1850. 12mo. 2 vols. pp. 245, 270.

M. LAMARTINE seems to have written this work to show that he is a great man, and ought not to be suffered to sink into the insignificance to which he is inevitably doomed. He is a man of very considerable ability, and undeniable eloquence, with some passable instincts, all of which are worse than ruined by his intolerable vanity. A great share of the revolution rests on him, and he must bear its odium, and the peculiar odium of daring to inaugurate a revolution and of not daring to follow it to its legitimate results. Of all the actors in that tragi-comedy called the Revolution of February, 1848, there is not one for whom personally we have less respect than for Lamartine, but we see clearly the hand of Providence in using him for a time to check the disastrous consequences of his own rashness and folly. As to the republic he proclaimed, it is as good as dead, and its history may well be written. What will succeed it, it is now difficult to foresee; but we shall not be surprised any day to learn, either that the empire is reëstablished, or that the Bourbons are restored in the person of Henry the Fifth.



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HENRY H. CLARET,

124 WASHINGTON STREET, BOSTON.

BOSTON, JANUARY, 1847.

Baltimore, 10th Mar. 18

DEAR SIR, —

After the close of our Council, I suggested to our venerable metropolitan prelate of encouraging you by our opinion and influence to continue literary labors in defense of the faith, of which you have proved an able and ardent advocate. He received the suggestion most readily, and I take liberty of communicating the fact to you, as a mark of my sincere esteem of the deep interest I feel in your excellent Review. I shall beg of him, & other prelates who entertain the same views, to subscribe their names in token of my assurance. Your very devoted friend,

† FRANCIS PATRICK KENNEDY,

Bishop of Philadelphia.

O. A. BROWNSON, Esq.

† SIMON, Archbishop of Baltimore.

† PIERRE BONAISE, Archbishop of St. Louis.

† MICHAEL, Bishop of Mobile.

† AUGUSTINE, Bishop of New Orleans.

† RICHARD PYLE, Bishop of New York.

† JOHN HARTLEY, Bishop of Charleston.

† JOHN HENRY, Bishop of New Jersey.

† RICHARD VIGOR, Bishop of New York.

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